Writing Otherwise than Seeing : Writing and Exteriority in Maurice Blanchot

Maurice Blanchot (1907-2003), the French writer and novelist, is one of the most important figures in post-war French literature and philosophy. The main intention of this study is to figure out his position and originality in the field of phenomenology. Since this thesis concentrates on the notion of vision in Blanchot s work, its primary context is the post-war discussion of the relation between seeing and thinking in France, and particularly the discussion of the conditions of non-violent vision and language. The focus will be on the philosophical conversation between Blanchot and his contemporary philosophers. The central premise is the following: Blanchot relates the criticism of vision to the criticism of the representative model of language. In this thesis, Blanchot s definition of literary language as the refusal to reveal anything is read as a reference pointing in two directions. First, to Hegel s idea of naming as negativity which reveals Being incrementally to man, and second, to Heidegger s idea of poetry as the simultaneity of revealing and withdrawal; the aim is to prove that eventually Blanchot opposes both Hegel s idea of naming as a gradual revelation of the totality of being and Heidegger s conception of poetry as a way of revealing the truth of Being. My other central hypothesis is that for Blanchot, the criticism of the privilege of vision is always related to the problematic of the exteriority. The principal intention is to trace how Blanchot s idea of language as infinity and exteriority challenges both the Hegelian idea of naming as conceptualizing things and Heidegger s concept of language as a way to truth (as aletheia). The intention is to show how Blanchot, with his concepts of fascination, resemblance and image, both affirms and challenges the central points of Heidegger s thinking on language. Blanchot s originality in, and contribution to, the discussion about the violence of vision and language is found in his answer to the question of how to approach the other by avoiding the worst violence . I claim that by criticizing the idea of language as naming both in Hegel and Heidegger, Blanchot generates an account of language which, since it neither negates nor creates Being, is beyond the metaphysical opposition between Being and non-Being.

Plasmatic Transformation

The session examines the role of the metaphysical and physical in art and animation and how this relates to natural spaces. Soviet Russian film director and theorist Sergei Eisenstein saw animation as possessing an ability called “plasmaticity”, the capacity for a being to assume any conceivable form dynamically. He saw each being as “primordial protoplasm, not yet possessing a ‘stable’ form, but capable of assuming any form” (Eisenstein 1989, 21). He was enamoured by the capacity of animation to transform and be liberated, of being able to escape from a fixed and static identity—to embody a "rejection of the once-­‐and-­‐forever allotted form" in which we are held (Eisenstein 1989, 21). Czech Surrealist animator Jan Švankmajer uses a metaphysical approach based on a belief in animism to art and animation. He believes that objects possess a conscious life or spirit, he says ‘Objects conceal within themselves the events they’ve witnessed. I don’t actually animate objects. I coerce their inner life out of them.’ (Švankmajer in Imre 2009, 214) In this animistic world there are no boundaries or rules, no physical or conceptual restrictions; anything is possible, with inanimate objects and places able to become animate and transact in a conscious relationship with humans and each other. This session invites artists, animators and theorists to discuss their conceptions and approaches to using visuals to promote and provoke transformation.

Hautamuistomerkki elämän ja kuoleman tulkitsijana : Heikki Häiväojan, Kain Tapperin ja Matti Peltokankaan tekemät hautamuistomerkit 1952-2002

