Strike Hard, Strike Sure - Operation Musketeer : British Military Planning during the Suez Crisis, 1956

This study analyses British military planning and actions during the Suez Crisis in 1956. It seeks to find military reasons for the change of concepts during the planning and compares these reasons with the tactical doctrines of the time. The thesis takes extensive advantage of military documents preserved in the National Archives, London. In order to expand the understanding of the exchange of views during the planning process, the private papers of high ranking military officials have also been consulted. French military documents preserved in the Service Historique de la Defence, Paris, have provided an important point of comparison. The Suez Crisis caught the British armed forces in the middle of a transition phase. The main objective of the armed forces was to establish a credible deterrence against the Soviet Union. However, due to overseas commitments the Middle East playing a paramount role because of its economic importance the armed forces were compelled to also prepare for Limited War and the Cold War. The armed forces were not fully prepared to meet this demand. The Middle Eastern garrison was being re-organised after the withdrawal from the Canal Base and the concept for a strategic reserve was unimplemented. The tactical doctrines of the time were based on experiences from the Second World War. As a result, the British view of amphibious operations and the subsequent campaigns emphasised careful planning, mastery of the sea and the air, sufficient superiority in numbers and firepower, centralised command and extensive administrative preparations. The British military had realized that Nasser could nationalise the Suez Canal and prepared an outline plan to meet this contingency. Although the plan was nothing more than a concept, it was accepted as a basis for further planning when the Canal was nationalised at the end of July. This plan was short-lived. The nominated Task Force Commanders shifted the landing site from Port Said to Alexandria because it enabled faster expansion of the bridgehead. In addition, further operations towards Cairo the hub of Nasser s power would be easier to conduct. The operational concept can be described as being traditional and was in accordance with the amphibious warfare doctrine. This plan was completely changed at the beginning of September. Apparently, General Charles Keightley, the Commander-in-Chief, and the Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff Committee developed the idea of prolonged aerial operations. The essence of the concept was to break the Egyptian will to resist by attacking the oil facilities, the transportation system and the armed forces. This victory through air concept would be supported by carefully planned psychological operations. This concept was in accordance with the Royal Air Force doctrine, which promoted a bomber offensive against selected target categories. General Keightley s plan was accepted despite suspicions at every planning level. The Joint Planning Staff and the Task Force Commanders opposed the concept from the beginning to the end because of its unpredictability. There was no information that suggested the bombing would persuade the Egyptians to submit. This problem was worsened by the fact that British intelligence was unable to provide reliable strategic information. The Task Force Commanders, who were responsible for the tactical plans, were not able to change Keightley s mind, but the concept was expanded to include a traditional amphibious assault on Port Said due to their resistance. The bombing campaign was never tested as the Royal Air Force was denied authorisation to destroy the transportation and oil targets. The Chiefs of Staff and General Keightley were too slow to realise that the execution of the plan depended on the determination of the Prime Minister. However, poor health, a lack of American and domestic support and the indecisiveness of the military had ruined Eden s resolve. In the end, a very traditional amphibious assault, which was bound to succeed at the tactical level but fail at the strategic level, was launched against Port Said.

Sankarihautaus vapaussodassa : valkoisten kaatuneiden hautaaminen Suomessa vuonna 1918

