The new bail-in doctrine: A recipe for banking crises and depression in the eurozone. CEPS Commentary


Autoria(s): De Grauwe, Paul.
Data(s)

01/04/2013

Resumo

This Commentary argues that the failure to recognise shared responsibility for the banking crisis in Cyprus has led to the imposition of a bail-in template that increases the risk of banking crises and economic depression in the eurozone.

Formato

application/pdf

Identificador

http://aei.pitt.edu/41609/1/Bail%2Din_PDG_CEPS_Commentary.pdf

De Grauwe, Paul. (2013) The new bail-in doctrine: A recipe for banking crises and depression in the eurozone. CEPS Commentary. [Policy Paper]

Relação

http://www.ceps.be/book/new-bail-doctrine-recipe-banking-crises-and-depression-eurozone

http://aei.pitt.edu/41609/

Palavras-Chave #Cyprus #financial crisis 2008-on/reforms/economic governance
Tipo

Policy Paper

NonPeerReviewed