39 resultados para Corporate institutions
em Helda - Digital Repository of University of Helsinki
Resumo:
The dissertation examines the power mechanisms and institutional power hierarchies of the 1940s-1950s era arts elite in Helsinki and their influence on issues of taste in the visual arts. For the purposes of this study, the elite is understood to consist mainly of the board members of the principal elected bodies in the field of the arts. The theoretical framework employed is based on Pierre Bourdieu s field theory and the network perspective. The author has examined what the key, pervasive valuations were that governed the exercising of power by the arts elite in issues of taste, involving determination of who was an acknowledged artist and what was good art. The dissertation demonstrates that this exercising of power was governed by certain collective practices which maintained the illusion that the exercising of power was democratic and based on artistic quality. These practices were the corporate system, using artistic arguments in issues of taste, and using networks in the exercising of power. The struggle in the field of the arts was about who ultimately was entitled to define the value of contemporary art; the issue did not arise regarding historical art. Artists managed to gain a leading position as gatekeepers in issues regarding contemporary art. The author discusses a number of conflicts in the field of the arts that highlight the institutional hierarchies and the capital held by the various players. The structural changes that occurred in administration in the field of cultural production in the 1950s led to the separation of bureaucratic competence on the one hand and aesthetic competence on the other. There was a hierarchy in the field of the arts between institutions, between instruments of legitimisation, and between the symbolic and social capital of players in the field. The hierarchy in the arts ultimately depended on how well the elite could influence tastes through the instruments at their disposal. The various instruments of legitimisation grants, purchases, etc. were ranked differently in the evaluation of acknowledged artists and good art. The dissertation discusses what values, in the form of types of symbolic capital, the arts elite embraced and what role these played in the elite s exercising of power, with particular focus on gender, language, region and economic capital. The aesthetic capital of an artist was of only minor importance in the exercising of power by the arts elite. The dissertation further discusses the points of contact between the arts elite and players in other fields, such as the economic, media and consumer fields. When the arts elite, through the Academy of Fine Arts, became an active player in the art market, this led to a hierarchy where the division between acknowledged and not-acknowledged galleries became sharper.
Resumo:
This dissertation consists of an introductory section and three theoretical essays analyzing the interaction of corporate governance and restructuring. The essays adopt an incomplete contracts approach and analyze the role of different institutional designs to facilitate the alignment of the objectives of shareholders and management (or employees) over the magnitude of corporate restructuring. The first essay analyzes how a firm's choice of production technology affects the employees' human capital investment. In the essay, the owners of the firm can choose between a specific and a general technology that both require a costly human capital investment by the employees. The specific technology is initially superior in using the human capital of employees but, in contrast to the general technology, it is not compatible with future innovations. As a result, anticipated changes in the specific technology diminish the ex ante incentives of the employees to invest in human capital unless the shareholders grant the employees specific governance mechanisms (a right of veto, severance pay) so as to protect their investments. The results of the first essay indicate that the level of protection that the shareholders are willing to offer falls short of the socially desirable one. Furthermore, when restructuring opportunities become more abundant, it becomes more attractive both socially and from the viewpoint of the shareholders to initially adopt the general technology. The second essay analyzes how the allocation of authority within the firm interacts with the owners' choice of business strategy when the ability of the owners to monitor the project proposals of the management is biased in favor of the status quo strategy. The essay shows that a bias in the monitoring ability will affect not only the allocation of authority within the firm but also the choice of business strategy. Especially, when delegation has positive managerial incentive effects, delegation turns out to be more attractive under the new business strategy because the improved managerial incentives are a way for the owners to compensate their own reduced information gathering ability. This effect, however, simultaneously makes the owners hesitant to switch the strategy since it would involve a more frequent loss of control over the project choice. Consequently, the owners' lack of knowledge of the new business strategy may lead to a suboptimal choice of strategy. The third essay analyzes the implications of CEO succession process for the ideal board structure. In this essay, the presence of the departing CEO on the board facilitates the ability of the board to find a matching successor and to counsel him. However, the ex-CEO's presence may simultaneously also weaken the ability of the board to restructure since the predecessor may use the opportunity to distort the successor's project choice. The results of the essay suggest that the extent of restructuring gains, the firm's ability to hire good outside directors and the importance of board's advisory role affect at which point and for how long the shareholders may want to nominate the predecessor to the board.
