Theories of ethics.

Includes bibliography.

How Could Emergency Modify our Normal Ethics Standards? A Brief Review of Selected Chapters in Emergency Ethics

Compte-rendu / Review

Guider la pratique et la formation éthique des professionnels de la santé : établir les fondements du modèle de la déontologie réflexive (MDR)

Si l’approche par compétences au Canada et aux États-Unis est particulièrement valorisée pour orienter la pratique des professionnels de la santé (PDS) – et en bioéthique clinique –, les travaux permettant de mieux comprendre les fondements psychologiques, ontologiques et philosophiques de ces compétences sont peu présents dans la littérature en bioéthique. Les principaux outils actuellement disponibles se divisent généralement en quatre principales catégories : 1) les documents officiels (codes de déontologie, règlements institutionnels, etc.); 2) les principales théories éthiques (éthique de la discussion, éthique de la vertu, principisme, etc.); 3) les ouvrages de référence scientifiques; 4) les outils de prise de décision éthique. Ces documents sont des incontournables pour les bioéthiciens et les PDS, mais leur disparité, voire leur contenu parfois contradictoire, jumelée à une compréhension limitée de l’éthique, est souvent source de confusion dans les processus décisionnels et peut être la cause de comportements ne répondant pas aux standards éthiques des pratiques professionnelles. Notre recherche constitue une réflexion qui s’inscrit en amont de ces outils dont le caractère pragmatique a le désavantage de simplifier la réflexion théorique au profit de données plus concrètes. Nos travaux visent à développer les bases d’un modèle flexible et inclusif – le modèle de la déontologie réflexive (MDR) – permettant de : 1) poser les principaux repères philosophiques, sociaux et déontologiques des problématiques éthiques rencontrées en pratique; 2) saisir les principales tensions éthiques inhérentes à cette complexité; 3) mieux comprendre, dans une perspective psychologique et développementale, les exigences personnelles et professionnelles qu’impose le statut de professionnel de la santé dans le contexte actuel des soins de santé. Entreprise théorique, ce projet consiste principalement à mettre en relation dynamique un ensemble de dimensions (légale, éthique, clinique, sociale, psychologique) à l’oeuvre dans la rencontre du bioéthicien et du PDS avec la complexité des situations éthiques, en s’inspirant du concept de sensibilité éthique de la « petite éthique » de Paul Ricoeur (1990), du modèle des quatre composantes de Rest (1994) et de la théorie du soi et des modes identitaires d’Augusto Blasi (1993). Ce processus implique trois étapes successives : 1) une mise en ii perspective de la posture épistémologique particulière du bioéthicien et du PDS à la lumière de la « petite éthique » de Ricoeur; 2) une revue de la littérature interdisciplinaire sur le concept de sensibilité éthique afin d’en proposer une définition et de le mettre en perspective avec d’autres compétences éthiques; 3) le développement d’un cadre de référence en matière d’identité éthique professionnelle (professional ethics identity tendencies, PEIT), inspiré de la théorie du soi et des modes identitaires de Blasi. Ces PEIT proposent un repère normatif aux exigences liées à la construction de l'identité en contexte de pratique des PDS et suggèrent des pistes de réflexion quant à la formation et à la recherche en éthique professionnelle. Cette recherche souhaite établir des fondements théoriques pour le développement ultérieur du modèle de la déontologie réflexive (MDR).

Teorías éticas contemporáneas : cuatro respuestas ante los desafíos sociales y políticos de nuestro tiempo

En estas páginas intentamos llevar adelante una revisión de las principales teorías éticas contemporáneas –las éticas comunicativas, las neocontractualistas, las comunitaristas y las que se originan en el utilitarismo– con el propósito de dilucidar los aportes que ellas ofrecen para orientar decisiones que comprometen a las personas en diferentes dimensiones de sus vidas: en el ámbito de lo cotidiano, en la dimensión pública dada por la condición de ciudadano y/o miembro de una comunidad, y más específicamente, en el campo de la actividad profesional. Tras el ejercicio de la sospecha que puso en tela de juicio a la razón como fundamento último del conocer y el obrar, y tras la crisis de la normatividad que condicionó la reflexión ética durante buena parte del siglo XX, nos preguntamos ¿cuáles son las problemáticas que asumen las teoría éticas contemporáneas? ¿cuál es el sustento teórico de sus reflexiones? ¿qué respuestas ofrecen a los desafíos sociales y políticos contemporáneos? ¿pueden esas respuestas satisfacer requerimientos surgidos de nuestra propia situación socio-histórica?

