Trade Blocs and the Cold War : The CMEA and the EC challenge, 1969-1976

The coherence of the Soviet bloc was seriously tested at the turn of the 1970s, as the Soviet Union and its allies engaged in intensive negotiations over their relations with the European Communities (EC). In an effort to secure their own national economic interests many East European countries began independent manoeuvres against the wishes of their bloc leader. However, much of the intra-bloc controversy was kept out of the public eye, as the battle largely took place behind the scenes, within the organisation for economic cooperation, the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA). The CMEA policy-making process vis-à-vis the EC is described in this study with reference to primary archival materials. This study investigates the negotiating positions and powers of the CMEA member states in their efforts to deal with the economic challenge created by the progress of the EC, as it advanced towards the customs union. This entails an analysis of the functioning principles and performance of the CMEA machinery. The study traces the CMEA negotiations that began in 1970 over its policy toward the EC. The policy was finally adopted in 1974, and was followed by the first official meeting between the two organisations in early 1975. The story ends in 1976, when the CMEA s efforts to enter into working relations with the EC were seemingly frustrated by the latter. The first major finding of the study is that, contrary to much of the prior research, the Soviet Union was not in a hegemonic position vis-à-vis its allies. It had to use a lot of its resources to tame the independent manoeuvring of its smaller allies. Thus, the USSR was not the kind of bloc leader that the totalitarian literature has described. Because the Soviet Union had to spend so much attention on its own bloc-politics, it was not able to concentrate on formulating a policy vis-à-vis the EC. Thus, the Soviet leadership was dependent on its allies in those instances when the socialist countries needed to act as a bloc. This consequently opened up the possibility for the USSR s allies to manoeuvre. This study also argues that when the CMEA did manage to find a united position, it was a force that the EC had to reckon with in its policy-making. This was particularly the case in the implementation of the EC Common Commercial Policy. The other main finding of the study is that, although it has been largely neglected in the previous literature on the history of West European integration, the CMEA did in fact have an effect on EC decision-making. This study shows how for political and ideological reasons the CMEA members did not acknowledge the EC s supranational authority. Therefore the EC had no choice but to refrain from implementing its Common Commercial Policy in full.

Essays on Russia's Economic Transition

This study comprises an introductory section and three essays analysing Russia's economic transition from the early 1990s up to the present. The papers present a combination of both theoretical and empirical analysis on some of the key issues Russia has faced during its somewhat troublesome transformation from state-controlled command economy to market-based economy. The first essay analyses fiscal competition for mobile capital between identical regions in a transition country. A standard tax competition framework is extended to account for two features of a transition economy: the presence of two sectors, old and new, which differ in productivity; and a non-benevolent regional decision-maker. It is shown that in very early phase of transition, when the old sector clearly dominates, consumers in a transition economy may be better off in a competitive equilibrium. Decision-makers, on the other hand, will prefer to coordinate their fiscal policies. The second essay uses annual data for 1992-2003 to examine income dispersion and convergence across 76 Russian regions. Wide disparities in income levels have indeed emerged during the transition period. Dispersion has increased most among the initially better-off regions, whereas for the initially poorer regions no clear trend of divergence or convergence could be established. Further, some - albeit not highly robust - evidence was found of both unconditional and conditional convergence, especially among the initially richer regions. Finally, it is observed that there is much less evidence of convergence after the economic crisis of 1998. The third essay analyses industrial firms' engagement in provision of infrastructure services, such as heating, electricity and road maintenance. Using a unique dataset of 404 large and medium-sized industrial enterprises in 40 regions of Russia, the essay examines public infrastructure provision by Russian industrial enterprises. It is found that to a large degree engagement in infrastructure provision, as proxied by district heating production, is a Soviet legacy. Secondly, firms providing district heating to users outside their plant area are more likely to have close and multidimensional relations with the local public sector.

