A brief philosophical examination of ADHD


Autoria(s): Tait, Gordon
Contribuinte(s)

Lloyd, Gwynedd

Stead, Joan

Cohen, David

Data(s)

13/04/2006

Resumo

Concerns have been raised over ADHD from within a range of different disciplines, concerns which are not only voiced from within the hard sciences themselves, but also from within the social sciences. This paper will add the discipline of philosophy to that number, arguing that an analysis of two traditionally philosophical topics - namely "truth" and "free-will" - allows us a new and unsettling perspective on conduct disorders like ADHD. More specifically, it will be argued that ADHD not only fails to meet its own ontological and epistemological standards as an 'objective' pathology, but it also constitutes one more element in what has already become a significant undermining of a crucial component of social life: moral responsibility.

Identificador

http://eprints.qut.edu.au/28787/

Publicador

Routledge (Taylor & Francis Group)

Relação

http://www.routledge.com/books/Critical-New-Perspectives-on-ADHD-isbn9780415360371

Tait, Gordon (2006) A brief philosophical examination of ADHD. In Lloyd, Gwynedd, Stead, Joan, & Cohen, David (Eds.) Critical New Perspectives on ADHD. Routledge (Taylor & Francis Group), London, pp. 83-95.

Fonte

Office of Education Research; Faculty of Education; School of Cultural & Language Studies in Education

Palavras-Chave #220304 Epistemology #ADHD #Free Will #Truth #Education
Tipo

Book Chapter