Mixed oligopoly in education

This paper studies oligopolistic competition in education markets when schools can be private and public and when the quality of education depends on ìpeer groupî e§ects. In the Örst stage of our game schools set their quality and in the second stage they Öx their tuition fees. We examine how the (subgame perfect Nash) equilibrium allocation (qualities, tuition fees and welfare) is a§ected by the presence of public schools and by their relative position in the quality range. When there are no peer group e§ects, e¢ ciency is achieved when (at least) all but one school are public. In particular in the two school case, the impact of a public school is spectacular as we go from a setting of extreme di§erentiation to an e¢ cient allocation. However, in the three school case, a single public school will lower welfare compared to the private equilibrium. We then introduce a peer group e§ect which, for any given school is determined by its student with the highest ability. These PGE do have a signiÖcant impact on the results. The mixed equilibrium is now never e¢ cient. However, welfare continues to be improved if all but one school are public. Overall, the presence of PGE reduces the e§ectiveness of public schools as regulatory tool in an otherwise private education sector.

Poor people and risky business

We try to explain why economic conflicts and illegal business often take place in poor countries. We use the concept of subsistence level of consumption (d) and assume a regular concave utility function for consumption levels higher than d. For consumption levels lower than d utility is constant and equal to zero. Under this framework poor agents are risk-lovers. This result helps to explain why economic conflicts are more likely to appear in poor economies and why poor agents are more willing to undertake illegal business.

Seguros de desempleo: revisión de literatura y propuesta para Colombia

En este artículo se estudia la posibilidad de introducir seguros de desempleo en Colombia. En una primera parte, se propone una revisión de literatura de los seguros de desempleo en la cual se exponen las ventajas generadas por una cobertura contra este riesgo, así como sus inconvenientes. En una segunda parte, se estudian varios escenarios para introducir seguros de desempleo en Colombia. Después de haber presentado el contexto del mercado laboral y de las normas que lo vigilan, se proponen varios diseños que abordan la gestión y la administración del riesgo de desempleo en Colombia. Igualmente se presentan algunas consideraciones teóricas para la valoración del costo del aseguramiento, las cuales incorporan los efectos del riesgo moral sobre la duración y la incidencia del desempleo.

Unemployment insurance in the presence of an informal sector

We study the effect of UI benefits in a typical developing country where the informal sector is sizeable and persistent. In a partial equilibrium environment, ruling out the macroeconomic consequences of UI benefits, we characterize the stationary equilibrium of an economy where policyholders may be employed in the formal sector, short-run unemployed receiving UI benefits or long-run unemployed without UI benefits. We perform comparative static exercises to understand how UI benefits affect unemployed worker´s effort to secure a formal job, their labor supply in the informal sector and leisure time. Our model reveals that an increase in UI benefits generates two opposing effects for the short-run unemployed. First, since search efforts cannot be monitored it generates moral hazard behaviours that lower effort. Second, it generates an income effect as it reduces the marginal cost of searching for a formal job and increases effort.The overall effect is ambiguous and depends on the relative strength of these two effects. Additionally, we show that an increase in UI benefits increases the efforts of long-run unemployed workers. We provide a simple simulation exercise which suggests that the income effect pointed out is not necessarily of second-order importance in comparison with moral hazard strength. This result softens the widespread opinion, usually based on the microeconomic/partial equilibrium argument that the presence of dual labor markets is an obstacle to providing UI in developing countries.

Asymmetrically fair rules for an indivisible good problem with a budget constraint

We study a particular restitution problem where there is an indivisible good (land or property) over which two agents have rights: the dispossessed agent and the owner. A third party, possibly the government, seeks to resolve the situation by assigning rights to one and compensate the other. There is also a maximum amount of money available for the compensation. We characterize a family of asymmetrically fair rules that are immune to strategic behavior, guarantee minimal welfare levels for the agents, and satisfy the budget constraint.

Cartoons and economics: general analysis based on colombian economic cartoons

May cartoons be considered as a viable and credible source for the study of economics? There is hardly any research on the subject, even though there is a quite significant amount of cartoons with economic content. This suggests that economics (and economists) have not paid enough attention and do not incorporate in their analysis a relevant primary source. The present paper aims to explore the value of using cartoons as a complementary primary source in economic analysis. We present a way of analyzing economic history through cartoons; first, reviewing cartoons which describe particular historical circumstances and second, examining cartoons that represent generic economic situations and are not necessarily linked to a historical period. We choose 17 cartoons, from different cartoonist, especially Colombian cartoonists that may give us an idea of economic matters and economic history.