Civil War Hero Burials the funerals of the fallen White in Finland in 1918 This study focuses on the burial with honours of fallen White combatants during the Finnish Civil War of 1918, as well as on the reasons underpinning the practice. The main sources of the study included the archives of the White army, the Civil Guard organisation and the Church, as well as the newspapers. The genetic method of history research was used. Both the existing tradition of military burials and the ecclesiastical burial culture influenced the burials of those who fell during the Civil War. The first war hero funerals took place as early as the beginning of February 1918, and the first larger-scale collective funerals were organised in Laihia and Vaasa in the Ostrobothnia province, with the latter attended by the supreme civil and military leaders of White Finland. From early on, these funerals assumed their characteristic features, such as the lion flag a design for the Finnish national flag proposed immediately upon the declaration of the country s independence military parades, lines of honour guards, eulogies, salutes and common war hero graves. As a result of the general offensive begun in mid-March 1918, the numbers of the fallen multiplied, so special organisations were established to handle the burials of the fallen. At the same time, the war hero funerals became more frequent and diffused, and the numbers of the buried grew throughout the country. In early March, the advocates of the republican system of government published their appeal in the newspapers, requesting that collective graves for those who fell in the war prepared in every locality. They motivated their request by stating that it was the funerals in particular that had inspired many men to join the ranks voluntarily in the first place, and that the large collective soldiers graves increased the numbers of those who answered the call and left for the front. The Civil Guard organisation arranged the burials of war heroes. The clergy contributed by officiating the religious service and by clearly aligning themselves with the Whites in their eulogies. The teachings of the Lutheran Church suggest that they found the Whites to be the temporal authority instituted by God, and therefore authorised raising the sword against the Reds. Speaking at the funerals with great pomp and sentimental power, the leaders of the Civil Guard and the exponents of the learned classes instigated their audiences against the Reds. The funeral speeches idealised the war hero s death by recalling military history since the times of ancient Greece. Being of the emblematic colour of the Whites, the white coffin assumed a particular importance connected to ideas of biblical purity and innocence. By the end of May 1918, almost 3,300 Whites were buried in the soldiers graves prepared by the burial organisation in some 400 localities. Only about 200 men remained missing in action or unidentified. The largest common graves accommodated over 60 fallen combatants. Thus, the traditions of the 1918 Civil War directly influenced war hero burial practices, which continued into the Finnish Winter War of 1939.

'A responsible nuclear weapons power' : Nuclear Weapons and Indian Foreign Policy

This thesis examines the interrelationship and dynamics between the Indian United Progressive Alliance government’s foreign policy and its nuclear weapons policy. The purpose of the study is to situate nuclear policy within a foreign policy framework, and the fundamental research problem is thus how does the Indian nuclear policy reflect and respond to the Indian foreign policy? The study examines the intentions in the Indian foreign and nuclear policies, and asks whether these intentions are commensurable or incommensurable. Moreover, the thesis asks whether the UPA government differs from its predecessors, most notably the Bharatiya Janata Party-led National Democratic Alliance government in its foreign and nuclear policies. Answers to these questions are based on the interpretation of political texts and speeches as suggested by Quentin Skinner’s notion of meaning3, what does a writer or speaker mean by what he or she says in a given text, and by J.L. Austin’s speech act theory. This linguistic perspective and the approach of intertextualizing, place the political acts within their contingent intellectual and political contexts. The notion of strategic culture is therefore introduced to provide context for these juxtapositions. The thesis firstly analyses the societal, historical and intellectual context of India’s foreign and nuclear policy. Following from this analysis the thesis then examines the foreign and nuclear policies of Prime Minister Manmo-han Singh’s UPA government. This analysis focuses on the texts, speeches and statements of Indian authorities between 2004 and 2008. This study forwards the following claims: firstly, the UPA Government conducts a foreign policy that is mainly and explicitly inclusive, open and enhancing, and it conducts a nuclear policy that is mainly and implicitly excluding, closed and protective. Secondly, despite the fact that the notion of military security is widely appreciated and does not, as such, necessarily collide with foreign policy, the UPA Government conducts a nuclear policy that is incommensurable with its foreign policy. Thirdly, the UPA Gov-ernment foreign and nuclear policies are, nevertheless, commensurable re-garding their internal intentions. Finally, the UPA Government is conduct-ing a nuclear policy that is gradually leading India towards having a triad of nuclear weapons with various platforms and device designs and a function-ing and robust command and control system encompassing political and military planning, decision-making and execution. Regarding the question of the possible differences between the UPA and NDA governments this thesis claims that, despite their different ideological roots and orientations in domestic affairs, the Indian National Congress Party conducts, perhaps surprisingly, quite a similar foreign and nuclear policy to the Bharatiya Janata Party.

