Grammar and disciplinary culture : a corpus-based study

The present study provides a usage-based account of how three grammatical structures, declarative content clauses, interrogative content clause and as-predicative constructions, are used in academic research articles. These structures may be used in both knowledge claims and citations, and they often express evaluative meanings. Using the methodology of quantitative corpus linguistics, I investigate how the culture of the academic discipline influences the way in which these constructions are used in research articles. The study compares the rates of occurrence of these grammatical structures and investigates their co-occurrence patterns in articles representing four different disciplines (medicine, physics, law, and literary criticism). The analysis is based on a purpose-built 2-million-word corpus, which has been part-of-speech tagged. The analysis demonstrates that the use of these grammatical structures varies between disciplines, and further shows that the differences observed in the corpus data are linked with differences in the nature of knowledge and the patterns of enquiry. The constructions in focus tend to be more frequently used in the soft disciplines, law and literary criticism, where their co-occurrence patterns are also more varied. This reflects both the greater variety of topics discussed in these disciplines, and the higher frequency of references to statements made by other researchers. Knowledge-building in the soft fields normally requires a careful contextualisation of the arguments, giving rise to statements reporting earlier research employing the constructions in focus. In contrast, knowledgebuilding in the hard fields is typically a cumulative process, based on agreed-upon methods of analysis. This characteristic is reflected in the structure and contents of research reports, which offer fewer opportunities for using these constructions.

Onko eläimillä oikeuksia? : Eläinkoelainsäädännön kehitys ja nykytila

The use of animals in scientific experiments tends to arouse strong emotional reactions among the general public, the most essential concern being the pain and suffering they cause. It is felt that suffering inflicted on other beings, including animals, is not morally acceptable. Is the function of a researcher who uses animals morally acceptable and beneficial for humans and animals? May such a researcher him/herself decide what animal experiments he/she can perform or should some outsider have the right to decide what kind of experiments a researcher can or cannot perform? The research material comprises the legislation of Finland and that of some member and non-member states of the European Union, together with European Union directives and pertinent preparatory parliamentary documents. The author has likewise studied the vast literature on animal rights, both pro and contra writings and opinions. The opinions of philosophers on the moral and legal rights of animals are markedly conflicting. Some strongly support the existence of rights, while others totally refute such an opinion, claiming that the question is only of the moral principles of man himself which imply that animals must be treated in a human manner. Speaking of animal rights only tends to muddle ideas on the one hand in philosophical considerations and in legal analyses on the other. The development of legislation in Finland and some other member states of the European Union has in principle been similar. In Finland, the positive laws on animal experiments nowadays comply with the EU directive 86/609/EEC. However, there are marked differences between member states in respect of the way they have in practice implemented the principles of the EU directive. No essential alterations have in practice been discernible in the actual performance of animal experiments during the decades when legislation has been developed in different countries. Self-regulation within the scientific community has been markedly more effectual than legislative procedures. Legal regulation has nevertheless clearly influenced the quality of breeding and life conditions of experimental laboratory animals, cages for example being nowadays larger than hitherto. EU parliament and council have now accepted in September 2010 a new directive on animal experiments which must be implemented in the national legislations by January 1, 2013.

Beyond Words : The European Court of Justice and Legal Certainty in Multilingual EU Law

