Market Competition and Lower Tier Incentives

The relationship between competition and performance-related pay has been analyzed in single-principal-single-agent models. While this approach yields good predictions for managerial pay schemes, the predictions fail to apply for employees at lower tiers of a firm's hierarchy. In this paper, a principal-multi-agent model of incentive pay is developed which makes it possible to analyze the effect of changes in the competitiveness of markets on lower tier incentive payment schemes. The results explain why the payment schemes of agents located at low and mid tiers are less sensitive to changes in competition when aggregated firm data is used. Journal of Economic Literature classiffication numbers: D82, J21, L13, L22. Keywords: Cournot Competition, Contract Delegation, Moral Hazard, Entry, Market Size, Wage Cost.

Decentralization and the Gains from Monitoring

This paper analyzes the delegation of contracting capacity in a moral hazard environment with sequential production in a project which involves a principal and two agents. The agent in charge of the …nal production can obtain soft information about the other agent's effort choice by investing in monitoring. I investigate the circumstances under which it is optimal for the principal to use a centralized organization in which she designs the contracts with both agents or to use a decentralized organization in which she contracts only one agent, and delegates the power to contract the other agent. It is shown that in this setting a decentralized organization can be superior to a centralized organization. This is because the principal is better off under monitoring and the incentives for an agent to invest in monitoring can be higher in a decentralized organization. The circumstances under which this is true are related to the monitoring costs and the importance of each agent for production. The results explain the recent application of the design-build method in public procurement. Journal of Economic Literature Classi…cation Numbers: D23, D82, L14, L22. Keywords: Decentralization of Contracting, Monitoring, Moral Hazard.

Perceptions of Europe in political and economic elites: a geographical compared analysis of Germany, Spain and Poland

Elite perceptions about Europe are a very important point in order to understand the current European integration process, as well as the future perspectives for the continent. This study makes a comparison between the perceptions which political and economical elites in some European countries have about the European Union process and its mechanisms. The main goal is to identify the differences in positions of each type of elites, as well as the variations among three key countries. The database built thanks to the INTUNE (Integrated and United? A quest for Citizenship in an ¨ever closer Europe¨) Project Survey on European Elites and Masses, funded by the Sixth Framework Programme of the EU [Contract CIT 3-CT-2005-513421] have being used. The questionnaire was applied between February and May 2007, in a total of 18 European countries. The national teams got a total of almost 2000 valid responses at European level. In the analysis we have showed some general descriptive statistics about the perception of Europe taking as a reference two dimensions of the INTUNE project: identity (attachment to the national level, the meaning of being a truly national, and the threats from Turkey that EU is facing at this moment) and representation (trust in European and national institutions, preferences for a national or an European army). The results are presented distinguishing between political (national MP’s in low chambers) and economical elites (presidents of corporations, general managers…) and, at the same time, among three countries: Germany as an original member of the European Union; Spain, incorporated in 1986; and a new member, Poland, joining the EU in 2004.

Modelling dependence in a ratemaking procedure with multivariate Poisson regression models

When actuaries face with the problem of pricing an insurance contract that contains different types of coverage, such as a motor insurance or homeowner's insurance policy, they usually assume that types of claim are independent. However, this assumption may not be realistic: several studies have shown that there is a positive correlation between types of claim. Here we introduce different regression models in order to relax the independence assumption, including zero-inflated models to account for excess of zeros and overdispersion. These models have been largely ignored to multivariate Poisson date, mainly because of their computational di±culties. Bayesian inference based on MCMC helps to solve this problem (and also lets us derive, for several quantities of interest, posterior summaries to account for uncertainty). Finally, these models are applied to an automobile insurance claims database with three different types of claims. We analyse the consequences for pure and loaded premiums when the independence assumption is relaxed by using different multivariate Poisson regression models and their zero-inflated versions.

Dynamic stackelberg game with risk-averse players: optimal risk-sharing under asymmetric information

The objective of this paper is to clarify the interactive nature of the leader-follower relationship when both players are endogenously risk-averse. The analysis is placed in the context of a dynamic closed-loop Stackelberg game with private information. The case of a risk-neutral leader, very often discussed in the literature, is only a borderline possibility in the present study. Each player in the game is characterized by a risk-averse type which is unknown to his opponent. The goal of the leader is to implement an optimal incentive compatible risk-sharing contract. The proposed approach provides a qualitative analysis of adaptive risk behavior profiles for asymmetrically informed players in the context of dynamic strategic interactions modelled as incentive Stackelberg games.

Work values, endogenous sentiments and redistribution

We examine the interactions between individual behavior, sentiments and the social contract in a model of rational voting over redistribution. Agents have moral "work values". Individuals' self-esteem and social consideration of others are endogenously determined comparing behaviors to moral standards. Attitudes toward redistribution depend on self-interest and social preferences. We characterize the politico-economic equilibria in which sentiments, labor supply and redistribution are determined simultaneously. The equilibria feature different degrees of "social cohesion" and redistribution depending on pre-tax income inequality. In clustered equilibria the poor are held partly responsible for their low income since they work less than the moral standard and hence redistribution is low. The paper proposes a novel explanation for the emergence of different sentiments and social contracts across countries. The predictions appear broadly in line with well-documented differences between the United States and Europe.

