Ethics of Justification : A Defence of Contractualism

In What We Owe to Each Other, T.M. Scanlon formulated a new version of the ethical theory called contractualism. This theory took reasons considerations that count in favour of judgment-sensitive attitudes to be the fundamental normative notion. It then used normative reasons to first account for evaluative properties. For an object to be valuable, on this view, is for it to have properties that provide reasons to have favourable attitudes towards the bearer of value. Scanlon also used reasons to account for moral wrongness. His contractualism claims that an act is morally wrong if it is forbidden by any set of moral principles that no one could reasonably reject. My thesis consists of five previously published articles which attempt to clarify Scanlon s theory and to defend it against its critics. The first article defends the idea that normative reason-relations are fundamental against Joshua Gert. Gert argues that rationality is a more basic notion than reasons and that reasons can be analysed in terms of their rationally requiring and justifying dimensions. The second article explores the relationship between value and reasons. It defends Scanlon s view according to which reasons are the more basic than value against those who think that reasons are based on the evaluative realm. The last three articles defend Scanlon s views about moral wrongness. The first one of them discusses a classic objection to contractualist theories. This objection is that principles which no one could reasonably reject are redundant in accounting for wrongness. This is because we need a prior notion of wrongness to select those principles and because such principles are not required to make actions wrong or to provide reasons against wrong actions. The fourth article explores the distinctive reasons which contractualists claim there are for avoiding the wrong actions. The last article argues against the critics of contractualism who claim that contractualism has implausible normative consequences for situations related to the treatment of different-sized groups of people.

Political Liberalism, Free Speech and Public Reason

In this paper, I critically assess John Rawls' repeated claim that the duty of civility is only a moral duty and should not be enforced by law. In the first part of the paper, I examine and reject the view that Rawls' position may be due to the practical difficulties that the legal enforcement of the duty of civility might entail. I thus claim that Rawls' position must be driven by deeper normative reasons grounded in a conception of free speech. In the second part of the paper, I therefore examine various arguments for free speech and critically assess whether they are consistent with Rawls' political liberalism. I first focus on the arguments from truth and self-fulfilment. Both arguments, I argue, rely on comprehensive doctrines and therefore cannot provide a freestanding political justification for free speech. Freedom of speech, I claim, can be justified instead on the basis of Rawls' political conception of the person and of the two moral powers. However, Rawls' wide view of public reason already allows scope for the kind of free speech necessary for the exercise of the two moral powers and therefore cannot explain Rawls' opposition to the legal enforcement of the duty of civility. Such opposition, I claim, can only be explained on the basis of a defence of unconstrained freedom of speech grounded in the ideas of democracy and political legitimacy. Yet, I conclude, while public reason and the duty of civility are essential to political liberalism, unconstrained freedom of speech is not. Rawls and political liberals could therefore renounce unconstrained freedom of speech, and endorse the legal enforcement of the duty of civility, while remaining faithful to political liberalism.

What Does Value Matter? The Interest-Relational Theory of the Semantics and Metaphysics of Value

Value and reasons for action are often cited by rationalists and moral realists as providing a desire-independent foundation for normativity. Those maintaining instead that normativity is dependent upon motivation often deny that anything called '"value" or "reasons" exists. According to the interest-relational theory, something has value relative to some perspective of desire just in case it satisfies those desires, and a consideration is a reason for some action just in case it indicates that something of value will be accomplished by that action. Value judgements therefore describe real properties of objects and actions, but have no normative significance independent of desires. It is argued that only the interest-relational theory can account for the practical significance of value and reasons for action. Against the Kantian hypothesis of prescriptive rational norms, I attack the alleged instrumental norm or hypothetical imperative, showing that the normative force for taking the means to our ends is explicable in terms of our desire for the end, and not as a command of reason. This analysis also provides a solution to the puzzle concerning the connection between value judgement and motivation. While it is possible to hold value judgements without motivation, the connection is more than accidental. This is because value judgements are usually but not always made from the perspective of desires that actually motivate the speaker. In the normal case judgement entails motivation. But often we conversationally borrow external perspectives of desire, and subsequent judgements do not entail motivation. This analysis drives a critique of a common practice as a misuse of normative language. The "absolutist" attempts to use and, as philosopher, analyze normative language in such a way as to justify the imposition of certain interests over others. But these uses and analyses are incoherent - in denying relativity to particular desires they conflict with the actual meaning of these utterances, which is always indexed to some particular set of desires.

