Imperfect Competition and Costly Screening in the Credit Market under Conditions of Asymmetric Information

This article provides an analysis of how banks determine levels of information production when they are in imperfect competition and there is a condition of information asymmetry between borrowers and banks. Specifically, the study concentrates on information production activities of banks in duopoly where they simultaneously determine intensity of pre-loan screening as well as interest rates. The preliminary model of this paper illustrates that due to strategic complementarities between banks, banking competition can result in inferior equilibrium out of multiple equilibria and insufficient information production. Policymakers must take into account the possible adverse effects of competition-enhancing policies on information production activities.

Risk aversion, overconfidence and private information as determinants of majority thresholds

We present and experimentally test a theoretical model of majority threshold determination as a function of voters’ risk preferences. The experimental results confirm the theoretical prediction of a positive correlation between the voter's risk aversion and the corresponding preferred majority threshold. Furthermore, the experimental results show that a voter's preferred majority threshold negatively relates to the voter's confidence about how others will vote. Moreover, in a treatment in which individuals receive a private signal about others’ voting behaviour, the confidence-related motivation of behaviour loses ground to the signal's strength.

Bounding ATE with ITT

We propose the bounds on ATE using intention-to-treat (ITT) estimator when there are compliers/noncompliers in randomized trials. The bounds are given as ITTand complier ratio. We show that these bounds can be derived from two assumptions: (1) average treatment effect is greater with compliers than noncompliers or CACE>NACE, (2) noncompliers' average treatment effect (NACE) is nonnegative. We give an example of poverty impacts of health insurance, and effects of adverse selection and moral hazard of health insurance.

Some notes on the spatial representations

There are conventional methods to calculate the centroid of spatial units and distance among them with using Geographical Information Systems (GIS). The paper points out potential measurement errors of this calculation. By taking Indian district data as an example, systematic errors concealed in such variables are shown. Two comparisons are examined; firstly, we compare the centroid obtained from the spatial units, polygons, and the centre of each city where its district headquarters locates. Secondly, between the centres represented in the above, we calculate the direct distances and road distances obtained from each pair of two districts. From the comparison between the direct distances of centroid of spatial units and the road distances of centre of district headquarters, we show the distribution of errors and list some caveats for the use of conventional variables obtained from GIS.

One Person, Many Votes: Divided Majority and Information Aggregation

In elections, majority divisions pave the way to focal manipulations and coordination failures, which can lead to the victory of the wrong candidate. This paper shows how this flaw can be addressed if voter preferences over candidates are sensitive to information. We consider two potential sources of divisions: majority voters may have similar preferences but opposite information about the candidates, or opposite preferences. We show that when information is the source of majority divisions, Approval Voting features a unique equilibrium with full information and coordination equivalence. That is, it produces the same outcome as if both information and coordination problems could be resolved. Other electoral systems, such as Plurality and Two-Round elections, do not satisfy this equivalence. The second source of division is opposite preferences. Whenever the fraction of voters with such preferences is not too large, Approval Voting still satisfies full information and coordination equivalence.

The economics of credence goods : an experiment on the role of liability, verifiability, reputation and competition

Credence goods markets are characterized by asymmetric information between sellers and consumers that may give rise to inefficiencies, such as under- and overtreatment or market breakdown. We study in a large experiment with 936 participants the determinants for efficiency in credence goods markets. While theory predicts that liability or verifiability yield efficiency, we find that liability has a crucial, but verifiability at best a minor, effect. Allowing sellers to build up reputation has little influence, as predicted. Seller competition drives down prices and yields maximal trade, but does not lead to higher efficiency as long as liability is violated. (JEL D12, D82)

Innis Lecture: Can the Theory of Incentives Explain Decentralization?

This survey presents within a single model three theories of decentralization of decision-making within organizations based on private information and incentives. Renegotiation, collusion, and limits on communication are three sufficient conditions for decentralization to be optimal.

Contentious Contracts

This paper offers an explanation of rationally contracts where incompeteness refers to unforeseen contingencies. Agents enter a relationship with two-sided moral hazard in which a commitment to discard parts of the joint resources may be ex ante efficient.

Commodity Taxation and Social Insurance

We investigate optimal commodity taxation in a social insurance framework based on Varian (1980). We show that the tax prescriptions in this moral hazard framework are notably similar to those derive-selection framework. In particular, Atkinson and Stiglitz's (1976) results on uniform commodity taxation are valid in this setup. We incorporate pre-committed goods - those whose consumption must be decided before the resolution of uncertainty - and show that tax prescriptions are also analogous to the existing literature. The robustness of tax rules across these setups is explained by the relaxation of incentive compatibility constraints.

