968 resultados para philosophical toy
Resumo:
The object consists of a disc with 20 or so images of an object/person around the edges, each slightly in a different position and space. Extending from the edges of the disc is a shutter: there are slots that one looks through with a solid part in between that blocks some of our view when in rotation to give the illusion of movement. A mirror is also used with the device. The user spins the wheel, while looking at the mirror and seeing the reflection of the phenakistoscope. The shutter blocks some of the image so that what we see appears to be moving, or animated. (Leskosky, 178)
Resumo:
Wheatstone’s stereoscope placed two mirrors on either side that were mounted at a right angle in order to view the two dissimilar drawings presented (Hankins 148). There are two identical monocular tubes that allow each eye to view the images (Hankins 148). Each eye views the image it was intended to see. The two eyes see slightly different images through this binocular vision (Hankins 148). The combination of the two images creates this illusion of depth and solidarity through their superimposition (Hankins 154). In order to view these images, the eyes were covered from all external light (Clay 152). The stereoscope was first seen as a philosophical toy along with other inventions such as the zoetrope, providing entertainment as well as scientific insight (Hankins 148). The stereoscope above is more similar to the “Holmes Stereoscope”, which transformed Wheatstone’s stereoscope into a handheld version that could be put on a stand (Hawkins 155). He replaced the retina of the eye with a sensitive plate; therefore, the lenses acted as the eyes (Silverman 738). In the video, an embellishment adorns the bottom of the stand that holds up the binocular lens and the images. The lenses are in a wooden frame that has an attached stand that holds the slides of images. There also is a knob on the side of the device that can adjust the lens on the two monocular tubes (Bokander 485).
Resumo:
Concerns have been raised over ADHD from within a range of different disciplines, concerns which are not only voiced from within the hard sciences themselves, but also from within the social sciences. This paper will add the discipline of philosophy to that number, arguing that an analysis of two traditionally philosophical topics - namely "truth" and "free-will" - allows us a new and unsettling perspective on conduct disorders like ADHD. More specifically, it will be argued that ADHD not only fails to meet its own ontological and epistemological standards as an 'objective' pathology, but it also constitutes one more element in what has already become a significant undermining of a crucial component of social life: moral responsibility.
Resumo:
Sets out a system of corporate governance regulation, aimed at combining legal and social methods of governing director behaviour and at creating a framework flexible enough to accommodate different business and ethical cultures. Outlines the theoretical basis of corporate governance and the broad responsibilities of directors, and discusses the extent to which they can and should be regulated. Discusses the constitution of a regulatory framework encompassing law, soft law and best practice, and ethics.
Resumo:
How interactive new media art can effectively communicate an indigenous philosophical concept. The sophistication and complexity of the philosophical concept concerning relationships between land and people and between people, intrinsic to the laws and customs of Australian Indigenous society, has begun to be communicated and accessed beyond the realm of anthropological and ethnological domains of Western scholarship. The exciting scope and rapid development of new media arts presents an innovative means of creating an interactive relationship with the general Australian public, addressing the urgent need for an understanding of Indigenous Australian concepts of relationship to land, and to each other, absent from Western narratives. The study is framed by an Indigenous concept of place, and relationships between land and people and between people; and explores how this concept can be clearly communicated through interactive new media arts. It involves: a creative project, the development of an interactive new media art project, a website work-in-progress titled site\sight\cite; and an exegesis, a Novella of Ideas, on the origins, influences, objectives, and potential of creative practices and processes engaged in the creative project. Research undertaken for the creative project and exegesis extended my creative practice into the use of interdisciplinary arts, expressly for the expression of philosophical concepts, consolidating 23 years experience in Indigenous community arts development. The creative project and exegesis contributes to an existing body of Indigenous work in a range of areas - including education, the arts and humanities - which bridges old and new society in Australia. In this study, old and new society is defined by the time of the initial production of art and foundations of knowledge, in the country of its origins, in Indigenous Australia dating back at least 40,000 years.
Resumo:
This volume breaks new ground by approaching Socially Responsible Investment (SRI) as an explicitly ethical practice in financial markets. The work explains the philosophical and practical shortcomings of ‘long term shareholder value’ and the origins and conceptual structure of SRI, and links its pursuit to both its deeper philosophical foundations and the broader, multi-dimensional global movement towards greater social responsibility in global markets. Interviews with fund managers in the Australian SRI sector generate recommendations for better integrating ethics into SRI practice via ethically informed engagement with invested companies, and an in-depth discussion of the central practical SRI issue of fiduciary responsibility strengthens the case in favour of SRI. The practical and ethical theoretical perspectives are then brought together to sketch out an achievable ideal for SRI worldwide, in which those who are involved in investment and business decisions become part of an ‘ethical chain’ of decision makers linking the ultimate owners of capital with the business executives who frame, advocate and implement business strategies. In between there are investment advisors, fund managers, business analysts and boards. The problem lies in the fact that the ultimate owners are discouraged from considering their own values, or even their own long term interests, whilst the others often look only to short term interests. The solution lies in the latter recognising themselves as links in the ethical chain.