This study addresses the issue of multilingualism in EU law. More specifically, it explores the implications of multilingualism for conceptualising legal certainty, a central principle of law both in domestic and EU legal systems. The main question addressed is how multilingualism and legal certainty may be reconciled in the EU legal system. The study begins with a discussion on the role of translation in drafting EU legislation and its implications for interpreting EU law at the European Court of Justice (ECJ). Uncertainty regarding the meaning of multilingual EU law and the interrelationship between multilingualism and ECJ methods of interpretation are explored. This analysis leads to questioning the importance of linguistic-semantic methods of interpretation, especially the role of comparing language versions for clarifying meaning and the ordinary meaning thesis, and to placing emphasis on other, especially the teleological, purpose-oriented method of interpretation. As regards the principle of legal certainty, the starting-point is a two-dimensional concept consisting of both formal and substantive elements; of predictability and acceptability. Formal legal certainty implies that laws and adjudication, in particular, must be predictable. Substantive legal certainty is related to rational acceptability of judicial decision-making placing emphasis on its acceptability to the legal community in question. Contrary to predictability that one might intuitively relate to linguistic-semantic methods of interpretation, the study suggests a new conception of legal certainty where purpose, telos, and other dynamic methods of interpretation are of particular significance for meaning construction in multilingual EU law. Accordingly, the importance of purposive, teleological interpretation as the standard doctrine of interpretation in a multilingual legal system is highlighted. The focus on rational, substantive acceptability results in emphasising discourse among legal actors among the EU legal community and stressing the need to give reasons in favour of proposed meaning in accordance with dynamic methods of interpretation including considerations related to purposes, aims, objectives and consequences. In this context, the role of ideal discourse situations and communicative action taking the form of interaction among the EU legal community in an ongoing dialogue especially in the preliminary ruling procedure is brought into focus. In order for this dialogue to function, it requires that the ECJ gives persuasive, convincing and acceptable reasons in justifying its decisions. This necessitates transparency, sincerity, and dialogue with the relevant audience.

Despairing Justice and the Ethics of Legal Interpretation

This study discusses legal interpretation. The question is how legal texts, for instance laws, statutes and regulations, can and do have meaning. Language makes interpretation difficult as it holds no definite meanings. When the theoretical connection between semantics and legal meaning is loosened and we realise that language cannot be a means of justifying legal decisions, the responsibility inherent in legal interpretation can be seen in full. We are thus compelled to search for ways to analyse this responsibility. The main argument of the book is that the responsibility of legal interpretation contains a responsibility towards the text that is interpreted (and through the mediation of the text also towards the legal system), but not only this. It is not simply a responsibility to read and read well, but it transcends on a broader scale. It includes responsibility for the effects of the interpretation in a particular situation and with regard to the people whose case is decided. Ultimately, it is a responsibility to do justice. These two aspects of responsibility are conceptualised here as the two dimensions of the ethics of legal interpretation: the textual and the situational. The basic conception of language presented here is provided by Ludwig Wittgenstein s later philosophy, but the argument is not committed to only one philosophical tradition. Wittgenstein can be counterpointed in interesting ways by Jacques Derrida s ideas on language and meaning. Derrida s work also functions as a contrast to hermeneutic theories. It is argued that the seed to an answer to the question of meaning lies in the inter-personal and situated activity of interpretation and communication, an idea that can be discerned in different ways in the works of Wittgenstein, Derrida and Hans-Georg Gadamer. This way the question of meaning naturally leads us to think about ethics, which is approached here through the philosophy of Emmanuel Levinas. His thinking, focusing on topics such as otherness, friendship and hospitality, provides possibilities for answering some of the questions posed in this book. However, at the same time we move inside a normativity where ethics and politics come together in many ways. The responsibility of legal interpretation is connected to the political and this has to be acknowledged lest we forget that law always implies force. But it is argued here that the political can be explored in positive terms as it does not have to mean only power or violence.

Hyvän hallinnon muunnelmat : Julkisoikeudellinen tutkimus

This doctoral thesis analyses the concepts of good governance and good administration. The hypothesis is that the concepts are radically indeterminate and over-inclusive. In the study the mechanisms of this indeterminacy are examined: why are the concepts indeterminate; how does the indeterminacy work and, indeed, is it by any means plausible to try to define the concepts in a closed way? Therefore, the study focuses on various current perspectives, from which the concepts of good governance and good administration are relevant and what kind of discursive contents they may include. The approach is both legal (a right to good administration) and one of moral philosophy and discourse analysis. It appears that under the meta-discourse of good governance and good administration there are different sub-discourses: at least a legal sub-discourse, a moral/ethical sub-discourse and sub-discourses concerning economic effectiveness and the promotion of societal and economic development. The main claim is that the various sub-discourses do not necessarily identify each other s value premises and conceptual underpinnings: for which value could the attribute good be substituted in different discourses (for example, good as legal, good as ethical and so on)? The underlying presumption is, of course, that values are ultimately subjective and incommensurable. One possible way of trying to resolve the dynamics of possible discourse collisions is to employ the systems theory approach. Can the different discourses be interpreted as autopoietic systems, which create and change themselves according to their own criteria and are formed around a binary code? Can the different discourses be reconciled or are they indifferent or hostile towards each other? Is there a hegemonic super discourse or is the construction of a correct meaning purely contextual? The questions come back to the notions of administration and governance themselves the terms the good in its polymorphic ways is attempting to define. Do they engage different political rationalities? It can be suggested that administration is labelled by instrumental reason, governance by teleological reason. In the final analysis, the most crucial factor is that of power. It is about a Schmittian battle of concepts; how meanings are constructed in the interplay between conceptual ambiguity and social power. Thus, the study deals with administrative law, legal theory and the limits of law from the perspective of revealing critique.

