The economics of credence goods: An experimental investigation of the role of verifiability, liability, competition and reputation in credence goods markets

Credence goods markets are characterized by asymmetric information between sellers and consumers that may give rise to inefficiencies, such as under- and overtreatment or market break-down. We study in a large experiment with 936 participants the determinants for efficiency in credence goods markets. While theory predicts that either liability or verifiability yields efficiency, we find that liability has a crucial, but verifiability only a minor effect. Allowing sellers to build up reputation has little influence, as predicted. Seller competition drives down prices and yields maximal trade, but does not lead to higher efficiency as long as liability is violated.

The economics of credence goods : an experiment on the role of liability, verifiability, reputation and competition

Credence goods markets are characterized by asymmetric information between sellers and consumers that may give rise to inefficiencies, such as under- and overtreatment or market breakdown. We study in a large experiment with 936 participants the determinants for efficiency in credence goods markets. While theory predicts that liability or verifiability yield efficiency, we find that liability has a crucial, but verifiability at best a minor, effect. Allowing sellers to build up reputation has little influence, as predicted. Seller competition drives down prices and yields maximal trade, but does not lead to higher efficiency as long as liability is violated. (JEL D12, D82)

Essays on the Economics of Intellectual Property Rights

Väitöskirjassani tarkastelen informaatiohyödykkeiden ja tekijänoikeuksien taloustiedettä kahdesta eri perspektiivistä. Niistä ensimmäinen kuuluu endogeenisen kasvuteorian alaan. Väitöskirjassani yleistän ”pool of knowledge” -tyyppisen endogeenisen kasvumallin tilanteeseen, jossa patentoitavissa olevalla innovaatiolla on minimikoko, ja jossa uudenlaisen tuotteen patentoinut yritys voi menettää monopolinsa tuotteeseen jäljittelyn johdosta. Mallin kontekstissa voidaan analysoida jäljittelyn ja innovaatioilta vaaditun ”minimikoon” vaikutuksia hyvinvointiin ja talouskasvuun. Kasvun maksimoiva imitaation määrä on mallissa aina nolla, mutta hyvinvoinnin maksimoiva imitaation määrä voi olla positiivinen. Talouskasvun ja hyvinvoinnin maksimoivalla patentoitavissa olevan innovaation ”minimikoolla” voi olla mikä tahansa teoreettista maksimia pienempi arvo. Väitöskirjani kahdessa jälkimmäisessä pääluvussa tarkastelen informaatiohyödykkeiden kaupallista piratismia mikrotaloustieteellisen mallin avulla. Informaatiohyödykkeistä laittomasti tehtyjen kopioiden tuotantokustannukset ovat pienet, ja miltei olemattomat silloin kun niitä levitetään esimerkiksi Internetissä. Koska piraattikopioilla on monta eri tuottajaa, niiden hinnan voitaisiin mikrotaloustieteen teorian perusteella olettaa laskevan melkein nollaan, ja jos näin kävisi, kaupallinen piratismi olisi mahdotonta. Mallissani selitän kaupallisen piratismin olemassaolon olettamalla, että piratismista saatavan rangaistuksen uhka riippuu siitä, kuinka monille kuluttajille piraatti tarjoaa laittomia hyödykkeitä, ja että se siksi vaikuttaa piraattikopioiden markkinoihin mainonnan kustannuksen tavoin. Kaupallisten piraattien kiinteiden kustannusten lisääminen on mallissani aina tekijänoikeuksien haltijan etujen mukaista, mutta ”mainonnan kustannuksen” lisääminen ei välttämättä ole, vaan se saattaa myös alentaa laillisten kopioiden myynnistä saatavia voittoja. Tämä tulos poikkeaa vastaavista aiemmista tuloksista sikäli, että se pätee vaikka tarkasteltuihin informaatiohyödykkeisiin ei liittyisi verkkovaikutuksia. Aiemmin ei-kaupallisen piratismin malleista on usein johdettu tulos, jonka mukaan informaatiohyödykkeen laittomat kopiot voivat kasvattaa laillisten kopioiden myynnistä saatavia voittoja jos laillisten kopioiden arvo niiden käyttäjille riippuu siitä, kuinka monet muut kuluttajat käyttävät samanlaista hyödykettä ja jos piraattikopioiden saatavuus lisää riittävästi laillisten kopioiden arvoa. Väitöskirjan viimeisessä pääluvussa yleistän mallini verkkotoimialoille, ja tutkin yleistämäni mallin avulla sitä, missä tapauksissa vastaava tulos pätee myös kaupalliseen piratismiin.