One Order, Two Laws: Recovering the 'Normative' in English School Theory

Bain, William, 'One Order, Two Laws: Recovering the 'Normative' in English School Theory', Review of International Studies, (2007) 33(4) pp.557-575 RAE2008

Does friendship give us non-derivative partial reasons ?

Une des façons d’approcher la question de l’existence de raisons partiales non-dérivatives d’une quelconque sorte consiste à expliquer ce que sont les raisons partiales et ensuite à chercher à savoir s’il y a des raisons de cette sorte. Si de telles raisons existent, alors il est au moins possible qu’il y ait des raisons partiales d’amitié. C’est cette approche que j’adopterai ici, et elle produit des résultats intéressants. Le premier a trait à la structure des raisons partiales. C’est au moins une condition nécessaire pour qu’une raison soit partiale qu’elle aie une composante relationnelle explicite. Cette composante, techniquement parlant, est un relatum dans la relation d’être une raison qui elle-même est une relation entre la personne à qui la raison s’applique et la personne concernée par l’action pour laquelle il y a une raison. La deuxième conclusion de ce texte est que cette composante relationnelle est aussi requise dans de nombreuses sortes de raisons admises comme impartiales. Afin d’éviter de banaliser la distinction entre raisons partiales et impartiales nous devons appliquer une condition suffisante additionnelle. Finalement, bien qu’il pourrait s’avérer possible de distinguer les raisons impartiales ayant une composante relationnelle des raisons partiales, cette approche suggère que la question de savoir si l’éthique est partiale ou impartiale devra se régler au niveau de l’éthique normative, ou à tout le moins, qu’elle ne pourra se régler au niveau du discours sur la nature des raisons d’agir.

Friendship and the grounds of reasons

L’amitié de même que d’autres relations intimes ont créé des difficultés pour les philosophes moraux. Bien que la morale semble exiger que nous demeurions impartiaux, l’amitié semble donner naissance à des obligations de partialité envers nos proches. Mais cette difficulté peut disparaître une fois que l’on cesse de se concentrer sur la catégorisation des raisons en tant que morales ou non morales. Cette tendance à classer les raisons comme morales vs. non morales nous mène à accorder la place d’honneur à l’étiquette « moral » et à supposer que cette catégorie est uniforme. Si nous abandonnons ces suppositions, alors les raisons données par nos proches ou nos amis ne nous sembleront plus problématiques. Il sera alors possible de voir que toutes les raisons sont, en bout de ligne, egocentriques d’une importante façon, et que la délibération doit toujours provenir d’une perspective egocentrique.

Normative and cognitive influences on female entrepreneurial reluctance at the base of the pyramid - an explorative study of cleaning ladies in Istanbul

Previous research has considered entrepreneurship as a way out of poverty and as a chance to foster economic growth. Moreover, specifically start-ups headed by women have played an important role in the economic development and it has been argued that gender-related issues, amongst others, play a significant role for the performance of a country or region. Against this background, this qualitative study explores desires, reluctances and constraints toward entrepreneurial activities of a comparably homogenous group of potential (poor) entrepreneurs in an emerging economy—cleaning ladies in Istanbul. We focus on this particular context as still rather little is known on reasons why women do not start a business (in Turkey). We believe exploring the reasons why certain individuals choose not to become entrepreneurs is at least as telling as investigating why they do so. We draw upon the social dimensions of entrepreneurship by Shapero and Sokol (1982) alongside Institutional Theory and posit that normative and cognitive forces may shape individual decisions on entrepreneurship. We identified two basic clusters of women and discuss possible hindrance factors undermining entrepreneurial desires and limitations for entrepreneurship as well as possible avenues for policy makers (and MNCs) to foster entrepreneurship in the given community.

How to write an unsuccessful entrepreneurial business plan : content analysis of the normative literature reveals a flawed paradigm

The study's aim was to investigate whether an Entrepreneurial Business Planning (EBP) paradigm could be discovered as a body of core, common maxims within the normative EBP literature (works of the 'how-to-write-a-successful-new-venture-business-plan' genre). It employed content analysis techniques adapted mainly from the methodological prescriptions of Krippendorf (1980) and Carney (1972). The textual investigation produced a comprehensive, quantitative data base capable of sufficient interpretative richness to discover that an established Entrepreneurial Business Planning paradigm does exist. Its major elements embrace two key assumptions, four strong mandates and four weaker mandates.