A little learning is a dangerous thing? The ethics of teaching accidental tourists in higher education

This paper raises questions about the ethical issues that arise for academics and universities when under-graduate students enrol in classes outside of their discipline - classes that are not designed to be multi-disciplinary or introductory. We term these students ‘accidental tourists'. Differences between disciplines in terms of pedagogy, norms, language and understanding may pose challenges for accidental tourists in achieving desired learning outcomes. This paper begins a discussion about whether lecturers and universities have any ethical obligations towards supporting the learning of these students. Recognising that engaging with only one ethical theory leads to a fragmented moral vision, this paper employs a variety of ethical theories to examine any possible moral obligations that may fall upon lecturers and/or universities. In regards to lecturers, the paper critically engages with the ethical theories of utilitarianism, Kantianism and virtue ethics (Aristotle) to determine the extent of any academic duty to accidental tourists. In relation to universities, this paper employs the emerging ethical theory of organisational ethics as a lens through which to critically examine any possible obligations. Organisational ethics stems from the recognition that moral demands also exist for organisations so organisations must be reconceptualised as ethical actors and their policies and practices subject to ethical scrutiny. The analysis in this paper illustrates the challenges faced by lecturers some of whom, we theorise, may experience a form of moral distress facing a conflict between personal beliefs and organisational requirements. It also critically examines the role and responsibilities of universities towards students and towards their staff and the inherent moral tensions between a market model and demands for ‘good' learning experiences. This paper highlights the tensions for academics, between academics and universities and within university policy and indicates the need for greater reflection about this issue, especially given the many constraints facing lecturers and universities.

Criminal Justice Ethics : Cultivating the Moral Imagination

It is essential for those employed within the justice system to be able to competently and confidently work at the borders between ethics and the law. Criminal Justice Ethics offers a fresh new approach to considering ethical issues in a criminal justice context. Rather than simply offering a range of ethical dilemmas specific to various justice professionals, it provides extensive discussion of how individuals develop their 'moral imaginations' using ethical perspectives and practices, both as citizens of the world and as practitioners of justice. Starting from a consideration of the major ethical theories, this book sets the framework for an expansive discussion of ethics by moving from theory to consider the just society and the role of the justice professional within it. Each chapter provides detailed analysis of relevant ethical issues, and activities to engage students with the content, as well as review questions, which can be used for revision or examination. This book will help students to: • understand the various theoretical approaches to ethics, • apply these understandings to issues in society and the justice process, • assist in developing the ability to investigate, discuss, and analyse current ethical issues in criminal justice, • appreciate the diverse nature of ethical systems across cultures, • outline strategies for detecting and resolving ethical dilemmas. Rich with examples and ethical dilemmas from a broad range of contexts, this book's multicultural approach will appeal not only to criminal justice educators, but also to academics, students and practitioners approaching criminal justice from sociological, psychological or philosophical perspectives.

Ethics of Justification : A Defence of Contractualism

In What We Owe to Each Other, T.M. Scanlon formulated a new version of the ethical theory called contractualism. This theory took reasons considerations that count in favour of judgment-sensitive attitudes to be the fundamental normative notion. It then used normative reasons to first account for evaluative properties. For an object to be valuable, on this view, is for it to have properties that provide reasons to have favourable attitudes towards the bearer of value. Scanlon also used reasons to account for moral wrongness. His contractualism claims that an act is morally wrong if it is forbidden by any set of moral principles that no one could reasonably reject. My thesis consists of five previously published articles which attempt to clarify Scanlon s theory and to defend it against its critics. The first article defends the idea that normative reason-relations are fundamental against Joshua Gert. Gert argues that rationality is a more basic notion than reasons and that reasons can be analysed in terms of their rationally requiring and justifying dimensions. The second article explores the relationship between value and reasons. It defends Scanlon s view according to which reasons are the more basic than value against those who think that reasons are based on the evaluative realm. The last three articles defend Scanlon s views about moral wrongness. The first one of them discusses a classic objection to contractualist theories. This objection is that principles which no one could reasonably reject are redundant in accounting for wrongness. This is because we need a prior notion of wrongness to select those principles and because such principles are not required to make actions wrong or to provide reasons against wrong actions. The fourth article explores the distinctive reasons which contractualists claim there are for avoiding the wrong actions. The last article argues against the critics of contractualism who claim that contractualism has implausible normative consequences for situations related to the treatment of different-sized groups of people.