Foreign Capital and Finland : Central government's first period of reliance on international financial markets, 1862-1938

The main objective of the study is to evaluate the Finnish central government s foreign borrowing between the years 1862 and 1938. Most of this period was characterised by deep capital market integration that bears resemblance to the liberal world financial order at the turn of the millennium. The main aim is to analyse the credit risk associated with the state and its determination by evaluating the world financial market centres perception of Finland. By doing this, the study is also expected to provide an additional dimension to Finland s political and economic history by incorporating into the research the assessments of international capital markets regarding Finland during a period that witnessed profound political and economic changes in Finnish society. The evaluation of the credit risk mainly relies on exchange-rate risk free time series of the state s foreign bonds. They have been collected from quotations in the stock exchanges in Helsinki, Hamburg, Paris and London. In addition, it investigates Finland s exposure to short-term debt and Moody s credit ratings assigned to Finland. The study emphasises the importance of the political risk. It suggests that the hey-day of the state s reliance on foreign capital markets took place during last few decades of the 19th century when Finland enjoyed a wide autonomy in the Russian Empire and prudently managed its economy, highlighted in Finland s adherence to the international gold standard. Political confrontations in Finland and, in particular, in Russia and the turbulence of the world financial system prevented the return of this beneficial position again. Through its issuance of foreign bonds the state was able to import substantial amounts of foreign capital, which was sorely needed to foster economic development in Finland. Moreover, the study argues that the state s presence in the western capital markets not only had economic benefits, but it also increased the international awareness of Finland s distinct and separate status in the Russian Empire and later underlined its position as an independent republic.

Fatigue fractures in military conscripts : A study on risk factors, diagnostics and long-term consequences

Fatigue fracture is an overuse injury commonly encountered in military and sports medicine, and known to relate to intensive or recently intensified physical activity. Bone responds to increased stress by enhanced remodeling. If physical stress exceeds bone s capability to remodel, accumulation of microfractures can lead to bone fatigue and stress fracture. Clinical diagnosis of stress fractures is complex and based on patient s anamnesis and radiological imaging. Bone stress fractures are mostly low-risk injuries, healing well after non-operative management, yet, occurring in high-risk areas, stress fractures can progress to displacement, often necessitating surgical treatment and resulting in prolonged morbidity. In the current study, the role of vitamin D as a predisposing factor for fatigue fractures was assessed using serum 25OHD level as the index. The average serum 25OHD concentration was significantly lower in conscripts with fatigue fracture than in controls. Evaluating TRACP-5b bone resorption marker as indicator of fatigue fractures, patients with elevated serum TRACP-5b levels had eight times higher probability of sustaining a stress fracture than controls. Among the 154 patients with exercise induced anterior lower leg pain and no previous findings on plain radiography, MRI revealed a total of 143 bone stress injuries in 86 patients. In 99% of the cases, injuries were in the tibia, 57% in the distal third of the tibial shaft. In patients with injury, forty-nine (57%) patients exhibited bilateral stress injuries. In a 20-year follow-up, the incidence of femoral neck fatigue fractures prior to the Finnish Defence Forces new regimen in 1986 addressing prevention of these fractures was 20.8/100,000, but rose to 53.2/100,000 afterwards, a significant 2.6-fold increase. In nineteen subjects with displaced femoral neck fatigue fractures, ten early local complications (in first postoperative year) were evident, and after the first postoperative year, osteonecrosis of the femoral head in six and osteoarthritis of the hip in thirteen patients were found. It seems likely that low vitamin D levels are related to fatigue fractures, and that an increasing trend exists between TRACP-5b bone resorption marker elevation and fatigue fracture incidence. Though seldom detected by plain radiography, fatigue fractures often underlie unclear lower leg stress-related pain occurring in the distal parts of the tibia. Femoral neck fatigue fractures, when displaced, lead to long-term morbidity in a high percentage of patients, whereas, when non-displaced, they do not predispose patients to subsequent adverse complications. Importantly, an educational intervention can diminish the incidence of fracture displacement by enhancing awareness and providing instructions for earlier diagnosis of fatigue fractures.

