Convex and exact games with non-transferable utility

We generalize exactness to games with non-transferable utility (NTU). A game is exact if for each coalition there is a core allocation on the boundary of its payoff set. Convex games with transferable utility are well-known to be exact. We consider ve generalizations of convexity in the NTU setting. We show that each of ordinal, coalition merge, individual merge and marginal convexity can be uni¯ed under NTU exactness. We provide an example of a cardinally convex game which is not NTU exact. Finally, we relate the classes of Π-balanced, totally Π-balanced, NTU exact, totally NTU exact, ordinally convex, cardinally convex, coalition merge convex, individual merge convex and marginal convex games to one another.

A Characterization of Exact Non-atomic Market Games

Continuous exact non-atomic games are naturally associated to certain operators between Banach spaces. It thus makes sense to study games by means of the corresponding operators. We characterize non-atomic exact market games in terms of the properties of the associated operators. We also prove a separation theorem for weak compact sets of countably additive measures, which is of independent interest.

On the impossibility of fair risk allocation

Measuring and allocating risk properly are crucial for performance evaluation and internal capital allocation of portfolios held by banks, insurance companies, investment funds and other entities subject to financial risk. We show that by using a coherent measure of risk it is impossible to allocate risk satisfying the natural requirements of (Solution) Core Compatibility, Equal Treatment Property and Strong Monotonicity. To obtain the result we characterize the Shapley value on the class of totally balanced games and also on the class of exact games.

On the impossibility of fair risk allocation

Measuring and allocating risk properly are crucial for performance evaluation and internal capital allocation of portfolios held by banks, insurance companies, investment funds and other entities subject to financial risk. We show that by using coherent measures of risk it is impossible to allocate risk satisfying simultaneously the natural requirements of Core Compatibility, Equal Treatment Property and Strong Monotonicity. To obtain the result we characterize the Shapley value on the class of totally balanced games and also on the class of exact games.

Exact and heuristic methods for solving Boolean games

Boolean games are a framework for reasoning about the rational behavior of agents whose goals are formalized using propositional formulas. Compared to normal form games, a well-studied and related game framework, Boolean games allow for an intuitive and more compact representation of the agents’ goals. So far, Boolean games have been mainly studied in the literature from the Knowledge Representation perspective, and less attention has been paid on the algorithmic issues underlying the computation of solution concepts. Although some suggestions for solving specific classes of Boolean games have been made in the literature, there is currently no work available on the practical performance. In this paper, we propose the first technique to solve general Boolean games that does not require an exponential translation to normal-form games. Our method is based on disjunctive answer set programming and computes solutions (equilibria) of arbitrary Boolean games. It can be applied to a wide variety of solution concepts, and can naturally deal with extensions of Boolean games such as constraints and costs. We present detailed experimental results in which we compare the proposed method against a number of existing methods for solving specific classes of Boolean games, as well as adaptations of methods that were initially designed for normal-form games. We found that the heuristic methods that do not require all payoff matrix entries performed well for smaller Boolean games, while our ASP based technique is faster when the problem instances have a higher number of agents or action variables.

Characterizing distribution rules for cost sharing games

In noncooperative cost sharing games, individually strategic agents choose resources based on how the welfare (cost or revenue) generated at each resource (which depends on the set of agents that choose the resource) is distributed. The focus is on finding distribution rules that lead to stable allocations, which is formalized by the concept of Nash equilibrium, e.g., Shapley value (budget-balanced) and marginal contribution (not budget-balanced) rules.

Recent work that seeks to characterize the space of all such rules shows that the only budget-balanced distribution rules that guarantee equilibrium existence in all welfare sharing games are generalized weighted Shapley values (GWSVs), by exhibiting a specific 'worst-case' welfare function which requires that GWSV rules be used. Our work provides an exact characterization of the space of distribution rules (not necessarily budget-balanced) for any specific local welfare functions remains, for a general class of scalable and separable games with well-known applications, e.g., facility location, routing, network formation, and coverage games.

We show that all games conditioned on any fixed local welfare functions possess an equilibrium if and only if the distribution rules are equivalent to GWSV rules on some 'ground' welfare functions. Therefore, it is neither the existence of some worst-case welfare function, nor the restriction of budget-balance, which limits the design to GWSVs. Also, in order to guarantee equilibrium existence, it is necessary to work within the class of potential games, since GWSVs result in (weighted) potential games.

We also provide an alternative characterization—all games conditioned on any fixed local welfare functions possess an equilibrium if and only if the distribution rules are equivalent to generalized weighted marginal contribution (GWMC) rules on some 'ground' welfare functions. This result is due to a deeper fundamental connection between Shapley values and marginal contributions that our proofs expose—they are equivalent given a transformation connecting their ground welfare functions. (This connection leads to novel closed-form expressions for the GWSV potential function.) Since GWMCs are more tractable than GWSVs, a designer can tradeoff budget-balance with computational tractability in deciding which rule to implement.

