The Good, the Bad and the Populist: A Model of Political Agency with Emotional Voters

This paper attempts to extend existing models of political agency to an environment in which voting may be divided between informed and instrumental, informed and ‘expressive’ (Brennan and Lomasky (1993)) and uninformed due to ‘rational irrationality’ (Caplan (2007)). It constructs a model where politicians may be good, bad or populist. Populists are more willing than good politicians to pander to voters who may choose inferior policies in a large-group electoral setting because their vote is insignificant compared with those that voters would choose were their vote decisive in determining the electoral outcome. Bad politicians would ideally like to extract tax revenue for their own ends. Initially we assume the existence of only good and populist politicians. The paper investigates the incentives for good politicians to pool with or separate from populists and focuses on three key issues – (1) how far the majority of voter’s preferences are from those held by the better informed incumbent politician (2) the extent to which the population exhibits rational irrationality and expressiveness (jointly labelled as emotional) and (3) the cost involved in persuading uninformed voters to change their views in terms of composing messages and spreading them. This paper goes on to consider how the inclusion of bad politicians may affect the behaviour of good politicians and suggests that a small amount of potential corruption may be socially useful. It is also argued that where bad politicians have an incentive to mimic the behaviour of good and populist politicians, the latter types of politician may have an incentive to separate from bad politicians by investing in costly public education signals. The paper also discusses the implications of the model for whether fiscal restraints should be soft or hard.

A Political Agency Model of Coattail Voting

In this paper, I provide a formal justi…cation for a well-established coattail effect, when a popular candidate at one branch of government attracts votes to candidates from the same political party for other branches of government. A political agency frame- work with moral hazard is applied to analyze coattails in simultaneous presidential and congressional elections. I show that coattail voting is a natural outcome of the optimal reelection scheme adopted by a representative voter to motivate politicians' efforts in a retrospective voting environment. I assume that an office-motivated politician (executive or congressman) prefers her counterpart to be affiliated with the same political party. This correlation of incentives leads the voter to adopt a joint performance evaluation rule, which is conditioned on the politicians belonging to the same party or different parties. The two-sided coattail effects then arise. On the one hand, the executive's suc- cess/failure props up/drags down her partisan ally in congressional election, which implies presidential coattails. On the other hand, the executive's reelection itself is affected by the congressman's performance, which results in reverse coattails. JEL classi…fication: D72, D86. Keywords: Coattail voting; Presidential coattails; Reverse coattails; Simultaneous elections; Political Agency; Retrospective voting.

Political centralization and government accountability

This paper studies fiscal federalism when regions differ in voters' ability to monitor publicofficials. We develop a model of political agency in which rent-seeking politicians providepublic goods to win support from heterogeneously informed voters. In equilibrium, voterinformation increases government accountability but displays decreasing returns. Therefore,political centralization reduces aggregate rent extraction when voter information varies acrossregions. It increases welfare as long as the central government is required to provide publicgoods uniformly across regions. The need for uniformity implies an endogenous trade off between reducing rents through centralization and matching idiosyncratic preferences throughdecentralization. We find that a federal structure with overlapping levels of government canbe optimal only if regional differences in accountability are sufficiently large. The modelpredicts that less informed regions should reap greater benefits when the central governmentsets a uniform policy. Consistent with our theory, we present empirical evidence that lessinformed states enjoyed faster declines in pollution after the 1970 Clean Air Act centralizedenvironmental policy at the federal level.

Reelection incentives and political corruption : evidence from Brazil’s municipal audit reports

This paper uses a unique dataset of political corruption, constructed from municipal audit reports obtained from Brazil’s randomized anti-corruption program, to test whether reelection incentives affect the level of rent extraction of incumbent politicians. In order to identify reelection incentives, we use the existence of a term limit in Brazil’s municipal elections. We find that in municipalities where mayors are in their second and final term, there is significantly more corruption compared to similar municipalities where mayors are in their first-term. In particular, in municipalities with second-term mayors there is, on average, R$188,431 more diversion of resources and the incidence of irregularities is 23% higher. We also find more pronounced effects where the costs of rent-extraction are lower (municipalities without media and judicial presence), and the density of pivotal voters is higher (more political competition). Finally, we show that first-term mayors, while less corrupt, have a larger incidence of poor administration suggesting that there may exist a trade-off between corruption and quality in public good provision.

