Solidarity and uniform rules in bankruptcy problems

The idea of ensuring a guarantee (a minimum amount of the resources) to each agent has recently acquired great relevance, in both social and politi- cal terms. Furthermore, the notion of Solidarity has been treated frequently in redistribution problems to establish that any increment of the resources should be equally distributed taking into account some relevant characteris- tics. In this paper, we combine these two general concepts, guarantee and solidarity, to characterize the uniform rules in bankruptcy problems (Con- strained Equal Awards and Constrained Equal Losses rules). Keywords: Constrained Equal Awards, Constrained Equal Losses, Lower bounds, Bankruptcy problems, Solidarity. JEL classification: C71, D63, D71.

Differential epipolar constraint in mobile robot egomotion estimation

The estimation of camera egomotion is a well established problem in computer vision. Many approaches have been proposed based on both the discrete and the differential epipolar constraint. The discrete case is mainly used in self-calibrated stereoscopic systems, whereas the differential case deals with a unique moving camera. The article surveys several methods for mobile robot egomotion estimation covering more than 0.5 million samples using synthetic data. Results from real data are also given

Constraint algorithm for k-presymplectic Hamiltonian systems. Application to singular field theories

The k-symplectic formulation of field theories is especially simple, since only tangent and cotangent bundles are needed in its description. Its defining elements show a close relationship with those in the symplectic formulation of mechanics. It will be shown that this relationship also stands in the presymplectic case. In a natural way,one can mimick the presymplectic constraint algorithm to obtain a constraint algorithmthat can be applied to k-presymplectic field theory, and more particularly to the Lagrangian and Hamiltonian formulations offield theories defined by a singular Lagrangian, as well as to the unified Lagrangian-Hamiltonian formalism (Skinner--Rusk formalism) for k-presymplectic field theory. Two examples of application of the algorithm are also analyzed.

Constraint satisfaction techniques under uncertain conditions for fault diagnosis in nonlinear dynamic systems

The speed of fault isolation is crucial for the design and reconfiguration of fault tolerant control (FTC). In this paper the fault isolation problem is stated as a constraint satisfaction problem (CSP) and solved using constraint propagation techniques. The proposed method is based on constraint satisfaction techniques and uncertainty space refining of interval parameters. In comparison with other approaches based on adaptive observers, the major advantage of the presented method is that the isolation speed is fast even taking into account uncertainty in parameters, measurements and model errors and without the monotonicity assumption. In order to illustrate the proposed approach, a case study of a nonlinear dynamic system is presented

Comparison of Work Scheduling Using Constraint Programming or Auctions

Business processes designers take into account the resources that the processes would need, but, due to the variable cost of certain parameters (like energy) or other circumstances, this scheduling must be done when business process enactment. In this report we formalize the energy aware resource cost, including time and usage dependent rates. We also present a constraint programming approach and an auction-based approach to solve the mentioned problem including a comparison of them and a comparison of the proposed algorithms for solving them

From bargaining solutions to claims rules: a proportional approach

Is it important to negotiate on proportions rather than on numbers? To answer this question, we analyze the behavior of well-known bargaining solutions and the claims rules they induce when they are applied to a "proportionally transformed" bargaining set SP -so-called bargaining-in-proportions set. The idea of applying bargaining solutions to claims problems was already developed in Dagan and Volij (1993). They apply the bargaining solutions over a bargaining set that is the one de ned by the claims and the endowment. A comparison among our results and theirs is provided. Keywords: Bargaining problem, Claims problem, Proportional, Constrained Equal Awards, Constrained Equal Losses, Nash bargaining solution. JEL classi fication: C71, D63, D71.

Rules vs. political discretion: evidence from constitutionally guaranteed transfers to local governments in Brazil

Can rules be used to shield public resources from political interference? The Brazilian constitution and national tax code stipulate that revenue sharing transfers to municipal governments be determined by the size of counties in terms of estimated population. In this paper I document that the population estimates which went into the transfer allocation formula for the year 1991 were manipulated, resulting in significant transfer differentials over the entire 1990's. I test whether conditional on county characteristics that might account for the manipulation, center-local party alignment, party popularity and the extent of interparty fragmentation at the county level are correlated with estimated populations in 1991. Results suggest that revenue sharing transfers were targeted at right-wing national deputies in electorally fragmented counties as well as aligned local executives.

Are rules-based government programs shielded from special-interest politics? Evidence from revenue-sharing transfers in Brazil

Manipulation of government finances for the benefit of narrowly defined groups is usuallythought to be limited to the part of the budget over which politicians exercise discretion inthe short run, such as earmarks. Analyzing a revenue-sharing program between the centraland local governments in Brazil that uses an allocation formula based on local population estimates,I document two main results: first, that the population estimates entering the formulawere manipulated and second, that this manipulation was political in nature. Consistent withswing-voter targeting by the right-wing central government, I find that municipalities withroughly equal right-wing and non-right-wing vote shares benefited relative to opposition orconservative core support municipalities. These findings suggest that the exclusive focus ondiscretionary transfers in the extant empirical literature on special-interest politics may understatethe true scope of tactical redistribution that is going on under programmatic disguise.