Conflict, wages, and multiple equilibria

Firms’ compensation practices affect the protection of investors’ interests and the degree of economic inequality by changing the stakes of engaging in appropriation activities versus respecting the status quo. We use a general equilibrium model where workers can either work peacefully or join a guerrilla movement that expropriates entrepreneurs. If workers are peaceful, they receive a competitive wage. If they join a guerrilla movement, they receive a share of the appropriated wealth, which depends positively on the number of guerrilla members. In this framework, we find one low-income, low-wage equilibrium with guerrilla activity and one peaceful, high-income, high-wage equilibrium. The peaceful equilibrium can be reached through redistribution policies, which can be implemented at the firm level. In essence, through their compensation policies entrepreneurs, not the state might be able to protect their assets against expropriation and simultaneously control the internal principal-agent problem.

Externalidades de red en una economía con tres idiomas

El documento estudia el impacto del aprendizaje de una lengua por parte de un grupo de personas sobre el bienestar individual y social. Seaborda el enfoque de economía de redes para incorporar las externalidades que aparecen en lenguaje. Se encuentra que el equilibrio alcanzado cuando se toman decisiones descentralizadas es inferior al que se obtendría al tomarlas de manera centralizada.

Economía matemática: antecedentes, evolución y algunos desarrollos recientes

Se presenta aquí, en forma breve, el origen de la matematización económica y el campo de la economía matemática. Un enfoque histórico inicial divide dicho campo en un primer periodo denominado marginalista, otro donde se utiliza la teoría de los conjuntos y modelos lineales y por último un periodo que integra los dos anteriores. Posteriormente, se analiza la evolución de la Teoría del Equilibrio General desde Quesnay, pasando por Walras y desarrollos posteriores hasta su culminación con los trabajos de Arrow, Debreu y sus contemporáneos. Finalmente, se describe la influencia de las matemáticas, en especial de la optimización dinámica, en la teoría macroeconómica y a otras áreas de la economía.

Un marco analítico de la discriminación laboral. Teorias, modalidades y estudios para Colombia

Este documento presenta un resumen de las principales corrientes teóricas que han tratado de dar una explicación a la discriminación laboral, asi como una exposición pedagógica de las principales modalidades mediante las cuales dicha discriminación se manifiesta. Se realiza un particular análisis de las consecuencias que dicha discriminación tiene, en particular para el caso de los jóvenes de América Latina, y finalmente se realiza una revisión de los estudios que sobre el tema se han realizado en Colombia, sus aspectos metodológicos y las conclusiones a las que dichos estudios han llegado.

Informality in the City: a Theoretical Analysis

This thesis theoretically studies the relationship between the informal sector (both in the labor and the housing market) and the city structure.

Ciencias de la complejidad: estado actual

Los aportes teóricos y aplicados de la complejidad en economía han tomado tantas direcciones y han sido tan frenéticos en las últimas décadas, que no existe un trabajo reciente, hasta donde conocemos, que los compile y los analice de forma integrada. El objetivo de este proyecto, por tanto, es desarrollar un estado situacional de las diferentes aplicaciones conceptuales, teóricas, metodológicas y tecnológicas de las ciencias de la complejidad en la economía. Asimismo, se pretende analizar las tendencias recientes en el estudio de la complejidad de los sistemas económicos y los horizontes que las ciencias de la complejidad ofrecen de cara al abordaje de los fenómenos económicos del mundo globalizado contemporáneo.

Auge minero-energético, enfermedad holandesa e informalidad en Colombia: un análisis a partir de un modelo DSGE

El presente trabajo desarrolla un modelo macroeconómico de equilibrio general dinámico y estocástico (DSGE), con el fin de analizar los efectos macroeconómicos que se derivan de simular un choque positivo al componente estocástico de la productividad del sector minero-energético. Este hecho genera un aumento generalizado de los salarios en el sector formal y en el recaudo tributario, incrementando el consumo total de los miembros del hogar. Esto genera un incremento del precio de los bienes no transables relativo al precio de los bienes transables, disminuyendo la tasa de cambio real (apreciación) y provocando un desplazamiento de los recursos productivos, desde el sector transable (manufacturero) al no-transable, seguido de un aumento en el PIB y empleo formal de la economía. Esto hace que el sector formal agregado absorba trabajadores desde el sector informal a través del subsector formal no-transable, lo que disminuye el PIB informal. En consecuencia, el consumo neto de los miembros informales disminuye, lo que incentiva a que algunos miembros del hogar no se empleen en el sector informal y prefieran quedarse desempleados. Por lo tanto, el resultado final sobre el mercado laboral es una disminución de los trabajadores informales, de los cuales una parte se encuentra en el sector formal, y la parte restante está en condición de desempleo.

Risk, ambiguity, and diversification

Attitudes toward risk influence the decision to diversify among uncertain options. Yet, because in most situations the options are ambiguous, attitudes toward ambiguity may also play an important role. I conduct a laboratory experiment to investigate the effect of ambiguity on the decision to diversify. I find that diversification is more prevalent and more persistent under ambiguity than under risk. Moreover, excess diversification under ambiguity is driven by participants who stick with a status quo gamble when diversification among gambles is not feasible. This behavioral pattern cannot be accommodated by major theories of choice under ambiguity.