Grave sculpture as interpreter of life and death. Grave sculptures done by Heikki Häiväoja, Kain Tapper and Matti Peltokangas 1952-2002. The thoughts of Philippe Ariès and Erwin Panofsky on western funeral art constitute the starting point of this study. These scholars speak about the 20th century as a period of decline regarding western funeral art. The reason for this situation lies, according to them, in the fact that death has been rejected and become a private affair in modern society. Especially Panofsky sees an important reason for the decay of funeral art also in the separation of death from religion. In this study, I approach the view of Ariès and Panofsky from the angle of Finnish funeral art. The subject of the study is grave sculptures of three Finnish sculptors: Heikki Häiväoja, Kain Tapper and Matti Peltokangas, from 1952 to 2002. (The analysis of the grave sculptures has been performed with the Iconology of Erwin Panofsky. The analysis has been deepened by the ideas of a graveyard as a semiotic text according to Werner Enninger and Christa Schwens. In order to confirm their argumentation, they analyse the graveyard text with the model of communicative functions of Roman Jakobson and verify that the graveyard is a cultural text according to Juri Lotman.) Results of the study In the grave sculptures of the sculptors, different worldviews appear alongside Christian thoughts indicating a new stage in the tradition of funeral art. In the grave sculptures characterised as Christian, the view of life after death is included. In these memorials the direction of life is prospective, pointing to the life beyond. Death is a border, beyond which one is unable to see. Nevertheless the border is open or marked by the cross. On this open border, death is absence of pain, glory and new unity. In memorials with different worldviews, the life beyond is a possibility which is not excluded. Memorials interpret life retrospectively; life is a precious memory which wakens grief and longing. Many memorials have metaphysical and mystic features. In spite of democratization the order and valuation of social classes appear in some memorials. The old order also materializes in the war memorials relating the same destiny of the deceased. Different burial places, nevertheless, do not indicate social inequality but are rather signs of diversity. The sculptors' abstract means of modern funeral art deepen the handling of the subject matter of death and reveal the mystery of it. Grave sculptures are a part of Finnish and sacral modern art, and there is an interaction between funeral art and modern art. Modern art acquires a new dimension, when grave sculptures become a part of its field. Grave sculptures offer an alternative to anonymous burying. The memorial is a sign of the end of life; it gives death significance and publicity and creates a relation to the past of the society. In this way, grave sculptures are a part of the chain of memory of the western funeral art, which extends throughout Antiquity until ancient Egypt. (In this study I have spoken of funeral art as a chain of memory using the thoughts of Danièle Hervieu-Léger.) There are no signs of decay in the grave sculptures, on the contrary the tradition of funeral art continues in them as a search for the meaning of life and death and as an intuitive interpretation of death. As such, grave sculptures are part of the Finnish discussion of death.

Ethics in a Technological World : Framing the Questions and Three Approaches

This study addresses the following question: How to think about ethics in a technological world? The question is treated first thematically by framing central issues in the relationship between ethics and technology. This relationship has three distinct facets: i) technological advance poses new challenges for ethics, ii) traditional ethics may become poorly applicable in a technologically transformed world, and iii) the progress in science and technology has altered the concept of rationality in ways that undermine ethical thinking itself. The thematic treatment is followed by the description and analysis of three approaches to the questions framed. First, Hans Jonas s thinking on the ontology of life and the imperative of responsibility is studied. In Jonas s analysis modern culture is found to be nihilistic because it is unable to understand organic life, to find meaning in reality, and to justify morals. At the root of nihilism Jonas finds dualism, the traditional Western way of seeing consciousness as radically separate from the material world. Jonas attempts to create a metaphysical grounding for an ethic that would take the technologically increased human powers into account and make the responsibility for future generations meaningful and justified. The second approach is Albert Borgmann s philosophy of technology that mainly assesses the ways in which technological development has affected everyday life. Borgmann admits that modern technology has liberated humans from toil, disease, danger, and sickness. Furthermore, liberal democracy, possibilities for self-realization, and many of the freedoms we now enjoy would not be possible on a large scale without technology. Borgmann, however, argues that modern technology in itself does not provide a whole and meaningful life. In fact, technological conditions are often detrimental to the good life. Integrity in life, according to him, is to be sought among things and practices that evade technoscientific objectification and commodification. Larry Hickman s Deweyan philosophy of technology is the third approach under scrutiny. Central in Hickman s thinking is a broad definition of technology that is nearly equal to Deweyan inquiry. Inquiry refers to the reflective and experiential way humans adapt to their environment by modifying their habits and beliefs. In Hickman s work, technology consists of all kinds of activities that through experimentation and/or reflection aim at improving human techniques and habits. Thus, in addition to research and development, many arts and political reforms are technological for Hickman. He argues for recasting such distinctions as fact/value, poiesis/praxis/theoria, and individual/society. Finally, Hickman does not admit a categorical difference between ethics and technology: moral values and norms need to be submitted to experiential inquiry as well as all the other notions. This study mainly argues for an interdisciplinary approach to the ethics of technology. This approach should make use of the potentialities of the research traditions in applied ethics, the philosophy of technology, and the social studies on science and technology and attempt to overcome their limitations. This study also advocates an endorsement of mid-level ethics that concentrate on the practices, institutions, and policies of temporal human life. Mid-level describes the realm between the instantaneous and individualistic micro-level and the universal and global macro level.