Puolustuskykyinen valtio vai Ruotsin hälytyskello? : Suomen sotilasstrateginen asema kylmän sodan alkuvuosien asiantuntija-arvioissa

The doctoral thesis deals with Finnish and foreign expert s analyses of Finland s military strategic position and defence capability, dating back to the early years of the Cold War. Finland s military high command prepared assessments of the country s strategic position and of the capability of the Defence Forces as grounds for defence planning. Since Finland was located on the Cold War dividing line, the foreign powers were also monitoring the development of Finland s situation. The research carried out had access to the armed forces internal assessments, as well as to analyses prepared by the military intelligence services of Sweden, Britain and the United States. One of the working hypotheses was that after the WWII the ability military leadership to estimate the security political needs of the country and the organisation of its defence was severely weakened so that the dangers of the international development were not perceived and the gradual erosion of defence capability was partly unnoticed. This hypothesis proved to be wrong. Even if the Finnish military intelligence was much weaker than during the war, it was able to provide the military leadership with information of the international military development for the most part. The military leadership was also fully aware of the weakening of the defence capability of the country. They faced the difficult task of making the country s political leadership, i.e. President Paasikivi and the government, also understand the gravity of the situation. Only in the last years of his term in office Paasikivi started to believe the warnings of the military. According to another hypothesis, outside observers considered the Finnish armed forces to primarily act as reinforcements for the Soviet Red Army, and they believed that, in the event of a full-scale war, the Finns would not have been able or even willing to resist a Soviet invasion of Sweden and Norway through Finland. The study confirmed that this was approximately the view the Swedes, the British and the Americans had of the Finnish forces. Western and Swedish intelligence assessments did not show confidence in Finland s defence ability and the country was regarded almost as a Soviet satellite. Finland s strategic position was, however, considered slightly different from that of the Soviet-occupied Eastern European countries. Finland had been forced to become part of the Soviet sphere of interest and security system and this was sealed by the Finno-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance in 1948. Finland had little importance to the military interests of the Western powers. In Sweden s defence planning, however, Finland played a significant role as an alarm bell of a possible Soviet surprise attack, as well as defensive frontline and buffer zone.

Encouragement and discouragement : Essays on taxation and government expenditure

This thesis consists of an introduction to a topic of optimal use of taxes and government expenditure and three chapters analysing these themes more in depth. Chapter 2 analyses to what extent a given amount of subsidies affects the labour supply of parents. Municipal supplement to the Finnish home care allowance provides exogenous variation to labour supply decision of a parent. This kind of subsidy that is tied to staying at home instead of working is found to have fairly large effect on labour supply decisions of parents. Chapter 3 studies theoretically when it is optimal to provide publicly private goods. In the set up of the model government sets income taxes optimally and provides a private good, if it is beneficial to do so. The analysis results in an optimal provision rule according to which the good should be provided when it lowers the participation threshold into labour force. Chapter 4 investigates what happened to prices and demand when hairdressers value added tax was cut in Finland from 22 per cent to 8 per cent. The pass-through to prices was about half of the full pass-through and no clear indication of increased demand for the services or better employment situation in the sector is found.

Somali State Failure: Players, Incentives and Institutions

In Somalia the central government collapsed in 1991 and since then state failure became a widespread phenomenon and one of the greatest political and humanitarian problems facing the world in this century. Thus, the main objective of this research is to answer the following question: What went wrong? Most of the existing literature on the political economy of conflict starts from the assumption that state in Africa is predatory by nature. Unlike these studies, the present research, although it uses predation theory, starts from the social contract approach of state definition. Therefore, rather than contemplating actions and policies of the rulers alone, this approach allows us to deliberately bring the role of the society – as citizens – and other players into the analyses. In Chapter 1, after introducing the study, a simple principal-agent model will be developed to check the logical consistence of the argument and to make the identification of causal mechanism easier. I also identify three main actors in the process of state failure in Somalia: the Somali state, Somali society and the superpowers. In Chapter 2, so as to understand the incentives, preferences and constraints of each player in the state failure game, I in some depth analyse the evolution and structure of three central informal institutions: identity based patronage system of leadership, political tribalism, and the Cold War. These three institutions are considered as the rules of the game in the Somali state failure. Chapter 3 summarises the successive civilian governments’ achievements and failures (1960-69) concerning the main national goals, national unification and socio-economic development. Chapter 4 shows that the military regime, although it assumed power through extralegal means, served to some extent the developmental interest of the citizens in the first five years of its rule. Chapter 5 shows the process, and the factors involved, of the military regime’s self-transformation from being an agent for the developmental interests of the society to a predatory state that not only undermines the interests of the society but that also destroys the state itself. Chapter 6 addresses the process of disintegration of the post-colonial state of Somalia. The chapter shows how the regime’s merciless reactions to political ventures by power-seeking opposition leaders shattered the entire country and wrecked the state institutions. Chapter 7 concludes the study by summarising the main findings: due to the incentive structures generated by the informal institutions, the formal state institutions fell apart.

