Convex and exact games with non-transferable utility
Data(s) |
01/02/2011
|
---|---|
Resumo |
We generalize exactness to games with non-transferable utility (NTU). A game is exact if for each coalition there is a core allocation on the boundary of its payoff set. Convex games with transferable utility are well-known to be exact. We consider ve generalizations of convexity in the NTU setting. We show that each of ordinal, coalition merge, individual merge and marginal convexity can be uni¯ed under NTU exactness. We provide an example of a cardinally convex game which is not NTU exact. Finally, we relate the classes of Π-balanced, totally Π-balanced, NTU exact, totally NTU exact, ordinally convex, cardinally convex, coalition merge convex, individual merge convex and marginal convex games to one another. |
Formato |
application/pdf |
Identificador |
http://unipub.lib.uni-corvinus.hu/585/1/ConvexAndExactNTU08.pdf Csóka, Péter, Herings, Jean-Jacques P., Kóczy Á., László and Pintér, Miklós (2011) Convex and exact games with non-transferable utility. European Journal of Operational Research, 209 (1). pp. 57-62. DOI 10.1016/j.ejor.2010.08.004 <http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ejor.2010.08.004> |
Publicador |
Elsevier |
Relação |
http://unipub.lib.uni-corvinus.hu/585/ http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0377221710005400 10.1016/j.ejor.2010.08.004 |
Palavras-Chave | #Mathematics, Econometrics |
Tipo |
Article PeerReviewed |
Idioma(s) |
en en |