Poliisiesimiehen käskyvalta : erityisesti aseenkäytön arvioinnissa

Tutkin rakenne- eli järjestelmäanalyyttiseksi lainopiksi kutsumallani metodilla poliisiesimiehen käskyvaltaa hallin-to- ja rikosoikeuden muodostamassa kokonaisuudessa käyttäen vertailupintana oikeuskäytäntöä ja oikeusvertai-lua. Hallinto-oikeus luo perustan, jota vasten esimiehen käskyvallan ulottuvuuksia tarkastelen. Siihen kuuluvat poliisiorganisaation hierarkkinen rakenne ja käskynalaisuussuhteet sekä hallinnon lainalaisuus ja poliisin toimi-valta. Toimivaltaa käsitellään laajassa (tehtäväpiiri) ja suppeassa (toimivaltanormit) merkityksessä. Esimiehen käskyvaltaa voi pitää sekä organisatorisena että hallinnollisena toimivaltana. Se määrittää lähtökohtaisesti polii-sihallinnon sisäistä työnjakoa, mutta sen merkitys on usein ratkaiseva poliisin puuttuessa yksityishenkilön pe-rusoikeuksiin. Perusoikeuksiin liittyy osaltaan myös lainsäädännöllinen näkökulma, koska tällaiset toimivaltuudet tulisi säätää riittävän täsmällisesti ja tarkka-rajaisesti lakitasolla. Nykyään poliisimiehen käskyvallasta säädetään poliisiasetuksen 7 §:ssä, jonka mukaan poliisimiehen on noudatettava esimiehen toimivaltansa rajoissa antamia käskyjä, määräyksiä ja ohjeita. Meneillään oleva poliisilain kokonaisuudistus tuo oman näkökulman lainvalmiste-luun, jonka vuoksi esitän työssä myös sääntelyehdotuksen ja oikeustieteellisen kuvauksen keskustelun pohjaksi. Hallinto-oikeuden ja rikosoikeuden rajamaille sijoittuu kysymys esimiehen määräämän poliisitaktiikan ja oikeut-tamisperusteiden välisestä suhteesta. Nykyisin esimerkiksi hätävarjelun ei yleensä katsottane kuuluvan poliisilain 1 §:ssä säädetyn poliisin tehtävän suorittamiseen, mikä tarkoittaa virkatehtävän suppeaa määrittelyä. Kuitenkin tosiasiallisesti poliisin tärkeimpiä tehtäviä on hengen ja terveyden suojaaminen, mikä koskee niin poliisitoiminnan johtamista kuin varsinaista hätävarjelutekoakin. Tutkielmassa onkin otettu kantaa poliisitaktiikan ja hätävarjelun välisen vuorovaikutuksen systematisoimiseksi. Johtamisessa tarvittavien käskyjen, määräysten ja ohjeiden oikeudellinen merkitys ei ole täysin selvä, mikä saattaa pahimmillaan haitata poliisitoiminnallisen tilanteen hoitamista sekä jälkikäteisen oikeudellisen vastuun oikeudenmukaista jakautumista. Poliisitaktiikan ja tosi-asiallisen voimankäytön välinen ero näkyy sekä kotimaisissa oikeustapauksissa että Euroopan ihmisoikeustuo-mioistuimen tuomioissa, jotka jakautuvat tilanteen suunnittelun ja valvonnan sekä aseenkäytön arviointiin. Rikoslain kokonaisuudistuksessa säädettiin anteeksiantoperuste sotilasesimiehen käskyyn perustuen. Samalla hallituksen esityksessä sivuttiin muun virkakäskyn merkitystä erilaisissa organisaatioissa. Sotilasesimiehen käs-kyvalta ei ole analogisesti suoraan sovellettavissa poliisiorganisaatioon. Kuitenkin punninta, joka liittyy sotilas-esimiehen käskyvaltaan, on samankaltaista myös muissa hierarkkisissa organisaatioissa. Esitöissä on esitetty poliisiorganisaatioon liittyen kaksi vaihtoehtoa. Ensinnäkin on mahdollista säätää erehdysoppiin ja osittain ana-logisesti sotilasesimiehen käskyvaltasäännökseen perustuva malli. Toisaalta poliisiesimiehen käskyvaltaa voi pitää pääosin hallinto-oikeudellisin keinoin ratkeavana ongelmana, jolloin rikoslakiin ei ole tarvetta lisätä erillistä anteeksiantoperustetta vaan arviointi tehdään rikoslain yleisten oppien kautta. Tällöin tulisi säätää poliisiesimiehen käskyvallasta ja siihen liittyvistä velvoitteista poliisilaissa. Työssä on pyritty arvioimaan myös eri oikeuskulttuurien välisiä eroja. Tämän vertailun kohteina on Saksan ja Ruotsin oikeusjärjestys ja oikeustiede.