Resumo:
In public economics, two extremist views on the functions of a government compete: one emphasizes government working for the public interest to provide value for the citizens, while another regards government mainly as a workhorse for private interests. Moreover, as the sole legitimate authority, the government has the right to define the rules and laws as well as to enforce them. With respect to regulation, two extremes arise: from too little regulation to too much of it. If the government does not function or ceases to exist, the state falls into anarchy or chaos (Somalia). If it regulates too much, it will completely suffocate private activities, which might be considered extralegal (the former Soviet Union). In this thesis I scrutinize the government s interventionist policies and evaluate the question of how to best promote economic well-being. The first two essays assume that the government s policies promote illegal activity. The first paper evaluates the interaction between the government and the mafia, and pays attention to the law enforcement of underground production. We show that the revenue-maximizing government will always monitor the shadow economy, as monitoring contributes to the government s revenue. In general, both legal and illegal firms are hurt by the entry of the mafia. It is, however, plausible that legal firms might benefit by the entry of the mafia if it competes with the government. The second paper tackles the issue of the measurement of the size of the shadow economy. To formulate policies it is essential to know what drives illegal economic activity; is it the tax burden, excess regulation, corruption or a weak legal environment? In this paper we propose an additional explanation for tax evasion and shadow production, namely cultural factors as manifested by religion as determinants of tax morality. According to our findings, Catholic and Protestant countries do not differ in their tax morale. The third paper contributes to the literature discussing the role of the government in promoting economic and productivity growth. Our main result is that, given the complex relationship between economic growth and economic freedom, marketization has not necessarily been beneficial in terms of growth. The last paper builds on traditional growth literature and revisits the debate on convergence clubs arising from demographic transition. We provide new evidence against the idea that countries within a club would converge over time. Instead, we propose that since the demographic transition is a dynamic process, one can expect countries to enter the last regime of stable, modern growth in stages.
Resumo:
The primary purpose of introducing a common corporate language in crossborder mergers is to integrate two previously separate organizations and facilitate communication. However, the present case study of a cross-border merger between two Nordic banks shows that the common corporate language decision may have disintegrating effects, particularly at organizational levels below top management. We identify such effects on performance appraisal, language training and management development, career paths, promotion and key personnel. Our findings show that top management needs to work through the consequences of the language decision upon those who are expected to make such a decision work.
Resumo:
In Somalia the central government collapsed in 1991 and since then state failure became a widespread phenomenon and one of the greatest political and humanitarian problems facing the world in this century. Thus, the main objective of this research is to answer the following question: What went wrong? Most of the existing literature on the political economy of conflict starts from the assumption that state in Africa is predatory by nature. Unlike these studies, the present research, although it uses predation theory, starts from the social contract approach of state definition. Therefore, rather than contemplating actions and policies of the rulers alone, this approach allows us to deliberately bring the role of the society – as citizens – and other players into the analyses. In Chapter 1, after introducing the study, a simple principal-agent model will be developed to check the logical consistence of the argument and to make the identification of causal mechanism easier. I also identify three main actors in the process of state failure in Somalia: the Somali state, Somali society and the superpowers. In Chapter 2, so as to understand the incentives, preferences and constraints of each player in the state failure game, I in some depth analyse the evolution and structure of three central informal institutions: identity based patronage system of leadership, political tribalism, and the Cold War. These three institutions are considered as the rules of the game in the Somali state failure. Chapter 3 summarises the successive civilian governments’ achievements and failures (1960-69) concerning the main national goals, national unification and socio-economic development. Chapter 4 shows that the military regime, although it assumed power through extralegal means, served to some extent the developmental interest of the citizens in the first five years of its rule. Chapter 5 shows the process, and the factors involved, of the military regime’s self-transformation from being an agent for the developmental interests of the society to a predatory state that not only undermines the interests of the society but that also destroys the state itself. Chapter 6 addresses the process of disintegration of the post-colonial state of Somalia. The chapter shows how the regime’s merciless reactions to political ventures by power-seeking opposition leaders shattered the entire country and wrecked the state institutions. Chapter 7 concludes the study by summarising the main findings: due to the incentive structures generated by the informal institutions, the formal state institutions fell apart.
