Herakleitos, filosofia ja metafysiikka : Collin ja Heideggerin tulkintojen valossa

Tutkielmani aiheena on noin 2500 vuotta sitten Efesoksen kaupungissa eläneen Herakleitoksen ajattelu. Selvitän, mikä suhde Herakleitoksen ajattelulla on filosofiaan ja metafysiikkaan. Lähestyn tätä kysymystä pääasiassa kahden uuden ajan filosofin italialaisen Giorgio Collin (1917-1979) ja saksalaisen Martin Heideggerin (1889-1976) esittämien tulkintojen pohjalta. Osoitan, että Herakleitoksen ajattelu eroaa olennaisesti Platonin ja Aristoteleen jälkeisestä filosofisesta ja metafyysisestä ajattelusta. Perusteluna tarkastelen Herakleitoksen ajattelua neljästä näkökulmasta: 1) historiallisesti filosofian syntyä edeltäneen viisauden ja uskonnollisen ajattelun edustajana, 2) loogisesti olevan käsitteeseen keskittyvästä metafysiikasta poikkeavana ajatteluna, 3) välittömän kokemuksen ajatteluna ja 4) fenomenologisena ilmiön ja kätkeytymättömyyden ajatteluna. Ensimmäinen ja kolmas näkökulma edustavat Collin tulkintaa, toinen ja neljäs näkökulma puolestaan Heideggerin tulkintaa. Tärkeimpinä lähteinäni ovat Collin teokset Filosofian synty (1975), Filosofia dell'espressione (1969) ja La sapienza greca (1977-80) sekä Heideggerin teokset Oleminen ja aika (1927), Einführung in die Metaphysik (1935/53), Aletheia (1951), Logos (1951) ja Heraklit Seminar (1966-67).

Clemens Aleksandrialaisen kristillinen filosofia Paedagogus-teoksessa

Clemens Aleksandrialainen oli sivistynyt varhaiskristillinen kirjoittaja. Tämän tutkielman päälähteenä on hänen Paedagogus-teoksensa, jota analysoimalla vastataan kysymykseen,millainen kristillisen elämän opas se on, ja mitä kirjoittaja opettaa siinä kristillisestä elämästä. Metodina on systemaattinen analyysi. Koska Clemens-tutkimuksessa on usein keskitytty hänen oletettuun pääteokseensa Stromateis, avaa Paedagogus-teoksen opetukseen tutustuminen sekä Clemensin ajattelusta että varhaiskristillisestä elämästä uusia puolia. Kirjoittajan opetusta kristillisestä käytännön elämästä (kr. praksis) on tutkittu hyvin vähän. Clemens on tärkeä varhaisen kirkon opettaja, joka kehitti ratkaisevalla tavalla ihmisen jumalallistumiseen (kr. theosis) liittyvää terminologiaa. Tutkielmassa keskitytään näiden kahden osa-alueen suhteeseen, jossa Clemensin tunneteorialla on keskeinen merkitys.

Drops That Open Worlds : Image of Water in the Poetry of Euphrase Kezilahabi

Euphrase Kezilahabi on tansanialainen kirjailija, joka ensimmäisenä julkaisi swahilinkielisen vapaalla mitalla kirjoitetun runokokoelman. Perinteisessä swahilirunoudessa tiukat muotosäännöt ovat tärkeitä, ja teos synnytti kiivasta keskustelua. Runoteokset Kichomi ( Viilto , Kipu , 1974) ja Karibu Ndani ( Tervetuloa sisään , 1988) sekä Kezilahabin muu tuotanto voidaan nähdä uuden sukupolven taiteena. Kezilahabi on arvostettu runoilija, mutta hänen runojaan ei aiemmin ole käännetty englanniksi (yksittäisiä säkeitä lukuunottamatta), eikä juurikaan tutkittu yksityiskohtaisesti. Yleiskuvaan pyrkivissä lausunnoissa Kezilahabin runouden on hyvin usein määritelty olevan poliittista. Monet Kezilahabin runoista ottavatkin kantaa yhteiskunnallisiin kysymyksiin, mutta niiden pohdinta on kuitenkin runoissa vain yksi taso. Sen lisäksi Kezilahabin lyriikassa on paljon muuta ennen kartoittamatonta tämä tutkimus keskittyy veden kuvaan (the image of water). Kezilahabi vietti lapsuutensa saarella Victoria-järven keskellä, ja hänen vesikuvastonsa on rikasta. Tutkimuskysymyksenä on, mitä veden kuva runoteoksissa Kichomi ja Karibu Ndani esittää. Runojen analysoinnissa ja tulkinnassa on tarkasteltu myös sitä, miten äänteellinen taso osallistuu kuvien luomiseen. Tutkimuksen määritelmä kuvasta pohjautuu osittain Hugh Kennerin näkemykseen, jonka mukaan oleellista kuvassa on kirjaimellinen taso. Kennerin lähtökohtaan on yhdistetty John Shoptawin teoriaa, joka korostaa runon äänteellisen puolen tärkeyttä merkityksen muodostumisessa. Foneemien analyysissä vaikutteena on ollut Reuven Tsurin teoria. Analyysiosio osoittaa, että veden kuva edustaa ja käsittelee teoksissa lukuisia teemoja: elämää, kuolemaa, fyysistä vetovoimaa, runoutta, mielikuvitusta ja (ali)tajuntaa sekä moraalia. Veden kuvan tutkimuksen pohjalta on nähtävissä, että Kezilahabin filosofia asettuu elävä/kuollut- ja elämä/kuolema dikotomioiden ulkopuolelle.