Legal Reasoning in Context

This study in EU law analyses the reasoning of the Court of Justice (the Court of Justice of the European Union) in a set of its preliminary rulings. Preliminary rulings are answers to national courts questions on the interpretation (and validity) of EU law called preliminary references. These questions concern specific legal issues that have arisen in legal disputes before the national courts. The Court of Justice alone has the ultimate authority to interpret EU law. The preliminary rulings bind the national courts in the cases giving rise to the preliminary reference, and the interpretations of EU law offered in the preliminary rulings are considered generally binding on all instances applying EU law. EU law is often described as a dynamic legal order and the Court of Justice as at the vanguard of developing it. It is generally assumed that the Court of Justice is striving to realise the EU s meta-level purpose (telos): integration. Against this backdrop one can understand the criticism the Court of Justice is often faced with in certain fields of EU law that can be described as developing. This criticism concerns the Court s (negatively) activist way of not just stating the law but developing or even making law. It is difficult to analyse or prove wrong this accusation as it is not in methodological terms clearly established what constitutes judicial activism, or more exactly where the threshold of negative activism lies. Moreover, one popular approach to assessing the role of the Court of Justice described as integration through law has become fairly political, neglecting to take into consideration the special nature of law as both facilitating and constraining action, not merely a medium for furthering integration. This study offers a legal reasoning approach of a more legalist nature, in order to balance the existing mix of approaches to explaining what the Court of Justice does and how. Reliance on legal reasoning is found to offer a working framework for analysis, whereas the tools for an analysis based on activism are found lacking. The legal reasoning approach enables one to assess whether or not the Court of Justice is pertaining to its own established criteria of interpretation of EU law, and if it is not, one should look more in detail at how the interpretation fits with earlier case-law and doctrines of EU law. This study examines the reasoning of the Court of Justice in a set of objectively chosen cases. The emphasis of the study is on analysing how the Court of Justice applies the established criteria of interpretation it has assumed for itself. Moreover, the judgments are assessed not only in terms of reasoning but also for meaningful silences they contain. The analysis is furthermore contextualised by taking into consideration how the cases were commented by legal scholars, their substantive EU law context, and also their larger politico-historical context. In this study, the analysis largely shows that the Court of Justice is interpreting EU law in accordance with its previous practice. Its reasoning retains connection with the linguistic or semiotic criteria of interpretation, while emphasis lies on systemic reasoning. Moreover, although there are a few judgments where the Court of Justice offers clearly dynamic reasoning or what can be considered as substantive reasoning stemming from, for example, common sense or reasonableness, such reasons are most often given in addition to systemic ones. In this sense and even when considered in its broader context, the case-law analysed in this study does not portray a specifically activist image of the Court of Justice. The legal reasoning approach is a valid alternative for explaining how and why the Court of Justice interprets EU law as it does.

