On the economics of the "meeting competition defense" under the Robinson-Patman Act
Data(s) |
13/03/2015
13/03/2015
19/02/2015
|
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Resumo |
Documento de trabajo In this paper we analyze the welfare effects of third-degree price discrimination when competitive pressure varies across markets. In particular, we study the economic aspects of the Robinson-Patman Act associated with the “meeting competition defense.” Using equilibrium models, the main result we find is that this defense might be used successfully in cases of primary line injury precisely when it should not be used, namely when price discrimination reduces social welfare. This result obtains both when discrimination appears in the final good market and when it is used in the intermediate goods market. We also find that these results may drastically change under secondary line injury. |
Identificador |
http://hdl.handle.net/10810/14747 RePEc:ehu:ikerla:14747 |
Idioma(s) |
eng |
Publicador |
Departamento de Fundamentos del Análisis Económico I, UPV/EHU |
Relação |
Ikerlanak;2015.86 |
Direitos |
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess |
Palavras-Chave | #price discrimination #meeting competition defense #robinson-patman act #social welfare |
Tipo |
info:eu-repo/semantics/workingPaper |