Contentious Contracts


Autoria(s): HEGE, Ulrich; VIALA, Pascale
Data(s)

24/01/2008

24/01/2008

1997

Resumo

This paper offers an explanation of rationally contracts where incompeteness refers to unforeseen contingencies. Agents enter a relationship with two-sided moral hazard in which a commitment to discard parts of the joint resources may be ex ante efficient.

Formato

1638721 bytes

application/pdf

Identificador

HEGE, Ulrich et VIALA, Pascale, «Contentious Contracts», Cahier de recherche #9711, Département de sciences économiques, Université de Montréal, 1997, 39 pages.

http://hdl.handle.net/1866/2022

Relação

Cahier de recherche #9711

Palavras-Chave #[JEL:D82] Microeconomics - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - Asymmetric and Private Information #[JEL:K12] Law and Economics - Basic Areas of Law - Contract Law #[JEL:D82] Microéconomie - Information et incertain - Information privée et asymétrique #[JEL:K12] Droit et économie - Les domaines du droit - Droit des contrats
Tipo

Article