Kristallivalheita : Itsepetos filosofisen tulkinnan lähtökohtana eräissä draaman klassikoissa

The philosophical problem of self-deception focuses the relation between desire, advantage, evidence and harm. A self-deceptive person is irrational because he or she belives or wants to belive contrary to the available evidence. The study focuses on different forms of self-deception that come out in certain classical Western dramas. The first self-deception forms are: "S knows that ~p but still belives that p because he wants that ~p", "S wants that p and therefore belives that p.", "S belives that p against evidence t because he wants to belive that p.", "S belives that p if t but S would belive that p even if ~t because S wants to belive that p.", "S belives that p (even if there is t that ~p) because S is ignorant of it." and "S belives that p (even if there is t that ~p) because of ignorant of t due to an internal deception." The main sources on self-deception are the views of contemporary researchers of the subject, such as Robert Audi, Marcia Baron, Bas C. van Fraassen, Mark Johnston, Mike W. Martin, Brian MaLaughlin, Alfred Mele, Amélie Oksenberg Rorty, William Ruddick and Stephen L. White. In this study it is claimed that Shakespeare´s Othello presents self-deception as a tragic phenomenom from witch it follows deceptions and murders. Moliére´s Tartuffe deals with a phony hypocrite´s attempts at cheating. Ibsen´s Wild Duck defends the necessity of vital lies. Beckett´s Waiting for Godot deals with the self-deception witch is related to the waiting of the supernatural rescuer. Miller´s The Death of a Salesman tells about a man who, while pursuing the American myth of success, winds both himself and his family into the skeins of self-deception. They are studied with a Barthesian method that emphasizes the autonomy of literary work and its interpretation independently of the author´s personal history and social conditions. Self-deception has been regarded as an immoral way of thinking or way of action. However, vital lies show the necessity or necessity of the self-deception when it brings joy and optimism to the human being and supports his or her self-esteem and does not cause a suffering or damage, either to self or others. In the study, the processual character of self-deception is brought out.

Imagination and diversity in the philosophy of Hobbes

This dissertation is a study of some aspects of theoretical philosophy of the early modern thinker Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679). The focal point of the work is Hobbes s conception of imagination, which is discussed from both a systematic and a historical point of view, as well as in the light of contemporary scholarship. I argue that though there are significant similarities between the view of Hobbes and that of his predecessors, he gives a novel theory of imagination, which clarifies not only early modern discussions on human nature, knowledge, science, and literary criticism, but above all his own versatile philosophy. The prologue of the dissertation introduces methodological principles and gives critical remarks on the standard view of Hobbes. In Chapter II, I discuss the prominent theories of imagination before Hobbes and link them to his account. I argue that though Hobbes adopted the Aristotelian framework, his view is not reduced to it, as he borrows from various sources, for instance, from the Stoics and from Renaissance thought. Chapters III and IV form the psychological part of the work. In the Chapter III I argue that imagination, not sense, is central in the basic cognitive operations of the mind and that imagination has a decisive role in Hobbes s theory of motivation. The Chapter IV concentrates on various questions of Hobbes s philosophy of language. The chapter ends with a defence of a less naturalistic reading of Hobbes s theory of human nature. Chapters V and VI form the epistemological part of the work. I suggest, contrary to what has been recently claimed, that though Hobbes s ideas of good literary style do have a point of contact with his philosophy (e.g. the psychology of creative process), his ideas in the field are independent of his project of demonstrative political science. Instead I argue that the novelty of his major political work, Leviathan (1651), is based on a new theory of knowledge which he continued to develop in the post-Leviathan works. Chapter VII seeks to connect the more theoretical conclusions of Chapters V and VI to Hobbes's idea(l) of science as well as to his philosophical practice. On the basis of Hobbes s own writings as well as some historical examinations, I argue that method is not an apt way to conceptualise Hobbes s philosophical practice. Contemporary readings of Hobbes s theory of science are critically discussed and the chapter ends with an analysis of Hobbes s actual argumentation. In addition to the concluding remarks, the epilogue suggest three things: first, imagination is central when trying to understand Hobbes s versatile philosophy; second, that it is misleading to depict Hobbes as a simple materialist, mechanist, and empiricist; and, third, that in terms of imagination his influence on early modern thought has not been fully appreciated.

