Solidarity and uniform rules in bankruptcy problems


Autoria(s): Giménez-Gómez, José Manuel; Peris, Josep E.
Contribuinte(s)

Universitat Rovira i Virgili. Departament d'Economia

Universitat Rovira i Virgili. Centre de Recerca en Economia Industrial i Economia Pública

Data(s)

2012

Resumo

The idea of ensuring a guarantee (a minimum amount of the resources) to each agent has recently acquired great relevance, in both social and politi- cal terms. Furthermore, the notion of Solidarity has been treated frequently in redistribution problems to establish that any increment of the resources should be equally distributed taking into account some relevant characteris- tics. In this paper, we combine these two general concepts, guarantee and solidarity, to characterize the uniform rules in bankruptcy problems (Con- strained Equal Awards and Constrained Equal Losses rules). Keywords: Constrained Equal Awards, Constrained Equal Losses, Lower bounds, Bankruptcy problems, Solidarity. JEL classification: C71, D63, D71.

Formato

9 p.

Identificador

http://hdl.handle.net/2072/182646

Idioma(s)

eng

Publicador

Universitat Rovira i Virgili. Departament d'Economia

Relação

Documents de treball del Departament d'Economia;2012-05

Direitos

info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess

L'accés als continguts d'aquest document queda condicionat a l'acceptació de les condicions d'ús establertes per la següent llicència Creative Commons: http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/es/

Fonte

RECERCAT (Dipòsit de la Recerca de Catalunya)

Palavras-Chave #Fallida #Jocs cooperatius #Economia del benestar #Elecció social #33 - Economia
Tipo

info:eu-repo/semantics/workingPaper