Resumo:
“Corporate governance deals with the ways in which suppliers of finance to firms assure themselves of getting a return on their investment” (Shleifer and Vishny (1997, p. 737). According to La Porta et al. (1999), research in corporate finance relevant for most countries should focus on the incentives and capabilities of controlling shareholders to treat themselves preferentially at the expense of minority shareholders. Accordingly, this thesis sets out to answer a number of research questions regarding the role of large shareholders in public firms that have received little attention in the literature so far. A common theme in the essays stems from the costs and benefits of individual large-block owners and the role of control contestability from the perspective of outside minority shareholders. The first essay empirically examines whether there are systematic performance differences between family controlled and nonfamily controlled firms in Western Europe. In contrast to the widely held view that family control penalizes firm value, the essay shows that publicly traded family firms have higher performance than comparable firms. In the second essay, we present both theoretical and empirical analysis on the effects of control contestability on firm valuation. Consistent with the theoretical model, the empirical results show that minority shareholders benefit from a more contestable control structure. The third essay explores the effects of individual large-block owners on top management turnover and board appointments in Finnish listed firms. The results indicate that firm performance is an important determinant for management and board restructurings. For certain types of turnover decisions the corporate governance structure influences the performance / turnover sensitivity. In the fourth essay, we investigate the relation between the governance structure and dividend policy in Finnish listed firms. We find evidence in support of the outcome agency model of dividends stating that lower agency conflicts should be associated with higher dividend payouts.
Resumo:
Banks are important as they have a central role in the financial system, where funds are channelled either through financial intermediaries, such as banks, or through financial markets, hence promoting growth in any economy. Recently, we have been reminded of the drawbacks of the central role of banks. The current financial crisis, which started out as a sub-prime mortgage crisis in the US, has become a global financial crisis with substantial impact on the real economy in many countries. Some of the roots to the current financial crisis can be sought in the changing role of banks and in bank corporate governance. Moreover, the substantial revitalising measures taken have been justified by the central role of banks. Not only are banks important, they are also very special. The fact that banks are regulated in conjunction with greater opacity, make bank corporate governance different from corporate governance in non-bank companies. Surprisingly little is, however, known about bank corporate governance, in particularly, in a European setting. Hence, the objective of this doctoral thesis is to provide new insights in this research area by examining banks from 37 different European countries. Each of the three essays included in the doctoral thesis examines a particular aspect of bank corporate governance. In the first essay the interaction between the regulatory environment a bank operates in and its ownership structure is explored. Indicators of the severity of the moral hazard problem induced by the deposit insurance system and implicit too-big-to-fail government guarantee, particular features of deposit insurance systems as well as legal protection of shareholders, legal origin of a country and level of integration to the European community are used in the analysis. The empirical findings confirm previous findings on the link between legal protection of shareholders and ownership structure. Moreover, they show that differences in deposit insurance system features can explain some of the differences in ownership structure across European banks. In the second essay the impact of management and board ownership on the profitability of banks with different strategy is examined. The empirical findings suggest that the efficiency of these two particular corporate governance mechanisms varies with the characteristics of the agency problem faced by the bank. More specifically, management ownership is important in opaque non-traditional banks, whereas board ownership is important in traditional banks, where deposit insurance reduces the monitoring incentives of outsiders. The higher profitability does, however, go together with higher risk. In the third essay the profitability and risk of commercial, savings and cooperative banks are compared. The empirical findings suggest that distinct operational and ownership characteristics rather than only the mere fact that a bank is a commercial, savings or cooperative bank explain the profitability and risk differences. The main insight from the three essays is that a number of different aspects should be addressed simultaneously in order to give the complexity of bank corporate governance justice.
Resumo:
The negative relationship between economic growth and stock market return is not an anomaly according to evidence documented in many economies. It is argued that future economic growth is largely irrelevant for predicting future equity returns, since long-run equity returns depend mainly on dividend yields and the growth of per share dividends. The economic growth does result in a higher standard of living for consumers, but does not necessarily translate into higher returns for owners of the capital. The divergence in performance between the real sector and stock markets appears to support the above argument. However, this thesis strives to offer an alternative explanation to the apparent divergence within the framework of corporate governance. It argues that weak corporate governance standards in Chinese listed firms exacerbated by poor inventor protection results into a marginalized capital market. Each of the three essays in the thesis addresses one particular aspect of corporate governance on the Chinese stock market in a sequential way through gathering empirical evidence on three distinctive stock market activities. The first essay questions whether significant agency conflicts do exist by building a game on rights issues. It documents significant divergence in interests among shareholders holding different classes of shares. The second essay investigates the level of agency costs by examining value of control through constructing a sample of block transactions. It finds that block transactions that transfer ultimate control entail higher premiums. The third essay looks into possible avenues through which corporate governance standards could be improved by investigating the economic consequences of cross-listing on the Chinese stock market. It finds that, by adopting a higher disclosure standard through cross-listings, firms voluntarily commit themselves to reducing information asymmetry, and consequently command higher valuation than their counterparts.