Ethics and Aesthetics : Intersections in Iris Murdoch's Philosophy

The study addresses the question concerning the relationship between ethics and aesthetics in the philosophy of Iris Murdoch. The main argument is that Murdoch s philosophy cannot be accurately understood without an understanding of the relationship she sees between the aesthetic experience and morality. Reading Murdoch s philosophy with this relationship in mind shows that it must be considered as a relevant alternative to the main forms of aesthetic-ethical theories. The study consists of seven previously published articles and a summary. It shows that Murdoch belongs to a tradition of philosophers who seek to broaden the scope of ethics by reference to aesthetic value and aesthetic experience. She sees an attitude responsible for aesthetic experiences as relevant for morality. However, she does not collapse morality into aesthetic experience. The two meet on the level of the subject s attitude towards its object, but there is a distinction between the experiences that accompany the attitudes. Aesthetic experiences can function as a clue to morals in that they present in a pleasing manner moral truths which otherwise might be psychologically too difficult to face. Murdoch equates the aesthetic attitude with virtuous love characterized by unselfish attention to its object. The primary object of such love is in Murdoch s account another human individual in her particularity. She compares the recognition of the other person as a particular existence to the experience of the Kantian sublime and offers her own version of the true sublime which is the experience of awe in the face of the infinity of the task of understanding others. One of the most central claims in Murdoch s philosophy is that human consciousness is evaluatively structured. This claim challenges the distinction between facts and values which has had an immense influence on modern moral philosophy. One argument with which Murdoch supports her claim is the nature of great literature. According to her, the standard of greatness in literature is the authors awareness of the independent existence of individuals in the particularity of their evaluative consciousnesses. The analysis of the standard of greatness in literature is also Murdoch s only argument for the claim that the primary object of the loving unselfish attention is the other particular individual. She is convinced that great literature reveals a deep truth about the human condition with its capacity to capture the particular. Abstract philo¬sophical discourse cannot compete with this capacity but it should take truths revealed by literature seriously in its theorising. Recognising this as Murdoch s stand on the question of the relation between philosophy and literature as forms of human discourse settles whether she is part of what has been called philosophy s turn to literature. The answer is yes.

Despairing Justice and the Ethics of Legal Interpretation

This study discusses legal interpretation. The question is how legal texts, for instance laws, statutes and regulations, can and do have meaning. Language makes interpretation difficult as it holds no definite meanings. When the theoretical connection between semantics and legal meaning is loosened and we realise that language cannot be a means of justifying legal decisions, the responsibility inherent in legal interpretation can be seen in full. We are thus compelled to search for ways to analyse this responsibility. The main argument of the book is that the responsibility of legal interpretation contains a responsibility towards the text that is interpreted (and through the mediation of the text also towards the legal system), but not only this. It is not simply a responsibility to read and read well, but it transcends on a broader scale. It includes responsibility for the effects of the interpretation in a particular situation and with regard to the people whose case is decided. Ultimately, it is a responsibility to do justice. These two aspects of responsibility are conceptualised here as the two dimensions of the ethics of legal interpretation: the textual and the situational. The basic conception of language presented here is provided by Ludwig Wittgenstein s later philosophy, but the argument is not committed to only one philosophical tradition. Wittgenstein can be counterpointed in interesting ways by Jacques Derrida s ideas on language and meaning. Derrida s work also functions as a contrast to hermeneutic theories. It is argued that the seed to an answer to the question of meaning lies in the inter-personal and situated activity of interpretation and communication, an idea that can be discerned in different ways in the works of Wittgenstein, Derrida and Hans-Georg Gadamer. This way the question of meaning naturally leads us to think about ethics, which is approached here through the philosophy of Emmanuel Levinas. His thinking, focusing on topics such as otherness, friendship and hospitality, provides possibilities for answering some of the questions posed in this book. However, at the same time we move inside a normativity where ethics and politics come together in many ways. The responsibility of legal interpretation is connected to the political and this has to be acknowledged lest we forget that law always implies force. But it is argued here that the political can be explored in positive terms as it does not have to mean only power or violence.

