Nearly Serial Sharing Methods


Autoria(s): Sprumont, Yves
Data(s)

22/09/2006

22/09/2006

2004

Resumo

A group of agents participate in a cooperative enterprise producing a single good. Each participant contributes a particular type of input; output is nondecreasing in these contributions. How should it be shared? We analyze the implications of the axiom of Group Monotonicity: if a group of agents simultaneously decrease their input contributions, not all of them should receive a higher share of output. We show that in combination with other more familiar axioms, this condition pins down a very small class of methods, which we dub nearly serial.

Formato

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Identificador

SPRUMONT, Yves, «Nearly Serial Sharing Methods», Cahier de recherche #2004-14, Département de sciences économiques, Université de Montréal, 2004

http://hdl.handle.net/1866/529

Relação

Cahier de recherche #2004-14

Palavras-Chave #surplus sharing #cost sharing #group monotonicity #serial method #[JEL:C71] Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - Cooperative Games #[JEL:D63] Microeconomics - Welfare Economics - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement #[JEL:C71] Mathématiques et méthodes quantitatives - Théorie des jeux et négociation - Jeux coopératifs #[JEL:D63] Microéconomie - Économie du bien-être - Egalité, justice, inégalité et autres critères normatifs et mesures
Tipo

Article