Resumo:
Financing trade between economic agents located in different countries is affected by many types of risks, resulting from incomplete information about the debtor, the problems of enforcing international contracts, or the prevalence of political and financial crises. Trade is important for economic development and the availability of trade finance is essential, especially for developing countries. Relatively few studies treat the topic of political risk, particularly in the context of international lending. This thesis explores new ground to identify links between political risk and international debt defaults. The core hypothesis of the study is that the default probability of debt increases with increasing political risk in the country of the borrower. The thesis consists of three essays that support the hypothesis from different angles of the credit evaluation process. The first essay takes the point of view of an international lender assessing the credit risk of a public borrower. The second investigates creditworthiness assessment of companies. The obtained results are substantiated in the third essay that deals with an extensive political risk survey among finance professionals in developing countries. The financial instruments of core interest are export credit guaranteed debt initiated between the Export Credit Agency of Finland and buyers in 145 countries between 1975 and 2006. Default events of the foreign credit counterparts are conditioned on country-specific macroeconomic variables, corporate-specific accounting information as well as political risk indicators from various international sources. Essay 1 examines debt issued to government controlled institutions and conditions public default events on traditional macroeconomic fundamentals, in addition to selected political and institutional risk factors. Confirming previous research, the study finds country indebtedness and the GDP growth rate to be significant indicators of public default. Further, it is shown that public defaults respond to various political risk factors. However, the impact of the risk varies between countries at different stages of economic development. Essay 2 proceeds by investigating political risk factors as conveivable drivers of corporate default and uses traditional accounting variables together with new political risk indicators in the credit evaluation of private debtors. The study finds links between corporate default and leverage, as well as between corporate default and the general investment climate and measeures of conflict in the debtor country. Essay 3 concludes the thesis by offering survey evidence on the impact of political risk on debt default, as perceived and experienced by 103 finance professionals in 38 developing countries. Taken together, the results of the thesis suggest that various forms of political risk are associated with international debt defaults and continue to pose great concerns for both international creditors and borrowers in developing countries. The study provides new insights on the importance of variable selection in country risk analysis, and shows how political risk is actually perceived and experienced in the riskier, often lower income countries of the global economy.
Resumo:
A growing body of empirical research examines the structure and effectiveness of corporate governance systems around the world. An important insight from this literature is that corporate governance mechanisms address the excessive use of managerial discretionary powers to get private benefits by expropriating the value of shareholders. One possible way of expropriation is to reduce the quality of disclosed earnings by manipulating the financial statements. This lower quality of earnings should then be reflected by the stock price of firm according to value relevance theorem. Hence, instead of testing the direct effect of corporate governance on the firm’s market value, it is important to understand the causes of the lower quality of accounting earnings. This thesis contributes to the literature by increasing knowledge about the extent of the earnings management – measured as the extent of discretionary accruals in total disclosed earnings - and its determinants across the Transitional European countries. The thesis comprises of three essays of empirical analysis of which first two utilize the data of Russian listed firms whereas the third essay uses data from 10 European economies. More specifically, the first essay adds to existing research connecting earnings management to corporate governance. It testifies the impact of the Russian corporate governance reforms of 2002 on the quality of disclosed earnings in all publicly listed firms. This essay provides empirical evidence of the fact that the desired impact of reforms is not fully substantiated in Russia without proper enforcement. Instead, firm-level factors such as long-term capital investments and compliance with International financial reporting standards (IFRS) determine the quality of the earnings. The result presented in the essay support the notion proposed by Leuz et al. (2003) that the reforms aimed to bring transparency do not correspond to desired results in economies where investor protection is lower and legal enforcement is weak. The second essay focuses on the relationship between the internal-control mechanism such as the types and levels of ownership and the quality of disclosed earnings in Russia. The empirical analysis shows that the controlling shareholders in Russia use their powers to manipulate the reported performance in order to get private benefits of control. Comparatively, firms owned by the State have significantly better quality of disclosed earnings than other controllers such as oligarchs and foreign corporations. Interestingly, market performance of firms controlled by either State or oligarchs is better than widely held firms. The third essay provides useful evidence on the fact that both ownership structures and economic characteristics are important factors in determining the quality of disclosed earnings in three groups of countries in Europe. Evidence suggests that ownership structure is a more important determinant in developed and transparent countries, while economic determinants are important determinants in developing and transitional countries.