La contextualisation du discours radiophonique par des moyens prosodiques. L’exemple de cinq grands philosophes français du XXe siècle

"Radiodiskurssin kontekstualisointi prosodisin keinoin. Esimerkkinä viisi suurta ranskalaista 1900-luvun filosofia" Väitöskirja käsittelee puheen kontekstualisointia prosodisin keinoin. Toisin sanottuna työssä käsitellään sitä, miten puheen prosodiset piirteet (kuten sävelkulku, intensiteetti, tauot, kesto ja rytmi) ohjaavat puheen tulkintaa vanhastaan enemmän tutkittujen sana- ja lausemerkitysten ohella. Työssä keskitytään seitsemään prosodisesti merkittyyn kuvioon, jotka koostuvat yhden tai usean parametrin silmiinpistävistä muutoksista. Ilmiöitä käsitellään sekä niiden akustisten muotojen että tyypillisten esiintymisyhteyksien ja diskursiivisten tehtävien näkökulmasta. Aineisto koostuu radio-ohjelmista, joissa puhuu viisi suurta ranskalaista 1900-luvun filosofia: Gaston Bachelard, Albert Camus, Michel Foucault, Maurice Merleau-Ponty ja Jean-Paul Sartre. Ohjelmat on lähetetty eri radiokanavilla Ranskassa vuosina 1948–1973. Väitöskirjan tulokset osoittavat, että prosodisesti merkityt kuviot ovat moniulotteisia puheen ilmiöitä, joilla on keskeinen rooli sanotun kontekstualisoinnissa: ne voivat esimerkiksi nostaa tai laskea sanotun informaatioarvoa, ilmaista puhujan voimakasta tai heikkoa sitoutumista sanomaansa, ilmaista rakenteellisen kokonaisuuden jatkumista tai päättymistä, jne. Väitöskirja sisältää myös kontrastiivisia osia, joissa ilmiöitä verrataan erääseen klassisessa pianomusiikissa esiintyvään melodiseen kuvioon sekä erääseen suomen kielen prosodiseen ilmiöön. Tulokset viittaavat siihen, että tietynlaista melodista kuviota käytetään samankaltaisena jäsentämiskeinona sekä puheessa että klassisessa musiikissa. Lisäksi tulokset antavat viitteitä siitä, että tiettyjä melodisia muotoja käytetään samankaltaisten implikaatioiden luomiseen kahdessa niinkin erilaisessa kielessä kuin suomessa ja ranskassa. Yksi väitöskirjan osa käsittelee pisteen ja pilkun prosodista merkitsemistä puheessa. Tulosten mukaan pisteellä ja pilkulla on kummallakin oma suullinen prototyyppinsä: piste merkitään tyypillisesti sävelkulun laskulla ja tauolla, ja pilkku puolestaan sävelkulun nousulla ja tauolla. Merkittävimmät tulokset koskevat kuitenkin tapauksia, joissa välimerkki tulkitaan prosodisesti epätyypillisellä tavalla: sekä pisteellä että pilkulla vaikuttaisi olevan useita eri suullisia vastaavuuksia, ja välimerkkien tehtävät voivat muotoutua hyvin erilaisiksi niiden prosodisesta tulkinnasta riippuen.