Patents, Ethics and Stem Cell Research : The Case of hESC Innovation in Australia, Europe and the United States

Embryonic stem cells offer potentially a ground-breaking insight into health and diseases and are said to offer hope in discovering cures for many ailments unimaginable few years ago. Human embryonic stem cells are undifferentiated, immature cells that possess an amazing ability to develop into almost any body cell such as heart muscle, bone, nerve and blood cells and possibly even organs in due course. This remarkable feature, enabling embryonic stem cells to proliferate indefinitely in vitro (in a test tube), has branded them as a so-called miracle cure . Their potential use in clinical applications provides hope to many sufferers of debilitating and fatal medical conditions. However, the emergence of stem cell research has resulted in intense debates about its promises and dangers. On the one hand, advocates hail its potential, ranging from alleviating and even curing fatal and debilitating diseases such as Parkinson s, diabetes, heart ailments and so forth. On the other hand, opponents decry its dangers, drawing attention to the inherent risks of human embryo destruction, cloning for research purposes and reproductive cloning eventually. Lately, however, the policy battles surrounding human embryonic stem cell innovation have shifted from being a controversial research to scuffles within intellectual property rights. In fact, the ability to obtain patents represents a pivotal factor in the economic success or failure of this new biotechnology. Although, stem cell patents tend to more or less satisfy the standard patentability requirements, they also raise serious ethical and moral questions about the meaning of the exclusions on ethical or moral grounds as found in European and to an extent American and Australian patent laws. At present there is a sort of a calamity over human embryonic stem cell patents in Europe and to an extent in Australia and the United States. This in turn has created a sense of urgency to engage all relevant parties in the discourse on how best to approach patenting of this new form of scientific innovation. In essence, this should become a highly favoured patenting priority. To the contrary, stem cell innovation and its reliance on patent protection risk turmoil, uncertainty, confusion and even a halt on not only stem cell research but also further emerging biotechnology research and development. The patent system is premised upon the fundamental principle of balance which ought to ensure that the temporary monopoly awarded to the inventor equals that of the social benefit provided by the disclosure of the invention. Ensuring and maintaining this balance within the patent system when patenting human embryonic stem cells is of crucial contemporary relevance. Yet, the patenting of human embryonic stem cells raises some fundamental moral, social and legal questions. Overall, the present approach of patenting human embryonic stem cell related inventions is unsatisfactory and ineffective. This draws attention to a specific question which provides for a conceptual framework for this work. That question is the following: how can the investigated patent offices successfully deal with patentability of human embryonic stem cells? This in turn points at the thorny issue of application of the morality clause in this field. In particular, the interpretation of the exclusions on ethical or moral grounds as found in Australian, American and European legislative and judicial precedents. The Thesis seeks to compare laws and legal practices surrounding patentability of human embryonic stem cells in Australia and the United States with that of Europe. By using Europe as the primary case study for lessons and guidance, the central goal of the Thesis then becomes the determination of the type of solutions available to Europe with prospects to apply such to Australia and the United States. The Dissertation purports to define the ethical implications that arise with patenting human embryonic stem cells and intends to offer resolutions to the key ethical dilemmas surrounding patentability of human embryonic stem cells and other morally controversial biotechnology inventions. In particular, the Thesis goal is to propose a functional framework that may be used as a benchmark for an informed discussion on the solution to resolving ethical and legal tensions that come with patentability of human embryonic stem cells in Australian, American and European patent worlds. Key research questions that arise from these objectives and which continuously thread throughout the monograph are: 1. How do common law countries such as Australia and the United States approach and deal with patentability of human embryonic stem cells in their jurisdictions? These practices are then compared to the situation in Europe as represented by the United Kingdom (first two chapters), the Court of Justice of the European Union and the European Patent Office decisions (Chapter 3 onwards) in order to obtain a full picture of the present patenting procedures on the European soil. 2. How are ethical and moral considerations taken into account at patent offices investigated when assessing patentability of human embryonic stem cell related inventions? In order to assess this part, the Thesis evaluates how ethical issues that arise with patent applications are dealt with by: a) Legislative history of the modern patent system from its inception in 15th Century England to present day patent laws. b) Australian, American and European patent offices presently and in the past, including other relevant legal precedents on the subject matter. c) Normative ethical theories. d) The notion of human dignity used as the lowest common denominator for the interpretation of the European morality clause. 3. Given the existence of the morality clause in form of Article 6(1) of the Directive 98/44/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 July 1998 on the legal protection of biotechnological inventions which corresponds to Article 53(a) European Patent Convention, a special emphasis is put on Europe as a guiding principle for Australia and the United States. Any room for improvement of the European morality clause and Europe s current manner of evaluating ethical tensions surrounding human embryonic stem cell inventions is examined. 4. A summary of options (as represented by Australia, the United States and Europe) available as a basis for the optimal examination procedure of human embryonic stem cell inventions is depicted, whereas the best of such alternatives is deduced in order to create a benchmark framework. This framework is then utilised on and promoted as a tool to assist Europe (as represented by the European Patent Office) in examining human embryonic stem cell patent applications. This method suggests a possibility of implementing an institution solution. 5. Ultimately, a question of whether such reformed European patent system can be used as a founding stone for a potential patent reform in Australia and the United States when examining human embryonic stem cells or other morally controversial inventions is surveyed. The author wishes to emphasise that the guiding thought while carrying out this work is to convey the significance of identifying, analysing and clarifying the ethical tensions surrounding patenting human embryonic stem cells and ultimately present a solution that adequately assesses patentability of human embryonic stem cell inventions and related biotechnologies. In answering the key questions above, the Thesis strives to contribute to the broader stem cell debate about how and to which extent ethical and social positions should be integrated into the patenting procedure in pluralistic and morally divided democracies of Europe and subsequently Australia and the United States.