The phenomenon of oligarchy in Russia and its impact on Russian transition

Nowadays any analysis of Russian economy is incomplete without taking into account the phenomenon of oligarchy. Russian oligarchs appeared after the fall of the Soviet Union and are represented by wealthy businessmen who control a huge part of natural resources enterprises and have a big political influence. Oligarchs’ shares in some natural resources industries reach even 70-80%. Their role in Russian economy is big without any doubts, however there has been very little economic analysis done. The aim of this work is to examine Russian oligarchy on micro and macro levels, its role in Russia’s transition and the possible positive and negative outcomes from this phenomenon. For this purpose the work presents two theoretical models. The first part of this thesis work examines the role of oligarchs on micro level, concentrating on the question whether the oligarchs can be more productive owners than other types of owners. To answer the question this part presents a model based on the article “Are oligarchs productive? Theory and evidence” by Y. Gorodnichenko and Y. Grygorenko. It is followed by empirical test based on the works of S. Guriev and A. Rachinsky. The model predicts oligarchs to invest more in the productivity of their enterprises and have higher returns on capital, therefore be more productive owners. According to the empirical test, oligarchs were found to outperform other types of owners, however it is not defined whether the productivity gains offset losses in tax revenue. The second part of the work concentrates on the role of oligarchy on macro level. More precisely, it examines the assumption that the depression after 1998 crises in Russia was caused by the oligarchs’ behavior. This part presents a theoretical model based on the article “A macroeconomic model of Russian transition: The role of oligarchic property rights” by S. Braguinsky and R. Myerson, where the special type of property rights is introduced. After the 1998 crises oligarchs started to invest all their resources abroad to protect themselves from political risks, which resulted in the long depression phase. The macroeconomic model shows, that better protection of property rights (smaller political risk) or/and higher outside investing could reduce the depression. Taking into account this result, the government policy can change the oligarchs’ behavior to be more beneficial for the Russian economy and make the transition faster.

The phenomenon of oligarchy in Russia and its impact on Russian transition

Nowadays any analysis of Russian economy is incomplete without taking into account the phenomenon of oligarchy. Russian oligarchs appeared after the fall of the Soviet Union and are represented by wealthy businessmen who control a huge part of natural resources enterprises and have a big political influence. Oligarchs’ shares in some natural resources industries reach even 70-80%. Their role in Russian economy is big without any doubts, however there has been very little economic analysis done. The aim of this work is to examine Russian oligarchy on micro and macro levels, its role in Russia’s transition and the possible positive and negative outcomes from this phenomenon. For this purpose the work presents two theoretical models. The first part of this thesis work examines the role of oligarchs on micro level, concentrating on the question whether the oligarchs can be more productive owners than other types of owners. To answer the question this part presents a model based on the article “Are oligarchs productive? Theory and evidence” by Y. Gorodnichenko and Y. Grygorenko. It is followed by empirical test based on the works of S. Guriev and A. Rachinsky. The model predicts oligarchs to invest more in the productivity of their enterprises and have higher returns on capital, therefore be more productive owners. According to the empirical test, oligarchs were found to outperform other types of owners, however it is not defined whether the productivity gains offset losses in tax revenue. The second part of the work concentrates on the role of oligarchy on macro level. More precisely, it examines the assumption that the depression after 1998 crises in Russia was caused by the oligarchs’ behavior. This part presents a theoretical model based on the article “A macroeconomic model of Russian transition: The role of oligarchic property rights” by S. Braguinsky and R. Myerson, where the special type of property rights is introduced. After the 1998 crises oligarchs started to invest all their resources abroad to protect themselves from political risks, which resulted in the long depression phase. The macroeconomic model shows, that better protection of property rights (smaller political risk) or/and higher outside investing could reduce the depression. Taking into account this result, the government policy can change the oligarchs’ behavior to be more beneficial for the Russian economy and make the transition faster.

