From bargaining solutions to claims rules: a proportional approach
| Contribuinte(s) |
Universitat Rovira i Virgili. Departament d'Economia Universitat Rovira i Virgili. Centre de Recerca en Economia Industrial i Economia Pública |
|---|---|
| Data(s) |
2013
|
| Resumo |
Is it important to negotiate on proportions rather than on numbers? To answer this question, we analyze the behavior of well-known bargaining solutions and the claims rules they induce when they are applied to a "proportionally transformed" bargaining set SP -so-called bargaining-in-proportions set. The idea of applying bargaining solutions to claims problems was already developed in Dagan and Volij (1993). They apply the bargaining solutions over a bargaining set that is the one de ned by the claims and the endowment. A comparison among our results and theirs is provided. Keywords: Bargaining problem, Claims problem, Proportional, Constrained Equal Awards, Constrained Equal Losses, Nash bargaining solution. JEL classi fication: C71, D63, D71. |
| Formato |
20 p. |
| Identificador | |
| Idioma(s) |
eng |
| Publicador |
Universitat Rovira i Virgili. Departament d'Economia |
| Relação |
Documents de treball del Departament d'Economia;2013-14 |
| Direitos |
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess L'accés als continguts d'aquest document queda condicionat a l'acceptació de les condicions d'ús establertes per la següent llicència Creative Commons: http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/es/ |
| Fonte |
RECERCAT (Dipòsit de la Recerca de Catalunya) |
| Palavras-Chave | #Jocs cooperatius #Igualtat #Decisió, Presa de #33 - Economia |
| Tipo |
info:eu-repo/semantics/workingPaper |
