The Transformation Problem : an Aleternative Solution with an Identical Aggregate Profit Rate in the Labor value and the Monetary Space.

The aim of this paper is to demonstrate that, even if Marx's solution to the transformation problem can be modified, his basic conclusions remain valid. the proposed alternative solution which is presented hare is based on the constraint of a common general profit rate in both spaces and a money wage level which will be determined simultaneously with prices.

Essays in labor and public economics

Dans ma thèse, je me sers de modèles de recherche solides pour répondre à des questions importantes de politique publique. Mon premier chapitre évalue l’impact causal de l’allégeance partisane (républicain ou démocrate) des gouverneurs américains sur le marché du travail. Dans ce chapitre, je combine les élections des gouverneurs avec les données du March CPS pour les années fiscales 1977 à 2008. En utilisant un modèle de régression par discontinuité, je trouve que les gouverneurs démocrates sont associés à de plus faibles revenus individuels moyens. Je mets en évidence que cela est entrainée par un changement dans la composition de la main-d’oeuvre à la suite d’une augmentation de l’emploi des travailleurs à revenus faibles et moyens. Je trouve que les gouverneurs démocrates provoquent une augmentation de l’emploi des noirs et de leurs heures travaillées. Ces résultats conduisent à une réduction de l’écart salarial entre les travailleurs noir et blanc. Mon deuxième chapitre étudie l’impact causal des fusillades qui se produisent dans les écoles secondaires américaines sur les performances des éléves et les résultats des écoles tels que les effectifs et le nombre d’enseignants recruté, a l’aide d’une stratégie de différence-en-différence. Le chapitre est coécrit avec Dongwoo Kim. Nous constatons que les fusillades dans les écoles réduisent significativement l’effectif des élèves de 9e année, la proportion d’élèves ayant un niveau adéquat en anglais et en mathématiques. Nous examinons aussi l’effet hétérogene des tueries dans les écoles secondaires entre les crimes et les suicides. Nous trouvons que les fusillades de natures criminelles provoquent la diminution du nombre d’inscriptions et de la proportion d’élèves adéquats en anglais et mathématiques. En utilisant des données sur les élèves en Californie, nous confirmons qu’une partie de l’effet sur la performance des élèves provient des étudiants inscrits et ce n’est pas uniquement un effet de composition. Mon troisième chapitre étudie l’impact des cellulaires sur la performance scolaire des élèves. Le chapitre est coécrit avec Richard Murphy. Dans ce chapitre, nous combinons une base de données unique contenant les politiques de téléphonie mobile des écoles obtenues à partir d’une enquète auprès des écoles dans quatre villes en Angleterre avec des données administratives sur la performance scolaire des éleves. Nous étudions ainsi l’impact de l’introduction d’une interdiction de téléphonie mobile sur le rendement des éleves. Nos résultats indiquent qu’il y a une augmentation du rendement des éleves après l’instauration de l’interdiction des cellulaires à l’école, ce qui suggère que les téléphones mobiles sont sources de distraction pour l’apprentissage et l’introduction d’une interdiction à l’école limite ce problème.

How Important Are Intergenerational Transfers of Time? a Macroeconomic Analysis.

This paper examines the implications of intergenerational transfers of time and money for labor supply and capital accumulation. Although intergenerational transfers of time in the form of grandparenting are as substantial as monetary transfers in the data, little is known about the role and importance of time transfers. In this paper, we calibrate an overlapping generations model extended to allow for both time and monetary transfers to the US economy. We use simulations to show that time transfers have important positive effects on capital accumulation and that these effects can be as significant as those of monetary transfers. However, while time transfers increase the labor supply of the young, monetary transfers produce an income effect that tends to decrease work effort. We also find that child care tax credits have little impact on parental time and money transfers, but that a universal child tax credit would increase the welfare of the rich while the poor would benefit from a means-tested program.

Reported Job Satisfaction : What Does It Mean?

By reporting his satisfaction with his job or any other experience, an individual does not communicate the number of utils that he feels. Instead, he expresses his posterior preference over available alternatives conditional on acquired knowledge of the past. This new interpretation of reported job satisfaction restores the power of microeconomic theory without denying the essential role of discrepancies between one’s situation and available opportunities. Posterior human wealth discrepancies are found to be the best predictor of reported job satisfaction. Static models of relative utility and other subjective well-being assumptions are all unambiguously rejected by the data, as well as an \"economic\" model in which job satisfaction is a measure of posterior human wealth. The \"posterior choice\" model readily explains why so many people usually report themselves as happy or satisfied, why both younger and older age groups are insensitive to current earning discrepancies, and why the past weighs more heavily than the present and the future.

Sector-Specific on-the-Job Training: Evidence from U.S. Data.

Using data from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY), we re-examine the effect of formal on-the-job training on mobility patterns of young American workers. By employing parametric duration models, we evaluate the economic impact of training on productive time with an employer. Confirming previous studies, we find a positive and statistically significant impact of formal on-the-job training on tenure with the employer providing the training. However, the expected net duration of the time spent in the training program is generally not significantly increased. We proceed to document and analyze intra-sectoral and cross-sectoral mobility patterns in order to infer whether training provides firm-specific, industry-specific, or general human capital. The econometric analysis rejects a sequential model of job separation in favor of a competing risks specification. We find significant evidence for the industry-specificity of training. The probability of sectoral mobility upon job separation decreases with training received in the current industry, whether with the last employer or previous employers, and employment attachment increases with on-the-job training. These results are robust to a number of variations on the base model.

In Search of Advice for Physicians in Entry-Level Medical Markets

We consider entry-level medical markets for physicians in the United Kingdom. These markets experienced failures which led to the adoption of centralized market mechanisms in the 1960's. However, different regions introduced different centralized mechanisms. We advise physicians who do not have detailed information about the rank-order lists submitted by the other participants. We demonstrate that in each of these markets in a low information environment it is not beneficial to reverse the true ranking of any two acceptable hospital positions. We further show that (i) in the Edinburgh 1967 market, ranking unacceptable matches as acceptable is not profitable for any participant and (ii) in any other British entry-level medical market, it is possible that only strategies which rank unacceptable positions as acceptable are optimal for a physician.

Von Neumann-Morgenstern Stable Sets in Matching Problems

The following properties of the core of a one well-known: (i) the core is non-empty; (ii) the core is a lattice; and (iii) the set of unmatched agents is identical for any two matchings belonging to the core. The literature on two-sided matching focuses almost exclusively on the core and studies extensively its properties. Our main result is the following characterization of (von Neumann-Morgenstern) stable sets in one-to-one matching problem only if it is a maximal set satisfying the following properties : (a) the core is a subset of the set; (b) the set is a lattice; (c) the set of unmatched agents is identical for any two matchings belonging to the set. Furthermore, a set is a stable set if it is the unique maximal set satisfying properties (a), (b) and (c). We also show that our main result does not extend from one-to-one matching problems to many-to-one matching problems.