Poor people and risky business
| Data(s) |
2006
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|---|---|
| Resumo |
We try to explain why economic conflicts and illegal business often take place in poor countries. We use the concept of subsistence level of consumption (d) and assume a regular concave utility function for consumption levels higher than d. For consumption levels lower than d utility is constant and equal to zero. Under this framework poor agents are risk-lovers. This result helps to explain why economic conflicts are more likely to appear in poor economies and why poor agents are more willing to undertake illegal business. |
| Formato |
application/pdf |
| Identificador | |
| Publicador |
Facultad de Economía |
| Relação |
Serie documentos de trabajo. No 7 (Octubre 2006) https://ideas.repec.org/p/col/000092/003356.html |
| Direitos |
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess |
| Fonte |
instname:Universidad del Rosario reponame:Repositorio Institucional EdocUR instname:Universidad del Rosario Brito, D.L. and M.D. Intriligator, 1992 ” Narco-Traffic and Guerrilla Warfare: A New Symbiosis” Defense Economics, 3 (4), 263-274. Burrus, R 1999 ” Do Efforts to Reduce the Supply of Illicit Drugs Increase Turf War Violence? A Theoretical Analysis” Journal of Economics and Finance, 23 (3), 226-234. Campbell, J.I and J.H. Cochrane, 1999 "By Force of Habit: A Consumption Base Explanation of Aggregate Stock Market Behavior" Journal of Political Economy, 107 (2), 205-251. Cussen, M. and W. Block, 2000 ”Legalize Drugs Now! an Analysis of the Benefits of Legalize Drugs” American Journal of Economics and Sociology, 59 (3), 525-536. Edwards, K.1996 ”Prospect Theory: A literature review” International Review of Financial Analysis, 5 (1), 19-38. Flower, T.B. 1996 ”The International Narcotics Trade: Can it be Stopped by Interdiction?” Journal of Policy Modeling, 18 (3), 273- 270. Friedman, M. and L.J Savage, 1948 ” The utility analysis of choices involving risk” The Journal of Political Economy, 56 (4), 279-304. Grossman, H.I. 1991 ”A General Equilibrium Model of Insurrections” American Economic Review, 81(4), 912-921. Grossman, H.I. 1994 ” Production, Appropriation and Land Reform” American Economic Review, 84(3), 705-712. Horowitz, A.W.1993 ”Time Paths and Land Reform Dynamics” American Economic Review, 83 (4), 1003-1010. Jullie, B. and B. Salanie, 2000 ”Estimating preferences under risk: the case of racetrack bettors” Journal of Political Economy, 108 (3), 503-30. Kennally, G 2001 ” Regulating the Trade in recreational Drugs” European Journal of Law and Economics , 11, 69-82. Kahneman, D. and A. Tversky, 1979 ”Prospect theory: Analysis of decision under risk” Econometrica 47, 263-291. Murphy, K.M. ; A. Shleifer and R.W. Vishny, 1993 ”Why is Rent Seeking so Costly to Growth?” AEA Papers and Proceedings, 83 (2), 263-291. Piron, R. and L.R Smith, 1995 ”Testing risklove in an experimental racetrack” Journal of Economic Behavoir and Organization., 27 (3), 465-74. Roemer, J.E. 1998 ” Why the Poor do Not Expropriate the Rich: An Old Argument in a New Garb” Journal of Public Economics, 70, 399-424. Skaperdas, S. 1992 ”Cooperation, Conflict and Power in the Absence of Property Rights” American Economic Review, 82 (4), 720-739. Skaperdas, S. and c. Syropoulos, 1997 ”Distribution of Income in the Presence of Appropiative Activities”, Economica, 64, 101-117.Press. Chapter 3, 70-73. Whynes, D.K. 1991 ”Illicit Drugs Production and Supply-side Policy in Asia and South America” Development and Change, 22 (3), 475-496. http://www.cicad.oas.org/es/Principal/Recursos/Estadisticas.htm. Zuleta, H. 2004 “Persistence and Expansion of Guerrilla Activities: the case of Colombia” Journal of Income Distribution, forthcoming. |
| Palavras-Chave | #Desarrollo económico #Pobreza - Aspectos económicos #Distribución de la riqueza #Ilegalidad - Aspectos económicos #338.9 #Poverty #Income Distribution #Illegal Business |
| Tipo |
info:eu-repo/semantics/book info:eu-repo/semantics/acceptedVersion |