Talking About Time in Russian and Finnish

In this study I look at what people want to express when they talk about time in Russian and Finnish, and why they use the means they use. The material consists of expressions of time: 1087 from Russian and 1141 from Finnish. They have been collected from dictionaries, usage guides, corpora, and the Internet. An expression means here an idiomatic set of words in a preset form, a collocation or construction. They are studied as lexical entities, without a context, and analysed and categorized according to various features. The theoretical background for the study includes two completely different approaches. Functional Syntax is used in order to find out what general meanings the speaker wishes to convey when talking about time and how these meanings are expressed in specific languages. Conceptual metaphor theory is used for explaining why the expressions are as they are, i.e. what kind of conceptual metaphors (transfers from one conceptual domain to another) they include. The study has resulted in a grammatically glossed list of time expressions in Russian and Finnish, a list of 56 general meanings involved in these time expressions and an account of the means (constructions) that these languages have for expressing the general meanings defined. It also includes an analysis of conceptual metaphors behind the expressions. The general meanings involved turned out to revolve around expressing duration, point in time, period of time, frequency, sequence, passing of time, suitable time and the right time, life as time, limitedness of time, and some other notions having less obvious semantic relations to the others. Conceptual metaphor analysis of the material has shown that time is conceptualized in Russian and Finnish according to the metaphors Time Is Space (Time Is Container, Time Has Direction, Time Is Cycle, and the Time Line Metaphor), Time Is Resource (and its submapping Time Is Substance), Time Is Actor; and some characteristics are added to these conceptualizations with the help of the secondary metaphors Time Is Nature and Time Is Life. The limits between different conceptual metaphors and the connections these metaphors have with one another are looked at with the help of the theory of conceptual integration (the blending theory) and its schemas. The results of the study show that although Russian and Finnish are typologically different, they are very similar both in the needs of expression their speakers have concerning time, and in the conceptualizations behind expressing time. This study introduces both theoretical and methodological novelties in the nature of material used, in developing empirical methodology for conceptual metaphor studies, in the exactness of defining the limits of different conceptual metaphors, and in seeking unity among the different facets of time. Keywords: time, metaphor, time expression, idiom, conceptual metaphor theory, functional syntax, blending theory

Canon and Beyond : Edvard Fazer and the Imperial Russian Ballet 1908 - 1910

The study explores the first appearances of Russian ballet dancers on the stages of northern Europe in 1908 1910, particularly the performances organized by a Finnish impresario, Edvard Fazer, in Helsinki, Stockholm, Copenhagen and Berlin. The company, which consisted of dancers from the Imperial Theatres of St. Petersburg, travelled under the name The Imperial Russian Ballet of St. Petersburg. The Imperial Russian Ballet gave more than seventy performances altogether during its tours of Finland, Sweden, Denmark and central Europe. The synchronic approach of the study covers the various cities as well as genres and thus stretches the rather rigid geographical and genre boundaries of dance historiography. The study also explores the role of the canon in dance history, revealing some of the diversity which underlies the standard canonical interpretation of early twentieth-century Russian ballet by bringing in source material from the archives of northern Europe. Issues like the central position of written documentation, the importance of geographical centres, the emphasis on novelty and reformers and the short and narrow scholarly tradition have affected the formation of the dance history canon in the west, often imposing limits on the historians and narrowing the scope of research. The analysis of the tours concentrates on four themes: virtuosity, character dancing, the idea of the expressive body, and the controversy over ballet and new dance. The debate concerning the old and new within ballet is also touched upon. These issues are discussed in connection with each city, but are stressed differently depending on the local art scene. In Copenhagen, the strong local canon based on August Bournonville s works influenced the Danish criticism of Russian ballet. In Helsinki, Stockholm and Berlin, the lack of a solid local canon made critics and audiences more open to new influences, and ballet was discussed in a much broader cultural context than that provided by the local ballet tradition. The contemporary interest in the more natural, expressive human body, emerging both in theatre and dance, was an international trend that also influenced the way ballet was discussed. Character dancing, now at low ebb, played a central role in the success of the Imperial Russian Ballet, not only because of its exoticism but also because it was considered to echo the kind of performing body represented by new dance forms. By exploring this genre and its dancers, the thesis brings to light artists who are less known in the current dance history canon, but who made considerable careers in their own time.

