The Worldhood of the Cinematic Image

A close analysis of the specifically cinematographic procedure in Akira Kurosawa’s ‘Dream’ Crows reveals it as an articulated and insightful philosophical statement, endowed with general relevance concerning ‘natural’ perception, phenomenological Erlebnis, mechanical image and aesthetic rapture. The antagonism between the Benjaminian lineage of a mechanical irreducibility of the cinematic image to anthropocentric categories, and the Cartesian tradition of a film-philosophy still relying on the equally irreducible structure of the intentional act, be it the one of a deeply embodied and enworlded counsciousness, in accounting for the essential structure of film and spectator (and their relation), i.e., the antagonism between the decentering primacy of the image and the self-centered primacy of perception, cannot be settled through a simple Phenomenological shift from occularcentric, intentional counsciousness to its embodyment ‘in-the-world’ as yet another carrier of intentionality. Still it remains to be explained what is it in the mechanical image that is able to so deeply affect the human flesh, and conversely, to what features in the human bodily experience is its mechanical other, the fascinating image, so successfuly adressing? It should be expected from the anti-Cartesianism of both the early and the late Merleau-Ponty the textual support for an approach to the essential condition of passivity in movie watching, that would be convergent with Benjamin. The Chapter ‘Le sentir’, in Phénoménologie de la perception, will offer us the proper guide to elucidate what we are already perceiving and conceiving in Kurosawa’s film, where the ex-static phenomenological body of the aesthetical contemplator ‘enters the frame’ like the Benjaminian surgeon enters the body and like the painter - and always already like our deepest level of ‘sensing’, previously to any act of cousciousness - ‘just looses himself in the scene before him’. The Polichinello secret of cinema watching is nonetheless too evident to be seen, and that is where Phenomenological description and reduction are still required.

La naissance de l'espace moderne: Merleau‐Ponty et Panofsky sur la perspective linéaire

Nous nous proposons d’examiner et de comparer les analyses de Maurice Merleau-Ponty et d’Erwin Panofsky sur la question de la perspective linéaire. Merleau-Ponty, dans le sillage des analyses de Panofsky, soutient la thèse selon laquelle la perspective linéaire est non seulement une technique picturale qui nous présente une vision et une interprétation de l’espace et, plus généralement, du monde se constituant en rupture avec la perception naturelle, mais une « construction symbolique » qui nous fait proprement voir et concevoir le monde d’après les principes de la géométrie euclidienne. Quoiqu’ils partagent la même interprétation historique et symbolique de la perspective, Merleau-Ponty et Panofsky diffèrent pourtant quant à la signification philosophique qu’ils lui donnent. Alors que pour Panofsky la perspective témoigne de la vérité indépassable du criticisme kantien, elle est l’expression chez Merleau-Ponty d’une interrogation ontologique sur la perception irréductible à la conception de l’espace de la philosophie moderne.

Phenomenology as a method to investigate the experience lived: a perspective from Husserl and Merleau Ponty's thought

Aim. By taking nursing as a human relationships activity, in spite of its strong technical-scientific features, this article reflects on the phenomenological method as one of the ways to develop ail investigation and acquire knowledge of the topic.Rationale. Based on Husserl's phenomenology, which is opposed to the way of doing science based on the laws that regulate the physics and mathematics, the article introduces Merleau Ponty's existential phenomenology as the theoretical foundation for the method it proposes. My existential conceptions-people as historic beings inserted in a world over which they act but which, in its turn, determines them; the human perception as reference for our way of being in the world; the space-time structure of perception-these are the key concepts that have led to the elaboration of ail approach to phenomenological research.Proposal of a methodology. Steps are proposed for such ail approach, namely phenomenological description, reduction and analysis. These lead to the building up of ideographic and nomothetic analyses, thus unveiling and describing general truths about the phenomenon studied. Finally, the possibilities for applying the methodology to nursing research are discussed, illustrated by my research into student nurses' perspectives on working oil an isolation ward.

Corpo e consciência: Merleau-Ponty, crítico de Descartes

Pós-graduação em Filosofia - FFC

Merleau-Ponty e descartes: o afeto entre a medicina e a psicologia

Através da noção de afeto, à luz da filosofia de Merleau-Ponty, busca-se problematizar a herança da metafísica cartesiana presente na medicina e na psicologia ocidentais. Em Descartes encontramos dois programas distintos de pesquisa para a Antropologia: um para o corpo, do qual se encarregou nossa medicina, e outro para a alma, do qual se encarregou nossa psicologia. Afinal, embora na Antropologia cartesiana o homem seja de fato a união substancial de corpo e alma, só se pode falar com clareza de um ou outro termo conforme os ditames de sua metafísica. Através da descrição do sentido da experiência do corpo próprio, Merleau-Ponty busca desconstruir as noções de corpo e alma em Descartes para explicitar essa união que a filosofia cartesiana reconheceu apenas de fato. A noção de sentir ou afeto é central nessa discussão, pois é a expressão privilegiada dessa união.

