Les impacts de la satisfaction envers les régimes de rémunération variable sur l’engagement organisationnel des travailleurs

Ce mémoire a pour objectif de comprendre l’impact de la satisfaction envers les régimes de rémunération variable sur l’engagement organisationnel des travailleurs. Pour étudier cette question, nous avons utilisé trois hypothèses basées sur la théorie des attentes ainsi que sur la théorie de l’agence. La première hypothèse stipule que la satisfaction envers les régimes de bonis fait augmenter le niveau d’engagement organisationnel des travailleurs. La deuxième hypothèse est que la satisfaction envers les régimes de partage des bénéfices fait augmenter le niveau d’engagement organisationnel des travailleurs. La troisième hypothèse stipule que la satisfaction envers les régimes d’actionnariat fait augmenter le niveau d’engagement organisationnel des travailleurs. Nous avons utilisé une base de données provenant d’une enquête plus large portant sur « les liens entre la rémunération, la formation et le développement des compétences et l’attraction et la rétention d’employés clés ». L’entreprise où les données ont été collectées œuvre dans le secteur des technologies de l’information et des communications (TIC). Les nouveaux employés embauchés dans cette entreprise établie à Montréal ont été interrogés. Nos résultats nous permettent de confirmer deux de nos hypothèses, soit celle qui concerne les régimes de bonis et celle qui concerne les régimes d’actionnariat. Nos résultats indiquent que les individus satisfaits à l’égard des régimes de rémunération variable, plus précisément envers les régimes de bonis et les régimes d’actionnariat, présentent de plus hauts niveaux d’engagement organisationnel. Le soutien organisationnel perçu est également un facteur important dans le développement de l’engagement organisationnel. Finalement, nous concluons ce mémoire avec l’implication de nos résultats pour les différents acteurs en relations industrielles.

L’impact de la rémunération variable sur l’intention de rester via l’engagement organisationnel : étude longitudinale dans le secteur des TIC.

Notre mémoire a pour objectif d’étudier l’impact différencié de la rémunération variable individuelle et collective sur l’intention de rester. De plus, nous nous intéressons au rôle de l’engagement organisationnel dans la relation entre la rémunération variable et l’intention de rester. Pour ce faire, nous avons formulé quatre hypothèses basées sur la littérature et certaines théories. La première hypothèse avance que la rémunération variable individuelle fait accroître l’intention de rester des travailleurs. La deuxième stipule que la rémunération variable collective fait accroître l’intention de rester. La troisième indique que la rémunération variable individuelle fait accroître davantage l’intention de rester que la rémunération variable collective sur l’intention de rester. Enfin, la quatrième hypothèse suggère que l’engagement organisationnel agit à titre de variable médiatrice dans la relation entre la rémunération variable et l’intention de rester. Notre étude s’appuie sur des données longitudinales colligées dans le cadre d’une enquête portant sur « les liens entre la rémunération, la formation et le développement des compétences avec l’attraction et la rétention des employés clés ». L’enquête a été réalisée auprès de nouveaux travailleurs d’une entreprise internationale du secteur des technologies de l’information et des communications (TIC) à Montréal. Les données ont été colligées en trois temps entre le 1er avril 2009 et le 30 septembre 2010. Nos résultats soutiennent qu’effectivement la rémunération variable individuelle et collective font augmenter l’intention de rester des travailleurs. De plus, nous trouvons que la rémunération variable individuelle et la rémunération variable collective ont un impact équivalent sur l’intention de rester. Enfin, bien que l’engagement organisationnel soit un prédicteur important de l’intention de rester, celui-ci n’agit pas à titre de variable médiatrice dans la relation entre la rémunération variable et l’intention de rester. Finalement, notre étude permet d’élaborer certaines pistes pour améliorer l’intention de rester des travailleurs.

Employee reward: alternatives, consequences and contexts

[Book Contents] Introducing Employee Reward Systems; Conceptual and Theoretical Frameworks; The Legal, Employment Relations and Market Context; Base Pay Structures and Relationships; Pay Setting, Composition and Progression; Variable Pay Schemes; Benefits; Pensions; Non-Financial Reward; Rewarding Directors and Executives; International Reward Management; Employee Reward within HRM.