At the Limits of Presentation : Coming-into-Presence and its Aesthetic Relevance in Jean-Luc Nancy's Philosophy

This study investigates the significance of art in Jean-Luc Nancy s philosophy. I argue that the notion of art contributes to some of Nancy s central ontological ideas. Therefore, I consider art s importance in its own right whether art does have ontological significance, and if so, how one should describe this with respect to the theme of presentation. According to my central argument, with his thinking on art Nancy attempts to give one viewpoint to what is called the metaphysics of presence and to its deconstruction. On which grounds, as I propose, may one say that art is not reducible to philosophy? The thesis is divided into two main parts. The first part, Presentation as a Philosophical Theme, is a historical genesis of the central concepts associated with the birth of presentation in Nancy s philosophy. I examine this from the viewpoint of the differentiation between the ontological notions of presentation and representation by concentrating on the influence of Martin Heidegger and Jacques Derrida, as well as of Hegel and Kant. I give an overview of the way in which being or sense for Nancy is to be described as a coming-into-presence or presentation . Therefore, being takes place in its singular plurality. I argue that Nancy redevelops Heidegger s account of being in two principal ways: first, in rethinking the ontico-ontological difference, and secondly, by striving to radicalize the Heideggerian concept of Mitsein, being-with . I equally wish to show the importance of Derrida s notion of différance and its inherence in Nancy s questioning of being that rests on the unfoundedness of existence. The second part, From Ontology to Art, draws on the importance of art and the aesthetic. If, in Nancy, the question of art touches upon its own limit as the limit of nothingness, how is art able to open its own strangeness and our exposure to this strangeness? My aim is to investigate how Nancy s thinking on art finds its place within the conceptual realm of its inherent difference and interval. My central concern is the thought of originary ungroundedness and the plurality of art and of the arts. As for the question of the difference between art and philosophy, I wish to show that what differentiates art from thought is the fact that art exposes what is obvious but not apparent, if apparent is understood in the sense of givenness. As for art s ability to deconstruct Nancy s ontological notions, I suggest that in question in art is its original heterogeneity and diversity. Art is a matter of differing art occurs singularly, as a local difference. With this in mind, I point out that in reflecting on art in terms of spacing and interval, as a thinker of difference Nancy comes closer to Derrida and his idea of différance than to the structure of Heidegger s ontological difference.

Karl Popper's Philosophy of Science - And the Evolution of the Popperian Worlds

This doctoral thesis in theoretical philosophy is a systematic analysis of Karl Popper's philosophy of science and its relation to his theory of three worlds. The general aim is to study Popper's philosophy of science and to show that Popper's theory of three worlds was a restatement of his earlier positions. As a result, a new reading of Popper's philosophy and development is offered and the theory of three worlds is analysed in a new manner. It is suggested that the theory of three worlds is not purely an ontological theory, but has a profound epistemological motivation. In Part One, Popper's epistemology and philosophy of science is analysed. It is claimed that Popper's thinking was bifurcated: he held two profound positions without noticing the tension between them. Popper adopted the position called the theorist around 1930 and focused on the logical structure of scientific theories. In Logik der Forschung (1935), he attempted to build a logic of science on the grounds that scientific theories may be regarded as universal statements which are not verifiable but can be falsified. Later, Popper emphasized another position, called here the processionalist. Popper focused on the study of science as a process and held that a) philosophy of science should study the growth of knowledge and that b) all cognitive processes are constitutive. Moreover, the constitutive idea that we see the world in the searchlight of our theories was combined with the biological insight that knowledge grows by trial and error. In Part Two, the theory of three worlds is analysed systematically. The theory is discussed as a cluster of theories which originate from Popper's attempt to solve some internal problems in his thinking. Popper adhered to realism and wished to reconcile the theorist and the processionalist. He also stressed the real and active nature of the human mind, and the possibility of objective knowledge. Finally, he wished to create a scientific world view.