The discovery is significant for two main reasons. First, it provides a formally-researched, explicitly-articulated EBP paradigm. This can replace the anecdotal, unarticulated assumption (implicit in most of the normative EBP literature) that an EBP paradigm 'probably exists'. Second, the research redresses some of the imbalance between entrepreneurship teaching- where Entrepreneurial Business Planning is at the core of international curricula - and entrepreneurship research which has virtually ignored EBP as a topic worthy of serious scrutiny. A firm basis for critical, scholarly exploration of the neglected EBP field is now established. This takes the theory and practice of EBP into a new era beginning with recognition that the discovered EBP paradigm is badly flawed and likely, if blindly applied, to lead to the writing of unsuccessful business plans.

Second-Personal Reasons and Special Obligations

The paper discusses the second-personal account of moral obligation as put forward by Stephen Darwall. It argues that on such an account, an important part of our moral practice cannot be explained, namely special obligations that are grounded in special relationships between persons. After highlighting the problem, the paper discusses several strategies to accommodate such special obligations that are implicit in some of Darwall’s texts, most importantly a disentanglement strategy and a reductionist strategy. It argues that neither one of these strategies is entirely convincing. The last part of the papers sketches a novel account of how to accommodate special obligations in a second-personal framework: According to this suggestion, special obligations might be due to the fact that relationships change the normative authority that persons have over each other.

Citizenship Deprivation: A Normative Analysis. Liberty and Security in Europe No. 82, 19 March 2015

Most critical analyses assess citizenship-deprivation policies against international human rights and domestic rule of law standards, such as prevention of statelessness, non-arbitrariness with regard to justifications and judicial remedies, or non-discrimination between different categories of citizens. This report considers instead from a political theory perspective how deprivation policies reflect specific conceptions of political community. We distinguish four normative conceptions of the grounds of membership in a political community that apply to decisions on acquisition and loss of citizenship status: i) a ‘State discretion’ view, according to which governments should be as free as possible in pursuing State interests when determining citizenship status; ii) an ‘individual choice’ view, according to which individuals should be as free as possible in choosing their citizenship status; iii) an ‘ascriptive community’ view, according to which both State and individual choices should be minimised through automatic determination of membership based on objective criteria such as the circumstances of birth; and iv) a ‘genuine link’ view, according to which the ties of individuals to particular States determine their claims to inclusion and against deprivation while providing at the same time objections against including individuals without genuine links. We argue that most citizenship laws combine these four normative views in different ways, but that from a democratic perspective the ‘genuine link’ view is normatively preferable to the others. The report subsequently examines five general grounds for citizenship withdrawal – threats to public security, non-compliance with citizenship duties, flawed acquisition, derivative loss and loss of genuine links – and considers how the four normative views apply to withdrawal provision motivated by these concerns. The final section of the report examines whether EU citizenship provides additional reasons for protection against Member States’ powers of citizenship deprivation. We suggest that, in addition to fundamental rights protection through EU law and protection of free movement rights, three further arguments could be invoked: toleration of dual citizenship in a political union, prevention of unequal conditions for loss among EU citizens, and the salience of genuine links to the EU itself rather than merely to one of its Member States.

EU-ASEAN relations in the post-Cold War era:an analysis of the impact of normative factors on interregionalism