L’impact différencié de la satisfaction envers les bonis individuels et les bonis collectifs sur l’intention de rester des travailleurs du secteur des technologies de l’information et des communications (TIC)

L’objectif de ce mémoire est d’étudier l’impact différencié de la satisfaction envers les bonis individuels et les bonis collectifs sur l’intention de rester (au sein d’une entreprise donnée) des travailleurs du secteur des technologies de l’information et des communications. Afin d’étudier cette question, trois hypothèses de recherche ont été émises à l’aide des théories suivantes : 1- la théorie de l’agence, 2- la théorie des attentes et 3- la théorie de l’échange social de Blau (1964). Selon la première hypothèse, la satisfaction envers les bonis individuels contribue à accroître l’intention de rester des travailleurs du secteur des TIC. La seconde hypothèse avance que la satisfaction envers les bonis collectifs contribue à accroître l’intention de rester des travailleurs du secteur des TIC. Enfin, la dernière hypothèse soutient que la satisfaction envers les bonis individuels a un impact plus important sur l’intention de rester des travailleurs du secteur des TIC que la satisfaction envers les bonis collectifs. Les données utilisées pour valider nos hypothèses ont été recueillies dans le cadre d'une enquête portant sur « les relations entre la rémunération, la formation et le développement des compétences avec l’attraction et la rétention des employés clés ». Ces données de nature longitudinale, proviennent d'une entreprise canadienne du secteur des TIC. La population étudiée regroupe les nouveaux employés embauchés entre le 1er avril 2009 et le 30 septembre 2010. Nos résultats confirment l’Hypothèse 1 voulant que la satisfaction envers les bonis individuels contribue à accroître l’intention de rester des travailleurs du secteur des TIC. À l’inverse, ces résultats infirment l’Hypothèse 2. La satisfaction envers les bonis collectifs n’a donc pas d’impact significatif sur l’intention de rester. Malgré un problème de colinéarité, nos résultats suggèrent de confirmer l’Hypothèse 3 voulant que la satisfaction envers les bonis individuels ait un impact plus important sur l’intention de rester des travailleurs du secteur des TIC que la satisfaction envers les bonis collectifs. Les résultats indiquent également que le niveau de scolarité et l’engagement organisationnel ont un impact positif sur l’intention de rester des travailleurs. Les analyses longitudinales révèlent que les différences entre les caractéristiques des travailleurs expliquent davantage l’intention de rester, que les différences à travers les temps chez un même travailleur.

Efeitos organizacionais da implantação de metas e remuneração variável por desempenho: o caso da segurança pública em Minas Gerais

Quais os efeitos práticos que a cobrança de metas provoca nas instituições e nos servidores públicos? E quando se vincula premiações financeiras a elas, qual o resultado? O Brasil vive uma onda recente de implantação de modelos de remuneração variável por desempenho no setor público. Minas Gerais universalizou o sistema em 2008, implantando o Acordo de Resultados e o Prêmio por Produtividade, já tendo gasto 1,3 bilhão de reais com o programa. Mas o otimismo dos gestores não encontra fundamento na teoria. A literatura mostra que sistemas de remuneração variável no setor público fracassam ou têm sucesso muito limitado (OCDE, 2005; Perry, Engbergs e Jun, 2009; Bowman, 2010; Weibel, Rost e Osterloh 2010). Conflitos, dificuldade de mensuração do desempenho, fraude e incapacidade de motivar servidores públicos têm direcionado experiências de incentivo ao fracasso. Alguns poucos estudos mostram que, sob certas condições, a remuneração variável por desempenho pode gerar resultados positivos (Marsden, 2010). Seria o sistema mineiro capaz de superar o pessimismo dos especialistas e alcançar resultados positivos? Quais mecanismos de fato operam quando se implementa metas e remuneração variável em instituições públicas? Este trabalho busca responder estas questões a partir do estudo de caso de três organizações da segurança pública em Minas Gerais: Polícia Militar, Polícia Civil e Corpo de Bombeiros Militar. Foram feitas 46 entrevistas com policiais, bombeiros e com a cúpula das instituições, analisados dados estatísticos – que avaliam a evolução do desempenho, observação participante e monitoramento da percepção da mídia sobre tais efeitos. O resultado mostra que metas e incentivos financeiros geraram profundas mudanças nas instituições pesquisadas. Na Polícia Civil houve crescimento da produtividade, aumento do controle e melhoria de processos internos. Entretanto, o foco na produção quantitativa de inquéritos gerou incentivos para a redução de sua qualidade. Na Polícia Militar observou-se impacto menor, uma vez que esta já havia auferido no passado recente ganhos que o uso de indicadores e metas poderia proporcionar. Ainda assim, observou-se aumento da cobrança interna de resultados. Esse fato foi um dos fatores que contribuiu para um efeito negativo importante: a reclassificação de crimes. Uma estrutura de incentivos e a ausência de obstáculos levaram alguns policiais a reclassificar crimes que tinham natureza próxima para melhorar as estatísticas de suas unidades. No Corpo de Bombeiros o impacto foi altamente positivo, levando a instituição a conceber novas estratégias, gerando ganhos importantes de produtividade e melhoria de resultados para o cidadão. O resultado mostra que metas e incentivos financeiros são muito poderosos e podem gerar resultados positivos ou negativos, dependendo da forma como são implementados. As evidências contradizem, em parte, o pessimismo dos acadêmicos e descortinam o funcionamento dos mecanismos que fazem metas e remuneração variável interferirem no resultado de organizações públicas.

