Banking crisis yet again and how to fix it. CEPS Commentary, 15 February 2016

Almost out of the blue, a combination of diverse factors has elicited a run on bank stocks and junior and senior debt, raising the spectre of a renewed systemic bank crisis within the European Union. The policy response cannot come from the European Central Bank but, instead, must consist of regulatory responses capable of dispelling the uncertainty over future prudential capital requirements while also temporarily suspending the rules on state aid cum bail-in that had ignited the crisis.

Essays on Banking Crises

This thesis aims at finding the role of deposit insurance scheme and central bank (CB) in keeping the banking system safe. The thesis also studies the factors associated with long-lasting banking crises. The first essay analyzes the effect of using explicit deposit insurance scheme (EDIS), instead of using implicit deposit insurance scheme (IDIS), on banking crises. The panel data for the period of 1980-2003 includes all countries for which the data on EDIS or IDIS exist. 70% of the countries in the sample are less developed countries (LDCs). About 55% of the countries adopting EDIS also come from LDCs. The major finding is that the using of EDIS increases the crisis probability at a strong significance level. This probability is greater if the EDIS is inefficiently designed allowing higher scope of moral hazard problem. Specifically, the probability is greater if the EDIS provides higher coverage to deposits and if it is less powerful from the legal point of view. This study also finds that the less developed a country is to handle EDIS, the higher the chance of banking crisis. Once the underdevelopment of an economy handling the EDIS is controlled, the EDIS separately is no longer a significant factor of banking crises. The second essay aims at determining whether a country s powerful CB can lessen the instability of the banking sector by minimizing the likelihood of a banking crisis. The data used include indicators of the CB s autonomy for a set of countries over the period of 1980-89. The study finds that in aggregate a more powerful CB lessens the probability of banking crisis. When the CB s authority is disentangled with respect to its responsibilities, the study finds that the longer tenure of CB s chief executive officer and the greater power of CB in assigning interest rate on government loans are necessary for reducing the probability of banking crisis. The study also finds that the probability of crisis reduces more if an autonomous CB can perform its duties in a country with stronger law and order tradition. The costs of long-lasting banking crises are high because both the depositors and the investors lose confidence in the banking system. For a rapid recovery of a crisis, the government very often undertakes one or more crisis resolution policy (CRP) measures. The third essay examines the CRP and other explanatory variables correlated with the durations of banking crises. The major finding is that the CRP measure allowing the regulation forbearance to keep the insolvent banks operative and the public debt relief program are respectively strongly and weakly significant to increase the durations of crises. Some other explanatory variables, which were found by previous studies to be related with the probability of crises to occur, are also correlated with the durations of crises.

¿Bancos con Problemas? Un Sistema de Alerta Temprana para la Prevención de Crisis Bancarias

[ES] Las autoridades reguladoras y supervisoras de los sistemas financieros han probado diversos métodos para intentar encontrar un procedimiento eficaz en la elaboración de un sistema de alerta temprana de las crisis bancarias. Los Modelos de Regresión Logística han sido usados aunque han mostrado algunas debilidades, por lo que se necesitan nuevos y mejores métodos. La crisis bancaria ocurrida en la República Dominicana entre los años 2002 y 2004 se ha usado para comparar la eficacia de la Regresión Logística frente al uso del método Support Vector Machines (SVM) para la detección de crisis bancarias.

Banking crises: The impact of financial liberalization

This paper intends to study whether financial liberalization tends to increase the likelihood of systemic banking crises. I used a sample of 79 countries with data spanning from 1973 to 2005 to run a panel probit model. I found that, if anything, financial liberalization as measured across seven different dimensions tends to decrease the probability of occurrence of a systemic banking crisis. I went further and did several robustness tests – used a conditional probit model, tested for different durations of liberalization impact and reduced the sample by considering only the first crisis event for each country. Main results still verified, proving the results’ robustness.

El papel de los principios en las fallas de los regímenes internacionales: el Fondo Monetario Internacional en la crisis económica argentina de 2001

Este trabajo de grado busca analizar el papel que juegan los principios en las fallas del Régimen Internacional de Pagos a la hora de responder a situaciones de crisis, específicamente, en la actuación del Fondo Monetario Internacional durante la crisis económica argentina de 2001. El Régimen, atado al cumplimiento de sus principios, actuó de manera tal que produjo unas fallas que terminaron exacerbando la crisis. Mediante el análisis de fuentes primarias y secundarias, y con métodos tanto cualitativos como cuantitativos se busca demostrar que efectivamente, los principios en los que se fundamentan las actuaciones de los regímenes, que son creencias, tienden a tornarse dogmáticos, por lo tanto, se hacen resistentes al cambio y no permiten a las instituciones obrar de manera que se ajuste a la realidad. Es así que los principios llegan agravar las crisis que debían solucionar, tal y como sucedió en Argentina en 2001.

Banking Union in three steps. CEPS Commentary, 12 June 2012

As the banking crisis in the eurozone becomes even more acute, CEPS Chief Executive Karel Lannoo exhorts the EU to not lose further precious time in creating a fully functional bank union, which would entail three main steps: creating a single supervisory authority, a common deposit protection and a harmonised bank resolution and liquidation system.

Does monetary policy stabilize the exchange rate following a currency crisis?

