Asymmetrically fair rules for an indivisible good problem with a budget constraint
| Data(s) |
01/03/2012
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| Resumo |
We study a particular restitution problem where there is an indivisible good (land or property) over which two agents have rights: the dispossessed agent and the owner. A third party, possibly the government, seeks to resolve the situation by assigning rights to one and compensate the other. There is also a maximum amount of money available for the compensation. We characterize a family of asymmetrically fair rules that are immune to strategic behavior, guarantee minimal welfare levels for the agents, and satisfy the budget constraint. |
| Formato |
application/pdf |
| Identificador | |
| Idioma(s) |
eng |
| Publicador |
Facultad de Economía |
| Relação |
Serie Documentos de trabajo ; No. 119 1 https://ideas.repec.org/p/col/000092/009381.html |
| Direitos |
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess |
| Fonte |
instname:Universidad del Rosario reponame:Repositorio Institucional EdocUR instname:Universidad del Rosario Alkan, A., G. Demange, and D. Gale (1991). Fair allocation of indivisible goods and criteria of justice. Econometrica 59, 1023–1039. Andersson, T. and L. G. Svensson (2008). Non-manipulable assignment of individuals to positions revisited. Mathematical Social Sciences 56, 350–354. Andersson, T., L. G. Svensson, and Z. Yang (2010). Constrainedly fair job assignments under minimum wages. Games and Economic Behavior 68, 428–442 Barry, M. (2011). Land restitution and communal property associations: The Elandskloof case. Land Use Policy 28, 139–150. Blacksell, M. and K. M. Born (2002). Rural property restitution in Germany’s new Bundesl¨ander: The case of Bergholz. Journal of Rural Studies 18, 325–338. Clark, E. H. (1971). Multipart pricing of public goods. Public Choice 11, 17–33. Foley, D. (1967). Resource allocation and the public sector. Yale Economics Essays 7, 45–98. Grover, R. and M. F. B´orquez (2004). Restitution and land markets. mimeo. Oxford Brookes University. Groves, T. (1973). Incentives in teams. Econometrica 41, 617–631. Ib´a˜nez, A. M. (2009). El Desplazamiento Forzoso en Colombia: Un Camino sin Retorno a la Pobreza. Editorial Uniandes. Kominers, S. D. and E. G. Weyl (2011). Concordance among holdouts. Harvard Institute of Economic Research Discussion Paper Mishra, D., S. Sarkar, and A. Sen (2008). Land deals in Sarkar Raj: Perspectives from mechanism design theory. mimeo. Indian Statistical Institute. Southern, D. B. (1993). Restitution or compensation: The land question in East Germany. International and Comparative Law Quarterly 42, 690–697. Sun, N. and Z. Yang (2003). A general strategy-proof fair allocation mechanism. Economics Letters 81, 73–89. Svensson, L. G. (1983). Large indivisibles: An analysis with respect to price equilibrium and fairness. Econometrica 51, 939–954. Tadenuma, K. and W. Thomson (1995). Games of fair division. Games and Economic Behavior 9, 191–204. van Boven, T. (2010). The United Nations basic principles and guidelines on the right to a remedy and reparation for victims of gross violations of international human rights law and serious violations of international humanitarian law. United Nations Audiovisual Library of International Law. New York, United Nations. Vickrey, W. (1961). Counterspeculation, auctions, and competitive sealed tenders. The Journal of Finance 16, 8–37. |
| Palavras-Chave | #Distribución de tierras -- Aspectos económicos #Tenencia de la tierra -- Aspectos económicos #Economía política #333.32 #Fairness #Strategy-proofness #Indivisible good #Land restitution |
| Tipo |
info:eu-repo/semantics/book info:eu-repo/semantics/acceptedVersion |