Les dispositifs d’aide à la consommation : une analyse qui prend compte des obstacles à la rationalité dans l’évaluation des biens de consommation

Ce projet de recherche vise à explorer le rôle du design dans l’acte d’achat et l’évaluation des produits. L’hypothèse de recherche repose sur le fait que le design est un obstacle à la rationalité dans le choix d’un bien, car ce dernier est rattaché à des singularités qui lui sont propres, le rendant difficilement comparable aux autres biens d’un même marché. Les produits deviennent difficiles à évaluer et à classer parmi les autres biens similaires dans le marché. En soi, la finalité et les vertus du design permettent aux consommateurs d’avoir une plus grande liberté de choix, mais ce rôle dynamique et économique que peut prendre le design peut aussi confondre les consommateurs devenant brouillés par l’abondance de choix. En ce sens, le design serait la clé de la voûte d’une économie des singularités telle que proposée par Lucien Karpik dans L’économie des singularités. Avec une méthodologie ethnologique, cinq projets d’évaluation de produits au sein de deux organismes produisant des dispositifs d’aide à la consommation ont été observés sur une période de deux ans. À la conclusion de cette étude, il a été démontré que certaines améliorations pouvaient être apportées aux processus d’évaluation, plus particulièrement en ce qui concerne les facteurs qui ne sont pas pris en compte dans les dispositifs d’aide à la consommation actuels, comme l’évaluation de produits centrée sur l’usager à l’aide de scénarios d’usages, plutôt que l’évaluation de produits centrée sur l’objet, ainsi que la considération de l’expérience de l’usager dans l’évaluation des biens.

Evaluation of cumulative externality: environmental economics, oligopoly and the private provision of public goods

This paper evaluates environmental externality when the structure of the externality is cumulative. The evaluation exercise is based on the assumption that the agents in question form conjectural variations. A number of environments are encompassed within this classification and have received due attention in the literature. Each of these heterogeneous environments, however, possesses considerable analytical homogeneity and permit subscription to a general model treatment. These environments include environmental externality, oligopoly and the analysis of the private provision of public goods. We highlight the general analytical approach by focusing on this latter context, in which debate centers around four issues: the existence of free-riding, the extent to which contributions are matched equally across individuals, the nature of conjectures consistent with equilibrium, and the allocative inefficiency of alternative regimes. This paper resolves each of these issues, with the following conclusions: A consistent-conjectures equilibrium exists in the private provision of public goods. It is the monopolistic-conjectures equilibrium. Agents act identically, contributing positive amounts of the public good in an efficient allocation of resources. There is complete matching of contributions among agents, no free-riding, and the allocation is independent of the number of members within the community. Thus the Olson conjecture—that inefficiency is exacerbated by community size—has no foundation in a consistent-conjectures, cumulative-externality, context (212 words).

