The Limits of Discrete Time Repeated Games:Some Notes and Comments

This paper studies the limits of discrete time repeated games with public monitoring. We solve and characterize the Abreu, Milgrom and Pearce (1991) problem. We found that for the "bad" ("good") news model the lower (higher) magnitude events suggest cooperation, i.e., zero punishment probability, while the highrt (lower) magnitude events suggest defection, i.e., punishment with probability one. Public correlation is used to connect these two sets of signals and to make the enforceability to bind. The dynamic and limit behavior of the punishment probabilities for variations in ... (the discount rate) and ... (the time interval) are characterized, as well as the limit payo¤s for all these scenarios (We also introduce uncertainty in the time domain). The obtained ... limits are to the best of my knowledge, new. The obtained ... limits coincide with Fudenberg and Levine (2007) and Fudenberg and Olszewski (2011), with the exception that we clearly state the precise informational conditions that cause the limit to converge from above, to converge from below or to degenerate. JEL: C73, D82, D86. KEYWORDS: Repeated Games, Frequent Monitoring, Random Pub- lic Monitoring, Moral Hazard, Stochastic Processes.