The love of a sage or the command of a superior: The natural law doctrines of Leibniz and Pufendorf

The study of natural law theories is presently one of the most fruitful areas of research in the studies of early modern intellectual history, and moral and political theory. Likewise the historical significance of the Enlightenment for the development of modernisation' in many different forms continues to be the subject of controversy. This collection therefore offers a timely opportunity to re-examine both the coherence of the concept of an early Enlightenment', and the specific contribution of natural law theories to its formation. The works of major thinkers such as Grotius, Hobbes, Locke, Malebranche, Pufendorf and Thomasius are reassessed, and the appeal and importance of the discourse of natural jurisprudence both to those working inside conventional educational and political structures and to those outside - such as in the Huguenot diaspora - is evaluated. This volume will therefore be of importance to all those readers concerned to study the character of the debates in the period 1650-1750 surrounding moral and political agency, sovereignty and obligation, and the legitimation of religious toleration in the divergent states and patriotic contexts of Europe.

A Model of Party Discipline in a Congress

This paper studies party discipline in a congress within a political agency framework with retrospective voting. Party discipline serves as an incentive device to induce office- motivated congress members to perform in line with the party leadership's objective of controlling both the executive and the legislative branches of government. I show fi…rst that the same party is more likely to control both branches of government (i.e., uni…ed government) the stronger the party discipline in the congress is. Second, the leader of the governing party imposes more party discipline under uni…ed government than does the opposition leader under divided government. Moreover, the incumbents' aggregate performance increases with party discipline, so a representative voter becomes better off. JEL classi…cation: D72. Keywords: Party discipline; Political agency; Retrospective voting; Office-motivated politicians.

Social capital, government expenditures, and growth

Countries with greater social capital have higher economic growth. We show that socialcapital is also highly positively correlated across countries with government expenditureon education. We develop an infinite-horizon model of public spending and endogenousstochastic growth that explains both facts through frictions in political agency whenvoters have imperfect information. In our model, the government provides servicesthat yield immediate utility, and investment that raises future productivity. Voters aremore likely to observe public services, so politicians have electoral incentives to underprovidepublic investment. Social capital increases voters' awareness of all governmentactivity. As a consequence, both politicians' incentives and their selection improve.In the dynamic equilibrium, both the amount and the efficiency of public investmentincrease, permanently raising the growth rate.

Opening The Fortress : the work of public gaze on the Swiss asylum reality

The Fortress (La Forteresse) is a 2008 documentary film by Fernand Melgar that reports the Swiss asylum reality from a distant but committed point of view. The documentary describes the life of asylum seekers awaiting in a federal centre the decision to grant them-or not-refugee status. It subtly raises the issue of the role that "textual realities", grasped from the spectator's point of view, play in the production of public discourses. Most of all, it subtly poses the question of the (Swiss) spectator as an actor of the asylum policy, in the context of a semi-direct democracy. After evoking the notion of sensible experience for linking spectatorship to politics, we look at how the documentary invites its model spectator to accept the film's moral premises. Furthermore, focusing on the Swiss public sphere, we deliver an account of the reception by empirical spectators, notably by a group of leftist activists that tend to subvert Melgar's intentions. This two-fold analysis leads us to exhibit that, in a context of discursive struggles, The Fortress generates an original space of deliberation and experience, which appeals to the public to exercise their political agency on asylum policy without being constricted by an antagonist framework.