An Axiom of Military Law : Applicability of National Criminal Law to Military Personnel and Associated Civilians Abroad

States regularly deploy elements of their armed forces abroad. When that happens, the military personnel concerned largely remain governed by the penal law of the State that they serve. This extraterritorial extension of national criminal law, which has been treated as axiomatic in domestic law and ignored by international law scholarship, is the subject of this dissertation. The first part of the study considers the ambit of national criminal law without any special regard to the armed forces. It explores the historical development of the currently prevailing system of territorial law and looks at the ambit that national legal systems claim today. Turning then to international law, the study debunks the oddly persistent belief that States enjoy a freedom to extend their laws to extraterritorial conduct as they please, and that they are in this respect constrained only by some specific prohibitions in international law. Six arguments historical, empirical, ideological, functional, doctrinal and systemic are advanced to support a contrary view: that States are prohibited from extending the reach of their legal systems abroad, unless they can rely on a permissive principle of international law for doing so. The second part of the study deals specifically with State jurisdiction in a military context, that is to say, as applied to military personnel in the strict sense (service members) and various civilians serving with or accompanying the forces (associated civilians). While the status of armed forces on foreign soil has transformed from one encapsulated in the customary concept of extraterritoriality to a modern regulation of immunities granted by treaties, elements of armed forces located abroad usually do enjoy some degree of insulation from the legal system of the host State. As a corollary, they should generally remain covered by the law of their own State. The extent of this extraterritorial extension of national law is revealed in a comparative review of national legislation, paying particular attention to recent legal reforms in the United States and the United Kingdom two states that have sought to extend the scope of their national law to cover the conduct of military contractor personnel. The principal argument of the dissertation is that applying national criminal law to service members and associated civilians abroad is distinct from other extraterritorial claims of jurisdiction (in particular, the nationality principle or the protective principle of jurisdiction). The service jurisdiction over the armed forces has a distinct aim: ensuring the coherence and indivisibility of the forces and maintaining discipline. Furthermore, the exercise of service jurisdiction seeks to reduce the chances of the State itself becoming internationally liable for the conduct of its service members and associated civilians. Critically, the legal system of the troop-deploying State, by extending its reach abroad, seeks to avoid accountability gaps that might result from immunities from host State law.