Democratic Legitimacy and the Politics of Rights : A comparative analysis of the conceptual relationship between democracy and rights in contemporary political theories

Democratic Legitimacy and the Politics of Rights is a research in normative political theory, based on comparative analysis of contemporary democratic theories, classified roughly as conventional liberal, deliberative democratic and radical democratic. Its focus is on the conceptual relationship between alternative sources of democratic legitimacy: democratic inclusion and liberal rights. The relationship between rights and democracy is studied through the following questions: are rights to be seen as external constraints to democracy or as objects of democratic decision making processes? Are individual rights threatened by public participation in politics; do constitutionally protected rights limit the inclusiveness of democratic processes? Are liberal values such as individuality, autonomy and liberty; and democratic values such as equality, inclusion and popular sovereignty mutually conflictual or supportive? Analyzing feminist critique of liberal discourse, the dissertation also raises the question about Enlightenment ideals in current political debates: are the universal norms of liberal democracy inherently dependent on the rationalist grand narratives of modernity and incompatible with the ideal of diversity? Part I of the thesis introduces the sources of democratic legitimacy as presented in the alternative democratic models. Part II analyses how the relationship between rights and democracy is theorized in them. Part III contains arguments by feminists and radical democrats against the tenets of universalist liberal democratic models and responds to that critique by partly endorsing, partly rejecting it. The central argument promoted in the thesis is that while the deconstruction of modern rationalism indicates that rights are political constructions as opposed to externally given moral constraints to politics, this insight does not delegitimize the politics of universal rights as an inherent part of democratic institutions. The research indicates that democracy and universal individual rights are mutually interdependent rather than oppositional; and that democracy is more dependent on an unconditional protection of universal individual rights when it is conceived as inclusive, participatory and plural; as opposed to robust majoritarian rule. The central concepts are: liberalism, democracy, legitimacy, deliberation, inclusion, equality, diversity, conflict, public sphere, rights, individualism, universalism and contextuality. The authors discussed are e.g. John Rawls, Jürgen Habermas, Seyla Benhabib, Iris Young, Chantal Mouffe and Stephen Holmes. The research focuses on contemporary political theory, but the more classical work of John S. Mill, Benjamin Constant, Isaiah Berlin and Hannah Arendt is also included.

Ethics and Aesthetics : Intersections in Iris Murdoch's Philosophy

The study addresses the question concerning the relationship between ethics and aesthetics in the philosophy of Iris Murdoch. The main argument is that Murdoch s philosophy cannot be accurately understood without an understanding of the relationship she sees between the aesthetic experience and morality. Reading Murdoch s philosophy with this relationship in mind shows that it must be considered as a relevant alternative to the main forms of aesthetic-ethical theories. The study consists of seven previously published articles and a summary. It shows that Murdoch belongs to a tradition of philosophers who seek to broaden the scope of ethics by reference to aesthetic value and aesthetic experience. She sees an attitude responsible for aesthetic experiences as relevant for morality. However, she does not collapse morality into aesthetic experience. The two meet on the level of the subject s attitude towards its object, but there is a distinction between the experiences that accompany the attitudes. Aesthetic experiences can function as a clue to morals in that they present in a pleasing manner moral truths which otherwise might be psychologically too difficult to face. Murdoch equates the aesthetic attitude with virtuous love characterized by unselfish attention to its object. The primary object of such love is in Murdoch s account another human individual in her particularity. She compares the recognition of the other person as a particular existence to the experience of the Kantian sublime and offers her own version of the true sublime which is the experience of awe in the face of the infinity of the task of understanding others. One of the most central claims in Murdoch s philosophy is that human consciousness is evaluatively structured. This claim challenges the distinction between facts and values which has had an immense influence on modern moral philosophy. One argument with which Murdoch supports her claim is the nature of great literature. According to her, the standard of greatness in literature is the authors awareness of the independent existence of individuals in the particularity of their evaluative consciousnesses. The analysis of the standard of greatness in literature is also Murdoch s only argument for the claim that the primary object of the loving unselfish attention is the other particular individual. She is convinced that great literature reveals a deep truth about the human condition with its capacity to capture the particular. Abstract philo¬sophical discourse cannot compete with this capacity but it should take truths revealed by literature seriously in its theorising. Recognising this as Murdoch s stand on the question of the relation between philosophy and literature as forms of human discourse settles whether she is part of what has been called philosophy s turn to literature. The answer is yes.