The Part-time pay penalty in a segmented labor market

This paper is the first to examine the implications of switching to PT work for women's subsequent earnings trajectories, distinguishing by their type of contract: permanent or fixedterm. Using a rich longitudinal Spanish data set from Social Security records of over 76,000 prime-aged women strongly attached to the Spanish labor market, we find that PT work aggravates the segmentation of the labor market insofar there is a PT pay penalty and this penalty is larger and more persistent in the case of women with fixed-term contracts. The paper discusses problems arising in empirical estimation (including a problem not discussed in the literature up to now: the differential measurement error of the LHS variable by PT status), and how to address them. It concludes with policy implications relevant for Continental Europe and its dual structure of employment protection.

Cronyism in Business, Public Sector and Politics

This paper contrasts the incentives for cronyism in business, the public sector and politics within an agency problem model with moral hazard. The analysis is focused on the institutional differences between private, public and political organizations. In business, when facing a residual claimant contract, a chief manager ends up with a relatively moderate …rst-best level of cronyism within a …firm. The institutional framework of the public sector does not allow explicit contracting, which leads to a more severe cronyism problem within public organizations. Finally, it is shown that the nature of political appointments (such that the subordinate's reappointment is conditioned on the chief's re-election) together with implicit contracting makes political cronyism the most extreme case. JEL classifi…cation: D72, D73, D86. Keywords: Cronyism; Meritocracy; Manager; Bureaucrat; Politician.

Decentralization of contracts with interim sidecontracting

This paper gives a new explanation for the phenomena of subcontracting. A model in which a principal contracts two agents who work in a sequence on a project, have soft information and can collude is considered. Side-contracts between agents can be signed at any stage of the game. Due to limited liability and moral hazard agents obtain a rent. The principal’s problem is to find the preferable contracting structure. It is shown that in this setting a decentralized contracting structure can be superior to a centralized structure for the principal. The paper derives the conditions under which this holds. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: D23, D82, L14, L22. Keywords: Contract delegation, Collusion, Interim side-contracting, Moral hazard.

El desistiment del contracte al futur llibre VI del Codi civil de Catalunya

Es proposa que el legislador català reguli, de manera uniforme, el dret de desistiment al Llibre VI CCCat. Pot fer-ho, en el seu cas, fent ús o considerant els models de regulació uniforme que s´està proposant en el context de la revisió de l´acquis comunitari. És aquesta mateixa regulació comunitària la que avala una configuració del dret a desistir com a causa extintiva del contracte, amb eficàcia retroactiva o ex tunc, i, per tant, com a mecanisme que es projecte sobre un contracte perfeccionat, fins i tot consumat. Ara bé, aquesta configuració no hauria de privar al legislador català de l´oportunitat de considerar altres possibilitats: així, la d´articular la facultat de penediment en fase pre-contractual. Serien més d´una les tècniques que faciliten la reflexió abans de l´atorgament del contracte, en comptes de permetre-la després. Convertida en mecanisme post-contractual, haurà d´anar acompanyada de les disposicions que estableixin el règim del contracte mentre no transcorre el termini per a desistir, les conseqüències de l´eventual pèrdua de la cosa entretant no caduqui el dret, les condicions i requisits d´exercici de la facultat i la liquidació de la situació possessòria, en el seu cas. Els comentaris i suggerències que es proposen a l´estudi es formulen a propòsit dels preceptes que, relatius al desistiment, s´incorporaren als Treballs preparatoris del Llibre Sisè del Codi civil de Catalunya (document de 23.04.04)

Tipus Abstractes de Dades i Disseny per Contracte

Biblioteca de tipus abstractes de dades (TADs) que incorpora la tecnologia de disseny per contracte (DbC) i consta bàsicament de dues parts. La primera, l'especificació, que és el punt d'entrada a l'API, és un conjunt d'interfícies, les quals introdueixen les operacions dels TADs i en fixen el comportament, així com defineixen els drets i obligacions dels usuaris.

La protecció de la part feble del contracte en el dret civil català i en el dret civil europeu

La investigación analiza si, con el horizonte del Libro Sexto del Código Civil de Cataluña relativo a las obligaciones y los contratos, el legislador catalán tiene que mantener el modelo tradicional de la rescisión por lesión ultradimidium, o bien tiene que integrar esta institución en el marco de la protección de la parte débil del contrato, en la línea de las modernas propuestas de derecho europeo.