A Literary Turn : Rethinking the Roles of Generalization and Theory in Anglo-American Moral Philosophy

This work investigates the role of narrative literature in late-20th century and contemporary Anglo-American moral philosophy. It aims to show the trend of reading narrative literature for purposes of moral philosophy from the 1970 s and early 80 s to the present day as a part of a larger movement in Anglo-American moral philosophy, and to present a view of its significance for moral philosophy overall. Chapter 1 provides some preliminaries concerning the view of narrative literature which my discussion builds on. In chapter 2 I give an outline of how narrative literature is considered in contemporary Anglo-American moral philosophy, and connect this use to the broad trend of neo-Aristotelian ethics in this context. In chapter 3 I connect the use of literature to the idea of the non-generalizability of moral perception and judgment, which is central to the neo-Aristotelian trend, as well as to a range of moral particularisms and anti-theoretical positions of late 20th century and contemporary ethics. The joint task of chapters 2 and 3 is to situate the trend of reading narrative literature for the purposes of moral philosophy in the present context of moral philosophy. In the following two chapters, 4 and 5, I move on from the particularizing power of narrative literature, which is emphasized by neo-Aristotelians and particularists alike, to a broader under-standing of the intellectual potential of narrative literature. In chapter 4 I argue that narrative literature has its own forms of generalization which are enriching for our understanding of the workings of ethical generalizations in philosophy. In chapter 5 I discuss Iris Murdoch s and Martha Nussbaum s respective ways of combining ethical generality and particularity in a philosophical framework where both systematic moral theory and narrative literature are taken seriously. In chapter 6 I analyse the controversy between contemporary anti-theoretical conceptions of ethics and Nussbaum s refutation of these. I present my suggestion for how the significance of the ethics/literature discussion for moral philosophy can be understood if one wants to overcome the limitations of both Nussbaum s theory-centred, equilibrium-seeking perspective, and the anti-theorists repudiation of theory. I call my position the inclusive approach .

On the Origin of Ideas : An Abductivist Approach to Discovery

The purpose of this study is to analyze and develop various forms of abduction as a means of conceptualizing processes of discovery. Abduction was originally presented by Charles S. Peirce (1839-1914) as a "weak", third main mode of inference -- besides deduction and induction -- one which, he proposed, is closely related to many kinds of cognitive processes, such as instincts, perception, practices and mediated activity in general. Both abduction and discovery are controversial issues in philosophy of science. It is often claimed that discovery cannot be a proper subject area for conceptual analysis and, accordingly, abduction cannot serve as a "logic of discovery". I argue, however, that abduction gives essential means for understanding processes of discovery although it cannot give rise to a manual or algorithm for making discoveries. In the first part of the study, I briefly present how the main trend in philosophy of science has, for a long time, been critical towards a systematic account of discovery. Various models have, however, been suggested. I outline a short history of abduction; first Peirce's evolving forms of his theory, and then later developments. Although abduction has not been a major area of research until quite recently, I review some critiques of it and look at the ways it has been analyzed, developed and used in various fields of research. Peirce's own writings and later developments, I argue, leave room for various subsequent interpretations of abduction. The second part of the study consists of six research articles. First I treat "classical" arguments against abduction as a logic of discovery. I show that by developing strategic aspects of abductive inference these arguments can be countered. Nowadays the term 'abduction' is often used as a synonym for the Inference to the Best Explanation (IBE) model. I argue, however, that it is useful to distinguish between IBE ("Harmanian abduction") and "Hansonian abduction"; the latter concentrating on analyzing processes of discovery. The distinctions between loveliness and likeliness, and between potential and actual explanations are more fruitful within Hansonian abduction. I clarify the nature of abduction by using Peirce's distinction between three areas of "semeiotic": grammar, critic, and methodeutic. Grammar (emphasizing "Firstnesses" and iconicity) and methodeutic (i.e., a processual approach) especially, give new means for understanding abduction. Peirce himself held a controversial view that new abductive ideas are products of an instinct and an inference at the same time. I maintain that it is beneficial to make a clear distinction between abductive inference and abductive instinct, on the basis of which both can be developed further. Besides these, I analyze abduction as a part of distributed cognition which emphasizes a long-term interaction with the material, social and cultural environment as a source for abductive ideas. This approach suggests a "trialogical" model in which inquirers are fundamentally connected both to other inquirers and to the objects of inquiry. As for the classical Meno paradox about discovery, I show that abduction provides more than one answer. As my main example of abductive methodology, I analyze the process of Ignaz Semmelweis' research on childbed fever. A central basis for abduction is the claim that discovery is not a sequence of events governed only by processes of chance. Abduction treats those processes which both constrain and instigate the search for new ideas; starting from the use of clues as a starting point for discovery, but continuing in considerations like elegance and 'loveliness'. The study then continues a Peircean-Hansonian research programme by developing abduction as a way of analyzing processes of discovery.