Retribuzione flessibile e contrattazione collettiva

Nel presente lavoro vengono esaminate le forme impiegate dalla contrattazione collettiva per rendere aleatorio il trattamento economico dei lavoratori subordinati. Dapprima ci si occupa del limite alla “flessibilizzazione” della retribuzione dei lavoratori subordinati che viene individuato nella “retribuzione sufficiente” di cui all’art. 36 Cost., qualificata come elemento essenziale del contratto. Di seguito si sofferma l’attenzione sulla retribuzione di produttività e di redditività dei lavoratori del settore privato e sul trattamento accessorio dei dipendenti pubblici privatizzati. Nonostante a queste quote della retribuzione sia astrattamente conferita una funzione incentivante, in concreto non la svolgono: nel lavoro privato a causa della politica egualitaria del sindacato e della “modalità” di determinazione degli obiettivi, nel lavoro pubblico perché questa parte della retribuzione è stata tradizionalmente erogata “a pioggia”. Nel terzo capitolo si prendono in considerazione le liti che possono sorgere se, nel periodo di tempo che va dalla fissazione degli obiettivi a quando si deve verificare il loro conseguimento, il datore di lavoro apporti modifiche organizzative in grado di ripercuotersi sulla capacità dei prestatori di raggiungere i risultati. Al fine di risolvere tale questione, in chiusura del secondo capitolo, la clausola in tema di retribuzione flessibile è stata classificata come condizione sospensiva in quanto una parte del trattamento economico, aggiuntiva alla retribuzione “base”, viene subordinata al conseguimento di obiettivi di produttività e redditività qualificabili come eventi futuri ed incerti. Tale qualificazione è volta a consentire l’applicazione dell’art. 1359 c.c. nelle controversie sopra descritte: se i lavoratori non conseguono gli obiettivi a causa di modifiche che il datore di lavoro ha apportato all’organizzazione, si può fingere che l’evento (che non si è verificato per una condotta imputabile al datore di lavoro) si sia verificato e, di conseguenza, erogare la retribuzione di risultato ai prestatori.

Essays on behavioral aspects of the design and disclosure of compensation contracts