Temporality of the Face-to-Face in Levinas' Ethics

This thesis focuses on a connection between temporality and ethics in the philosophy of Emmanuel Levinas. I argue that Levinas understanding of temporality is rooted in the function of pra-impression which in its turn does not belong to the intentional consciousness but reveals a subject as being open to the Other. In the face-to-face situation with the Other the pra-impression is an essential and constitutive force: it fractures the moment of the present, questions subjectivity and generates a new meaning of temporality. As a result a responsible subject is revealed; responsibility for the Other marks a latent birth of the subject which is prior to any origin of subjectivity, it discloses a meaning of time that does not belong to the subject but is found in the Other. In this study I suggest that pra-impression finds its productive force in language, the function of the feminine, and what Levinas calls the other in the same .

Essays in Philosophical Moral Psychology

The dissertation consists of four essays and a comprehensive introduction that discusses the topics, methods, and most prominent theories of philosophical moral psychology. I distinguish three main questions: What are the essential features of moral thinking? What are the psychological conditions of moral responsibility? And finally, what are the consequences of empirical facts about human nature to normative ethics? Each of the three last articles focuses on one of these issues. The first essay and part of the introduction are dedicated to methodological questions, in particular the relationship between empirical (social) psychology and philosophy. I reject recent attempts to understand the nature of morality on the basis of empirical research. One characteristic feature of moral thinking is its practical clout: if we regard an action as morally wrong, we either refrain from doing it even against our desires and interests, or else feel shame or guilt. Moral views seem to have a conceptual connection to motivation and emotions – roughly speaking, we can’t conceive of someone genuinely disapproving an action, but nonetheless doing it without any inner motivational conflict or regret. This conceptual thesis in moral psychology is called (judgment) internalism. It implies, among other things, that psychopaths cannot make moral judgments to the extent that they are incapable of corresponding motivation and emotion, even if they might say largely the words we would expect. Is internalism true? Recently, there has been an explosion of interest in so-called experimental philosophy, which is a methodological view according to which claims about conceptual truths that appeal to our intuitions should be tested by way of surveys presented to ordinary language users. One experimental result is that the majority of people are willing to grant that psychopaths make moral judgments, which challenges internalism. In the first article, ‘The Rise and Fall of Experimental Philosophy’, I argue that these results pose no real threat to internalism, since experimental philosophy is based on a too simple conception of the relationship between language use and concepts. Only the reactions of competent users in pragmatically neutral and otherwise conducive circumstances yield evidence about conceptual truths, and such robust intuitions remain inaccessible to surveys for reasons of principle. The epistemology of folk concepts must still be based on Socratic dialogue and critical reflection, whose character and authority I discuss at the end of the paper. The internal connection between moral judgment and motivation led many metaethicists in the past century to believe along Humean lines that judgment itself consists in a pro-attitude rather than a belief. This expressivist view, as it is called these days, has far-reaching consequences in metaethics. In the second essay I argue that perhaps the most sophisticated form of contemporary expressivism, Allan Gibbard’s norm-expressivism, according to which moral judgments are decisions or contingency plans, is implausible from the perspective of the theory of action. In certain circumstances it is possible to think that something is morally required of one without deciding to do so. Morality is not a matter of the will. Instead, I sketch on the basis of Robert Brandom’s inferentialist semantics a weak form of judgment internalism, according to which the content of moral judgment is determined by a commitment to a particular kind of practical reasoning. The last two essays in the dissertation emphasize the role of mutual recognition in the development and maintenance of responsible and autonomous moral agency. I defend a compatibilist view of autonomy, according to which agents who are unable to recognize right and wrong or act accordingly are not responsible for their actions – it is not fair to praise or blame them, since they lacked the relevant capacity to do otherwise. Conversely, autonomy demands an ability to recognize reasons and act on them. But as a long tradition in German moral philosophy whose best-known contemporary representative is Axel Honneth has it, both being aware of reasons and acting on them requires also the right sort of higher-order attitudes toward the self. Without self-respect and self-confidence we remain at the mercy of external pressures, even if we have the necessary normative competence. These attitudes toward the self, in turn, are formed through mutual recognition – we value ourselves when those who we value value us. Thus, standing in the right sort of relations of recognition is indirectly necessary for autonomy and moral responsibility. Recognition and valuing are concretely manifest in actions and institutions, whose practices make possible participation on an equal footing. Seeing this opens the way for a kind of normative social criticism that is grounded in the value of freedom and automomy, but is not limited to defending negative rights. It thus offers a new way to bridge the gap between liberalism and communitarianism.