Uskonto ilman uskontoa : Radikaalin postmodernin uskonnonfilosofian haaste

Religion without religion. The challenge of radical postmodern philosophy of religion. The aim of this study is to examine the central ideas of Mark C. Taylor, Don Cupitt, and Grace Jantzen on the subject of the philosophy of religion. The method is a qualitative, systematic analysis of the works of the aforementioned philosophers. The purpose is to present, analyze, identify, find connections, and to gain an understanding of the original texts. This thesis shows that radical postmodern religion is “religion without religion”. God is “dead” and the concept of God is seen as “writing”, an ideal, a relationship of meanings or a language. In ethics, there are no objective values or principles. People must create their own morality. Reality is each person´s concept of reality. Language is universal in that language and reality cannot be considered separately. The human subject is contingent and formed in the linguistic and social context. According to postmodern feminism, the ideas that men present as facts are often degrading to women, distort reality and support the power of men. For this reason, we should create a new kind of philosophy of religion and a new language that takes women into consideration. Finally, we will study some philosophers, who have used postmodern ideas in a more moderate manner. In this way, we will look for a balanced solution between modernism and postmodernism. This study shows that the postmodern idea of religion is very different from classical Christianity. Ethics becomes subjective, anarchistic and nihilistic. Epistemology is relativistic and the human being becomes the measure of all things. Objective reality becomes blurry. Language is seen to be game-like, and it has no relation to reality. The moral responsibility of a subject becomes problematic. Science and rationality come into question without the permanent core provided by our consciousness. Women are not in an epistemologically privileged position. The truth claims by either men or women must each be evaluated one at a time. Many postmodern ideas can successfully be made of use if used in moderate manner.

Non-reductive Physicalism, Irreducibility of the Mental and the Problem of Mental Causation : A study of Donald Davidson's and Georg Henrik von Wright's positions in the philosophy of mind

In this study I consider what kind of perspective on the mind body problem is taken and can be taken by a philosophical position called non-reductive physicalism. Many positions fall under this label. The form of non-reductive physicalism which I discuss is in essential respects the position taken by Donald Davidson (1917-2003) and Georg Henrik von Wright (1916-2003). I defend their positions and discuss the unrecognized similarities between their views. Non-reductive physicalism combines two theses: (a) Everything that exists is physical; (b) Mental phenomena cannot be reduced to the states of the brain. This means that according to non-reductive physicalism the mental aspect of humans (be it a soul, mind, or spirit) is an irreducible part of the human condition. Also Davidson and von Wright claim that, in some important sense, the mental aspect of a human being does not reduce to the physical aspect, that there is a gap between these aspects that cannot be closed. I claim that their arguments for this conclusion are convincing. I also argue that whereas von Wright and Davidson give interesting arguments for the irreducibility of the mental, their physicalism is unwarranted. These philosophers do not give good reasons for believing that reality is thoroughly physical. Notwithstanding the materialistic consensus in the contemporary philosophy of mind the ontology of mind is still an uncharted territory where real breakthroughs are not to be expected until a radically new ontological position is developed. The third main claim of this work is that the problem of mental causation cannot be solved from the Davidsonian - von Wrightian perspective. The problem of mental causation is the problem of how mental phenomena like beliefs can cause physical movements of the body. As I see it, the essential point of non-reductive physicalism - the irreducibility of the mental - and the problem of mental causation are closely related. If mental phenomena do not reduce to causally effective states of the brain, then what justifies the belief that mental phenomena have causal powers? If mental causes do not reduce to physical causes, then how to tell when - or whether - the mental causes in terms of which human actions are explained are actually effective? I argue that this - how to decide when mental causes really are effective - is the real problem of mental causation. The motivation to explore and defend a non-reductive position stems from the belief that reductive physicalism leads to serious ethical problems. My claim is that Davidson's and von Wright's ultimate reason to defend a non-reductive view comes back to their belief that a reductive understanding of human nature would be a narrow and possibly harmful perspective. The final conclusion of my thesis is that von Wright's and Davidson's positions provide a starting point from which the current scientistic philosophy of mind can be critically further explored in the future.