Locating emergency services with priority rules: The priority queuing covering location problem

One of the assumptions of the Capacitated Facility Location Problem (CFLP) is thatdemand is known and fixed. Most often, this is not the case when managers take somestrategic decisions such as locating facilities and assigning demand points to thosefacilities. In this paper we consider demand as stochastic and we model each of thefacilities as an independent queue. Stochastic models of manufacturing systems anddeterministic location models are put together in order to obtain a formula for thebacklogging probability at a potential facility location.Several solution techniques have been proposed to solve the CFLP. One of the mostrecently proposed heuristics, a Reactive Greedy Adaptive Search Procedure, isimplemented in order to solve the model formulated. We present some computationalexperiments in order to evaluate the heuristics performance and to illustrate the use ofthis new formulation for the CFLP. The paper finishes with a simple simulationexercise.

Monetary policy rules and macroeconomic stability: Evidence and some theory

We estimate a forward-looking monetary policy reaction function for thepostwar United States economy, before and after Volcker's appointmentas Fed Chairman in 1979. Our results point to substantial differencesin the estimated rule across periods. In particular, interest ratepolicy in the Volcker-Greenspan period appears to have been much moresensitive to changes in expected inflation than in the pre-Volckerperiod. We then compare some of the implications of the estimated rulesfor the equilibrium properties of inflation and output, using a simplemacroeconomic model, and show that the Volcker-Greenspan rule is stabilizing.

Efficient interval scoring rules

Scoring rules that elicit an entire belief distribution through the elicitation of point beliefsare time-consuming and demand considerable cognitive e¤ort. Moreover, the results are validonly when agents are risk-neutral or when one uses probabilistic rules. We investigate a classof rules in which the agent has to choose an interval and is rewarded (deterministically) onthe basis of the chosen interval and the realization of the random variable. We formulatean e¢ ciency criterion for such rules and present a speci.c interval scoring rule. For single-peaked beliefs, our rule gives information about both the location and the dispersion of thebelief distribution. These results hold for all concave utility functions.

Rules or consequences? The role of ethical mindsets in moral dynamics

Recent research on the dynamics of moral behavior has documented two contrastingphenomena - moral consistency and moral balancing. Moral balancing refers to thephenomenon whereby behaving (un)ethically decreases the likelihood of doing so againat a later time. Moral consistency describes the opposite pattern - engaging in(un)ethical behavior increases the likelihood of doing so later on. Three studies supportthe hypothesis that individuals' ethical mindset (i.e., outcome-based versus rule-based)moderates the impact of an initial (un)ethical act on the likelihood of behaving ethicallyin a subsequent occasion. More specifically, an outcome-based mindset facilitates moralbalancing and a rule-based mindset facilitates moral consistency.

Setting the rules of the game: The choice of electoral systems in advanced democracies

The origins of electoral systems have received scant attention in the literature. Looking at the history of electoral rules in the advanced world in the last century, this paper shows that the existing wide variation in electoral rules across nations can be traced to the strategic decisions that the current ruling parties, anticipating the coordinating consequences of different electoral regimes, make to maximize their representation according to the following conditions. On the one hand, as long as the electoral arena does not change substantially and the current electoral regime serves the ruling parties well, the latter have no incentives to modify the electoral regime. On the other hand, as soon as the electoral arena changes (due to the entry of new voters or a change in their preferences), the ruling parties will entertain changing the electoral system, depending on two main conditions: the emergence of new parties and the coordinating capacities of the old ruling parties. Accordingly, if the new parties are strong, the old parties shift from plurality/majority rules to proportional representation (PR) only if the latter are locked into a 'non-Duvergerian' equilibrium; i.e. if no old party enjoys a dominant position (the case of most small European states)--conversely, they do not if a Duvergerian equilibrium exists (the case of Great Britain). Similarly, whenever the new entrants are weak, a non-PR system is maintained, regardless of the structure of the old party system (the case of the USA). The paper discusses as well the role of trade and ethnic and religious heterogeneity in the adoption of PR rules.

Price regulation of plastic money: A critical assessment of Spanish rules

Recent decisions by the Spanish national competition authority (TDC) mandate paymentsystems to include only two costs when setting their domestic multilateral interchange fees(MIF): a fixed processing cost and a variable cost for the risk of fraud. This artificiallowering of MIFs will not lower consumer prices, because of uncompetitive retailing; but itwill however lead to higher cardholders fees and, likely, new prices for point of saleterminals, delaying the development of the immature Spanish card market. Also, to the extent that increased cardholders fees do not offset the fall in MIFs revenue, the task of issuing new cards will be underpaid relatively to the task of acquiring new merchants, causing an imbalance between the two sides of the networks. Moreover, the pricing scheme arising from the decisions will cause unbundling and underprovision of those services whose costs are excluded. Indeed, the payment guarantee and the free funding period will tend to be removed from the package of services currently provided, to be either provided by third parties, by issuers for a separate fee, or not provided at all, especially to smaller and medium-sized merchants. Transaction services will also suffer the consequences that the TDC precludes pricing them in variable terms.