Obtención mediante procesos quimioenzimáticos de monoglicéridos, y derivados de los mismo, con posible actividad antimicrobiana

The dissertation accomplishes two aims: 1) to diagnose what prevents true beliefs from being knowledge; 2) to give an positive account of knowledge. Concerning the first aim, it offers an account of the notion of luck. It defends the view that luck is a form of risk and distinguishes two types of luck. Then, it applies the account to the problem of epistemic luck and distinguishes, accordingly, two types of epistemic luck. It is argued that these two types of epistemic luck explain the whole range of cases of not-known true belief. Concerning the second aim, the dissertation advances an account of knowledge in terms of the notion of cognitive control that deals with the two forms of epistemic luck distinguished.

Two-sided learning in new keynesian models: dynamics, (lack of) convergence and the value of information

This paper investigates the role of learning by private agents and the central bank (two-sided learning) in a New Keynesian framework in which both sides of the economy have asymmetric and imperfect knowledge about the true data generating process. We assume that all agents employ the data that they observe (which may be distinct for different sets of agents) to form beliefs about unknown aspects of the true model of the economy, use their beliefs to decide on actions, and revise these beliefs through a statistical learning algorithm as new information becomes available. We study the short-run dynamics of our model and derive its policy recommendations, particularly with respect to central bank communications. We demonstrate that two-sided learning can generate substantial increases in volatility and persistence, and alter the behavior of the variables in the model in a signifficant way. Our simulations do not converge to a symmetric rational expectations equilibrium and we highlight one source that invalidates the convergence results of Marcet and Sargent (1989). Finally, we identify a novel aspect of central bank communication in models of learning: communication can be harmful if the central bank's model is substantially mis-specified

Las posiciones de los diferentes grupos políticos israelíes sobre la resolución de la situación de los refugiados

La cuestión de los refugiados palestinos es uno de los asuntos clave para alcanzar una resolución firme del conflicto palestino-israelí. Para ello debe resolverse la situación de los cientos de miles de palestinos que fueron expulsados y/o huyeron con la guerra de 1948, y sus descendientes, que hoy suman casi 5 millones. En el proceso de paz, este es uno de los asuntos que ni siquiera fue tenido en cuenta con la profundidad que lo requiere. Los palestinos se acogen a la resolución 194 de la Asamblea de Naciones Unidas y reivindican el Derecho al Retorno. Pero del lado israelí tres argumentos ponen en duda este derecho al retorno: A) El asunto de la responsabilidad en la huida/expulsión de cientos de miles de palestinos de sus hogares. B) La «necesidad» existencial de ser un estado de mayoría judía, que el retorno podría poner en cuestión. C) El hecho de que Israel ya acogió a cientos de miles de judíos originarios de los países árabes. Analizaremos cómo los partidos políticos israelíes tratan este asunto, y cómo los «nuevos historiadores israelíes» pueden ayudar a cambiar el punto de vista israelí al poner en cuestión la narrativa sionista de la guerra del 48.

Prevención de la transmisión sexual del VIH en adolescentes

En una muestra de 119 estudiantes de cuarto de Educación Secundaria Obligatoria (ESO) y primerode Bachillerato (52,6% mujeres) se analizan los conocimientos sobre la prevención de latransmisión sexual del virus del sida, las expectativas de resultados y de autoeficacia respecto a losmétodos preventivos y el tipo de prevención utilizada durante la última relación sexual. Para evitarlas respuestas inducidas respecto a los comportamientos preventivos se emplea un formato de preguntaabierta. Los resultados muestran que sólo el 23,5% de los estudiantes han dado dos respuestastotalmente correctas sobre estrategias consideradas eficaces en la prevención sexual del VIH:uso del preservativo y abstinencia (por este orden). El 70,5% valoran totalmente o muy eficaz elpreservativo para evitar la transmisión sexual del VIH y el 95% de los que dan la segunda respuestajuzgan totalmente eficaz la práctica de la abstinencia con la misma finalidad. En el caso del preservativose sienten totalmente o muy capaces de usarlo el 64,3%, mientras que cuando se trata de laabstinencia sólo se perciben con esa competencia el 20%. Por lo que se refiere al uso autoinformadode métodos preventivos en la última relación, por parte de los 29 estudiantes que tuvieronactividad sexual durante el mes anterior, se observa que 21 de ellos emplearon el preservativo, dosla píldora anticonceptiva, otros dos no precisan el tipo de precaución y el resto no tomó ninguna.Tanto el reducido nivel de conocimientos sobre prevención, como la baja percepción de autoeficaciapara mantenerse abstinentes, nos alertan sobre la necesidad de hacer un mayor esfuerzo de informaciónpara eliminar creencias equivocadas, como por ejemplo: sobre la pretendida eficacia protectorade tener relaciones sexuales con una pareja estable o conocida. Así mismo, conviene insistiren el uso del preservativo como anticonceptivo de elección entre los adolescentes