Murtuva säätyvalta, kestävä eliitti : Senaattori Lennart Gripenbergin sukupiiri ja sääty-yhteiskunnan muodonmuutos

This study examines the transformation of the society of estates in the Finnish Grand Duchy through the case study of Senator Lennart Gripenberg and his family circle. While national borders and state structures changed, the connections between old ruling elite families remained intact as invisible family networks, ownership relations, economic collaboration and power of military families. These were the cornerstones of trust, which helped to strengthen positions gained in society. Also, these connections often had a central if unperceivable impact on social development and modernization. Broadly speaking, the intergenerational social reproduction made it possible for this network of connections to remain in power and, as an imperceptible factor, also influenced short-term developments in the long run. Decisions which in the short term appeared unproductive, would in the long run produce cumulative immaterial and material capital across generations as long-term investments. Social mobility, then, is a process which clearly takes several generations to become manifest. The study explores long-term strategies of reproducing and transferring the capital accumulated in multinational elite networks. Also, what was the relationship of these strategies to social change? For the representatives of the military estate the nobility and for those men of the highest estates who had benefited from military training, this very education of a technical-military nature was the key to steering, controlling and dealing with the challenges following the industrial breakthrough. The disintegration of the society of estates and the rising educational standards also increased the influence of those professionals previously excluded, which served to intensify competition for positions of power. The family connections highlighted in this study overlapped in many ways, working side by side and in tandem to manage the economic and political life in Finland, Russia and Sweden. The analysis of these ties has opened up a new angle to economic co-operation, for example, as seen in the position of such family networks not only in Finnish, but also Swedish and Russian corporations and in the long historical background of the collaboration. This also highlights in a new way the role of women in transferring the cumulative social capital and as silent business partners. The marriage strategies evident in business life clearly had an impact on the economic life. The collaborative networks which transcended generations, national boundaries and structures also uncover, as far as the elites are concerned, serious problems in comparative studies conducted from purely national premises. As the same influential families and persons in effect held several leading positions in society, the line would blur between public and invisible uses of power. The power networks thus aimed to build monopolies to secure their key positions at the helm. This study therefore examines the roles of Lennart Gripenberg senator, business executive, superintendent of the Department of Industry, factory inspector, and founding member of industrial interest groups as part of the reproduction strategies of the elite. The family and other networks of the powerful leaders of society, distinguished by social, economic and cultural capital, provided a solid backdrop for the so-called old elites in their quest for strategies to reproducing power in a changing world. Crucially, it was easier for the elites to gain expertise to steer the modernization process and thereby secure for the next generation a leading position in society, something that they traditionally, too, had had the greatest interest in.

