Transfer Pricing in the Decentralized Multinational Corporation

This paper considers how the multinational corporation's transfer price responds to changes in international corporate effective tax rates. It extends the decentralized decision-making analysis of transfer pricing in the context of different tax rates. It adopts and extends Bond's (1980) model of the decentralized multinational corporation that assumes centralized transfer pricing. The direction of transfer price change is as expected, while the magnitude of change is likely to be less than predicted by the Horst (1971), centralized decision-making model. The paper extends the model further by assuming negotiated transfer pricing, where the analysis is partitioned into perfect and imperfect information cases. The negotiated transfer pricing result reverts to the Horst (1971), or centralized decision-making, result, under perfect information. Under imperfect information, the centralized decision-making result obtains when top management successfully informs division general managers or it successfully implements a non-monetary reward scheme to encourage division general managers to cooperate. Under simplifying assumptions, centralized decision-making dominates decentralized decision-making, while negotiated transfer pricing weakly dominates centralized transfer pricing.

International Transfer Pricing for Goods and Intangible Asset Licenses in a Decentralized Multinational Corporation: Review and Extensions

We review and extend the core literature on international transfer price manipulation to avoid or evade taxes. Under negotiated transfer pricing with a viable bargaining structure, including performance evaluation disconnected from the transfer price, divisions voluntarily exchange accurate information to obtain firm-wide optimality, a result not dependent on restraint from exercising internal market power. For intangible licenses, a larger optimal profit shift for a given tax rate change strengthens incentives for transfer pricing abuse. In practice, an intangible's arm's length range is viewed as a guideline, a context where incentives for abuse materialize. Transfer pricing for intangibles obliges greater tax authority scrutiny.

The traditional rationale of the arm's length approach to transfer pricing - should the separate accounting model be maintained for modern multinational entities?

This article examines the current transfer pricing regime to consider whether it is a sound model to be applied to modern multinational entities. The arm's length price methodology is examined to enable a discussion of the arguments in favour of such a regime. The article then refutes these arguments concluding that, contrary to the very reason multinational entities exist, applying arm's length rules involves a legal fiction of imagining transactions between unrelated parties. Multinational entities exist to operate in a way that independent entities would not, which the arm's length rules fail to take into account. As such, there is clearly an air of artificiality in applying the arm's length standard. To demonstrate this artificiality with respect to modern multinational entities, multinational banks are used as an example. The article concluded that the separate entity paradigm adopted by the traditional transfer pricing regime is incongruous with the economic theory of modern multinational enterprises.

The taxing effects of the advance pricing arrangement program: A review of APAs and their impact on stakeholders

The current transfer pricing rules contained in Australia’s taxation regime are designed to counter the underpayment of tax by businesses engaged in international related-party dealings. Currently, these transactions must take place at an arm’s length price, a requirement which is becoming increasingly difficult to demonstrate. This results in an increased risk of an audit by the Australian Taxation Office. If a taxpayer wishes to avoid the risk of an audit, and any ensuing penalties, there is one option: an advance pricing arrangement (‘APA’). An APA is an agreement whereby the future transfer pricing methodology to be used to determine the arm’s length price is agreed to by the taxpayer and the relevant tax authority or authorities. This article investigates the use of APAs as a solution to the problem of transfer pricing and considers their impact on stakeholders. It is argued that while APAs provide a valuable practical tool for multinational entities facing the challenges of the taxation of global trading under the current regime, they may not be a practical long term solution.

Advance pricing arrangements : an Australian Tax Office success or a legislative failure?

Australia’s domestic income tax legislation and double tax agreements contain transfer pricing rules which are designed to counter the underpayment of tax by businesses engaged in international dealings between related parties. The current legislation and agreements require that related party transactions take place at a value which reflects an arm’s length price, that is, a price which would be charged between unrelated parties. For a host of reasons, it is increasingly difficult for multinational entities to demonstrate that they are transferring goods and services at a price which is reflective of the behaviour of independent parties, thereby making it difficult to demonstrate compliance with the relevant legislation. Further, where an Australian business undertakes cross-border related party transactions there is the risk of an audit by the Australian Tax Office (ATO). If a business wishes to avoid the risk of an audit, and any ensuing penalties, there is one option: an advance pricing arrangement (APA). An APA is an agreement whereby the future transfer pricing methodology to be used to determine the arm’s length price is agreed to by the taxpayer and the relevant tax authority or authorities. The ATO views the APA process as an important part of its international tax strategy and believes that there are complementary benefits provided to both the taxpayer and the ATO. The ATO promotes the APA process on the basis of creating greater certainty for all parties while reducing compliance costs and the risk of audit and penalty. While the ATO regards the APA system as a success, it may be argued that the implementation of such a system is simply a practical solution to an ongoing problem of an inherent failure in both the legislation and ATO interpretation and application of this legislation to provide certainty to the taxpayer. This paper investigates the use of APAs as a solution to the problem of transfer pricing and considers whether they are the success the ATO claims. It is argued that there is no doubt that APAs provide a valuable practical tool for multinational entities facing the challenges of the taxation of global trading under the current transfer pricing regime. It does not, however, provide a long term solution. Rather, the long term solution may be in the form of legislative amendment.

Arm’s length pricing and multinational banks : an old fashioned approach in a modern world

In “Arm’s Length Pricing and Multinational Banks: An Old Fashioned Approach in a Modern World”, Kerrie Sadiq, describes the high level of integration of multinational financial institutions and argues that treating each element within a given operation as a separate entity for transfer pricing purposes is not economically or legally realistic. She proposes instead formulary apportionment as a device for managing this complexity.

Multiple roles of transfer prices: One vs. two books

This paper investigates multiple roles of transfer prices for shipments of goods and services between entities of a multinational enterprise. At the center is the role of transfer pricing (TP) in tax manipulation, but other roles having to do with internal operations or strategic delegation, etc. are also considered. The interesting question is to what extent and how the different roles of TPs interfere with each other. The answer depends on whether companies use one or two books, i.e. whether they (can) apply different TPs for different purposes. We illustrate, in a stylized model, the competing aims of tax manipulation and strategic delegation. Finally, we briefly look at selected reform proposals, concluding that either TP problems are not addressed, or else new distortions will be introduced instead.

The Value of Negotiating Cost-Based Transfer Prices

This paper analyzes the potential of one-step transfer prices based on either variable or full costs for coordinating decentralized production and quality-improving investment decisions. Transfer prices based on variable costs fail to induce investments on the upstream stage. In contrast, transfer prices based on full costs provide strong investment incentives for the upstream divisions. However, they fail to coordinate the investment decisions. We show that negotiations prevent such coordination failure. In particular, we find that the firm benefits from a higher degree of decentralization so that total profit increases in the number of parameters being subject to negotiations.