Conrad Summenhart's theory of individual rights and its medieval background

This study focuses on the theory of individual rights that the German theologian Conrad Summenhart (1455-1502) explicated in his massive work Opus septipartitum de contractibus pro foro conscientiae et theologico. The central question to be studied is: How does Summenhart understand the concept of an individual right and its immediate implications? The basic premiss of this study is that in Opus septipartitum Summenhart composed a comprehensive theory of individual rights as a contribution to the on-going medieval discourse on rights. With this rationale, the first part of the study concentrates on earlier discussions on rights as the background for Summenhart s theory. Special attention is paid to language in which right was defined in terms of power . In the fourteenth century writers like Hervaeus Natalis and William Ockham maintained that right signifies power by which the right-holder can to use material things licitly. It will also be shown how the attempts to describe what is meant by the term right became more specified and cultivated. Gerson followed the implications that the term power had in natural philosophy and attributed rights to animals and other creatures. To secure right as a normative concept, Gerson utilized the ancient ius suum cuique-principle of justice and introduced a definition in which right was seen as derived from justice. The latter part of this study makes effort to reconstructing Summenhart s theory of individual rights in three sections. The first section clarifies Summenhart s discussion of the right of the individual or the concept of an individual right. Summenhart specified Gerson s description of right as power, taking further use of the language of natural philosophy. In this respect, Summenhart s theory managed to bring an end to a particular continuity of thought that was centered upon a view in which right was understood to signify power to licit action. Perhaps the most significant feature of Summenhart s discussion was the way he explicated the implication of liberty that was present in Gerson s language of rights. Summenhart assimilated libertas with the self-mastery or dominion that in the economic context of discussion took the form of (a moderate) self-ownership. Summenhart discussion also introduced two apparent extensions to Gerson s terminology. First, Summenhart classified right as relation, and second, he equated right with dominion. It is distinctive of Summenhart s view that he took action as the primary determinant of right: Everyone has as much rights or dominion in regard to a thing, as much actions it is licit for him to exercise in regard to the thing. The second section elaborates Summenhart s discussion of the species dominion, which delivered an answer to the question of what kind of rights exist, and clarified thereby the implications of the concept of an individual right. The central feature in Summenhart s discussion was his conscious effort to systematize Gerson s language by combining classifications of dominion into a coherent whole. In this respect, his treatement of the natural dominion is emblematic. Summenhart constructed the concept of natural dominion by making use of the concepts of foundation (founded on a natural gift) and law (according to the natural law). In defining natural dominion as dominion founded on a natural gift, Summenhart attributed natural dominion to animals and even to heavenly bodies. In discussing man s natural dominion, Summenhart pointed out that the natural dominion is not sufficiently identified by its foundation, but requires further specification, which Summenhart finds in the idea that natural dominion is appropriate to the subject according to the natural law. This characterization lead him to treat God s dominion as natural dominion. Partly, this was due to Summenhart s specific understanding of the natural law, which made reasonableness as the primary criterion for the natural dominion at the expense of any metaphysical considerations. The third section clarifies Summenhart s discussion of the property rights defined by the positive human law. By delivering an account on juridical property rights Summenhart connected his philosophical and theological theory on rights to the juridical language of his times, and demonstrated that his own language of rights was compatible with current juridical terminology. Summenhart prepared his discussion of property rights with an account of the justification for private property, which gave private property a direct and strong natural law-based justification. Summenhart s discussion of the four property rights usus, usufructus, proprietas, and possession aimed at delivering a detailed report of the usage of these concepts in juridical discourse. His discussion was characterized by extensive use of the juridical source texts, which was more direct and verbal the more his discussion became entangled with the details of juridical doctrine. At the same time he promoted his own language on rights, especially by applying the idea of right as relation. He also showed recognizable effort towards systematizing juridical language related to property rights.

Popper or Kuhn: Truth and the progress of science

The questions of whether science pursues truth as correspondence to reality and whether science in fact progresses towards attaining a truthful understanding of physical reality are fundamental and contested in the philosophy of science. On one side of the debate stands Popper, who argues that science is objective, necessarily assumes a correspondence theory of truth, and inevitably progresses toward truth as physical theories develop, gaining a more truthful understanding of reality through progressively more sophisticated empirical analysis. Conversely Kuhn, influenced by postmodern philosophy, argues that ultimate truth cannot be attained since no objective metaphysical reality exists and it cannot be known, and consequently the notion of scientific objectivity and "progress" is a myth, marred by philosophical and ideological value judgments. Ultimately, Kuhn reduces so-called scientific progress through the adoption of successive paradigms to leaps of "faith". This paper seeks a reconciliation of the two extremes, arguing that Popper is correct in the sense that science assumes a correspondence theory of truth and may progress toward truth as physical theories develop, while simultaneously acknowledging with Kuhn that science is not purely objective and free of value judgments. The notion of faith is also critical, for it was the acknowledgement of God's existence as the creator and instituter of observable natural laws which allowed the development of science and the scientific method in the first place. Therefore, accepting and synthesising the contentions that science is to some extent founded on faith, assumes and progresses toward truth, and is subject to value judgments is necessary for the progress of science.

