Theory-of-Mind Continuum Model: Why Mind Matters in Philosophy, Psychology and Education

Theory-of-Mind has been defined as the ability to explain and predict human behaviour by imputing mental states, such as attention, intention, desire, emotion, perception and belief, to the self and others (Astington & Barriault, 2001). Theory-of-Mind study began with Piaget and continued through a tradition of meta-cognitive research projects (Flavell, 2004). A study by Baron-Cohen, Leslie and Frith (1985) of Theory-of-Mind abilities in atypically developing children reported major difficulties experienced by children with autism spectrum disorder (ASD) in imputing mental states to others. Since then, a wide range of follow-up research has been conducted to confirm these results. Traditional Theory-of-Mind research on ASD has been based on an either-or assumption that Theory-of-Mind is something one either possesses or does not. However, this approach fails to take account of how the ASD population themselves experience Theory-of-Mind. This paper suggests an alternative approach, Theory-of-Mind continuum model, to understand the Theory-of-Mind experience of people with ASD. The Theory-of-Mind continuum model will be developed through a comparison of subjective and objective aspects of mind, and phenomenal and psychological concepts of mind. This paper will demonstrate the importance of balancing qualitative and quantitative research methods in investigating the minds of people with ASD. It will enrich our theoretical understanding of Theory-of-Mind, as well as contain methodological implications for further studies in Theory-of-Mind

Understanding theory of mind in children who are deaf

Research on theory of mind began in the context of determining whether chimpanzees are aware that individuals experience cognitive and emotional states. More recently, this research has involved various groups of children and various tasks, including the false belief task. Based almost exclusively on that paradigm, investigators have concluded that although ``normal'' hearing children develop theory of mind by age 5, children who are autistic or deaf do not do so until much later, perhaps not until their teenage years. The present study explored theory of mind by examining stories told by children who are deaf and hearing (age 9±15 years) for statements ascribing behaviour-relevant states of mind to themselves and others. Both groups produced such attributions, although there were reliable differences between them. Results are discussed in terms of the cognitive abilities assumed to underlie false belief and narrative paradigms and the implications of attributing theory of mind solely on the basis of performance on the false belief task.

Imitation and 'theory of mind' competencies in discrimination of autism from other neurodevelopmental disorders

Several studies have reported imitative deficits in autism spectrum disorder (ASD). However, it is still debated if imitative deficits are specific to ASD or shared with clinical groups with similar mental impairment and motor difficulties. We investigated whether imitative tasks can be used to discriminate ASD children from typically developing children (TD) and children with general developmental delay (GDD). We applied discriminant function analyses to the performance of these groups on three imitation tasks and tests of dexterity, motor planning, verbal skills, theory of mind (ToM). Analyses revealed two significant dimensions. The first represented impairment of dexterity and verbal ability, and discriminated TD from GDD children. Once these differences were accounted for, differences in ToM and the three imitation tasks accounted for a significant proportion of the remaining intergroup variance and discriminated the ASD group from other groups. Further analyses revealed that inclusion of imitative tasks increased the specificity and sensitivity of ASD classification and that imitative tasks considered alone were able to reliably discriminate ASD, TD and GDD. The results suggest that imitation and theory of mind impairment in autism may stem from a common domain of origin separate from general cognitive and motor skill.

A Influência da personalidade e da sintomatologia na Theory of Mind

Dissertação de mestrado, Psicologia Clínica e da Saúde, Faculdade de Ciências Humanas e Sociais, Universidade do Algarve, 2015

Can children with autism spectrum disorders be helped to acquire a theory of mind?. '¿Se puede ayudar a los niños con trastornos del espectro autista a adquirir una teoría de la mente?'.

Resumen en español

Theory of mind and language comprehension in schizophrenia

Resumen tomado de la publicación

The relationship of language development to theory of mind understanding in young deaf children

This paper studies cognitive development in young deaf children, specifically Theory of Mind development and its link to language abilities.

Research on theory of mind in deaf education

Prior research has shown that theory of mind (ToM) development is delayed in children who are deaf and hard of hearing. Although research has demonstrated a delay in ToM development in children who are deaf and hard of hearing there are not many suggestions for how ToM is or should be addressed in deaf education. The current research addressed this issue by compiling an extensive literature review and sending 113 surveys’ to OPTION schools for the deaf around the country.

Theory of mind in children with traumatic brain injury

Objective: This study was designed to examine the existence of deficits in mentalizing or theory of mind (ToM) in children with traumatic brain injury (TBI). Research design: ToM functioning was assessed in 12 children aged 6-12 years with TBI and documented frontal lobe damage and compared to 12 controls matched for age, sex and verbal ability. Brief measures of attention and memory were also included. Main outcome and results: The TBI group was significantly impaired relative to controls on the advanced ToM measure and a measure of basic emotion recognition. No difference was found in a basic measure of ToM. Conclusion: Traumatic brain damage in childhood may disrupt the developmental acquisition of emotion recognition and advanced ToM skills. The clinical and theoretical importance of these findings is discussed and the implications for the assessment and treatment of children who have experienced TBI are outlined.

Theory of mind and attentional bias to facial emotional expressions: A preliminary study

Theory of mind ability has been associated with performance in interpersonal interactions and has been found to influence aspects such as emotion recognition, social competence, and social anxiety. Being able to attribute mental states to others requires attention to subtle communication cues such as facial emotional expressions. Decoding and interpreting emotions expressed by the face, especially those with negative valence, are essential skills to successful social interaction. The current study explored the association between theory of mind skills and attentional bias to facial emotional expressions. According to the study hypothesis, individuals with poor theory of mind skills showed preferential attention to negative faces over both non-negative faces and neutral objects. Tentative explanations for the findings are offered emphasizing the potential adaptive role of vigilance for threat as a way of allocating a limited capacity to interpret others’ mental states to obtain as much information as possible about potential danger in the social environment.

Understanding of mental states in later childhood: an investigation of theory of mind in autism spectrum disorder and typical development with a novel task

The developmental trajectories of Theory of Mind (ToM) in later childhood and into adolescence have not been thoroughly investigated, partly due to a lack of sensitive paradigms that can chart development in typical populations or in individuals with a core deficit in ToM, such as those with autism spectrum disorder (ASD). The present study assessed understanding of emotions, beliefs, and intentions using both an established ToM task (Baron‐Cohen et al., 2001) and the more recently developed Comic Strip Task (CST; Cornish et al., 2010). Participants comprised 12 typically-developing (TD) children (mean age: 12·0 years, range: 9·9‐14·8 years) and 12 high-functioning children with ASD (mean age: 11·0 years, range: 9·1‐13·6 years). Results indicated that the ASD group were not impaired on any of the ToM tasks relative to TD children. It was concluded that although children with high-functioning ASD appear to develop basic ToM skills, they do not generalize these to naturalistic situations. The comic-strip paradigm is suggested as a promising way to approach the measurement of ToM across childhood in typical children and those with ASD.