Rossijskaja Karelija i karely v imperskoi politike Rossii, 1905-1917

Russian Karelians were one of the small peasant nations of the Russian Empire that began to identify themselves as nations during the late imperial period. At that historical moment Russian Karelia fell between an economically undeveloped empire and the rapidly modernizing borderland of Finland. The economic and cultural lure of Finland drew Karelians into the Finnish camp. This attraction was seen as a challenge to Russia and influenced the straggle between Russia and Finland for the Karelians. This struggle was waged from 1905 to 1917. This work is focused on the beginning stage of the struggle, its various phases, and their results. The confrontation extended into different dimensions (economic, political, ideological, church and cultural politics) and occurred on two levels: central and regional. Countermeasures against local nationalisms developed much earlier both in Russia and in other empires for use were also used in the Russian Karelian case. Economic policies were deployed to try to make relations with Russia more alluring for Karelians and to improve their economic condition. However, these efforts produced only minimal results due to the economic weakness of the empire and a lack of finances. Fear of the economic integration of the Karelians and Finns, which would have stimulated the economy of the Karelia, also hindered these attempts. The further development of the Orthodox Church, the schools and the zemstvos in Karelia yielded fewer results than expected due to the economic underdevelopment of the region and the avoidance of the Finnish language. Policizing measures were the most successfull, as all activities in Russian Karelia by the Finns were entirely halted in practice. However, the aspiration of Russian Karelians to integrate their home districts with Finland remained a latent force that just waited for an opportunity to push to the surface again. Such a chance materialized with the Russian revolution. The Karelian question was also a part of Russian domestic political confrontation. At the and of the 1800s, the Russian nationalist right had grown strong and increasingly gained the favor of the autocracy. The right political forces exploited the Karelian question in its anti-Finnish ideology and in its general resistance to the national emancipation of the minority peoples of Russia. A separate ideology was developed, focusing on the closeness of Karelians to the "great Russian people." Simultaneously, this concept found a place in the ultramonarchist myth of the particularly close connection between the people and tsar that was prominent in the era of Nicholas II. This myth assigned the Karelians a place amongst the "simple people" faithful to the tsar.

Metsäpirulainen : Liikemies Erik Johan Längman (1799-1863) talousjärjestelmän murroksessa

The Forest devil. Businessman Erik Johan Längman (1799 1863) in the transition of economic system In Finnish historiography, Erik Johan Längman (1799-1863) bears a bad reputation of his own level: a mean, profit-seeking businessman who did not care too much about methods in his operations. Although little known, Längman has been praised as one of the pioneers of modern industry in the Grand Duchy of Finland, which belonged to the Russian Empire. From the mid 1830s Längman owned iron mill and several sawmills around the country. The growing demand of the markets in the 1830s, especially in Great Britain, marked a strong stimulus to Finnish lumber industry. At the same time claims for stricter rule over the sawmill industry were raised by high officials. The momentum of the conflict, the Forest Act of 1851, brought an end to illegal overproduction. In this biography, particular emphasis is laid on the entrepreneurial behaviour of Längman, but also on the effect the entrepreneurs had on the Crown s policies. On the other hand, how did the limitations imposed by the Crown guide the actions of the sawmill owners? The solutions adopted by the sawmill owners and the manoeuvring of the government are in a constant dialogue in this study. The Finnish sawmill industry experienced a major change in its techniques and methods of acquiring timber during the 1830s. Längman particularly, with his acquisition organisation, was able to find and reach faraway forests with unexpected results. The official regulating system with its strict producing quotas couldn t follow the changes. When the battle against the sawmill industry really started on, in 1840, it didn t happen for the benefit of iron industry, as argued previously, but to save Crown forests from depletion. After the mid 1840s Längman and the leader of the Finnish nationalistic movement, J. V. Snellman questioned the rationality of the entire regulation system and in doing so they also posed a threat against the aristocratic power. The influential but now also badly provoked chairman of the economic division of senate, Lars Gabriel von Haartman, accused the sawmill-owners harder than ever and took the advantage of the reactionary spirit of imperial Russia to launch the state forest administration. Längman circumvented the conditions of privileges, felled Crown forests illegally and accusations were brought against him for destroying his competitors. The repeated conflicts spoke primarily about a superior business idea and organisational ability. Although Längman spent his last years mostly abroad he still had interests in Finnish timber business when the liberation of sawmill-industry was established, in 1861. Surprisingly, the antagonism around the Crown forests continued, probably even more heated.