This thesis examines the relationship between the European Union (EU) and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) with a focus on why their normative elements, e.g. values and norms, affect their ties in the post-Cold War era. Since the end of the Cold War, policy-makers and academics have become interested in region-to-region interaction, termed interregionalism. Though interregionalism is considered to have become an indelible feature of post-Cold War international politics, there are question marks over its importance. It is often argued that interregionalism reinforces the collective identity of the regional organisations involved. It is also maintained that its overall relevance to the international system depends on the level of actorness, which is primarily measured in institutional and material terms, of the participant regional organisations. This thesis contends that the normative components of the EU and ASEAN are also fundamental constituents of their actorness and, consequently, define significantly their interregionalism. This is based on a crucial observation that normative factors are of importance to the regional and international relations of the EU and ASEAN. Yet, while they strongly espouse norms and values to guide their internal and external activities, their normative premises radically differ from each other. Furthermore, these normative differences jeopardise their cooperation. Building on this observation the inquiry takes the normative components of the EU and ASEAN as the criterion as well as the focus for investigating their interregionalism. In doing so, it hypothesises that the EU and ASEAN are two different regional actors that adopt two dissimilar sets of norms to conduct their regional and international affairs and that such normative differences hinder their relations. Within this hypothesis, it seeks to address three central questions. First, what are the normative features that constitute the EU and ASEAN as actors in world politics and that make them different from each other? Second, what are the main sources of their normative differences? Finally, why do their normative differences become an obstructive factor in their relationship? To address these issues, the inquiry adopts a constructivist interpretation (of International Relations) and opts for a narrative and empirical inquiry, which is based on information and data acquired from official documents, scholarly works and interviews and questionnaires. In doing so, it finds that as they were born and evolved in two dissimilar temporal and spatial settings, the EU and ASEAN are two different norm entrepreneurs and normative powers. The former advocates a set of liberal cosmopolitan norms whereas the latter champions a set of traditional communitarian principles. Their normative differences become a major obstacle to their cooperation, especially when one regional organisation’s norms are refused or violated by the other. Thus, a key lesson drawn from these findings is that in order to explain more fully EU-ASEAN interregionalism, it is essential to consider their norms, the reasons behind their normative differences and the implication of those differences to their relations

Feasibility, normative heuristics and the proper place of historical responsibility – a reply to Ohndorf et al.

In this comment, we pick up three points raised by Ohndorf et al. (2015) in their reply to our ethical assessment of the German Advisory Council’s Budget Approach (WBGUBA). First, we discuss and clarify the relationship between ethics and political feasibility, highlighting that the way Ohndorf et el. use feasibility creates an unwarranted status quo bias. Second, we explain the proper place historical responsibility should have within the WBGUBA, stressing the fact that the reasons why we choose one policy proposal over another matter. Third, we analyze the limited extent to which a normative heuristic should motivate an ethically ambitious policy proposal like the WBGUBA.

The governance of adaptation: choices, reasons, and effects. Introduction to the Special Feature

The governance of climate adaptation involves the collective efforts of multiple societal actors to address problems, or to reap the benefits, associated with impacts of climate change. Governing involves the creation of institutions, rules and organizations, and the selection of normative principles to guide problem solution and institution building. We argue that actors involved in governing climate change adaptation, as climate change governance regimes evolve, inevitably must engage in making choices, for instance on problem definitions, jurisdictional levels, on modes of governance and policy instruments, and on the timing of interventions. Yet little is known about how and why these choices are made in practice, and how such choices affect the outcomes of our efforts to govern adaptation. In this introduction we review the current state of evidence and the specific contribution of the articles published in this Special Feature, which are aimed at bringing greater clarity in these matters, and thereby informing both governance theory and practice. Collectively, the contributing papers suggest that the way issues are defined has important consequences for the support for governance interventions, and their effectiveness. The articles suggest that currently the emphasis in adaptation governance is on the local and regional levels, while underscoring the benefits of interventions and governance at higher jurisdictional levels in terms of visioning and scaling-up effective approaches. The articles suggest that there is a central role of government agencies in leading governance interventions to address spillover effects, to provide public goods, and to promote the long-term perspectives for planning. They highlight the issue of justice in the governance of adaptation showing how governance measures have wide distributional consequences, including the potential to amplify existing inequalities, access to resources, or generating new injustices through distribution of risks. For several of these findings, future research directions are suggested.

Effects of susceptibility to normative influence and type of testimonial on attitudes toward print advertising

In two experiments, we show how a consumer’s susceptibility to normative influence (SNI) offers useful insights into the effectiveness of two types of testimonials: a typical person endorsement (Study 1) and a celebrity endorsement (Study 2). Specifically, we suggest that two variables moderate testimonial effects—SNI and product attribute information. Results show that in forming their evaluations, high-SNI consumers place a greater emphasis on the testimonial than on the attribute information. In contrast, low-SNI consumers are more influenced by attribute information. A mediation analysis shows that advertising attitudes for high-SNI consumers are mediated by testimonial thoughts, whereas the attitudes for low-SNI consumers are mediated by their attribute thoughts. Theoretical and managerial implications are presented.