Incarnate Subjectivity : The Constitutive Significance of Embodiment in Husserlian Phenomenology

This work offers a systematic phenomenological investigation of the constitutive significance of embodiment. It provides detailed analyses of subjectivity in relation to itself, to others, and to objective reality, and it argues that these basic structures cannot be made intelligible unless one takes into account how they are correlated with an embodied subject. The methodological and conceptual starting point of the treatise is the philosophy of Edmund Husserl. The investigation employs the phenomenological method and uses the descriptions and analyses provided by Husserl and his successors. The treatise is motivated and outlined systematically, and textual exegesis serves as a means for the systematic phenomenological investigation. The structure of the work conforms to the basic relations of subjectivity. The first part of the thesis explores the intimate relation between lived-body and selfhood, analyzes the phenomena of localization, and argues that self-awareness is necessarily and fundamentally embodied self-awareness. The second part examines the intersubjective dimensions of embodiment, investigates the corporal foundations of empathy, and unravels the bodily aspects of transcendental intersubjectivity. The third part scrutinizes the role of embodiment in the constitution of the surrounding objective reality: it focuses on the complex relationship between transcendental subjectivity and transcendental intersubjectivity, carefully examines the normative aspects of genetic and generative self-constitution, and argues eventually that what Husserl calls the paradox of subjectivity originates in a tension between primordial and intersubjective normativity. The work thus reinterprets the paradox of subjectivity in terms of a normative tension, and claims that the paradox is ultimately rooted in the structures of embodiment. In this manner, as a whole, the work discloses the constitutive significance of embodiment, and argues that transcendental subjectivity must be fundamentally embodied.

Logic as the Universal Science : Bertrand Russell's Early Conception of Logic and Its Philosophical Context

Bertrand Russell (1872 1970) introduced the English-speaking philosophical world to modern, mathematical logic and foundational study of mathematics. The present study concerns the conception of logic that underlies his early logicist philosophy of mathematics, formulated in The Principles of Mathematics (1903). In 1967, Jean van Heijenoort published a paper, Logic as Language and Logic as Calculus, in which he argued that the early development of modern logic (roughly the period 1879 1930) can be understood, when considered in the light of a distinction between two essentially different perspectives on logic. According to the view of logic as language, logic constitutes the general framework for all rational discourse, or meaningful use of language, whereas the conception of logic as calculus regards logic more as a symbolism which is subject to reinterpretation. The calculus-view paves the way for systematic metatheory, where logic itself becomes a subject of mathematical study (model-theory). Several scholars have interpreted Russell s views on logic with the help of the interpretative tool introduced by van Heijenoort,. They have commonly argued that Russell s is a clear-cut case of the view of logic as language. In the present study a detailed reconstruction of the view and its implications is provided, and it is argued that the interpretation is seriously misleading as to what he really thought about logic. I argue that Russell s conception is best understood by setting it in its proper philosophical context. This is constituted by Immanuel Kant s theory of mathematics. Kant had argued that purely conceptual thought basically, the logical forms recognised in Aristotelian logic cannot capture the content of mathematical judgments and reasonings. Mathematical cognition is not grounded in logic but in space and time as the pure forms of intuition. As against this view, Russell argued that once logic is developed into a proper tool which can be applied to mathematical theories, Kant s views turn out to be completely wrong. In the present work the view is defended that Russell s logicist philosophy of mathematics, or the view that mathematics is really only logic, is based on what I term the Bolzanian account of logic . According to this conception, (i) the distinction between form and content is not explanatory in logic; (ii) the propositions of logic have genuine content; (iii) this content is conferred upon them by special entities, logical constants . The Bolzanian account, it is argued, is both historically important and throws genuine light on Russell s conception of logic.