Influencia social y uso del preservativo en la prevención de la transmisión heterosexual del VIH = Social influence and condom use for VIH heterosexual transmission prevention

Se revisan diferentes formas en que la influencia social puede incidir sobre los comportamientosheterosexuales de prevención de la transmisión del VIH de los jóvenes y se presentanlos resultados de algunos trabajos de las autoras, así como de otros investigadores, en que seanalizan dichas relaciones. Se concluye resaltando: 1) la utilidad clínica de la evaluación de lasexpectativas de autoeficacia para poder intervenir específicamente en aquellas áreas en que losjóvenes se perciban con menores capacidades para ser preventivos, 2) la relación observadaentre el uso de preservativo autoinformado y la creencia en su aceptación por parte de los referentessociales más cercanos y 3) la conveniencia de que los jóvenes posean suficientes habilidadesde comunicación que les permitan negociar con éxito el uso del preservativo y les ayudena compensar posibles influencias sociales en contra de su empleo

Els mites en les altes capacitats

Davant la diversitat de teories que acompanyen les altes capacitats, la intel·ligència,la sobredotació, el talent, etc., a continuació es presenta el treball que he desenvolupat en el centre privat Sales Jové S.L.P. de Lleida, enfocat a detectar i avaluar infants i adolescents amb altes capacitats. Gràcies a les dades obtingudes he pogut verificar o rebutjar alguns dels mites, creences i tòpics existents sobre les altes capacitats.

Goal recognition over POMDPs: inferring the intention of a POMDP agent

Plan recognition is the problem of inferring the goals and plans of an agent from partial observations of her behavior. Recently, it has been shown that the problem can be formulated and solved usingplanners, reducing plan recognition to plan generation.In this work, we extend this model-basedapproach to plan recognition to the POMDP setting, where actions are stochastic and states are partially observable. The task is to infer a probability distribution over the possible goals of an agent whose behavior results from a POMDP model. The POMDP model is shared between agent and observer except for the true goal of the agent that is hidden to the observer. The observations are action sequences O that may contain gaps as some or even most of the actions done by the agent may not be observed. We show that the posterior goal distribution P(GjO) can be computed from the value function VG(b) over beliefs b generated by the POMDPplanner for each possible goal G. Some extensionsof the basic framework are discussed, and a numberof experiments are reported.

The Economic Effects of Christian Moralities

This article examines the different influences that Catholicism and Protestantism exert on economically relevant values. It argues that Catholic theology and practice facilitate personal transactions while Protestantism favors values and types of moral and legal enforcement better adapted for impersonal trade. Protestantism may thus be more conducive to economic growth through anonymous exchange while Catholicism may provide better support for personal contracting. Several components of this hypothesis are confirmed using statistical models with data from the 1998 ISSP international survey on religion. These show that Protestants are more trusting of anonymous counter parties, develop more reliable institutions for legal enforcement and are more willing to spend resources on monitoring and punishing other members of the community. Catholicism is more protective of the family and small-group relationships, and provides more tolerant and less motivating beliefs. Relatively smaller and less consistent differences appear in terms of worldly personal success and incentives.

Neglected risks, financial innovation, and financial fragility

We present a standard model of financial innovation, in which intermediaries engineer securities with cash flows that investors seek, but modify two assumptions. First, investors (and possibly intermediaries) neglect certain unlikely risks. Second, investors demand securities with safe cash flows. Financial intermediaries cater to these preferences and beliefs by engineering securities perceived to be safe but exposed to neglected risks. Because the risks are neglected, security issuance is excessive. As investors eventually recognize these risks, they fly back to safety of traditional securities and markets become fragile, even without leverage, precisely because the volume of new claims is excessive.

