Normality under uncertainty

Consider the demand for a good whose consumption be chosen prior to the resolution of uncertainty regarding income. How do changes in the distribution of income affect the demand for this good? In this paper we show that normality, is sufficient to guarantee that consumption increases of the Radon-Nikodym derivative of the new distribution with respect to the old is non-decreasing in the whole domain. However, if only first order stochastic dominance is assumed more structure must be imposed on preferences to guanantee the validity of the result. Finally a converse of the first result also obtains. If the change in measure is characterized by non-decreasing Radon-Nicodyn derivative, consumption of such a good will always increase if and only if the good is normal.

Oligopolistic competition under knightian uncertainty

This artic/e applies a theorem of Nash equilibrium under uncertainty (Dow & Werlang, 1994) to the classic Coumot model of oligopolistic competition. It shows, in particular, how one can map all Coumot equilibrium (which includes the monopoly and the null solutions) with only a function of uncertainty aversion coefficients of producers. The effect of variations in these parameters over the equilibrium quantities are studied, also assuming exogenous increases in the number of matching firms in the game. The Cournot solutions under uncertainty are compared with the monopolistic one. It shows principally that there is an uncertainty aversion level in the industry such that every aversion coefficient beyond it induces firms to produce an aggregate output smaller than the monopoly output. At the end of the artic/e equilibrium solutions are specialized for Linear Demand and for Coumot duopoly. Equilibrium analysis in the symmetric case allows to identify the uncertainty aversion coefficient for the whole industry as a proportional lack of information cost which would be conveyed by market price in the perfect competition case (Lerner Index).

A notion of subgame perfect Nash equilibrium under knightian uncertainty

We define a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium under Knightian uncertainty for two players, by means of a recursive backward induction procedure. We prove an extension of the Zermelo-von Neumann-Kuhn Theorem for games of perfect information, i. e., that the recursive procedure generates a Nash equilibrium under uncertainty (Dow and Werlang(1994)) of the whole game. We apply the notion for two well known games: the chain store and the centipede. On the one hand, we show that subgame perfection under Knightian uncertainty explains the chain store paradox in a one shot version. On the other hand, we show that subgame perfection under uncertainty does not account for the leaving behavior observed in the centipede game. This is in contrast to Dow, Orioli and Werlang(1996) where we explain by means of Nash equilibria under uncertainty (but not subgame perfect) the experiments of McKelvey and Palfrey(1992). Finally, we show that there may be nontrivial subgame perfect equilibria under uncertainty in more complex extensive form games, as in the case of the finitely repeated prisoner's dilemma, which accounts for cooperation in early stages of the game.

A notion of subgame perfect nash equilibrium under knightian uncertainty

We define a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium under Knightian uncertainty for two players, by means of a recursive backward induction procedure. We prove an extension of the Zermelo-von Neumann-Kuhn Theorem for games of perfect information, i. e., that the recursive procedure generates a Nash equilibrium under uncertainty (Dow and Werlang(1994)) of the whole game. We apply the notion for two well known games: the chain store and the centipede. On the one hand, we show that subgame perfection under Knightian uncertainty explains the chain store paradox in a one shot version. On the other hand, we show that subgame perfection under uncertainty does not account for the leaving behavior observed in the centipede game. This is in contrast to Dow, Orioli and Werlang(1996) where we explain by means of Nash equilibria under uncertainty (but not subgame perfect) the experiments of McKelvey and Palfrey(1992). Finally, we show that there may be nontrivial subgame perfect equilibria under uncertainty in more complex extensive form games, as in the case of the finitely repeated prisoner's dilemma, which accounts for cooperation in early stages of the game .

Aplicação de modelos gráficos probabilísticos computacionais em economia

O objetivo deste trabalho é testar a aplicação de um modelo gráfico probabilístico, denominado genericamente de Redes Bayesianas, para desenvolver modelos computacionais que possam ser utilizados para auxiliar a compreensão de problemas e/ou na previsão de variáveis de natureza econômica. Com este propósito, escolheu-se um problema amplamente abordado na literatura e comparou-se os resultados teóricos e experimentais já consolidados com os obtidos utilizando a técnica proposta. Para tanto,foi construído um modelo para a classificação da tendência do "risco país" para o Brasil a partir de uma base de dados composta por variáveis macroeconômicas e financeiras. Como medida do risco adotou-se o EMBI+ (Emerging Markets Bond Index Plus), por ser um indicador amplamente utilizado pelo mercado.