Certainty or Faith? Arendt's and Merleau-Ponty's Critique of Cartesian Foundationalism

Epistemological foundationalism has for centuries attempted to unify all scientific inquiry into the context of one grand science, the first philosophy. One of the most important tasks of this tradition has been to ground all knowledge on absolutely certain foundations. In this master s thesis I ask the following question: To what extent and under what conditions is it possible to achieve absolute certainty in the sense of the attempts of Cartesian foundationalism? By examining how the 20th century philosophers, Edmund Husserl (1859-1938), Hannah Arendt (1906-1975) and Maurice Merleau-Ponty (1908-1961) interpret the epistemological methodology of René Descartes, I claim that the Cartesian achievement of absolute certainty rests on the implicit presupposition of an epistemologically prior form of faith in the world and trust (pistis) in other conscious beings. I show that knowledge is possible only within the context of a common world that is inhabited by several conscious beings that share a common linguistic system. This threefold element is shown to be the bedrock condition for any kind of philosophical inquiry. The main literature sources for this thesis are The Life of the Mind by Hannah Arendt, Le Visible et l invisible by Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Meditationes de Prima Philosophiae by René Descartes and Erfahrung und Urteil by Edmund Husserl.

Merleau-Ponty e a condição do natural em nós

In this paper, the aim is to highlight and analyze certain moments in the work of Merleau-Ponty when discussions took place about the condition of the natural in us. We mainly focus on the observed opposition between the evolutionist viewpoint adopted in The structure of Behavior and the perspective in the Phenomenology of Perception, based on the body as expression. We also look at studies on infantile prematuration and mention the characterization of the human body in the philosopher’s courses on the notion of nature. We underline the expressive dimension of the natural in us, which emerges from Merleau-Ponty’s formulations. In addition, we evidence the importance of psychoanalysis in the Merleau-Ponty’s treatment of the corporeity problem.

Os primeiros trabalhos de Merleau-Ponty: convergência filosófica e diplopia metodológica

The discussion of different themes revealed in the initial works of Merleau-Ponty, which are especially relevant in debates on the foundations of psychology, demands a closer look at the strategically complicity, from a psychological viewpoint, between The Structure of Behavior and the Phenomenology of perception. That context constitutes the background for this article. Based on the prerogative of this complicity, the goal is to present a reading that highlights primordial issues to outline the philosophical intention of that author. Despite the use of distinct methodological perspectives, both are part of one single work project. They fit into the discussion of Cartesian antinomies in philosophy and depart from the delimitation of the same problem, i.e. that of perception, as a point of integration between the two fundamental orders of Descartes’ thinking: the soul and the body.

Merleau-Ponty: uma ontologia do visível

This work discusses the ontology of the visible at the thought of Maurice Merleau-Ponty (1908-1961), which points to a depth and opacity of the perceived world that oppose transparency of geometric world thought by René Descartes (1596-1650). At first we approached the Cartesian discourse developed in Dioptrics Descartes, the first of three scientific discourses published in 1637, being introduced by the famous Discourse method. In this sense, this research discusses the mechanistic explanation that the modern philosopher has the vision, process comprising the formation of images on the retina and its communication to the brain, and the subsequent reading performed by an immaterial mind. Discusses the notion of image as a result of the interpretation of the spirit because, for Descartes, is not the eye that sees, but the spirit that reads and decodes the signals that the body receives the world. At another point, reflected on the criticism of the philosopher Maurice Merleau-Ponty at the thought of overflight present in Dioptrics Descartes. Therefore, it takes as its reference the third part of the book The Eye and the Spirit (1961), in which the intellectualist approach of vision is considered a failed attempt to move away from the visible to rebuild it from anywhere . In this sense, it reflects on a new ontology proposed by Merleau-Ponty thinking being without departing from the puzzles of the body and vision. Puzzles that show a promiscuity between the seer and the seen, between sentient and sensitive. Thus, this paper discusses how visibility was treated by the contemporary philosopher, not as something to be judged by the spirit to get a real nature of things, but as a manifestation of the same things. Finally, this research explores the ontology of the visible in merleaupontiano thought, an ontology that does not rebuild or appropriates visible by a thought of overflight, but what you do from your own visibility as compared original and constant with depth in the world.