Truth, Proof and Gödelian Arguments : A Defence of Tarskian Truth in Mathematics

One of the most fundamental questions in the philosophy of mathematics concerns the relation between truth and formal proof. The position according to which the two concepts are the same is called deflationism, and the opposing viewpoint substantialism. In an important result of mathematical logic, Kurt Gödel proved in his first incompleteness theorem that all consistent formal systems containing arithmetic include sentences that can neither be proved nor disproved within that system. However, such undecidable Gödel sentences can be established to be true once we expand the formal system with Alfred Tarski s semantical theory of truth, as shown by Stewart Shapiro and Jeffrey Ketland in their semantical arguments for the substantiality of truth. According to them, in Gödel sentences we have an explicit case of true but unprovable sentences, and hence deflationism is refuted. Against that, Neil Tennant has shown that instead of Tarskian truth we can expand the formal system with a soundness principle, according to which all provable sentences are assertable, and the assertability of Gödel sentences follows. This way, the relevant question is not whether we can establish the truth of Gödel sentences, but whether Tarskian truth is a more plausible expansion than a soundness principle. In this work I will argue that this problem is best approached once we think of mathematics as the full human phenomenon, and not just consisting of formal systems. When pre-formal mathematical thinking is included in our account, we see that Tarskian truth is in fact not an expansion at all. I claim that what proof is to formal mathematics, truth is to pre-formal thinking, and the Tarskian account of semantical truth mirrors this relation accurately. However, the introduction of pre-formal mathematics is vulnerable to the deflationist counterargument that while existing in practice, pre-formal thinking could still be philosophically superfluous if it does not refer to anything objective. Against this, I argue that all truly deflationist philosophical theories lead to arbitrariness of mathematics. In all other philosophical accounts of mathematics there is room for a reference of the pre-formal mathematics, and the expansion of Tarkian truth can be made naturally. Hence, if we reject the arbitrariness of mathematics, I argue in this work, we must accept the substantiality of truth. Related subjects such as neo-Fregeanism will also be covered, and shown not to change the need for Tarskian truth. The only remaining route for the deflationist is to change the underlying logic so that our formal languages can include their own truth predicates, which Tarski showed to be impossible for classical first-order languages. With such logics we would have no need to expand the formal systems, and the above argument would fail. From the alternative approaches, in this work I focus mostly on the Independence Friendly (IF) logic of Jaakko Hintikka and Gabriel Sandu. Hintikka has claimed that an IF language can include its own adequate truth predicate. I argue that while this is indeed the case, we cannot recognize the truth predicate as such within the same IF language, and the need for Tarskian truth remains. In addition to IF logic, also second-order logic and Saul Kripke s approach using Kleenean logic will be shown to fail in a similar fashion.

Questions to Artificial Nature: A Philosophical Study of Interdisciplinary Models and their Functions in Scientific Practice

This thesis presents an interdisciplinary analysis of how models and simulations function in the production of scientific knowledge. The work is informed by three scholarly traditions: studies on models and simulations in philosophy of science, so-called micro-sociological laboratory studies within science and technology studies, and cultural-historical activity theory. Methodologically, I adopt a naturalist epistemology and combine philosophical analysis with a qualitative, empirical case study of infectious-disease modelling. This study has a dual perspective throughout the analysis: it specifies the modelling practices and examines the models as objects of research. The research questions addressed in this study are: 1) How are models constructed and what functions do they have in the production of scientific knowledge? 2) What is interdisciplinarity in model construction? 3) How do models become a general research tool and why is this process problematic? The core argument is that the mediating models as investigative instruments (cf. Morgan and Morrison 1999) take questions as a starting point, and hence their construction is intentionally guided. This argument applies the interrogative model of inquiry (e.g., Sintonen 2005; Hintikka 1981), which conceives of all knowledge acquisition as process of seeking answers to questions. The first question addresses simulation models as Artificial Nature, which is manipulated in order to answer questions that initiated the model building. This account develops further the "epistemology of simulation" (cf. Winsberg 2003) by showing the interrelatedness of researchers and their objects in the process of modelling. The second question clarifies why interdisciplinary research collaboration is demanding and difficult to maintain. The nature of the impediments to disciplinary interaction are examined by introducing the idea of object-oriented interdisciplinarity, which provides an analytical framework to study the changes in the degree of interdisciplinarity, the tools and research practices developed to support the collaboration, and the mode of collaboration in relation to the historically mutable object of research. As my interest is in the models as interdisciplinary objects, the third research problem seeks to answer my question of how we might characterise these objects, what is typical for them, and what kind of changes happen in the process of modelling. Here I examine the tension between specified, question-oriented models and more general models, and suggest that the specified models form a group of their own. I call these Tailor-made models, in opposition to the process of building a simulation platform that aims at generalisability and utility for health-policy. This tension also underlines the challenge of applying research results (or methods and tools) to discuss and solve problems in decision-making processes.