Opções reais em decisões de investimento de exploração e produção

Este trabalho faz uma revisão dos principais conceitos que definem a Teoria de Opções Reais. Tem como objetivo discutir o problema da decisão de investimento sob incerteza aplicado a problemas de Exploração e Produção de petróleo (E&P). Foram priorizados modelos simples que podem ser facilmente implantados no dia a dia de uma empresa, incluindo o clássico de Paddock, Siegel e Smith (1988). Os modelos discutidos são elaborados com Movimento Geométrico Browniano, que pode ser uma aproximação razoável para a modelagem de preços, a depender dos parâmetros considerados. Em particular, é apresentado um modelo de opção composta para exploração, que se revela mais apropriado por considerar o risco geológico e os estágios da opção com expiração diferenciada. A priorização de investimentos com auxílio de OR para uma carteira representativa de um portfolio de projetos de Produção também é testada, resultando numa maior relação VPL / Investimento da carteira selecionada.

On the positive correlation between income inequality and unemployment

Several empirical studies in the literature have documented the existence of a positive correlation between income inequalitiy and unemployment. I provide a theoretical framework under which this correlation can be better understood. The analysis is based on a dynamic job search under uncertainty. I start by proving the uniqueness of a stationary distribution of wages in the economy. Drawing upon this distribution, I provide a general expression for the Gini coefficient of income inequality. The expression has the advantage of not requiring a particular specification of the distribution of wage offers. Next, I show how the Gini coefficient varies as a function of the parameters of the model, and how it can be expected to be positively correlated with the rate of unemployment. Two examples are offered. The first, of a technical nature, to show that the convergence of the measures implied by the underlying Markov process can fail in some cases. The second, to provide a quantitative assessment of the model and of the mechanism linking unemployment and inequality.

The ex-Ante non-optimality of the Dempster-Schafer updating rule for ambiguous beliefs

The most widely used updating rule for non-additive probalities is the Dempster-Schafer rule. Schmeidles and Gilboa have developed a model of decision making under uncertainty based on non-additive probabilities, and in their paper “Updating Ambiguos Beliefs” they justify the Dempster-Schafer rule based on a maximum likelihood procedure. This note shows in the context of Schmeidler-Gilboa preferences under uncertainty, that the Dempster-Schafer rule is in general not ex-ante optimal. This contrasts with Brown’s result that Bayes’ rule is ex-ante optimal for standard Savage preferences with additive probabilities.

Are real options a real option for real-world finance professionals? case study : the application of real options to evaluate investment projects in the latin american oil and gas field services industry

Brasil e outros mercados emergentes continuarão a apresentar muitas oportunidades de investimento nos próximos anos. Profissionais financeiros que gerenciam os processos de orçamento de capital nas empresas terão grandes desafios a enfrentar. Características específicas destes projetos como preços ligados a commodities (por exemplo: petróleo e gás e projetos agrícolas) e as incertezas habituais relacionadas com os mercados emergentes são desafios adicionais. Neste cenário, ferramentas mais sofisticadas de orçamento de capital como Opções Reais, oferece uma teoria mais robusta para lidar com incerteza, flexibilidade gerencial, e os resultados voláteis embutidas nestas oportunidades. A teoria de Opções Reais assume que o envolvimento dos gestores nos projetos gera valor à medida que potencializam os bons resultados ou reduzem as perdas por abandonar projetos com maus resultados. O objetivo principal desta pesquisa foi aplicar a análise de Opções Reais para um projeto de investimento e discutir o processo e os resultados da metodologia. O estudo de caso analisa retroativamente um projeto de investimento na Colômbia e compara os resultados sob o tradicional VPL e Opções Reais. As técnicas de avaliação foram realizadas como se estivessem sendo aplicadas no momento em que o projeto foi aprovado, e depois comparadas com o desempenho real do projeto. O estudo de caso avaliado possui dois tipos de Opções Reais: primeiro, o efeito de uma opção para cancelar um contrato que é analisado a partir da perspectiva do cliente que pode exercer essa opção, e o segundo, a opção de abandonar e adiar a partir da perspectiva da empresa que irá executar a investimento.