Merleau-Ponty: uma ontologia do visível

This work discusses the ontology of the visible at the thought of Maurice Merleau-Ponty (1908-1961), which points to a depth and opacity of the perceived world that oppose transparency of geometric world thought by René Descartes (1596-1650). At first we approached the Cartesian discourse developed in Dioptrics Descartes, the first of three scientific discourses published in 1637, being introduced by the famous Discourse method. In this sense, this research discusses the mechanistic explanation that the modern philosopher has the vision, process comprising the formation of images on the retina and its communication to the brain, and the subsequent reading performed by an immaterial mind. Discusses the notion of image as a result of the interpretation of the spirit because, for Descartes, is not the eye that sees, but the spirit that reads and decodes the signals that the body receives the world. At another point, reflected on the criticism of the philosopher Maurice Merleau-Ponty at the thought of overflight present in Dioptrics Descartes. Therefore, it takes as its reference the third part of the book The Eye and the Spirit (1961), in which the intellectualist approach of vision is considered a failed attempt to move away from the visible to rebuild it from anywhere . In this sense, it reflects on a new ontology proposed by Merleau-Ponty thinking being without departing from the puzzles of the body and vision. Puzzles that show a promiscuity between the seer and the seen, between sentient and sensitive. Thus, this paper discusses how visibility was treated by the contemporary philosopher, not as something to be judged by the spirit to get a real nature of things, but as a manifestation of the same things. Finally, this research explores the ontology of the visible in merleaupontiano thought, an ontology that does not rebuild or appropriates visible by a thought of overflight, but what you do from your own visibility as compared original and constant with depth in the world.

3D anthropometry : from the ergonomist's perspective

Since the availability of 3D full body scanners and the associated software systems for operations with large point clouds, 3D anthropometry has been marketed as a breakthrough and milestone in ergonomic design. The assumptions made by the representatives of the 3D paradigm need to be critically reviewed though. 3D anthropometry has advantages as well as shortfalls, which need to be carefully considered. While it is apparent that the measurement of a full body point cloud allows for easier storage of raw data and improves quality control, the difficulties in calculation of standardized measurements from the point cloud are widely underestimated. Early studies that made use of 3D point clouds to derive anthropometric dimensions have shown unacceptable deviations from the standardized results measured manually. While 3D human point clouds provide a valuable tool to replicate specific single persons for further virtual studies, or personalize garment, their use in ergonomic design must be critically assessed. Ergonomic, volumetric problems are defined by their 2-dimensional boundary or one dimensional sections. A 1D/2D approach is therefore sufficient to solve an ergonomic design problem. As a consequence, all modern 3D human manikins are defined by the underlying anthropometric girths (2D) and lengths/widths (1D), which can be measured efficiently using manual techniques. Traditionally, Ergonomists have taken a statistical approach to design for generalized percentiles of the population rather than for a single user. The underlying method is based on the distribution function of meaningful single and two-dimensional anthropometric variables. Compared to these variables, the distribution of human volume has no ergonomic relevance. On the other hand, if volume is to be seen as a two-dimensional integral or distribution function of length and girth, the calculation of combined percentiles – a common ergonomic requirement - is undefined. Consequently, we suggest to critically review the cost and use of 3D anthropometry. We also recommend making proper use of widely available single and 2-dimensional anthropometric data in ergonomic design.

Cómo recibir a Merleau-Ponty en la “theory of time” : una polémica

Resumen: El presente trabajo busca clarificar (en polémica con el abordaje de Stephen Priest) el auténtico sentido del “subjetivismo” merleaupontyano con respecto al tiempo, según el cual solo existe tiempo como correlato de una subjetividad situada en él. En un marco más general, reponer esta tesis merleaupontyana permite colocar las reflexiones del fenomenólogo francés en diálogo con la tradición analítica sobre el tiempo (centrada en el debate entre las teorías “A” y “B”), y, en particular, en continuidad temática con el abordaje de la “paradoja de McTaggart” por parte de Michael Dummett