The British Intervention in South Russia 1918-1920

Soon after the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917, a three-year civil war broke out in Russia. As in many other civil wars, foreign powers intervened in the conflict. Britain played a leading role in this intervention and had a significant effect on the course of the war. Without this intervention on the White side, the superiority of numbers in manpower and weaponry of the Bolsheviks would have quickly overwhelmed their opponents. The aim of this dissertation is to explain the nature and role of the British intervention on the southern, and most decisive, front of the Civil War. The political decision making in London is studied as a background, but the focus of the dissertation is on the actual implementation of the British policy in Russia. The British military mission arrived in South Russia in late 1918, and started to provide General Denikin s White army with ample supplies. General Denikin would have not been able to build his army of more than 200,000 men or to make his operation against Moscow without the British matériel. The British mission also organized the training and equipping of the Russian troops with British weapons. This made the material aid much more effective. Many of the British instructors took part in fighting the Bolsheviks despite the orders of their government. The study is based on primary sources produced by British departments of state and members of the British mission and military units in South Russia. Primary sources from the Whites, including the personal collections of several key figures of the White movement and official records of the Armed Forces of South Russia are also used to give a balanced picture of the course of events. It is possible to draw some general conclusions from the White movement and reasons for their defeat from the study of the British intervention. In purely material terms the British aid placed Denikin s army in a far more favourable position than the Bolsheviks in 1919, but other military defects in the White army were numerous. The White commanders were unimaginative, their military thinking was obsolete, and they were incapable of organizing the logistics of their army. There were also fundamental defects in the morale of the White troops. In addition to all political mistakes of Denikin s movement and a general inability to adjust to the complex situation in Revolutionary Russia, the Whites suffered a clear military defeat. In South Russia the Whites were defeated not because of the lack of British aid, but rather in spite of it.

An Axiom of Military Law : Applicability of National Criminal Law to Military Personnel and Associated Civilians Abroad

States regularly deploy elements of their armed forces abroad. When that happens, the military personnel concerned largely remain governed by the penal law of the State that they serve. This extraterritorial extension of national criminal law, which has been treated as axiomatic in domestic law and ignored by international law scholarship, is the subject of this dissertation. The first part of the study considers the ambit of national criminal law without any special regard to the armed forces. It explores the historical development of the currently prevailing system of territorial law and looks at the ambit that national legal systems claim today. Turning then to international law, the study debunks the oddly persistent belief that States enjoy a freedom to extend their laws to extraterritorial conduct as they please, and that they are in this respect constrained only by some specific prohibitions in international law. Six arguments historical, empirical, ideological, functional, doctrinal and systemic are advanced to support a contrary view: that States are prohibited from extending the reach of their legal systems abroad, unless they can rely on a permissive principle of international law for doing so. The second part of the study deals specifically with State jurisdiction in a military context, that is to say, as applied to military personnel in the strict sense (service members) and various civilians serving with or accompanying the forces (associated civilians). While the status of armed forces on foreign soil has transformed from one encapsulated in the customary concept of extraterritoriality to a modern regulation of immunities granted by treaties, elements of armed forces located abroad usually do enjoy some degree of insulation from the legal system of the host State. As a corollary, they should generally remain covered by the law of their own State. The extent of this extraterritorial extension of national law is revealed in a comparative review of national legislation, paying particular attention to recent legal reforms in the United States and the United Kingdom two states that have sought to extend the scope of their national law to cover the conduct of military contractor personnel. The principal argument of the dissertation is that applying national criminal law to service members and associated civilians abroad is distinct from other extraterritorial claims of jurisdiction (in particular, the nationality principle or the protective principle of jurisdiction). The service jurisdiction over the armed forces has a distinct aim: ensuring the coherence and indivisibility of the forces and maintaining discipline. Furthermore, the exercise of service jurisdiction seeks to reduce the chances of the State itself becoming internationally liable for the conduct of its service members and associated civilians. Critically, the legal system of the troop-deploying State, by extending its reach abroad, seeks to avoid accountability gaps that might result from immunities from host State law.