Resumo:
The integrated European debt capital market has undoubtedly broadened the possibilities for companies to access funding from the public and challenged investors to cope with an ever increasing complexity of its market participants. Well into the Euro-era, it is clear that the unified market has created potential for all involved parties, where investment opportunities are able to meet a supply of funds from a broad geographical area now summoned under a single currency. Europe’s traditionally heavy dependency on bank lending as a source of debt capital has thus been easing as corporate residents are able to tap into a deep and liquid capital market to satisfy their funding needs. As national barriers eroded with the inauguration of the Euro and interest rates for the EMU-members converged towards over-all lower yields, a new source of debt capital emerged to the vast majority of corporate residents under the new currency and gave an alternative to the traditionally more maturity-restricted bank debt. With increased sophistication came also an improved knowledge and understanding of the market and its participants. Further, investors became more willing to bear credit risk, which opened the market for firms of ever lower creditworthiness. In the process, the market as a whole saw a change in the profile of issuers, as non-financial firms increasingly sought their funding directly from the bond market. This thesis consists of three separate empirical studies on how corporates fund themselves on the European debt capital markets. The analysis focuses on a firm’s access to and behaviour on the capital market, subsequent the decision to raise capital through the issuance of arm’s length debt on the bond market. The specific areas considered are contributing to our knowledge in the fields of corporate finance and financial markets by considering explicitly firms’ primary market activities within the new market area. The first essay explores how reputation of an issuer affects its debt issuance. Essay two examines the choice of interest rate exposure on newly issued debt and the third and final essay explores pricing anomalies on corporate debt issues.
Resumo:
ANNE HOLMA ADAPTATION IN TRIADIC BUSINESS RELATIONSHIP SETTINGS – A STUDY IN CORPORATE TRAVEL MANAGEMENT Business-to-business relationships form complicated networks that function in an increasingly dynamic business environment. This study addresses the complexity of business relationships, both when it comes to the core phenomenon under investigation, adaptation, and the structural context of the research, a triadic relationship setting. In business research, adaptation is generally regarded as a dyadic phenomenon, even though it is well recognised that dyads do not exist isolated from the wider network. The triadic approach to business relationships is especially relevant in cases where an intermediary is involved, and where all three actors are directly connected with each other. However, only a few business studies apply the triadic approach. In this study, the three dyadic relationships in triadic relationship settings are investigated in the context of the other two dyads to which each is connected. The focus is on the triads as such, and on the connections between its actors. Theoretically, the study takes its stand in relationship marketing. The study integrates theories and concepts from two approaches, the industrial network approach by the Industrial marketing and purchasing group, and the Service marketing and management approach by the Nordic School. Sociological theories are used to understand the triadic relationship setting. The empirical context of the study is corporate travel management. The study is a retrospective case study, where the data is collected by in-depth interviews with key informants from an industrial enterprise and its travel agency and service supplier partners. The main theoretical contribution of the study concerns opening a new research area in relationship marketing by investigating adaptation in business relationships with a new perspective, and in a new context. This study provides a comprehensive framework to analyse adaptation in triadic business relationship settings. The analysis framework was created with the help of a systematic combining approach, which is based on abductive logic and continuous iteration between the theory and the case study results. The framework describes how adaptations initiate, and how they progress. The framework also takes into account how adaptations spread in triadic relationship settings, i.e. how adaptations attain all three actors of the triad. Furthermore, the framework helps to investigate the outcomes of the adaptations for individual firms, for dyadic relationships, and for the triads. The study also provides concepts and classification that can be used when evaluating adaptation and relationship development in both dyadic and triadic relationships.