Evil Gods and Reckless Saviours : Adaptation and Appropriation in Late Twentieth Century Jesus-Novels

Late twentieth century Jesus-novels search after a completely new picture of Jesus. Novels written for instance by Norman Mailer, José Saramago, Michèle Roberts, Marianne Fredriksson, and Ki Longfellow provide an inversive revision of the canonic Gospels. They read the New Testament in terms of the present age. In their adaptation the story turns often into a critique of the whole Christian history. The investigated contrast-novels end up with an appropriation that is based on prototypical rewriting. They aim at the rehabilitation of Judas, and some of them make Mary Magdalane the key figure of Christianity. Saramago describes God as a blood thirsty tyrant, and Mailer makes God combat with the Devil in a manichean sense as with an equal. Such ideas are familiar both from poststructuralist philosophy and post-metaphysical death-of-God theology. The main result of the intertextual analysis is that these scholars have adopted Nietzschean ideas in their writing. Quite unlike earlier Jesus-novels, these more recent novels present a revision that produces discontinuity with the original source text, the New Testament. The intertextual strategy is based on contradiction. The reader wittnesses contesting and challenging, the authors attack Biblical beliefs and attempt to dissolve Christian doctrines. An attack on Biblical slave morality and violent concept of God deprives Jesus of his Jewish Messianic identity, makes Old Testament law a contradiction of life, calls sacrificial soteriology a violent pattern supporting oppression, and presents God as a cruel monster who enslaves people under his commandments and wishes their death. The new Jesus-figure contests Mosaic Law, despises orthodox Judaism, abandons Jewish customs and even questions Old Testament monotheism. In result, the novels intentionally transfer Jesus out of Judaism. Furthermore, Jewish faith appears in a negative light. Such an intertextual move is not open anti-Semitism but it cannot avoid attacking Jewish worship. Why? One reason that explains these attitudes is that Western culture still carries anti-Judaic attitudes beneath the surface covered with sentiments of equality and tolerance. Despite the evident post-holocaust consciousness present in the novels, they actually adopt an arrogant and ironical refutation of Jewish beliefs and Old Testament faith. In these novels, Jesus is made a complete opposite and antithesis to Judaism. Key words: Jesus-novel, intertextuality, adaptation, slave morality, Nietzsche, theodicy, patriarchy.

Philosophy as a Path to Happiness : Attainment of Happiness in Arabic Peripatetic and Ismaili Philosophy

The aim of the dissertation is to explore the idea of philosophy as a path to happiness in classical Arabic philosophy. The starting point is in comparison of two distinct currents between the 10th and early 11th centuries, Peripatetic philosophy, represented by al-Fārābī and Ibn Sīnā, and Ismaili philosophy represented by al-Kirmānī and the Brethren of Purity. They initially offer two contrasting views about philosophy in that the attitude of the Peripatetics is rationalistic and secular in spirit, whereas for the Ismailis philosophy represents the esoteric truth behind revelation. Still, they converge in their view that the ultimate purpose of philosophy lies in its ability to lead man towards happiness. Moreover, they share a common concept of happiness as a contemplative ideal of human perfection, which refers primarily to an otherworldly state of the soul s ascent to the spiritual world. For both the way to happiness consists of two parts: theory and practice. The practical part manifests itself in the idea of the purification of the rational soul from its bodily attachments in order for it to direct its attention fully to the contemplative life. Hence, there appears an ideal of philosophical life with the goal of relative detachment from the worldly life. The regulations of the religious law in this context appear as the primary means for the soul s purification, but for all but al-Kirmānī they are complemented by auxiliary philosophical practices. The ascent to happiness, however, takes place primarily through the acquisition of theoretical knowledge. The saving knowledge consists primarily of the conception of the hierarchy of physical and metaphysical reality, but all of philosophy forms a curriculum through which the soul gradually ascends towards a spiritual state of being along an order that is inverse to the Neoplatonic emanationist hierarchy of creation. For Ismaili philosophy the ascent takes place from the exoteric religious sciences towards the esoteric philosophical knowledge. For Peripatetic philosophers logic performs the function of an instrument enabling the ascent, mathematics is treated either as propaedeutic to philosophy or as a mediator between physical and metaphysical knowledge, whereas physics and metaphysics provide the core of knowledge necessary for the attainment of happiness.

