Self-serving biases: Evidence from a simulated labor relationship


Autoria(s): Charness, Gary; Haruvy, Ernan
Contribuinte(s)

Universitat Pompeu Fabra. Departament d'Economia i Empresa

Data(s)

15/09/2005

Resumo

Previous studies have found evidence of a self-serving bias in bargaining and dispute resolution. We use experimental data to test for this effect in a simulated labor relatonship. We finda consistent discrepancy between employer beliefs and employee actions that can only be attributed to self-serving biases. This discrepancy is evident through stated beliefs, revealed satisfaction, and actual actions. We present evidenceand discuss implications.

Identificador

http://hdl.handle.net/10230/289

Idioma(s)

eng

Direitos

L'accés als continguts d'aquest document queda condicionat a l'acceptació de les condicions d'ús establertes per la següent llicència Creative Commons

info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess

<a href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/es/">http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/es/</a>

Palavras-Chave #Behavioral and Experimental Economics #experiment #fairness #labor relations #self-serving bias #leex
Tipo

info:eu-repo/semantics/workingPaper