This thesis consists of four essays on the design and disclosure of compensation contracts. Essays 1, 2 and 3 focus on behavioral aspects of mandatory compensation disclosure rules and of contract negotiations in agency relationships. The three experimental studies develop psychology- based theory and present results that deviate from standard economic predictions. Furthermore, the results of Essay 1 and 2 also have implications for firms’ discretion in how to communicate their top management’s incentives to the capital market. Essay 4 analyzes the role of fairness perceptions for the evaluation of executive compensation. For this purpose, two surveys targeting representative eligible voters as well as investment professionals were conducted. Essay 1 investigates the role of the detailed ‘Compensation Discussion and Analysis’, which is part of the Security and Exchange Commission’s 2006 regulation, on investors’ evaluations of executive performance. Compensation disclosure complying with this regulation clarifies the relationship between realized reported compensation and the underlying performance measures and their target achievement levels. The experimental findings suggest that the salient presentation of executives’ incentives inherent in the ‘Compensation Discussion and Analysis’ makes investors’ performance evaluations less outcome dependent. Therefore, investors’ judgment and investment decisions might be less affected by noisy environmental factors that drive financial performance. The results also suggest that fairness perceptions of compensation contracts are essential for investors’ performance evaluations in that more transparent disclosure increases the perceived fairness of compensation and the performance evaluation of managers who are not responsible for a bad financial performance. These results have important practical implications as firms might choose to communicate their top management’s incentive compensation more transparently in order to benefit from less volatile expectations about their future performance. Similar to the first experiment, the experiment described in Essay 2 addresses the question of more transparent compensation disclosure. However, other than the first experiment, the second experiment does not analyze the effect of a more salient presentation of contract information but the informational effect of contract information itself. For this purpose, the experiment tests two conditions in which the assessment of the compensation contracts’ incentive compatibility, which determines executive effort, is either possible or not. On the one hand, the results suggest that the quality of investors’ expectations about executive effort is improved, but on the other hand investors might over-adjust their prior expectations about executive effort if being confronted with an unexpected financial performance and under-adjust if the financial performance confirms their prior expectations. Therefore, in the experiment, more transparent compensation disclosure does not lead to more correct overall judgments of executive effort and to even lower processing quality of outcome information. These results add to the literature on disclosure which predominantly advocates more transparency. The findings of the experiment however, identify decreased information processing quality as a relevant disclosure cost category. Firms might therefore carefully evaluate the additional costs and benefits of more transparent compensation disclosure. Together with the results from the experiment in Essay 1, the two experiments on compensation disclosure imply that firms should rather focus on their discretion how to present their compensation disclosure to benefit from investors’ improved fairness perceptions and their spill-over on performance evaluation. Essay 3 studies the behavioral effects of contextual factors in recruitment processes that do not affect the employer’s or the applicant’s bargaining power from a standard economic perspective. In particular, the experiment studies two common characteristics of recruitment processes: Pre-contractual competition among job applicants and job applicants’ non-binding effort announcements as they might be made during job interviews. Despite the standard economic irrelevance of these factors, the experiment develops theory regarding the behavioral effects on employees’ subsequent effort provision and the employers’ contract design choices. The experimental findings largely support the predictions. More specifically, the results suggest that firms can benefit from increased effort and, therefore, may generate higher profits. Further, firms may seize a larger share of the employment relationship’s profit by highlighting the competitive aspects of the recruitment process and by requiring applicants to make announcements about their future effort. Finally, Essay 4 studies the role of fairness perceptions for the public evaluation of executive compensation. Although economic criteria for the design of incentive compensation generally do not make restrictive recommendations with regard to the amount of compensation, fairness perceptions might be relevant from the perspective of firms and standard setters. This is because behavioral theory has identified fairness as an important determinant of individuals’ judgment and decisions. However, although fairness concerns about executive compensation are often stated in the popular media and even in the literature, evidence on the meaning of fairness in the context of executive compensation is scarce and ambiguous. In order to inform practitioners and standard setters whether fairness concerns are exclusive to non-professionals or relevant for investment professionals as well, the two surveys presented in Essay 4 aim to find commonalities in the opinions of representative eligible voters and investments professionals. The results suggest that fairness is an important criterion for both groups. Especially, exposure to risk in the form of the variable compensation share is an important criterion shared by both groups. The higher the assumed variable share, the higher is the compensation amount to be perceived as fair. However, to a large extent, opinions on executive compensation depend on personality characteristics, and to some extent, investment professionals’ perceptions deviate systematically from those of non-professionals. The findings imply that firms might benefit from emphasizing the riskiness of their managers’ variable pay components and, therefore, the findings are also in line with those of Essay 1.