A New Definition of A Priori Knowledge: In Search of a Modal Basis

In this paper I will offer a novel understanding of a priori knowledge. My claim is that the sharp distinction that is usually made between a priori and a posteriori knowledge is groundless. It will be argued that a plausible understanding of a priori and a posteriori knowledge has to acknowledge that they are in a constant bootstrapping relationship. It is also crucial that we distinguish between a priori propositions that hold in the actual world and merely possible, non-actual a priori propositions, as we will see when considering cases like Euclidean geometry. Furthermore, contrary to what Kripke seems to suggest, a priori knowledge is intimately connected with metaphysical modality, indeed, grounded in it. The task of a priori reasoning, according to this account, is to delimit the space of metaphysically possible worlds in order for us to be able to determine what is actual.

Constructions and situations : a constructivist reading of Hegel's System

The object of this work is Hegel's Logic, which comprises the first third of his philosophical System that also includes the Philosophy of Nature and the Philosophy of Spirit. The work is divided into two parts, where the first part investigates Hegel s Logic in itself or without an explicit reference to rest of Hegel's System. It is argued in the first part that Hegel's Logic contains a methodology for constructing examples of basic ontological categories. The starting point on which this construction is based is a structure Hegel calls Nothing, which I argue to be identical with an empty situation, that is, a situation with no objects in it. Examples of further categories are constructed, firstly, by making previous structures objects of new situations. This rule makes it possible for Hegel to introduce examples of ontological structures that contain objects as constituents. Secondly, Hegel takes also the very constructions he uses as constituents of further structures: thus, he is able to exemplify ontological categories involving causal relations. The final result of Hegel's Logic should then be a model of Hegel s Logic itself, or at least of its basic methods. The second part of the work focuses on the relation of Hegel's Logic to the other parts of Hegel's System. My interpretation tries to avoid, firstly, the extreme of taking Hegel's System as a grand metaphysical attempt to deduce what exists through abstract thinking, and secondly, the extreme of seeing Hegel's System as mere diluted Kantianism or a second-order investigation of theories concerning objects instead of actual objects. I suggest a third manner of reading Hegel's System, based on extending the constructivism of Hegel's Logic to the whole of his philosophical System. According to this interpretation, transitions between parts of Hegel's System should not be understood as proofs of any sort, but as constructions of one structure or its model from another structure. Hence, these transitions involve at least, and especially within the Philosophy of Nature, modelling of one type of object or phenomenon through characteristics of an object or phenomenon of another type, and in the best case, and especially within the Philosophy of Spirit, transformations of an object or phenomenon of one type into an object or phenomenon of another type. Thus, the transitions and descriptions within Hegel's System concern actual objects and not mere theories, but they still involve no fallacious deductions.

Arvoja näkyvissä : Kaunokirjallisuuden etiikka Ludwig Wittgensteinin filosofian valossa

The goal of this dissertation was to study whether it is possible and meaningful to apply Ludwig Wittgenstein s distinction between saying (Sagen) and showing (Zeigen) to ethically oriented literary criticism. The following questions were used as the primary guidelines: 1. Is it possible, in the context of literary criticism, to put in practice Wittgenstein s ethical conceptions, which are quite theoretical and metaphysical by nature? 2. If so, what practical literary devices do authors use if they want to demonstrate their ethical values within the frame of a fictional work? 3. Does philosophy offer useful ethical consepts that open us new and interesting readings in fiction? The philosophical background of Wittgenstein s distinction is clarified in chapter I. This clarification is based on his main works, Tractatus logico-philosophicus and Philosophishe Untersuchungen, the published correspondence between Wittgenstein and Paul Engelmann, and selected Wittgenstein research and papers. Analyzing ethics and it s expression in Georg Trakl s poetry further elucidates Wittgenstein s concept of showing. The concept that a literary work is an act of an author was used as a starting point. The presumption was that analyzing this act of an author will reveal how ethical values can be demonstrated in literature. Categorizing an author s act at different levels of literary expression provides the structure of this study. In chapters IV - XIII literary devices useful for demonstrating ethics are examined and explained using examples from the works of Joseph Conrad, Charles Dickens, Nikolay Leskov, Ludwig Uhland, Eino Leino, Pentti Haanpää and Maria Jotuni. The concepts and views of researchers and writers such as Mihail Bahtin, Peter Juhl, E. D. Hirsch, Peter Lamarque and Stein Haugom Olsen are used. The concepts outlined in previous chapters are then applied in three case studies: Aeschylus s Oresteia trilogy, J-L. Runeberg s poem Sven Dufva and Sofi Oksanen s novel Puhdistus (Purge). On the whole, Wittgenstein s idea that ethical values can be demonstrated (shown) by means of literature is revealed as a fruitful point of departure for a more exact ethical reading, offering a new perspective on literary works.