Evidence in European Asylum Procedures

This thesis explores the particular framework of evidentiary assessment of three selected appellate national asylum procedures in Europe and discusses the relationship between these procedures, on the one hand, and between these procedures and other legal systems, including the EU legal order and international law, on the other. A theme running throughout the thesis is the EU strivings towards approximation of national asylum procedures and my study analyses the evidentiary assessment of national procedures with the aim of pinpointing similarities and differences, and the influences which affect these distinctions. The thesis first explores the frames construed for national evidentiary solutions by studying the object of decision-making and the impact of legal systems outside the national. Second, the study analyses the factual evidentiary assessment of three national procedures - German, Finnish and English. Thirdly, the study explores the interrelationship between these procedures and the legal systems influencing them and poses questions in relation to the strivings of EU and methods of convergence. The thesis begins by stating the framework and starting points for the research. It moves on to establish keys of comparison concerning four elements of evidentiary assessment that are of importance to any appellate asylum procedure, and that can be compared between national procedures, on the one hand, and between international, regional and national frameworks, on the other. Four keys of comparison are established: the burden of proof, demands for evidentiary robustness, the standard of proof and requirements for the methods of evidentiary assessment. These keys of comparison are then identified in three national appellate asylum procedures, and in order to come to conclusions on the evidentiary standards of the appellate asylum procedures, relevant elements of the asylum procedures in general are presented. Further, institutional, formal and procedural matters which have an impact on the evidentiary standards in the national appellate procedures are analysed. From there, the thesis moves on to establish the relationship between national evidentiary standards and the legal systems which affect them, and gives reasons for similarities and divergences. Further, the thesis studies the impact of the national frameworks on the regional and international level. Lastly, the dissertation makes a de lege ferenda survey of the relationship between EU developments, the goal of harmonization in relation to national asylum procedures and the particular feature of evidentiary standards in national appellate asylum procedures. Methodology The thesis follows legal dogmatic methods. The aim is to analyse legal norms and legal constructions and give them content and context. My study takes as its outset an understanding of the purposes for legal research also regarding evidence and asylum to determine the contents of valid law through analysis and systematization. However, as evidentiary issues traditionally are normatively vaguely defined, a strict traditional normative dogmatic approach is not applied. For the same reason a traditionalist and strict legal positivism is not applied. The dogmatics applied to the analysis of the study is supported by practical analysis. The aim is not only to reach conclusions concerning the contents of legal norms and the requirements of law, but also to study the use and practical functioning of these norms, giving them a practcial context. Further, the study relies on a comparative method. A functionalist comparative method is employed and keys of comparison are found in evidentiary standards of three selected national appellate asylum procedures. The functioning equivalences of German, Finnish and English evidentiary standards of appellate asylum procedures are compared, and they are positioned in an European and international legal setting. Research Results The thesis provides results regarding the use of evidence in national appellate asylum procedures. It is established that evidentiary solutions do indeed impact on the asylum procedure and that the results of the procedure are dependent on the evidentiary solutions made in the procedures. Variations in, amongst other things, the interpretation of the burden of proof, the applied standard of proof and the method for determining evidentiary value, are analysed. It is established that national impacts play an important role in the adaptation of national appellate procedures to external requirements. Further, it is established that the impact of national procedures on as well the international framework as on EU law varies between the studied countries, partly depending on the position of the Member State in legislative advances at the EU level. In this comparative study it is, further, established that the impact of EU requirements concerning evidentiary issues may be have positive as well as negative effects with regard to the desired harmonization. It is also concluded that harmonization using means of convergence that primaly target legal frameworks may not in all instances be optimal in relation to evidentiary standards, and that more varied and pragmatic means of convergence must be introduced in order to secure harmonization also in terms of evidence. To date, legal culture and traditions seem to prevail over direct efforts at procedural harmonization.

Patents, Ethics and Stem Cell Research : The Case of hESC Innovation in Australia, Europe and the United States