Random error in willingness to pay measurement: A multiple indicators, latent variable approach to the reliability of contingent values

The reliability of measurement refers to unsystematic error in observed responses. Investigations of the prevalence of random error in stated estimates of willingness to pay (WTP) are important to an understanding of why tests of validity in CV can fail. However, published reliability studies have tended to adopt empirical methods that have practical and conceptual limitations when applied to WTP responses. This contention is supported in a review of contingent valuation reliability studies that demonstrate important limitations of existing approaches to WTP reliability. It is argued that empirical assessments of the reliability of contingent values may be better dealt with by using multiple indicators to measure the latent WTP distribution. This latent variable approach is demonstrated with data obtained from a WTP study for stormwater pollution abatement. Attitude variables were employed as a way of assessing the reliability of open-ended WTP (with benchmarked payment cards) for stormwater pollution abatement. The results indicated that participants' decisions to pay were reliably measured, but not the magnitude of the WTP bids. This finding highlights the need to better discern what is actually being measured in VVTP studies, (C) 2003 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

Pay for performance does not always increase performance

Pay for performance can have a positive or a negative influence on actual performance. The aim of this study was to give an explanation for this contradiction.We demonstrated that the variability of the payment can act as a stressor. According to the transactional model of stress, the influence on performance depends on the subjective interpretation of the variability as challenge or threat. Therefore we manipulated the degree of variability. The data showed decreasing performance for participants who preferred less-variable payments. They performed better under a less-variable rather than more-variable payment. The participants who preferred more-variable payment schemes showed the opposite pattern. These participants showed a higher performance under a more-variable rather than less-variable payment scheme.

Moderating effect of allocentrism on the pay referent comparison-pay level satisfaction relationship

Pay referent comparisons (comparisons of one's salary to that of others) such as other-inside (salary of other people in the organisation), other-outside (the market rate), and cost-of- living, have been shown to influence pay level satisfaction. Bordia and Blau (1998) identified family as another referent that had a significant effect on pay level satisfaction in a sample of public and private sector employees in India. The finding was interpreted in view of the importance of family in collectivistic cultures. In the study reported here, the moderating influence of an individual differences variable, allocentrism-idiocentrism (the individual level conceptualisation of collectivism-individualism) on pay referent comparison-pay level satisfaction relationship was investigated. A sample of 146 employees from three public sector organisations in India participated in the study. In line with the predictions, results showed that after controlling for age, tenure, and pay level, pay referent comparisons explained more variance in pay level satisfaction for allocentrics than for idiocentrics. Family and pay level were stronger explanatory variables of pay level satisfaction for allocentrics and idiocentrics, respectively, while cost of living was a significant explanatory variable for both sub-groups.

Diseño y aplicación de un modelo de remuneración variable para una empresa del sector de las telecomunicaciones

Actualmente encontramos una fuerte presión en las organizaciones por adaptarse a un mundo competitivo con un descenso en las utilidades y una incertidumbre constante en su flujo de caja. Estas circunstancias obligan a las organizaciones al mejoramiento continuo buscando nuevas formas de gestionar sus procesos y sus recursos. Para las organizaciones de prestación de servicios en el sector de telecomunicaciones una de las ventajas competitivas más importantes de obtener es la productividad debido a que sus ganancias dependen directamente del número de actividades que puedan ejecutar cada empleado. El reto es hacer más con menos y con mejor calidad. Para lograrlo, la necesidad de gestionar efectivamente los recursos humanos aparece, y aquí es donde los sistemas de compensación toman un rol importante. El objetivo en este trabajo es diseñar y aplicar un modelo de remuneración variable para una empresa de prestación de servicios profesionales en el sector de las telecomunicaciones y con esto aportar al estudio de la gestión del desempeño y del talento humano en Colombia. Su realización permitió la documentación del diseño y aplicación del modelo de remuneración variable en un proyecto del sector de telecomunicaciones en Colombia. Su diseño utilizó las tendencias de programas remunerativos y teorías de gestión de desempeño para lograr un modelo integral que permita el crecimiento sostenido en el largo plazo y la motivación al recurso más importante de la organización que es el talento humano. Su aplicación permitió también la documentación de problemas y aciertos en la implementación de estos modelos.