La cuestión de los fundamentos en la ética de Lonergan

Resumen: En este artículo se explica cómo a partir del método trascendental de Lonergan surge una comprensión de la ética cómo ética existencial, la cual nos invita a dejar a un lado las categorías metafísicas-abstractas y reflexionar éticamente usando categorías que surjan de los actos de nuestra conciencia. La conciencia moral se presenta distintiva en cuanto a la decisión, inclusiva en cuanto que integra los niveles del entender y del juzgar y elevada en cuanto que está abierta a la posibilidad de una integración superior, puesto que la noción trascendental de valor puede ser enriquecida intrínsecamente con la experiencia religiosa de estar enamorado de un modo irrestricto.La explicitación de los fundamentos a partir del método trascendental permite tener en cuenta la realidad del hombre como ser histórico en devenir e integra la experiencia moral y religiosa a la comprensión del actuar ético. De este modo la reflexión ética surge a partir de la historia vividaen la cual se manifiesta el hacerse a sí mismo de los sujetos y la auto-constitución de lavida moral de una comunidad o de un pueblo.

Alcance y límites de la potencia humana

Resumen: La visión sobre el modo de ser del hombre condiciona, de un modo u otro, su actuar en el mundo. En general, es éste un punto de partida compartido por las distintas corrientes filosóficas al momento de dar respuesta al ejercicio del potencial humano, si bien pueden distanciarse drásticamente al sustentar el pasaje ser-obrar. En este sentido, entre las formas más alejadas entre sí cabe reparar, por una parte, en una concepción que recurre a la justificación de una metafísica realista que reconoce la dialéctica de la participación y, por otra, en una concepción que se declara anti-metafísica al disolver el ser en su negación, en la nada, para exaltar la voluntad de poder del hombre. Si bien este trabajo se desarrollará en el marco de la primera concepción, desde el estudio de la causación del acto de ser en Tomás de Aquino, habré de recurrir a la segunda concepción, en particular al nihilismo nietzscheano, solamente como planteo del estado de la cuestión, buscando remover críticamente una objeción recurrente en la historia del pensamiento sobre el alcance y límites de la operación humana.

Alcance y límites de la interpretación analógica

Resumen: El objetivo principal de esta investigación es definir cuál es el alcance y cuáles son los límites del uso de la analogía en el Derecho. Para el efecto, se comienza estudiando el concepto, las clases y la justificación de la analogía (capítulos I a III), primero desde un punto de vista netamente teórico y metafísico, y luego con un enfoque práctico jurídico. El capítulo IV revisa qué funciones tiene y para qué no sirve la analogía en el Derecho. A continuación se delimita cuándo es posible acudir al recurso analógico, señalando cuáles son los requisitos necesarios para que la analogía opere (capítulo V) y a qué objetos jurídicos puede aplicarse la analogía (capítulo VI). El capítulo VII estudia la diversa fortaleza intrínseca de los diferentes tipos de analogía que pueden darse en el Derecho. Tomando en cuenta todos estos antecedentes, el capítulo VIII termina definiendo ya concretamente cuáles son los casos en que la analogía en el Derecho (tanto la “analogía legis”, como la “analogía iuris”) es eficaz jurídicamente, y qué motivos podrían hacer que su aplicación resulte impedida o limitada.

La sabiduría desde el “Quaerens intellectum” en Anselmo de Canterbury

Resumen: La prueba de la existencia de Dios, sacada de su sola idea, fue, y es aún, una de esas experiencias metafísicas de las que se puede decir que nacen eternas, porque alcanzan el último término de uno de los caminos por donde el espíritu humano puede encauzarse. La presencia de Dios en el alma vivifica la fórmula que da san Anselmo y el análisis que hace de ella no tiene otro fin que llevar a la clara luz de la inteligencia una presencia realmente, pero oscuramente, sentida. Situados, dice, entre la fe y la visión, considera que “la inteligencia que alcanzamos en esta vida es intermedia”; los modos de aproximación difieren, pero sus términos no.