Corporate Governance in China (summary section only)


Autoria(s): Gang, Ji
Contribuinte(s)

Svenska handelshögskolan, institutionen för finansiell ekonomi och ekonomisk statistik, finansiell ekonomi

Swedish School of Economics and Business Administration, Department of Finance and Statistics, Finance

Data(s)

19/05/2006

Resumo

The negative relationship between economic growth and stock market return is not an anomaly according to evidence documented in many economies. It is argued that future economic growth is largely irrelevant for predicting future equity returns, since long-run equity returns depend mainly on dividend yields and the growth of per share dividends. The economic growth does result in a higher standard of living for consumers, but does not necessarily translate into higher returns for owners of the capital. The divergence in performance between the real sector and stock markets appears to support the above argument. However, this thesis strives to offer an alternative explanation to the apparent divergence within the framework of corporate governance. It argues that weak corporate governance standards in Chinese listed firms exacerbated by poor inventor protection results into a marginalized capital market. Each of the three essays in the thesis addresses one particular aspect of corporate governance on the Chinese stock market in a sequential way through gathering empirical evidence on three distinctive stock market activities. The first essay questions whether significant agency conflicts do exist by building a game on rights issues. It documents significant divergence in interests among shareholders holding different classes of shares. The second essay investigates the level of agency costs by examining value of control through constructing a sample of block transactions. It finds that block transactions that transfer ultimate control entail higher premiums. The third essay looks into possible avenues through which corporate governance standards could be improved by investigating the economic consequences of cross-listing on the Chinese stock market. It finds that, by adopting a higher disclosure standard through cross-listings, firms voluntarily commit themselves to reducing information asymmetry, and consequently command higher valuation than their counterparts.

Formato

177293 bytes

application/pdf

Identificador

http://hdl.handle.net/10227/64

URN:ISBN:951-555-913-8

951-555-913-8

0424-7256

Idioma(s)

en

Publicador

Svenska handelshögskolan

Swedish School of Economics and Business Administration

Relação

Economics and Society

157

Direitos

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Palavras-Chave #corporate governance #corporate ownership structure #china stock market #a share #b share #non-tradable shares #rights issues #cross listing #block trade #large shareholders #expropriations #corporate control transactions #tobin’s Q #block premia #Finance
Tipo

Doctoral thesis

Väitöskirja

Doktorsavhandling

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