On the economics of the "meeting competition defense" under the Robinson-Patman Act

Documento de trabajo

Measuring non-use value of environmental goods using the contingent valuation method:problems of information and cognition and the application of cognitive questionnaire design methods

Much interest now focuses on the use of the contingent valuation method (CVM) to assess non-use value of environmental goods. The paper reviews recent literature and highlights particular problems of information provision and respondent knowledge, comprehension and cognition. These must be dealt with by economists in designing CVM surveys for eliciting non-use values. Cognitive questionnaire design methods are presented which invoke concepts from psychology and tools from cognitive survey design (focus groups and verbal reports) to reduce a complex environmnetal good into a meaningful commodity that can be valued by respondents in a contingent market. This process is illustrated with examples from the authors' own research valuing alternative afforestation programmes. -Authors

Bayesian Analysis for a Theory of Random Consumer Demand: The Case of Indivisible Goods

McCausland (2004a) describes a new theory of random consumer demand. Theoretically consistent random demand can be represented by a \"regular\" \"L-utility\" function on the consumption set X. The present paper is about Bayesian inference for regular L-utility functions. We express prior and posterior uncertainty in terms of distributions over the indefinite-dimensional parameter set of a flexible functional form. We propose a class of proper priors on the parameter set. The priors are flexible, in the sense that they put positive probability in the neighborhood of any L-utility function that is regular on a large subset bar(X) of X; and regular, in the sense that they assign zero probability to the set of L-utility functions that are irregular on bar(X). We propose methods of Bayesian inference for an environment with indivisible goods, leaving the more difficult case of indefinitely divisible goods for another paper. We analyse individual choice data from a consumer experiment described in Harbaugh et al. (2001).

Interpersonal interaction and economic theory: the case of public goods

Interpersonal interaction in public goods contexts is very different in character to its depiction in economic theory, despite the fact that the standard model is based on a small number of apparently plausible assumptions. Approaches to the problem are reviewed both from within and outside economics. It is argued that quick fixes such as a taste for giving do not provide a way forward. An improved understanding of why people contribute to such goods seems to require a different picture of the relationships between individuals than obtains in standard microeconomic theory, where they are usually depicted as asocial. No single economic model at present is consistent with all the relevant field and laboratory data. It is argued that there are defensible ideas from outside the discipline which ought to be explored, relying on different conceptions of rationality and/or more radically social agents. Three such suggestions are considered, one concerning the expressive/communicative aspect of behaviour, a second the possibility of a part-whole relationship between interacting agents and the third a version of conformism.

Optimal second best taxation of addictive goods in dynamic general equilibrium: a revenue raising perspective

In this paper we derive conditions under which optimal tax rates for addictive goods exceed tax rates for non-addictive consumption goods within a rational addiction framework where exogenous government spending cannot be financed with lump sum taxes. We reexamine classic results on optimal commodity taxation and find a rich set of new findings. Two dynamic effects exist. First, households anticipating higher future addictive tax rates reduce current addictive consumption, so they will be less addicted when the tax rate increases. Therefore, addictive tax revenue falls prior to the tax increase. Surprisingly, the optimal tax rate on addictive goods is generally decreasing in the strength of tolerance, since strong tolerance strengthens this tax anticipation effect. Second, high current tax rates on addictive goods make households less addicted in the future, affecting all future tax revenues in a way which depends on how elasticities are changing over time. Classic results on uniform commodity taxation emerge as special cases when elasticities are constant and the addiction function is homogeneous of degree one. Finally, we also study features of addictive goods such as complementarity to leisure that, while not directly related to the definition of addiction, are nonetheless properties many addictive goods display.

The Economics of Managing Wildlife Disease

The spread of infectious disease among and between wild and domesticated animals has become a major problem worldwide. Upon analyzing the dynamics of wildlife growth and infection when the diseased animals cannot be identified separately from healthy wildlife prior to the kill, we find that harvest-based strategies alone have no impact on disease transmission. Other controls that directly influence disease transmission and/or mortality are required. Next, we analyze the socially optimal management of infectious wildlife. The model is applied to the problem of bovine tuberculosis among Michigan white-tailed deer, with non-selective harvests and supplemental feeding being the control variables. Using a two-state linear control model, we find a two-dimensional singular path is optimal (as opposed to a more conventional bang-bang solution) as part of a cycle that results in the disease remaining endemic in the wildlife. This result follows from non-selective harvesting and intermittent wildlife productivity gains from supplemental feeding.