Convex and exact games with non-transferable utility


Autoria(s): Csóka, Péter; Herings, Jean-Jacques P.; Kóczy Á., László; Pintér, Miklós
Data(s)

01/02/2011

Resumo

We generalize exactness to games with non-transferable utility (NTU). A game is exact if for each coalition there is a core allocation on the boundary of its payoff set. Convex games with transferable utility are well-known to be exact. We consider ve generalizations of convexity in the NTU setting. We show that each of ordinal, coalition merge, individual merge and marginal convexity can be uni¯ed under NTU exactness. We provide an example of a cardinally convex game which is not NTU exact. Finally, we relate the classes of Π-balanced, totally Π-balanced, NTU exact, totally NTU exact, ordinally convex, cardinally convex, coalition merge convex, individual merge convex and marginal convex games to one another.

Formato

application/pdf

Identificador

http://unipub.lib.uni-corvinus.hu/585/1/ConvexAndExactNTU08.pdf

Csóka, Péter, Herings, Jean-Jacques P., Kóczy Á., László and Pintér, Miklós (2011) Convex and exact games with non-transferable utility. European Journal of Operational Research, 209 (1). pp. 57-62. DOI 10.1016/j.ejor.2010.08.004 <http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ejor.2010.08.004>

Publicador

Elsevier

Relação

http://unipub.lib.uni-corvinus.hu/585/

http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0377221710005400

10.1016/j.ejor.2010.08.004

Palavras-Chave #Mathematics, Econometrics
Tipo

Article

PeerReviewed

Idioma(s)

en

en