A expressão da subjetividade na Filosofia de Merleau-Ponty

Neste trabalho, o filósofo francês Maurice Merleau-Ponty é autor privilegiado na busca de uma compreensão fenomenológica da subjetividade. Na primeira concede-se relevo às análises sobre a corporeidade, a partir da qual se revela uma socialidade originária aberta pela experiência perceptiva. Se na parte I predomina o mundo natural, na parte II a experiência do mundo cultural é o principal tema. O caráter estrutural da experiência perceptiva não é aban-donado, mas retomado no intuito de explorar a tese de que a significação da experiência é desvinculada de uma consciência separada da existência. Fundamentada na percepção, parti-cularmente em seu aspecto antepredicativo, desenvolve-se uma análise fenomenológica da linguagem, bem como o lugar da praxis e da intersubjetividade na compreensão deste tema, explicitando ainda mais a dimensão social originária revelada pela corporeidade. O vínculo da dimensão subjetiva com a existência, mediante o corpo, é realçado a partir da noção de ex-pressão. A noção de expressão refere-se à transcendência do sujeito em relação à sua situação, sem prescindir dela e serve para mostrar que o sentido das coisas percebidas é abordado não como algo isolável, mas produto de uma articulação na ordem do sensível, dispensando, assim, a tese de um paralelismo entre a ordem positiva (a percepção do mundo) e a ordem da idealidade (o que é dito ou pensado sobre a experiência). A lógica da expressão, verificada no corpo, é sucedida pelo estudo da linguagem na obra de Merleau-Ponty, para obter sua concep-ção sobre a relação do sujeito com o instituído. Constata-se que a expressividade presente na linguagem, análoga ao gesto corporal, aponta para a transcendência do significado em relação aos significantes partilhados em determinada cultura e, portanto, para a liberdade do sujeito enquanto produtora de uma história, a partir das transformações operadas na situação em que se encontra. Se a linguagem permitiu conceber de que modo o sujeito pode instaurar novas significações a partir das que estão estabelecidas, o retorno, no fim da dissertação, ao tema da liberdade, desenvolvido na Fenomenologia da Percepção, demonstra que as teses presentes em seus últimos textos mantêm uma coerência com os primeiros. A influência da noção de estrutura em seu interesse pela antropologia, abordada no último capítulo da dissertação, con-firma que a função simbólica, presente ao longo do texto como lógica da expressão, expõe a dialética sem síntese característica da subjetividade.

Merleau-Ponty and Nishida: Artistic expression as 'motor-perceptual faith'

This dissertation carries out a dialogue between Maurice Merleau-Ponty and Nishida Kitarō concerning their theories of artistic expression and faith. Both philosophers go through remarkably similar trajectories in their philosophic projects: In their early works they focus on the motor-perceptual body of the artist, and as they move towards the mature articulation of their ontologies, the concept of faith becomes central. I propose the term “motor-perceptual faith” to bring these seemingly diverse sets of concerns into a conceptual continuity. My study explores this connection, and argues that the artist’s motor-perceptual expressive body, as colourfully and sometimes poetically articulated in their early works, enacts the form of faith developed more abstractly in their later writings. Exploring these relations fosters a mutual expansion of the early by the later works, thus thickening the concept of faith by seeing it as enacted by the artist, while enlarging the concept of artistic expression by understanding it as a practice of motor‐perceptual faith. Framing these philosophers as putting forth a traditionally religious concept as illustrated by way of artistic expression, offers a new articulation of both of their writings, an important conceptual bridge between the two, while challenging un-ambiguous distinctions between art, philosophy and religion, and ultimately philosophy East and West.

Within the carnal: re-reading Merleau-Ponty through the language of drawing

In order to present visual art as a paradigm for philosophy, Merleau-Ponty investigated the creative processes of artists whose work corresponded closely with his philosophical ideas. His essays on art are widely valued for emphasising process over product, and for challenging the primacy of the written word in all spheres of human expression. While it is clear that he initially favoured painting, Merleau-Ponty began to develop a much deeper understanding of the complexities of how art is made in his late work in parallel with his advancement of a new ontology. Although his ontology remains unfinished and only exists as working notes and a manuscript entitled The Visible and Invisible, Merleau-Ponty had begun to appreciate the fundamental role drawing plays in the making of art and the creation of a language of expression that is as vital as the written or spoken word. Through an examination of Merleau-Ponty’s unfinished manuscript and working notes my thesis will investigate his working methods and use of materials and also explore how he processed his ideas by using my own art practice as the basis of my research. This research will take the form of an inquiry into how the unfinished and incomplete nature of text and artworks, while they are still ‘works in progress’, can often reveal the more human and carnal components of creative processes. Applying my experience as a practitioner and a teacher in an art school, I focus on the significance of drawing practice for Merleau-Ponty’s later work, in order to rebalance an overemphasis on painting in the literature. Understanding the differences between these two art forms, and how they are taught, can offer an alternative engagement with Merleau-Ponty’s later work and his struggle to find a language to express his developing new ontology. In addition, by re-reading his work through the language of drawing, I believe we gain new insights which reaffirm Merleau-Ponty's relevance to contemporary art making and aesthetics.