Luonto, tiede ja teknologia : Kansanvalistuksen Suomi-kuva 1870-1920

Nature, science and technology. The image of Finland through popular enlightenment texts 1870-1920 This doctoral thesis looks at how Finnish popular enlightenment texts published between 1870 and 1920 took part in the process of forming a genuine Finnish national identity. The same process was occurring in other Nordic countries at the time and the process in Finland was in many ways influenced by them, particularly Sweden. In Finland the political realities under Russian rule especially during the Russification years, and the fact that its history was considered to be short compared to other European countries, made this nation-building process unique. The undertaking was led by members of the national elite, influential in the cultural, academic as well as political arenas, who were keen to support the foundation of a modern Finnish identity. The political realities and national philosophy of history necessitated a search for elements of identity in nature and the Finnish landscape, which were considered to have special national importance: Finland was very much determined as a political entity on the basis of its geography and nature. Nature was also used as means of taking a cultural or political view in terms of, for example, geographical facts such as the nation s borders or the country s geographical connections to Western Europe. In the building of a proper national identity the concept of nature was not, however, static, but was more or less affected by political and economic progress in society. This meant that nature, or the image of the national landscape, was no longer seen only as a visual image of the national identity, but also as a source of science, technology and a prosperous future. The role of technology in this process was very much connected to the ability to harness natural resources to serve national interests. The major change in this respect had occurred by the early 20th century, when indisputable scientific progress altered the relationship between nature and technology. Concerning technology, the thesis is mainly interested in the large and at the time modern technological manifestations, such as railways, factories and industrial areas in Finland. Despite the fact that the symbiosis between national nature and international but successfully localized technology was in Finnish popular enlightenment literature depicted mostly as a national success story, concerns began to arise already in last years of the 19th century. It was argued that the emerging technology would eventually destroy Finland s natural environment, and therefore the basis of its national identity. The question was not how to preserve nature through natural science, but more how to conserve such natural resources and images that were considered to be the basis of national identity and thus of the national history. National parks, isolated from technology, and distant enough so as to have no economic value, were considered the solution to the problem. Methodologically the thesis belongs to the genre of science and technology studies, and offers new viewpoints with regard to both the study of Finnish popular enlightenment literature and the national development process as a whole.

Substrata Uralica : Studies on Finno-Ugrian Substrate in Northern Russian Dialects

The thesis consists of five articles and an introduction. It treats the problems of the Uralic substrate, most notably, the substrate toponyms, in the Russian dialects of Arkhangelsk region. The articles contribute to the general linguistic discussion concerning the nature of linguistic substrate and the outcome of language shift and to the onomastic discussion concerning the etymologisation and ethnic interpretation of substrate toponymy. Among the questions the articles scrutinised are the following: 1) How may phonetic and morphosyntactic substrate interference be verified? 2) How typical is the transfer of vocabulary in the case of a language shift? 3) How the borrowing of toponymy and appellative vocabulary are connected in the case of a language shift? 4) How does the etymologisation of the toponyms differ from the etymologisation of appellatives? 5) How reliable can the toponymic etymologies be? 6) How can the substrate language be identified? It is found that the substrate interference that can be meaningfully studied, from the point of view of historical linguistics, is predominantly lexical and not related to phonetics and morphosyntax, as presumed in many handbooks. New methods are outlined for the identification of substrate languages separately from the lexical, phonological and typological point of view by using the substrate toponymy as the main source of information on extinct languages. A reliability scale for the toponymic etymologies is developed that helps to identify the kinds of etymologies containing ethnohistorically meaningful information. The study also sheds light on questions related to Uralistics and Slavistics. The most important of these are the following: 1) Which Uralic languages were spoken in North Russia prior to Slavic? 2) When did the Slavicisation of the Finno-Ugrian population take place in the area of the Arkhangelsk Region? 3) What is the significance of the Finno-Ugrian substrate in northern Russian dialects to comparative Uralistics? 4) Are there any traces of pre-Uralic substrate languages in north-eastern Europe? The Finnic substrate languages, already identified by earlier studies, seem to have consisted of two groups, one of which was closest to the southern Finnic. Also, language(s) close to Sámi in some respects though not identical with it where spoken in pre-Slavic North Russia.