This paper provides evidence on the relationship between rnonetary policy and the exchange rate in the aftermath of currency crises. It ana1yzes a large data set of currency crises in 80 countries in the period 1980 to 1998. The rnain question addressed is: can rnonetary policy significantly alter the probability of reversing the post-crisis undervaluation through nominal appreciation rather than higher int1ation? We find that tight rnonetary policy facilitates the reversal of currency undervaluation through nominal appreciation rather than inflation. When the econorny is also facing a banking crisis, depending on the specification, tight rnonetary policy rnay not have the same effect.

Corporate Governance and Dividend Policy in European Banking

This dissertation investigates corporate governance and dividend policy in banking. This topic has recently attracted the attention of numerous scholars all over the world and currently remains one of the most discussed topics in Banking. The core of the dissertation is constituted by three papers. The first paper generalizes the main achievements in the field of relevant study using the approach of meta-analysis. The second paper provides an empirical analysis of the effect of banking corporate governance on dividend payout. Finally, the third paper investigates empirically the effect of government bailout during 2007-2010 on corporate governance and dividend policy of banks. The dissertation uses a new hand-collected data set with information on corporate governance, ownership structure and compensation structure for a sample of listed banks from 15 European countries for the period 2005-2010. The empirical papers employ such econometric approaches as Within-Group model, difference-in-difference technique, and propensity score matching method based on the Nearest Neighbor Matching estimator. The main empirical results may be summarized as follows. First, we provide evidence that CEO power and connection to government are associated with lower dividend payout ratios. This result supports the view that banking regulators are prevalently concerned about the safety of the bank, and powerful bank CEOs can afford to distribute low payout ratios, at the expense of minority shareholders. Next, we find that government bailout during 2007-2010 changes the banks’ ownership structure and helps to keep lending by bailed bank at the pre-crisis level. Finally, we provide robust evidence for increased control over the banks that receive government money. These findings show the important role of government when overcoming the consequences of the banking crisis, and high quality of governance of public bailouts in European countries.

The new bail-in doctrine: A recipe for banking crises and depression in the eurozone. CEPS Commentary

This Commentary argues that the failure to recognise shared responsibility for the banking crisis in Cyprus has led to the imposition of a bail-in template that increases the risk of banking crises and economic depression in the eurozone.

The sovereign debt crisis that isn't: Or, How to turn a lending crisis into a spending crisis and pocket the spread. ACES Cases No. 2014.1

It’s a testament to the power of ideas in politics that the ongoing policy disaster in Europe is still referred to, by academic as well as popular commentators, as the European Sovereign Debt Crisis. That there was a crisis in European sovereign debt markets in 2010 through the middle of 2012 is not in doubt. That is was a crisis of European sovereign debt markets generated by ‘too much spending’ should be very much in doubt. The ongoing European economic crisis is in fact a transmuted private sector banking crisis first exacerbated and then calmed by central bank policy, the costs of which have been asymmetrically distributed across European mass publics.

Banks and the political economy of the sovereign debt crisis in Italy and Spain. CES Papers - Open Forum #18, 2013-2014

This paper sets out to explain why Spain experienced a full-fledged sovereign debt crisis and had to resort to euroarea financial assistance for its banks, whereas Italy did not. It undertakes a structured comparison, dissecting the sovereign debt crisis into a banking crisis and a balance of payments crisis. It argues that the distinctive features of bank business models and of national banking systems in Italy and Spain have considerable analytical leverage in explaining the different scenarios of the crises in each country. This ‘bank-based’ analysis contributes to the flourishing literature that examines changes in banking with a view to account for the differentiated impact of the global banking crisis first and the sovereign debt crisis in the euroarea later.

Ethical screening and financial performance : the case of Islamic equity funds

Whether ethical screening affects portfolio performance is an important question that is yet to be settled in the literature. This paper aims to shed further light on this question by examining the performance of a large global sample of Islamic equity funds (IEFs) from 1984 to 2010. We find that IEFs underperform conventional funds by an average of 40 basis points per month, consistent with the underperformance hypothesis. In line with popular media claims that Islamic funds are a safer investment, IEFs outperformed conventional funds during the recent banking crisis. However, we find no such outperformance for other crises or high volatility periods. Based on fund holdings-based data, we provide evidence of a negative curvilinear relation between fund performance and ethical screening intensity, consistent with a return trade-off to being more ethical.

After the Party the Hangover?: An Analysis of ‘Post-Celtic Tiger’ Ireland in the Light of the February 2011 elections’

The election of February 2011 was dominated by the International Monetary Fund/European Central Bank bailout of November 2010, the state of the public finances, the ongoing Irish banking crisis, and the disastrous state of the economy with rising unemployment, emigration and collapsing international competiveness. After years of phenomenal economic growth (at least as measured by orthodox economic measurements such as gross domestic product (GDP) and foreign direct investment), known as the 'Celtic Tiger‘, during which a bloated construction industry accounted for a quarter of GDP and Irish banks sank nearly a third of their lending in construction projects, Ireland has entered a 'post-Celtic Tiger‘ era. This article offers a critical analysis outlining some political, economic and cultural issues of this election as heralding a decisive stage in the 'post-Celtic Tiger' development of the Republic of Ireland, and suggests that what is required at this present historical moment is that a different development model be articulated by the Irish state and wider society.