The role of consumer's risk aversion on price rigidity

This paper aims at contributing to the research agenda on the sources of price stickiness, showing that the adoption of nominal price rigidity may be an optimal firms' reaction to the consumers' behavior, even if firms have no adjustment costs. With regular broadly accepted assumptions on economic agents behavior, we show that firms' competition can lead to the adoption of sticky prices as an (sub-game perfect) equilibrium strategy. We introduce the concept of a consumption centers model economy in which there are several complete markets. Moreover, we weaken some traditional assumptions used in standard monetary policy models, by assuming that households have imperfect information about the ineflicient time-varying cost shocks faced by the firms, e.g. the ones regarding to inefficient equilibrium output leveIs under fiexible prices. Moreover, the timing of events are assumed in such a way that, at every period, consumers have access to the actual prices prevailing in the market only after choosing a particular consumption center. Since such choices under uncertainty may decrease the expected utilities of risk averse consumers, competitive firms adopt some degree of price stickiness in order to minimize the price uncertainty and fi attract more customers fi.'

Estimação do desconto de reequilíbrio ótimo em concessões rodoviárias através da metodologia das opções reais

Este trabalho propõe um novo modelo para avaliação, em tempo discreto, do desconto de reequilíbrio em contratos de concessão rodoviária, a partir de conceitos da Teoria Clássica de Finanças e da Teoria de Opções Reais. O modelo desenvolvido permitiu incorporar flexibilidades decorrentes de incertezas nas situações reais, como decisões gerenciais, vieses de comportamento e componentes políticos, comumente presentes em contratos de concessões rodoviária. Os resultados obtidos, utilizando-se como estudo de caso a BR-262, sinalizaram que há espaço para uma melhor intervenção regulatória com relação ao mecanismo do desconto de reequilíbrio, no sentido de prover melhores incentivos aos concessionários.

Nash equilibrium under knightian uncertainty: breaking down backward induction (extensively revised version)

We define Nash equilibrium for two-person normal form games in the presence of uncertainty, in the sense of Knight(1921). We use the fonna1iution of uncertainty due to Schmeidler and Gilboa. We show tbat there exist Nash equilibria for any degree of uncertainty, as measured by the uncertainty aversion (Dow anel Wer1ang(l992a». We show by example tbat prudent behaviour (maxmin) can be obtained as an outcome even when it is not rationaliuble in the usual sense. Next, we break down backward industion in the twice repeated prisoner's dilemma. We link these results with those on cooperation in the finitely repeated prisoner's dilemma obtained by Kreps-Milgrom-Roberts-Wdson(1982), and withthe 1iterature on epistemological conditions underlying Nash equilibrium. The knowledge notion implicit in this mode1 of equilibrium does not display logical omniscience.

Nash equilibrium under knightian uncertainty: breaking-down backward induction

We present two alternative definitions of Nash equilibrium for two person games in the presence af uncertainty, in the sense of Knight. We use the formalization of uncertainty due to Schmeidler and Gilboa. We show that, with one of the definitions, prudent behaviour (maxmin) can be obtained as an outcome even when it is not rationalizable in the usual sense. Most striking is that with the Same definition we break down backward induction in the twice repeated prisoner's dilemma. We also link these results with the Kreps-Milgrom-Roberts-Wilson explanation of cooperation in the finitely repeated prisoner's dilemma.

Exogenous expectations on endogenous uncertainty: recursive equilibrium and survival

This paper analyses general equilibrium models with finite heterogeneous agents having exogenous expectations on endogenous uncertainty. It is shown that there exists a recursive equilibrium with the state space consisting of the past aggregate portfolio distribution and the current state of the nature and that it implements the sequential equilibrium. We establish conditions under which the recursive equilibrium is continuous. Moreover, we use the continuous recursive relation of the aggregate variables to prove that if the economy has two types of agents, the one who commits persistent mistakes on the expectation rules of the future endogenous variables is driven out of the market by the others with correct anticipations of the variables, that is, the rational expectations agents.