Embryonic stem cells offer potentially a ground-breaking insight into health and diseases and are said to offer hope in discovering cures for many ailments unimaginable few years ago. Human embryonic stem cells are undifferentiated, immature cells that possess an amazing ability to develop into almost any body cell such as heart muscle, bone, nerve and blood cells and possibly even organs in due course. This remarkable feature, enabling embryonic stem cells to proliferate indefinitely in vitro (in a test tube), has branded them as a so-called miracle cure . Their potential use in clinical applications provides hope to many sufferers of debilitating and fatal medical conditions. However, the emergence of stem cell research has resulted in intense debates about its promises and dangers. On the one hand, advocates hail its potential, ranging from alleviating and even curing fatal and debilitating diseases such as Parkinson s, diabetes, heart ailments and so forth. On the other hand, opponents decry its dangers, drawing attention to the inherent risks of human embryo destruction, cloning for research purposes and reproductive cloning eventually. Lately, however, the policy battles surrounding human embryonic stem cell innovation have shifted from being a controversial research to scuffles within intellectual property rights. In fact, the ability to obtain patents represents a pivotal factor in the economic success or failure of this new biotechnology. Although, stem cell patents tend to more or less satisfy the standard patentability requirements, they also raise serious ethical and moral questions about the meaning of the exclusions on ethical or moral grounds as found in European and to an extent American and Australian patent laws. At present there is a sort of a calamity over human embryonic stem cell patents in Europe and to an extent in Australia and the United States. This in turn has created a sense of urgency to engage all relevant parties in the discourse on how best to approach patenting of this new form of scientific innovation. In essence, this should become a highly favoured patenting priority. To the contrary, stem cell innovation and its reliance on patent protection risk turmoil, uncertainty, confusion and even a halt on not only stem cell research but also further emerging biotechnology research and development. The patent system is premised upon the fundamental principle of balance which ought to ensure that the temporary monopoly awarded to the inventor equals that of the social benefit provided by the disclosure of the invention. Ensuring and maintaining this balance within the patent system when patenting human embryonic stem cells is of crucial contemporary relevance. Yet, the patenting of human embryonic stem cells raises some fundamental moral, social and legal questions. Overall, the present approach of patenting human embryonic stem cell related inventions is unsatisfactory and ineffective. This draws attention to a specific question which provides for a conceptual framework for this work. That question is the following: how can the investigated patent offices successfully deal with patentability of human embryonic stem cells? This in turn points at the thorny issue of application of the morality clause in this field. In particular, the interpretation of the exclusions on ethical or moral grounds as found in Australian, American and European legislative and judicial precedents. The Thesis seeks to compare laws and legal practices surrounding patentability of human embryonic stem cells in Australia and the United States with that of Europe. By using Europe as the primary case study for lessons and guidance, the central goal of the Thesis then becomes the determination of the type of solutions available to Europe with prospects to apply such to Australia and the United States. The Dissertation purports to define the ethical implications that arise with patenting human embryonic stem cells and intends to offer resolutions to the key ethical dilemmas surrounding patentability of human embryonic stem cells and other morally controversial biotechnology inventions. In particular, the Thesis goal is to propose a functional framework that may be used as a benchmark for an informed discussion on the solution to resolving ethical and legal tensions that come with patentability of human embryonic stem cells in Australian, American and European patent worlds. Key research questions that arise from these objectives and which continuously thread throughout the monograph are: 1. How do common law countries such as Australia and the United States approach and deal with patentability of human embryonic stem cells in their jurisdictions? These practices are then compared to the situation in Europe as represented by the United Kingdom (first two chapters), the Court of Justice of the European Union and the European Patent Office decisions (Chapter 3 onwards) in order to obtain a full picture of the present patenting procedures on the European soil. 2. How are ethical and moral considerations taken into account at patent offices investigated when assessing patentability of human embryonic stem cell related inventions? In order to assess this part, the Thesis evaluates how ethical issues that arise with patent applications are dealt with by: a) Legislative history of the modern patent system from its inception in 15th Century England to present day patent laws. b) Australian, American and European patent offices presently and in the past, including other relevant legal precedents on the subject matter. c) Normative ethical theories. d) The notion of human dignity used as the lowest common denominator for the interpretation of the European morality clause. 3. Given the existence of the morality clause in form of Article 6(1) of the Directive 98/44/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 July 1998 on the legal protection of biotechnological inventions which corresponds to Article 53(a) European Patent Convention, a special emphasis is put on Europe as a guiding principle for Australia and the United States. Any room for improvement of the European morality clause and Europe s current manner of evaluating ethical tensions surrounding human embryonic stem cell inventions is examined. 4. A summary of options (as represented by Australia, the United States and Europe) available as a basis for the optimal examination procedure of human embryonic stem cell inventions is depicted, whereas the best of such alternatives is deduced in order to create a benchmark framework. This framework is then utilised on and promoted as a tool to assist Europe (as represented by the European Patent Office) in examining human embryonic stem cell patent applications. This method suggests a possibility of implementing an institution solution. 5. Ultimately, a question of whether such reformed European patent system can be used as a founding stone for a potential patent reform in Australia and the United States when examining human embryonic stem cells or other morally controversial inventions is surveyed. The author wishes to emphasise that the guiding thought while carrying out this work is to convey the significance of identifying, analysing and clarifying the ethical tensions surrounding patenting human embryonic stem cells and ultimately present a solution that adequately assesses patentability of human embryonic stem cell inventions and related biotechnologies. In answering the key questions above, the Thesis strives to contribute to the broader stem cell debate about how and to which extent ethical and social positions should be integrated into the patenting procedure in pluralistic and morally divided democracies of Europe and subsequently Australia and the United States.