On the Impossibility of an Exact Imperfect Monitoring Folk Theorem

It is shown that, for almost every two-player game with imperfect monitoring, the conclusions of the classical folk theorem are false. So, even though these games admit a well-known approximate folk theorem, an exact folk theorem may only be obtained for a measure zero set of games. A complete characterization of the efficient equilibria of almost every such game is also given, along with an inefficiency result on the imperfect monitoring prisoner s dilemma.

Exact Solution of Bayes and Minimax Change-Detection Problems

The challenge of detecting a change in the distribution of data is a sequential decision problem that is relevant to many engineering solutions, including quality control and machine and process monitoring. This dissertation develops techniques for exact solution of change-detection problems with discrete time and discrete observations. Change-detection problems are classified as Bayes or minimax based on the availability of information on the change-time distribution. A Bayes optimal solution uses prior information about the distribution of the change time to minimize the expected cost, whereas a minimax optimal solution minimizes the cost under the worst-case change-time distribution. Both types of problems are addressed. The most important result of the dissertation is the development of a polynomial-time algorithm for the solution of important classes of Markov Bayes change-detection problems. Existing techniques for epsilon-exact solution of partially observable Markov decision processes have complexity exponential in the number of observation symbols. A new algorithm, called constellation induction, exploits the concavity and Lipschitz continuity of the value function, and has complexity polynomial in the number of observation symbols. It is shown that change-detection problems with a geometric change-time distribution and identically- and independently-distributed observations before and after the change are solvable in polynomial time. Also, change-detection problems on hidden Markov models with a fixed number of recurrent states are solvable in polynomial time. A detailed implementation and analysis of the constellation-induction algorithm are provided. Exact solution methods are also established for several types of minimax change-detection problems. Finite-horizon problems with arbitrary observation distributions are modeled as extensive-form games and solved using linear programs. Infinite-horizon problems with linear penalty for detection delay and identically- and independently-distributed observations can be solved in polynomial time via epsilon-optimal parameterization of a cumulative-sum procedure. Finally, the properties of policies for change-detection problems are described and analyzed. Simple classes of formal languages are shown to be sufficient for epsilon-exact solution of change-detection problems, and methods for finding minimally sized policy representations are described.

Now everything looks like a game : Mobile phones and location-based games.

This paper explores how we may transform peoples’ perceived access to cultural participation by exploiting the possible relationships between place, play and mobile devices. It presents SCOOT; a location-based game in order to investigate how aspects of game-play can be employed to evoke at once playful and culturally meaningful experiences of place. In particular this paper is concerned with how the portable, communicative and social affordances of mobile phones are integral to making a “now everything looks like a game” experience.

Maintaining human agency in the design on context-aware systems : Design games in a dental surgery

This paper describes a series of design games, specifically aimed at exploring shifts in human agency in order to inform the design of context-aware applications. The games focused on understanding information handling issues in dental practice with participants from a university dental school playing an active role in the activities. Participatory design activities help participants to reveal potential implicit technical resources that can be presented explicitly in technologies in order to assist humans in managing their interactions with and amidst technical systems gracefully.

Co-creating games: A co-evolutionary analysis

ABSTRACT. The phenomenon of consumer co-creation is often framed in terms of whether either economic market forces or socio-cultural non-market forces ultimately dominate. We propose an alternate model of consumer co-creation in terms of co-evolution between markets and non-markets. Our model is based on a recent ethnographic study of a massively multiplayer online game through its development, release and ultimate failure, and cast in terms of two explanatory models: multiple games and social network markets. We conclude that consumer co-creation is indeed complex, but in ways that relate to both emergent market expectations and the evolution of markets, not to the transcendence of markets.

Co-creative expertise : Auran Games and Fury - a case study

This article discusses the ways in which the relations among professional and non-professional participants in co-creative relations are being reconfigured as part of the shift from a closed industrial paradigm of expertise toward open and distributed expertise networks. This article draws on ethnographic consultancy research undertaken throughout 2007 with Auran Games, a Brisbane, Australia based games developer, to explore the co-creative relationships between professional developers and gamers. This research followed and informed Auran’s online community management and social networking strategies for Fury (http://unleashthefury.com), a massively multiplayer online game released in October 2007. This paper argues that these co-creative forms of expertise involve co-ordinating expertises through social-network markets.

Empowerment games : empathic design probes for user participation in community housing

This paper documents the empowering process of a group of public housing residents through different design probing exercises. These exercises worked along with existing social processes without any involvement of designers. This paper shows how a design researcher devised a series of probing tools called "empowerment games" with a group of active users. These games are self-learning tools for making the abstract language of design legible to users. The main purpose of this intitiative was to change the preconception of govenmental bodies and professional designers of the passivity of the users with regard to their designed environment. This was the first case of the application of a participatory design process in Hong Kong subsidized housing. Design empathy is a central skill when working with users throughout the whole design research project.