The Restless Love of Thinking : The Concept Liebe in Hegel's Philosophy

The German philosopher G.W.F.Hegel (1770–1831) is best known for his idealistic system philosophy, his concept of spirit [Geist] and for his dictum that the existing and the rational overlap. This thesis offers a new perspective: it examines the working of the concept ‘love’ in Hegel’s philosophy by looking at the contexts and function he puts it to, from his earliest writings to the very last lectures he gave. The starting point of the inquiry is that he applied the concept Liebe to different contexts for different purposes, but each time to provide an answer to a specific philosophical problem. His formulation, reformulation and use of ‘love’ give possible solutions to problems the solving of which was crucial to the development of his thought as a whole. The study is divided into three parts, each analysing the different problems and solutions to which Hegel applied the concept of love. The first part, "Love, morality and ethical life", examines these interconnected themes in Hegel’s early work. The main questions he addressed during this period concerned how to unite Kant’s philosophy and the Greek ideal of the good life. In this context, the concept ‘love’ did three things. First, it served to formulate his grounding idea of the relation between unity and difference, or the manifold. Secondly, it was the key to his attempt to base an ideal folk religion on Christianity interpreted as a religion of love. Finally, it provided the means to criticise Kant’s moral philosophy. The question of the moral value of love helped Hegel to break away from Kant’s thought and develop his own theory about love and ethical life. The second part of the study, "Love and the political realm", considers the way 'Liebe' functions in connection with questions concerning the community and political life in Hegel’s work. In addition to questioning the universal applicability of the concept of recognition as a key to his theory of social relations, the chapters focus on gender politics and the way he conceptualised the gender category ‘woman’ through the concept ‘love’. Another line of inquiry is the way the figure of Antigone was used to conceptualise the differentiated spheres of action for men and women, and the part ‘love’ played in Hegel’s description of Antigone’s motives. Thirdly, Hegel’s analogy of the family and the state and the way ‘love’ functions in an attempt to promote understanding of the relation between citizens and the state are examined. The third and final part of the study, "Love as absolute spirit", focuses on ‘love’ within Hegel’s systemic thought and the way he continued to characterise Geist through the language of Liebe up until and including his very last works. It is shown how Liebe functions in his hierarchical organisation of the domains of art, religion and philosophy, and how both art and religion end up in similar structural positions with regard to philosophy. One recurrent theme in the third part is Hegel’s complex relation to Romantic thought. Another line of investigation is how he reconstructed Christianity as a religion of love in his mature work. In striking contrast to his early thought, in his last works Hegel introduced a new concept of love that incorporated negativity, and that could also function as the root of political action.