Birth of the European individual : Outline of a theory of legal practice

The modern subject is what we can call a self-subjecting individual. This is someone in whose inner reality has been implanted a more permanent governability, a governability that works inside the agent. Michel Foucault s genealogy of the modern subject is the history of its constitution by power practices. By a flight of imagination, suppose that this history is not an evolving social structure or cultural phenomenon, but one of those insects (moth) whose life cycle consists of three stages or moments: crawling larva, encapsulated pupa, and flying adult. Foucault s history of power-practices presents the same kind of miracle of total metamorphosis. The main forces in the general field of power can be apprehended through a generalisation of three rationalities functioning side-by-side in the plurality of different practices of power: domination, normalisation and the law. Domination is a force functioning by the rationality of reason of state: the state s essence is power, power is firm domination over people, and people are the state s resource by which the state s strength is measured. Normalisation is a force that takes hold on people from the inside of society: it imposes society s own reality its empirical verity as a norm on people through silently working jurisdictional operations that exclude pathological individuals too far from the average of the population as a whole. The law is a counterforce to both domination and normalisation. Accounting for elements of legal practice as omnihistorical is not possible without a view of the general field of power. Without this view, and only in terms of the operations and tactical manoeuvres of the practice of law, nothing of the kind can be seen: the only thing that practice manifests is constant change itself. However, the backdrop of law s tacit dimension that is, the power-relations between law, domination and normalisation allows one to see more. In the general field of power, the function of law is exactly to maintain the constant possibility of change. Whereas domination and normalisation would stabilise society, the law makes it move. The European individual has a reality as a problem. What is a problem? A problem is something that allows entry into the field of thought, said Foucault. To be a problem, it is necessary for certain number of factors to have made it uncertain, to have made it lose familiarity, or to have provoked a certain number of difficulties around it . Entering the field of thought through problematisations of the European individual human forms, power and knowledge one is able to glimpse the historical backgrounds of our present being. These were produced, and then again buried, in intersections between practices of power and games of truth. In the problem of the European individual one has suitable circumstances that bring to light forces that have passed through the individual through centuries.

New Governance and the EU Courts : The Experimentalist Architecture of Judicial Decision-Making

The dissertation examines the role of the EU courts in new governance. New governance has raised unprecedented interest in the EU in recent years. This is manifested in a plethora of instruments and actors at various levels that challenge more traditional forms of command-and-control regulation. New governance and political experimentation more generally is thought to sap the ability of the EU judiciary to monitor and review these experiments. The exclusion of the courts is then seen to add to the legitimacy problem of new governance. The starting point of this dissertation is the observation that the marginalised role of the courts is based on theoretical and empirical assumptions which invite scrutiny. The theoretical framework of the dissertation is deliberative democracy and democratic experimentalism. The analysis of deliberative democracy is sustained by an attempt to apply theoretical concepts to three distinctive examples of governance in the EU. These are the EU Sustainable Development Strategy, the European Chemicals Agency, and the Common Implementation Strategy for the Water Framework Directive. The case studies show numerous disincentives and barriers to judicial review. Among these are questions of the role of courts in shaping governance frameworks, the reviewability of science-based measures, the standing of individuals before the courts, and the justiciability of soft law. The dissertation analyses the conditions of judicial review in each governance environment and proposes improvements. From a more theoretical standpoint it could be said that each case study presents a governance regime which builds on legislation that lays out major (guide)lines but leaves details to be filled out at a later stage. Specification of detailed standards takes place through collaborative networks comprising members from national administrations, NGOs, and the Commission. Viewed this way, deliberative problem-solving is needed to bring people together to clarify, elaborate, and revise largely abstract and general norms in order to resolve concrete and specific problems and to make law applicable and enforceable. The dissertation draws attention to the potential of peer review included there and its profound consequences for judicial accountability structures. It is argued that without this kind of ongoing and dynamic peer review of accountability in governance frameworks, judicial review of new governance is difficult and in some cases impossible. This claim has implications for how we understand the concept of soft law, the role of the courts, participation rights, and the legitimacy of governance measures more generally. The experimentalist architecture of judicial decision-making relies upon a wide variety of actors to provide conditions for legitimate and efficient review.