Von Neumann-Morgenstern Stable Sets in Matching Problems


Autoria(s): Ehlers, Lars
Data(s)

22/09/2006

22/09/2006

2005

Resumo

The following properties of the core of a one well-known: (i) the core is non-empty; (ii) the core is a lattice; and (iii) the set of unmatched agents is identical for any two matchings belonging to the core. The literature on two-sided matching focuses almost exclusively on the core and studies extensively its properties. Our main result is the following characterization of (von Neumann-Morgenstern) stable sets in one-to-one matching problem only if it is a maximal set satisfying the following properties : (a) the core is a subset of the set; (b) the set is a lattice; (c) the set of unmatched agents is identical for any two matchings belonging to the set. Furthermore, a set is a stable set if it is the unique maximal set satisfying properties (a), (b) and (c). We also show that our main result does not extend from one-to-one matching problems to many-to-one matching problems.

Formato

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Identificador

EHLERS, Lars, «Von Neumann-Morgenstern Stable Sets in Matching Problems», Cahier de recherche #2005-11, Département de sciences économiques, Université de Montréal, 2005, 27 pages.

http://hdl.handle.net/1866/540

Relação

Cahier de recherche #2005-11

Palavras-Chave #Matching Problem #Von Neumann-Morgenstern Stable Sets #[JEL:C78] Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory #[JEL:J41] Labor and Demographic Economics - Particular Labor Markets - Contracts: Specific Human Capital, Matching Models, Efficiency Wage Models, and Internal Labor Markets #[JEL:J44] Labor and Demographic Economics - Particular Labor Markets - Professional Labor Markets and Occupations #[JEL:C78] Mathématiques et méthodes quantitatives - Théorie des jeux et négociation - Théorie de la négociation et du "matching" #[JEL:J41] Démographie et économie du travail - Marchés particuliers de travail - Contrats: capital humain spécifique, modèles de matching, modèles du salaire d'efficacité et marchés internes du travail #[JEL:J44] Démographie et économie du travail - Marchés particuliers de travail - Marché du travail pour les professionnels
Tipo

Article