Population dynamics of blue mussels in a variable environment at the edge of their range

Spatial and temporal variation in the abundance of species can often be ascribed to spatial and temporal variation in the surrounding environment. Knowledge of how biotic and abiotic factors operate over different spatial and temporal scales in determining distribution, abundance, and structure of populations lies at the heart of ecology. The major part of the current ecological theory stems from studies carried out in central parts of the distributional range of species, whereas knowledge of how marginal populations function is inadequate. Understanding how marginal populations, living at the edge of their range, function is however in a key position to advance ecology and evolutionary biology as scientific disciplines. My thesis focuses on the factors affecting dynamics of marginal populations of blue mussels (Mytilus edulis) living close to their tolerance limits with regard to salinity. The thesis aims to highlight the dynamics at the edge of the range and contrast these with dynamics in more central parts of the range in order to understand the potential interplay between the central and the marginal part in the focal system. The objectives of the thesis are approached by studies on: (1) factors affecting regional patterns of the species, (2) long-term temporal dynamics of the focal species spaced along a regional salinity gradient, (3) selective predation by increasing populations of roach (Rutilus rutilus) when feeding on their main food item, the blue mussel, (4) the primary and secondary effects of local wave exposure gradients and (5) the role of small-scale habitat heterogeneity as determinants of large-scale pattern. The thesis shows that populations of blue mussels are largely determined by large scale changes in sea water salinity, affecting mainly recruitment success and longevity of local populations. In opposite to the traditional view, the thesis strongly indicate that vertebrate predators strongly affect abundance and size structure of blue mussel populations, and that the role of these predators increases towards the margin where populations are increasingly top-down controlled. The thesis also indicates that the positive role of biogenic habitat modifiers increases towards the marginal areas, where populations of blue mussels are largely recruitment limited. Finally, the thesis shows that local blue mussel populations are strongly dependent on high water turbulence, and therefore, dense populations are constrained to offshore habitats. Finally, the thesis suggests that ongoing sedimentation of rocky shores is detrimental for the species, affecting recruitment success and post-recruit survival, pushing stable mussel beds towards offshore areas. Ongoing large scale changes in the Baltic Sea, especially dilution processes with attendant effects, are predicted to substantially contract the distributional range of the mussel, but also affect more central populations. The thesis shows that in order to understand the functioning of marginal populations, research should (1) strive for multi-scale approaches in order to link ecosystem patterns with ecosystem processes, and (2) challenge the prevailing tenets that origin from research carried out in central areas that may not be valid at the edge.

Hur höra tyst kunskap? Utveckling av en metod för studier av tyst kunnande

Det tysta kunnandet utgör en stor del av kunskapsresursen både hos oss som individer och i arbetsorganisationerna. Trots att vi omger oss med böcker, manualer och databaser, som alla är exempel på explicit kunskap, så är det ”den rätta känslan”, erfarenheten och våra färdigheter som avgör om och hur vi klarar av våra uppgifter. Dessa begrepp är alla relaterade till den tysta dimensionen av kunskap. En dimension som traditionellt karaktäriserats som abstrakt, individuell, omedveten, praktisk, erfarenhetsbaserad och framför allt svår att uttrycka. Alla dessa är karaktärsdrag som ställt speciella krav inom kunskapsforskning och -ledning. Resultatet av detta är att både forskning och ledning av det tysta kunnandet har åsidosatts till förmån för forskning och ledning av explicit kunskap. Ett bidragande problem har varit bristen på lämpliga metoder för att ur ett företagsekonomiskt perspektiv studera och leda tyst kunnande. Ett annat problem har varit oklarhet i begreppet tyst kunskap. Detta har lett till brist på förståelse och/eller missförstånd. För att råda bot på svårigheten att uttrycka vårt tysta kunnande har människan utvecklat olika begrepp som i vår vardagskommunikation symboliserar tyst kunnande. Begrepp som intuition, människokännedom, förhandlingsförmåga och kultur används vanligt och med dem uttrycker vi den tysta dimensionen av kunnande. Dessa begrepp utgör även grunden för den intervjumetod som utvecklats för att empiriskt studera eller i ledningssyfte kartlägga tyst kunnande. Metoden använder dessa ”Epitet för Tyst Kunskap” (ETK) som bas för stimuluskort-intervjuer. Intervjuer som visat sig öka möjligheten att utforska och kartlägga tyst kunnande i organisationer oberoende av om man är forskare eller företagsledare.