Poliittinen subjektiviteetti

Kirjallisuusarvostelu

Politiikkaa ilman ydinminää/meitä

Kirjallisuusarvostelu

O efeito da intenção de reeleição sobre gastos em saúde: uma análise com base no modelo de reputação política

The effect of reelection intention on public health expenditures: An analysis based on reputation models. The political model of reputational-building argues that if the incumbent politician aspires to be reassigned, he/she must act in the voters' interest to obtain their approval and consequently their votes. Considering that voters are sensitive to public health expenditures, we check how reputational incentives shift municipal spending patterns in electoral years. The empirical tests for 3.004 Brazilian municipalities show an increase of health expenditures in those cities in which incumbents are trying to maintain their jobs. In addition, we find an increment in health expenditures where mayors forfeit their chance of being reelected to the benefit of a party mate.

¿Entre los máximos y los mínimos de la justicia? revolución, justicia transicional y ciudadanía

Lo que me propongo desarrollar a continuación es la idea según la cual, los procesos de justicia transicional deberían incluir entre sus mínimos normativos una noción de ciudadanía y de agencia política mucho más exigente que aquella que tradicionalmente está asociada al marco conceptual de la democracia liberal. En esta dirección, considero que la aproximación realizada por Hannah Arendt sobre la revolución como constitutio libertatis arroja elementos claves que pueden ser de utilidad en la búsqueda de consolidar la ciudadanía en los procesos de justicia transicional cuyo principal objetivo es la transición hacia regímenes democráticos.

Incidencia de las agresiones a la seguridad cibernética en el desarrollo informático de las Fuerzas Armadas de Estados Unidos (2003-2013)

La presente investigación tiene como objetivo analizar la incidencia de las agresiones cibernéticas en el desarrollo informático de las Fuerzas Armadas de Estados Unidos. Los diferentes estudios que se han realizado sobre el ciberespacio se han enfocado en el papel del individuo como actor principal y se ha dejado de lado las repercusiones que éste ha tenido para el Estado, como un nuevo eje de amenazas. Teniendo en cuenta lo anterior, esta investigación demostrará a partir del concepto de securitización, que se busca priorizar la “ciberseguridad” dentro de la agenda del gobierno estadounidense. Al ser este un estudio que aborda experiencias concretas durante un periodo de tiempo de más de 10 años, el diseño metodológico de la investigación será longitudinal, ya que abarcará estudios, artículos, textos y resoluciones que se han realizado desde 2003 hasta la actualidad.

La alianza de estados insulares pequeños y la securitización del cambio climático en la convención marco de Naciones Unidas sobre cambio climático (1992-2012)

La presente monografía busca explicar el proceso de securitización realizado por la AOSIS del cambio climático en las COP de la CMNUCC. Esta investigación defiende que la AOSIS sí ha hecho dicho proceso a través de estrategias como el liderazgo moral y los nexos con actores no-estatales; pero dicho proceso no ha sido exitoso, dado el predominio del discurso del desarrollo sostenible en las negociaciones, el debilitamiento de la AOSIS como actor securitizador y el poco apoyo formal de las potencias emergentes y el bloque UMBRELLA. Para sustentar lo anterior, se realizará una revisión de informes científicos que demuestran que el cambio climático es una amenaza a la seguridad, y un estudio desde de la teoría de securitización de Thierry Balzacq, de los discursos dados por los estados AOSIS, de las COP y de las posiciones de algunos bloques de negociación sobre el cambio climático.

El movimiento social de mujeres en búsqueda del voto femenino. Periodo (1930-1957)

La presente monografía tiene como objetivo reivindicar la imagen política y social de las mujeres que hicieron parte del proceso de obtención del sufragio femenino en Colombia durante el periodo 1930-1957. El reconocimiento del movimiento social en pro del sufragio y su participación (directa e indirecta) desde la esfera pública y privada en el contexto social estructurado permitió reconocerlas como actor político. El anterior resultado demostrará cuan determinante fueron las mujeres del movimiento en el tema del voto femenino y otros derechos civiles y políticos obtenidos para las mujeres colombianas. Así mismo desde las fuentes primarias, se propone el replanteamiento del concepto de actor político teniendo en cuenta las restricciones que supone el mismo.