The economics of credence goods : an experiment on the role of liability, verifiability, reputation and competition


Autoria(s): Dulleck, Uwe; Kerschbamer, Rudolf; Sutter, Matthias
Data(s)

01/04/2011

Resumo

Credence goods markets are characterized by asymmetric information between sellers and consumers that may give rise to inefficiencies, such as under- and overtreatment or market breakdown. We study in a large experiment with 936 participants the determinants for efficiency in credence goods markets. While theory predicts that liability or verifiability yield efficiency, we find that liability has a crucial, but verifiability at best a minor, effect. Allowing sellers to build up reputation has little influence, as predicted. Seller competition drives down prices and yields maximal trade, but does not lead to higher efficiency as long as liability is violated. (JEL D12, D82)

Formato

application/pdf

Identificador

http://eprints.qut.edu.au/75882/

Publicador

American Economic Association

Relação

http://eprints.qut.edu.au/75882/1/75882%28pub%29.pdf

http://pubs.aeaweb.org/doi/pdfplus/10.1257/aer.101.2.526

DOI:10.1257/aer.101.2.526

Dulleck, Uwe, Kerschbamer, Rudolf, & Sutter, Matthias (2011) The economics of credence goods : an experiment on the role of liability, verifiability, reputation and competition. The American Economic Review, 101(2), pp. 526-555.

Direitos

Copyright 2011 American Economic Association

Fonte

QUT Business School; School of Economics & Finance

Palavras-Chave #Consumer Economics #Asymmetric and Private Information
Tipo

Journal Article