Self-serving biases: Evidence from a simulated labor relationship

Previous studies have found evidence of a self-serving bias in bargaining and dispute resolution. We use experimental data to test for this effect in a simulated labor relatonship. We finda consistent discrepancy between employer beliefs and employee actions that can only be attributed to self-serving biases. This discrepancy is evident through stated beliefs, revealed satisfaction, and actual actions. We present evidenceand discuss implications.

Efficient interval scoring rules

Scoring rules that elicit an entire belief distribution through the elicitation of point beliefsare time-consuming and demand considerable cognitive e¤ort. Moreover, the results are validonly when agents are risk-neutral or when one uses probabilistic rules. We investigate a classof rules in which the agent has to choose an interval and is rewarded (deterministically) onthe basis of the chosen interval and the realization of the random variable. We formulatean e¢ ciency criterion for such rules and present a speci.c interval scoring rule. For single-peaked beliefs, our rule gives information about both the location and the dispersion of thebelief distribution. These results hold for all concave utility functions.

The political cost of reforms

This paper formalizes in a fully-rational model the popular idea that politiciansperceive an electoral cost in adopting costly reforms with future benefits and reconciles it with the evidence that reformist governments are not punished by voters.To do so, it proposes a model of elections where political ability is ex-ante unknownand investment in reforms is unobservable. On the one hand, elections improve accountability and allow to keep well-performing incumbents. On the other, politiciansmake too little reforms in an attempt to signal high ability and increase their reappointment probability. Although in a rational expectation equilibrium voters cannotbe fooled and hence reelection does not depend on reforms, the strategy of underinvesting in reforms is nonetheless sustained by out-of-equilibrium beliefs. Contrary tothe conventional wisdom, uncertainty makes reforms more politically viable and may,under some conditions, increase social welfare. The model is then used to study howpolitical rewards can be set so as to maximize social welfare and the desirability of imposing a one-term limit to governments. The predictions of this theory are consistentwith a number of empirical regularities on the determinants of reforms and reelection.They are also consistent with a new stylized fact documented in this paper: economicuncertainty is associated to more reforms in a panel of 20 OECD countries.

Two-sided learning in New Keynesian models: Dynamics, (lack of) convergence and the value of information

This paper investigates the role of learning by private agents and the central bank(two-sided learning) in a New Keynesian framework in which both sides of the economyhave asymmetric and imperfect knowledge about the true data generating process. Weassume that all agents employ the data that they observe (which may be distinct fordifferent sets of agents) to form beliefs about unknown aspects of the true model ofthe economy, use their beliefs to decide on actions, and revise these beliefs througha statistical learning algorithm as new information becomes available. We study theshort-run dynamics of our model and derive its policy recommendations, particularlywith respect to central bank communications. We demonstrate that two-sided learningcan generate substantial increases in volatility and persistence, and alter the behaviorof the variables in the model in a significant way. Our simulations do not convergeto a symmetric rational expectations equilibrium and we highlight one source thatinvalidates the convergence results of Marcet and Sargent (1989). Finally, we identifya novel aspect of central bank communication in models of learning: communicationcan be harmful if the central bank's model is substantially mis-specified.

Quotient spaces of boundedly rational types

By identifying types whose low-order beliefs up to level li about the state of nature coincide, weobtain quotient type spaces that are typically smaller than the original ones, preserve basic topologicalproperties, and allow standard equilibrium analysis even under bounded reasoning. Our Bayesian Nash(li; l-i)-equilibria capture players inability to distinguish types belonging to the same equivalence class.The case with uncertainty about the vector of levels (li; l-i) is also analyzed. Two examples illustratethe constructions.

Money doctors

We present a new model of money management, in which investors delegate portfolio management to professionals based not only on performance, but also on trust. Trust in the manager reduces an investor's perception of the riskiness of a given investment, and allows managers to charge higher fees to investors who trust them more. Money managers compete for investor funds by setting their fees, but because of trust the fees do not fall to costs. In the model, 1) managers consistently underperform the market net of fees but investors still prefer to delegate money management to taking risk on their own, 2) fees involve sharing of expected returns between managers and investors, with higher fees in riskier products, 3) managers pander to investors when investors exhibit biases in their beliefs, and do not correct misperceptions, and 4) despite long run benefits from better performance, the profits from pandering to trusting investors discourage managers from pursuing contrarian strategies relative to the case with no trust. We show how trust-mediated money management renders arbitrage less effective, and may help destabilize financial markets.