Strategic Information Acquisition: Applications to Herding and Auctions

The information that the economic agents have and regard relevant to their decision making is often assumed to be exogenous in economics. It is assumed that the agents either poses or can observe the payoff relevant information without having to exert any effort to acquire it. In this thesis we relax the assumption of ex-ante fixed information structure and study what happens to the equilibrium behavior when the agents must also decide what information to acquire and when to acquire it. This thesis addresses this question in the two essays on herding and two essays on auction theory. In the first two essays, that are joint work with Klaus Kultti, we study herding models where it is costly to acquire information on the actions that the preceding agents have taken. In our model the agents have to decide both the action that they take and additionally the information that they want to acquire by observing their predecessors. We characterize the equilibrium behavior when the decision to observe preceding agents' actions is endogenous and show how the equilibrium outcome may differ from the standard model, where all preceding agents actions are assumed to be observable. In the latter part of this thesis we study two dynamic auctions: the English and the Dutch auction. We consider a situation where bidder(s) are uninformed about their valuations for the object that is put up for sale and they may acquire this information for a small cost at any point during the auction. We study the case of independent private valuations. In the third essay of the thesis we characterize the equilibrium behavior in an English auction when there are informed and uninformed bidders. We show that the informed bidder may jump bid and signal to the uninformed that he has a high valuation, thus deterring the uninformed from acquiring information and staying in the auction. The uninformed optimally acquires information once the price has passed a particular threshold and the informed has not signalled that his valuation is high. In addition, we provide an example of an information structure where the informed bidder initially waits and then makes multiple jumps. In the fourth essay of this thesis we study the Dutch auction. We consider two cases where all bidders are all initially uninformed. In the first case the information acquisition cost is the same across all bidders and in the second also the cost of information acquisition is independently distributed and private information to the bidders. We characterize a mixed strategy equilibrium in the first and a pure strategy equilibrium in the second case. In addition we provide a conjecture of an equilibrium in an asymmetric situation where there is one informed and one uninformed bidder. We compare the revenues that the first price auction and the Dutch auction generate and we find that under some circumstances the Dutch auction outperforms the first price sealed bid auction. The usual first price sealed bid auction and the Dutch auction are strategically equivalent. However, this equivalence breaks down in case information is acquired during the auction.

Studies on Understanding Individual Willingness to Disclose Genetic Information to Public and Private Stakeholders

While technologies for genetic sequencing have increased the promise of personalized medicine, they simultaneously pose threats to personal privacy. The public’s desire to protect itself from unauthorized access to information may limit the uses of this valuable resource. To date, there is limited understanding about the public’s attitudes toward the regulation and sharing of such information. We sought to understand the drivers of individuals’ decisions to disclose genetic information to a third party in a setting where disclosure potentially creates both private and social benefits, but also carries the risk of potential misuse of private information. We conducted two separate but related studies. First, we administered surveys to college students and parents, to determine individual attitudes toward and inter-generational influences on the disclosure decision. Second, we conducted a game-theory based experiment that assessed how participants’ decisions to disclose genetic information are influenced by societal and health factors. Key survey findings indicate that concerns about genetic information privacy negatively impact the likelihood of disclosure while the perceived benefits of disclosure and trust in the institution receiving the information have a positive influence. The experiment results also show that the risk of discrimination negatively affects the likelihood of disclosure, while the positive impact that disclosure has on the probability of finding a cure and the presence of a monetary incentive to disclose, increase the likelihood. We also study the determinants of individuals’ decision to be informed of findings about their health, and how information about health status is used for financial decisions.

Fighting for shells: how private information about resource value changes hermit crab pre-fight displays and escalated fight behaviour

Pre-fight displays typically provide honest, but sometimes dishonest, information about resource holding potential and may be influenced by assessment of resource value and hence motivation to acquire the resource. These assessments of potential costs and benefits are also predicted to influence escalated fight behaviour. This is examined in shell exchange contests of hermit crabs in which we establish an information asymmetry about a particularly poor quality shell. The poor shell was created by gluing sand to the interior whereas control shells lacked sand and the low value of the poor shell could not be accurately assessed by the opponent. Crabs in the poor shell showed changes in the use of pre-fight displays, apparently to increase the chances of swapping shells. When the fights escalated, crabs in poor shells fought harder if they took the role of attacker but gave up quickly if in the defender role. These tactics appear to be adaptive but do not result in a major shift in the roles taken or outcome. We thus link resource assessment with pre-fight displays, the roles taken, tactics used during escalation and the outcome of these contests.

Japanese Scientific And Technology Information in the United States - Public Policy and Private Initiatives

In January 1983 a group of US government, industry and university information specialists gathered at MIT to take stock of efforts to monitor, acquire, assess, and disseminate Japanese scientific and technical information (JSTI). It was agreed that these efforts were uncoordinated and poorly conceived, and that a clearer understanding of Japanese technical information systems and a clearer sense of its importance to end users was necessary. That meeting led to formal technology assessments, Congressinal hearings, and legislation; it also helped stimulate several private initiatives in JSTI provision. Four years later there exist better coordinated and better conceived JSTI programs in both the public and private sectors, but there remains much room for improvement. This paper will recount their development and assess future directions.