Prototypes, exemplars, and theoretical & applied ethics

Concepts are mental representations that are the constituents of thought. EdouardMachery claims that psychologists generally understand concepts to be bodies of knowledge or information carrying mental states stored in long term memory that are used in the higher cognitive competences such as in categorization judgments, induction, planning, and analogical reasoning. While most research in the concepts field generally have been on concrete concepts such as LION, APPLE, and CHAIR, this paper will examine abstract moral concepts and whether such concepts may have prototype and exemplar structure. After discussing the philosophical importance of this project and explaining the prototype and exemplar theories, criticisms will be made against philosophers, who without experimental support from the sciences of the mind, contend that moral concepts have prototype and/or exemplar structure. Next, I will scrutinize Mark Johnson's experimentally-based argument that moral concepts have prototype structure. Finally, I will show how our moral concepts may indeed have prototype and exemplar structure as well as explore the further ethical implications that may be reached by this particular moral concepts conclusion. © 2011 Springer Science+Business Media B.V.

An inquiry concerning the acceptance of intrinsic value theories of nature

This study empirically assesses the extent to which intrinsic value theories of nature are accepted and acknowledged outside the realm of academic environmental ethics. It focuses on twenty of the largest landowning organisations in England, including both conservation and non-conservation organisations and investigates the environmental philosophical beliefs and values held by representative individuals of these groups. An in-depth interview was held with a representative from each organisation. The interviews were analysed using qualitative data analysis software and the results compared against a backdrop of academic philosophical positions. The study found that an ecocentric position which acknowledges nature's intrinsic value was adopted by the majority of respondents, both from conservation and non-conservation organisations. However, it was also found that individuals felt the idea of nature's intrinsic value was generally not reflected in organisational policy.

A Classification of Feminist Theories

In this paper I criticize Alison Jaggar’s descriptions of feminist political theories. I propose an alternative classification of feminist theories that I think more accurately reflects the multiplication of feminist theories and philosophies. There are two main categories, “street theory” and academic theories, each with two sub-divisions, political spectrum and “differences” under street theory, and directly and indirectly political analyses under academic theories. My view explains why there are no radical feminists outside of North America and why there are so few socialist feminists inside North America. I argue, controversially, that radical feminism is a radical version of liberalism. I argue that “difference” feminist theories – theory by and about feminists of colour, queer feminists, feminists with disabilities and so on – belong in a separate sub-category of street theory, because they’ve had profound effects on feminist activism not tracked by traditional left-to-right classifications. Finally, I argue that, while academic feminist theories such as feminist existentialism or feminist sociological theory are generally unconnected to movement activism, they provide important feminist insights that may become importanby showing the advantages of my classification over Jaggar’s views.