The Limits of Discrete Time Repeated Games:Some Notes and Comments

This paper studies the limits of discrete time repeated games with public monitoring. We solve and characterize the Abreu, Milgrom and Pearce (1991) problem. We found that for the "bad" ("good") news model the lower (higher) magnitude events suggest cooperation, i.e., zero punishment probability, while the highrt (lower) magnitude events suggest defection, i.e., punishment with probability one. Public correlation is used to connect these two sets of signals and to make the enforceability to bind. The dynamic and limit behavior of the punishment probabilities for variations in ... (the discount rate) and ... (the time interval) are characterized, as well as the limit payo¤s for all these scenarios (We also introduce uncertainty in the time domain). The obtained ... limits are to the best of my knowledge, new. The obtained ... limits coincide with Fudenberg and Levine (2007) and Fudenberg and Olszewski (2011), with the exception that we clearly state the precise informational conditions that cause the limit to converge from above, to converge from below or to degenerate. JEL: C73, D82, D86. KEYWORDS: Repeated Games, Frequent Monitoring, Random Pub- lic Monitoring, Moral Hazard, Stochastic Processes.

Slope processes in changing permafrost environments: a geomorphological and sedimentological approach

Estudi realitzat a partir d’una estada al Centro de Estudos Geograficos de la Universidade de Lisboa, Portugal, entre 2011 i 2012. En aquest grup he desenvolupat la meva recerca focalitzada en ambients polars en presència de permafrost, concretament centrada en l’extrem nord-occidental de la Península Antàrtica (Shetland del Sud) i a l’Alt Àrtic (Svalvard). Ambdós àrees han registrat un augment de temperatura molt significatiu les darreres dècades. La meva recerca ha contemplat l’anàlisi de registres sedimentaris (lacustres, eòlics, vessant) i la monitorització de processos geomorfològics actuals a fi efecte d’entendre la dinàmica ambiental present i passada (i.e. clima). Amb aquesta finalitat he realitzat tres campanyes de treball de camp a l’Antàrtida i dues a l’Àrtic. El posterior treball de laboratori i d’oficina està propiciant nombroses publicacions que donen fe dels èxits assolits. A més, cal enfatitzar altres activitats desenvolupades durant la BP-A: coneixement de com organitzar i gestionar una campanya antàrtica, docència universitària, participació en comitès, associacions i tribunals de tesis doctorals, organització i participació en nombroses conferències, treball de camp en noves àrees d’estudi, referee per revistes internacionals, etc. Tanmateix, la concessió del projecte de recerca HOLOANTAR, del qual en sóc l’Investigador Responsable, ha estat l’èxit més important d’aquesta estada. Aquest projecte m’està conferint la capacitat de gestionar i integrar la recerca de 16 investigadors de diferents nacionalitats des d’una perspectiva multidisciplinar. Tothora, cal remarcar que no s’ha assolit un dels èxits que pretenia el meu projecte de BP-A: la transferència del bagatge i coneixement adquirit al sistema de recerca català. Malgrat haver presentat la meva candidatura per un contracte BP-B per tal que aquest background après a l’estranger revertís a Catalunya, el procés de selecció emprat en la convocatòria ho ha impedit i m’obliga a continuar la meva recerca a l’estranger.

Esfingolipids i senyal•lització cel.lular: l'(E)-2-hexadecenal com a possible lípid bioactiu

L’esfingosina-1-fosfat (S1P) és un lípid bioactiu amb funcions crucials en la biologia cel•lular. Entre aquestes, la seva activitat mitogènica i citoprotectora són les més estudiades. L’S1P és catabolitzada intracel•lularment mitjançant l’esfingosina-1-fosfat liasa (SGPL1) per generar (E)-2-hexadecenal i fosforiletanolamina. L’objectiu d’aquest projecte és explorar si l’(E)-2-hexadecenal és realment un catabòlit innocu o bé si, pel seu caràcter acceptor de Michael, és capaç de reaccionar amb pèptids o proteïnes específics. Aquesta interacció podria traduïr-se en funcions biològiques determinades, algunes de les quals són possiblement atribuïdes a l’esfingosina-1-fosfat com a tal. Per poder explorar el potencials adductes proteïcs amb l’aldehid, s’han emprat, sobre cèl•lules HeLa que sobreexpressen SGPL1, sondes anàlegs a esfingosina i esfinganina (i els seus derivats fosforil•lats) que presenten una funció azida en la posició omega de la cadena esfingoide. Aquestes, mitjançant química click sense coure, s’han fet reaccionar amb una molècula que presenta un dibenzociclooctí unit a biotina DBCObiotina). Després d’aïllar les proteïnes així biotinilades amb una reïna d’estreptavidina, aquestes es van separar per electroforesi. Les bandes proteïques observades es van extreure del gel i es van digerir amb tripsina, per posteriorment analitzar els pèptids per MALDI-TOF, el que permetria l’identificació de proteïnes a partir de “peptide mass fingerprinting”. Lamentablement, a la fi d’aquest contracte, encara no s’ha pogut identificar cap proteïna que s’uneixi a l’aldehid alliberat per la reacció de l’esfingosina-1- fosfat liasa. No obstant, durant aquest temps s’ha millorat el mètode per detectar aquests adductes proteïcs. Per això, si la recerca continua en aquesta línia, properament es podria saber amb certesa si existeixen o no aquestes interaccions covalents entre determinades proteïnes i l’(E)-2-hexadecenal.