Lojalitet i licensavtal

Loyalty in Licensing Agreements The purpose of the dissertation is to analyse the impact of the principle of loyalty on licensing agreements from the viewpoint of Finnish law using the traditional legal method (Rechtsdogmatik) combined with empirical data in the form of licensing agreements. The need for good licensing agreements is crucial. One should avoid mechanical and stereotyped agreements in favour of more conscious and goal-oriented ones. When the parties' will and goals have been made clear, the drafting technique should be chosen accordingly. The importance of the principle of loyalty in the interpretation of licensing agreements varies according to their degree of relationality. This is a concept originating in the relational contract theory, more precisely Ian Macneil's spectrum of contracts, where contracts can be placed on an axis according to their degree of relationality. In the dissertation different factors are used to conclude whether the licensing agreement at hand is to be placed on the axis closer to the transactional pole or closer to the relational pole. A conclusion of the dissertation is that few licensing agreements can be placed so close to the transactional pole, that the principle of loyalty lacks importance altogether. The impact of the principle of loyalty the main focus of which is on fostering the contracting parties to behave in accordance with best practices, not for example on altering contract terms is analysed in different situations where the parties' interests typically collide. These situations are discussed from the point of view of three patent and knowhow licensing agreements that differ as to their degree of relationality. A balance needs to be struck between freedom of contract and relational needs. Especially when interpreting more modern licensing agreements, one should not focus on the written document alone, as is often recommended in the literature on Nordic intellectual property law. Neither is the principle of caveat emptor a proper starting point. Moreover, where the parties are of equal bargaining power, one should not assume that the grants in licensing agreements are to be interpreted narrowly. Focus in the interpretation should instead be on the entirety of the circumstances.

Nonlinear mixture autoregressive model: economic applications

The aim of this dissertation is to model economic variables by a mixture autoregressive (MAR) model. The MAR model is a generalization of linear autoregressive (AR) model. The MAR -model consists of K linear autoregressive components. At any given point of time one of these autoregressive components is randomly selected to generate a new observation for the time series. The mixture probability can be constant over time or a direct function of a some observable variable. Many economic time series contain properties which cannot be described by linear and stationary time series models. A nonlinear autoregressive model such as MAR model can a plausible alternative in the case of these time series. In this dissertation the MAR model is used to model stock market bubbles and a relationship between inflation and the interest rate. In the case of the inflation rate we arrived at the MAR model where inflation process is less mean reverting in the case of high inflation than in the case of normal inflation. The interest rate move one-for-one with expected inflation. We use the data from the Livingston survey as a proxy for inflation expectations. We have found that survey inflation expectations are not perfectly rational. According to our results information stickiness play an important role in the expectation formation. We also found that survey participants have a tendency to underestimate inflation. A MAR model has also used to model stock market bubbles and crashes. This model has two regimes: the bubble regime and the error correction regime. In the error correction regime price depends on a fundamental factor, the price-dividend ratio, and in the bubble regime, price is independent of fundamentals. In this model a stock market crash is usually caused by a regime switch from a bubble regime to an error-correction regime. According to our empirical results bubbles are related to a low inflation. Our model also imply that bubbles have influences investment return distribution in both short and long run.