Resumo:
This investigation measured the effects of a one year participation in an Australian Philosophical Community of Inquiry program on 280 sixth grade students' reading comprehension, interest in maths, self-esteem, social behaviours, and emotional well-being. A multilevel model for change was used to detect differences in the response variables, between a quasi-experimental group and comparison group. Results showed that, for participants, reading comprehension significantly increased while interest in maths decreased. No differences between the groups were found for pro-social behaviour and emotional well-being. Self esteem, however, declined for participants while nonparticipants' self esteem increased.
Resumo:
Philosophical inquiry in the teaching and learning of mathematics has received continued, albeit limited, attention over many years (e.g., Daniel, 2000; English, 1994; Lafortune, Daniel, Fallascio, & Schleider, 2000; Kennedy, 2012a). The rich contributions these communities can offer school mathematics, however, have not received the deserved recognition, especially from the mathematics education community. This is a perplexing situation given the close relationship between the two disciplines and their shared values for empowering students to solve a range of challenging problems, often unanticipated, and often requiring broadened reasoning. In this article, I first present my understanding of philosophical inquiry as it pertains to the mathematics classroom, taking into consideration the significant work that has been undertaken on socio-political contexts in mathematics education (e.g., Skovsmose & Greer, 2012). I then consider one approach to advancing philosophical inquiry in the mathematics classroom, namely, through modelling activities that require interpretation, questioning, and multiple approaches to solution. The design of these problem activities, set within life-based contexts, provides an ideal vehicle for stimulating philosophical inquiry.
Resumo:
Bertrand Russell (1872 1970) introduced the English-speaking philosophical world to modern, mathematical logic and foundational study of mathematics. The present study concerns the conception of logic that underlies his early logicist philosophy of mathematics, formulated in The Principles of Mathematics (1903). In 1967, Jean van Heijenoort published a paper, Logic as Language and Logic as Calculus, in which he argued that the early development of modern logic (roughly the period 1879 1930) can be understood, when considered in the light of a distinction between two essentially different perspectives on logic. According to the view of logic as language, logic constitutes the general framework for all rational discourse, or meaningful use of language, whereas the conception of logic as calculus regards logic more as a symbolism which is subject to reinterpretation. The calculus-view paves the way for systematic metatheory, where logic itself becomes a subject of mathematical study (model-theory). Several scholars have interpreted Russell s views on logic with the help of the interpretative tool introduced by van Heijenoort,. They have commonly argued that Russell s is a clear-cut case of the view of logic as language. In the present study a detailed reconstruction of the view and its implications is provided, and it is argued that the interpretation is seriously misleading as to what he really thought about logic. I argue that Russell s conception is best understood by setting it in its proper philosophical context. This is constituted by Immanuel Kant s theory of mathematics. Kant had argued that purely conceptual thought basically, the logical forms recognised in Aristotelian logic cannot capture the content of mathematical judgments and reasonings. Mathematical cognition is not grounded in logic but in space and time as the pure forms of intuition. As against this view, Russell argued that once logic is developed into a proper tool which can be applied to mathematical theories, Kant s views turn out to be completely wrong. In the present work the view is defended that Russell s logicist philosophy of mathematics, or the view that mathematics is really only logic, is based on what I term the Bolzanian account of logic . According to this conception, (i) the distinction between form and content is not explanatory in logic; (ii) the propositions of logic have genuine content; (iii) this content is conferred upon them by special entities, logical constants . The Bolzanian account, it is argued, is both historically important and throws genuine light on Russell s conception of logic.
Resumo:
This thesis presents an interdisciplinary analysis of how models and simulations function in the production of scientific knowledge. The work is informed by three scholarly traditions: studies on models and simulations in philosophy of science, so-called micro-sociological laboratory studies within science and technology studies, and cultural-historical activity theory. Methodologically, I adopt a naturalist epistemology and combine philosophical analysis with a qualitative, empirical case study of infectious-disease modelling. This study has a dual perspective throughout the analysis: it specifies the modelling practices and examines the models as objects of research. The research questions addressed in this study are: 1) How are models constructed and what functions do they have in the production of scientific knowledge? 2) What is interdisciplinarity in model construction? 3) How do models become a general research tool and why is this process problematic? The core argument is that the mediating models as investigative instruments (cf. Morgan and Morrison 1999) take questions as a starting point, and hence their construction is intentionally guided. This argument applies the interrogative model of inquiry (e.g., Sintonen 2005; Hintikka 1981), which conceives of all knowledge acquisition as process of seeking answers to questions. The first question addresses simulation models as Artificial Nature, which is manipulated in order to answer questions that initiated the model building. This account develops further the "epistemology of simulation" (cf. Winsberg 2003) by showing the interrelatedness of researchers and their objects in the process of modelling. The second question clarifies why interdisciplinary research collaboration is demanding and difficult to maintain. The nature of the impediments to disciplinary interaction are examined by introducing the idea of object-oriented interdisciplinarity, which provides an analytical framework to study the changes in the degree of interdisciplinarity, the tools and research practices developed to support the collaboration, and the mode of collaboration in relation to the historically mutable object of research. As my interest is in the models as interdisciplinary objects, the third research problem seeks to answer my question of how we might characterise these objects, what is typical for them, and what kind of changes happen in the process of modelling. Here I examine the tension between specified, question-oriented models and more general models, and suggest that the specified models form a group of their own. I call these Tailor-made models, in opposition to the process of building a simulation platform that aims at generalisability and utility for health-policy. This tension also underlines the challenge of applying research results (or methods and tools) to discuss and solve problems in decision-making processes.