Finite-Sample Simulation-Based Inference in VAR Models with Applications to Order Selection and Causality Testing

Statistical tests in vector autoregressive (VAR) models are typically based on large-sample approximations, involving the use of asymptotic distributions or bootstrap techniques. After documenting that such methods can be very misleading even with fairly large samples, especially when the number of lags or the number of equations is not small, we propose a general simulation-based technique that allows one to control completely the level of tests in parametric VAR models. In particular, we show that maximized Monte Carlo tests [Dufour (2002)] can provide provably exact tests for such models, whether they are stationary or integrated. Applications to order selection and causality testing are considered as special cases. The technique developed is applied to quarterly and monthly VAR models of the U.S. economy, comprising income, money, interest rates and prices, over the period 1965-1996.

A Semi-Parametric Factor Model for Interest Rates.

Understanding the dynamics of interest rates and the term structure has important implications for issues as diverse as real economic activity, monetary policy, pricing of interest rate derivative securities and public debt financing. Our paper follows a longstanding tradition of using factor models of interest rates but proposes a semi-parametric procedure to model interest rates.

The Rationality of Revolution.

Did the recent transition to liberal democracy in Eastern Europe consitute revolutions? Here, game theory is used to structure an explanation of institutional change proposed by Harold Innis (1950).

Probabilistic Assignments of Identical Indivisible Objects and Uniform Probabilistic Rules.

We consider a probabilistic approach to the problem of assigning k indivisible identical objects to a set of agents with single-peaked preferences. Using the ordinal extension of preferences, we characterize the class of uniform probabilistic rules by Pareto efficiency, strategy-proofness, and no-envy. We also show that in this characterization no-envy cannot be replaced by anonymity. When agents are strictly risk averse von-Neumann-Morgenstern utility maximizers, then we reduce the problem of assigning k identical objects to a problem of allocating the amount k of an infinitely divisible commodity.

A Systematic Framework for Analyzing the Dynamic Effects of Permanent and Transitory Shocks.

This paper proposes a systematic framework for analyzing the dynamic effects of permanent and transitory shocks on a system of \"n\" economic variables.

Statistical Inference for Computable General Equilibrium Models with Application to a Model of the Moroccan Economy

We study the problem of measuring the uncertainty of CGE (or RBC)-type model simulations associated with parameter uncertainty. We describe two approaches for building confidence sets on model endogenous variables. The first one uses a standard Wald-type statistic. The second approach assumes that a confidence set (sampling or Bayesian) is available for the free parameters, from which confidence sets are derived by a projection technique. The latter has two advantages: first, confidence set validity is not affected by model nonlinearities; second, we can easily build simultaneous confidence intervals for an unlimited number of variables. We study conditions under which these confidence sets take the form of intervals and show they can be implemented using standard methods for solving CGE models. We present an application to a CGE model of the Moroccan economy to study the effects of policy-induced increases of transfers from Moroccan expatriates.

Confidence Regions for Calibrated Parameters in Computable General Equilibrium Models

We consider the problem of accessing the uncertainty of calibrated parameters in computable general equilibrium (CGE) models through the construction of confidence sets (or intervals) for these parameters. We study two different setups under which this can be done.

Simulation-Based Finite-Sample Normality Tests in Linear Regressions

In the literature on tests of normality, much concern has been expressed over the problems associated with residual-based procedures. Indeed, the specialized tables of critical points which are needed to perform the tests have been derived for the location-scale model; hence reliance on available significance points in the context of regression models may cause size distortions. We propose a general solution to the problem of controlling the size normality tests for the disturbances of standard linear regression, which is based on using the technique of Monte Carlo tests.

Paretian Quasi-Orders: Two Agents.

We characterize Paretian quasi-orders in the two-agent continuous case.

Responsibility and Cross-Subsidization in Cost Sharing

We propose two axiomatic theories of cost sharing with the common premise that agents demand comparable -though perhaps different- commodities and are responsible for their own demand. Under partial responsibility the agents are not responsible for the asymmetries of the cost function: two agents consuming the same amount of output always pay the same price; this holds true under full responsibility only if the cost function is symmetric in all individual demands. If the cost function is additively separable, each agent pays her stand alone cost under full responsibility; this holds true under partial responsibility only if, in addition, the cost function is symmetric. By generalizing Moulin and Shenker’s (1999) Distributivity axiom to cost-sharing methods for heterogeneous goods, we identify in each of our two theories a different serial method. The subsidy-free serial method (Moulin, 1995) is essentially the only distributive method meeting Ranking and Dummy. The cross-subsidizing serial method (Sprumont, 1998) is the only distributive method satisfying Separability and Strong Ranking. Finally, we propose an alternative characterization of the latter method based on a strengthening of Distributivity.

In Search of Advice for Physicians in Entry-Level Medical Markets

We consider entry-level medical markets for physicians in the United Kingdom. These markets experienced failures which led to the adoption of centralized market mechanisms in the 1960's. However, different regions introduced different centralized mechanisms. We advise physicians who do not have detailed information about the rank-order lists submitted by the other participants. We demonstrate that in each of these markets in a low information environment it is not beneficial to reverse the true ranking of any two acceptable hospital positions. We further show that (i) in the Edinburgh 1967 market, ranking unacceptable matches as acceptable is not profitable for any participant and (ii) in any other British entry-level medical market, it is possible that only strategies which rank unacceptable positions as acceptable are optimal for a physician.

Aumann-Shapley Pricing : A Reconsideration of the Discrete Case

We reconsider the following cost-sharing problem: agent i = 1,...,n demands a quantity xi of good i; the corresponding total cost C(x1,...,xn) must be shared among the n agents. The Aumann-Shapley prices (p1,...,pn) are given by the Shapley value of the game where each unit of each good is regarded as a distinct player. The Aumann-Shapley cost-sharing method assigns the cost share pixi to agent i. When goods come in indivisible units, we show that this method is characterized by the two standard axioms of Additivity and Dummy, and the property of No Merging or Splitting: agents never find it profitable to split or merge their demands.

The Ghost in the Machine: Inferring Machine-Based Strategies from Observed Behavior

We introduce a procedure to infer the repeated-game strategies that generate actions in experimental choice data. We apply the technique to set of experiments where human subjects play a repeated Prisoner's Dilemma. The technique suggests that two types of strategies underly the data.

Nearly Serial Sharing Methods

A group of agents participate in a cooperative enterprise producing a single good. Each participant contributes a particular type of input; output is nondecreasing in these contributions. How should it be shared? We analyze the implications of the axiom of Group Monotonicity: if a group of agents simultaneously decrease their input contributions, not all of them should receive a higher share of output. We show that in combination with other more familiar axioms, this condition pins down a very small class of methods, which we dub nearly serial.

Von Neumann-Morgenstern Stable Sets in Matching Problems

The following properties of the core of a one well-known: (i) the core is non-empty; (ii) the core is a lattice; and (iii) the set of unmatched agents is identical for any two matchings belonging to the core. The literature on two-sided matching focuses almost exclusively on the core and studies extensively its properties. Our main result is the following characterization of (von Neumann-Morgenstern) stable sets in one-to-one matching problem only if it is a maximal set satisfying the following properties : (a) the core is a subset of the set; (b) the set is a lattice; (c) the set of unmatched agents is identical for any two matchings belonging to the set. Furthermore, a set is a stable set if it is the unique maximal set satisfying properties (a), (b) and (c). We also show that our main result does not extend from one-to-one matching problems to many-to-one matching problems.