Decentralization of contracts with interim sidecontracting
| Contribuinte(s) |
Universitat Rovira i Virgili. Departament d'Economia Universitat Rovira i Virgili. Centre de Recerca en Economia Industrial i Economia Pública |
|---|---|
| Data(s) |
2011
|
| Resumo |
This paper gives a new explanation for the phenomena of subcontracting. A model in which a principal contracts two agents who work in a sequence on a project, have soft information and can collude is considered. Side-contracts between agents can be signed at any stage of the game. Due to limited liability and moral hazard agents obtain a rent. The principal’s problem is to find the preferable contracting structure. It is shown that in this setting a decentralized contracting structure can be superior to a centralized structure for the principal. The paper derives the conditions under which this holds. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: D23, D82, L14, L22. Keywords: Contract delegation, Collusion, Interim side-contracting, Moral hazard. |
| Formato |
25 345599 bytes application/pdf |
| Identificador | |
| Idioma(s) |
eng |
| Relação |
Documents de treball del Departament d'Economia;2011-15 |
| Direitos |
Aquest document està subjecte a una llicència d'ús de Creative Commons, amb la qual es permet copiar, distribuir i comunicar públicament l'obra sempre que se'n citin l'autor original, la universitat i el departament i no se'n faci cap ús comercial ni obra derivada, tal com queda estipulat en la llicència d'ús (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/2.5/es/) |
| Palavras-Chave | #Subcontractació #33 - Economia |
| Tipo |
info:eu-repo/semantics/workingPaper |
