33 resultados para Swedes


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Swedes are well aware of what dependency on imported oil means and the oil crises of the 1970s forced them to reduce their usage dramatically. The use of oil in the residential and services sector has fallen by 90% since 1970 largely due to the transition to electricity and district heating. Energy use in the transport sector, however, has proved harder to rein in. Despite taxes, subsidies and other incentives, oil products still supplied 91% of the country’s energy for transport in 2010 and continues to rise. It represents 23% of the country’s final energy use.

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"Charter of the United Swedish Lutheran Churches of Wicaco, Kingsessing, and Upper Merion, called Gloria Dei, St. James, and Christ Church": p. [157]-180.

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Marriage index (males)--Marriage index (females)--Births and baptisms.--Burials.--General index.--Errata.

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This article explores transnational experiences within a group of Somali- Swedes, particularly how parents’ transnational practices are transferred to their children and how a transnational social space, built on close relationships on a global scale, is constructed. The readiness to relocate between countries and the implications for the children is illuminated. The onward migration to Egypt is highlighted as an example. According to research on Somalis in diaspora, they explain their propensity to move by claiming to be nomads, but this article indicates that it is also about their desire for better opportunities in combination with the cultural and economic marginalisation experienced in the West.

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In this paper, I discuss the representation of Sweden and Swedes in the Íslendingasögur, with an emphasis on identifying patterns across the works, both in terms of narrative structure and content. The aim in doing so is to shed light on modes of representing non-Icelanders in the Íslendingasögur, as well as on medieval Icelandic conceptions of Sweden as a distinct region within Scandinavia. I also aim here to add to a longer-term project that examines the place of foreign visitors to Iceland in the saga corpus more generally. As the scope of this paper is limited to Swedish characters, I am cautious about drawing broad conclusions about their representation – observations given here will need to be framed by a wider study, and one that reads for the characterisation of Swedes in the context both of other genres of saga literature and representations of characters from other regions beside Sweden. However, it is clear that some similarities exist in saga episodes involving Swedish characters: in four of the Íslendingasögur, Swedes are given roles as intruders or outsiders who threaten the community of the saga and whose deaths bring about a change in the for- tunes of their killers.

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Background Ambulance professionals often address conflicts between ethical values. As individuals’ values represent basic convictions of what is right or good and motivate behaviour, research is needed to understand their value profiles. Objectives To translate and adapt the Managerial Values Profile to Spanish and Swedish, and measure the presence of utilitarianism, moral rights and/or social justice in ambulance professionals’ value profiles in Spain and Sweden. Methods The instrument was translated and culturally adapted. A content validity index was calculated. Pilot tests were carried out with 46 participants. Ethical considerations This study conforms to the ethical principles for research involving human subjects and adheres to national laws and regulations concerning informed consent and confidentiality. Findings Spanish professionals favoured justice and Swedish professionals’ rights in their ambulance organizations. Both countries favoured utilitarianism least. Gender differences across countries showed that males favoured rights. Spanish female professionals favoured justice most strongly of all. Discussion Swedes favour rights while Spaniards favour justice. Both contexts scored low on utilitarianism focusing on total population effect, preferring the opposite, individualized approach of the rights and justice perspectives. Organizational investment in a utilitarian perspective might jeopardize ambulance professionals’ moral right to make individual assessments based on the needs of the patient at hand. Utilitarianism and a caring ethos appear as stark opposites. However, a caring ethos in its turn might well involve unreasonable demands on the individual carer’s professional role. Since both the justice and rights perspectives portrayed in the survey mainly concern relationship to the organization and peers within the organization, this relationship might at worst be given priority over the equal treatment and moral rights of the patient. Conclusion A balanced view on ethical perspectives is needed to make professionals observant and ready to act optimally – especially if these perspectives are used in patient care. Research is needed to clarify how justice and rights are prioritized by ambulance services and whether or not these organization-related values are also implemented in patient care.

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In the eighteenth century, the birth of scientific societies in Europe created a new framework for scientific cooperation. Through a new contextualist study of the contacts between the first scientific societies in Sweden and the most important science academy in Europe at the time, l Académie des Sciences in Paris, this dissertation aims to shed light on the role taken by the Swedish learned men in the new networks. It seeks to show that the academy model was related to a new idea of specialisation in science. In the course of the eighteenth century, it is argued, the study of the northern phenomena and regions offered the Swedes an important field of speciality with regard to their foreign colleagues. Although historical studies have often underlined the economic, practical undertone of eighteenth-century Swedish science, participation in fashionable scientific pursuits had also become an important scene for representation. However, the views prevailing in Europe tied civilisation and learning closely to the sunnier, southern climates, which had lead to the difficulty of portraying Sweden as a learned country. The image of the scientific North, as well as the Swedish strategies to polish the image of the North as a place for science, are analysed as seen from France. While sixteenth-century historians had preferred to put down the effects of the cold and claim a similarity of northern conditions to the others, the scientific exchange between Swedish and French researchers shows a new tendency to underline the difference of the North and its harsh climate. An explanation is sought by analysing how information about northern phenomena was used in France. In the European academies, new empirical methods had lead to a need for direct observations on different phenomena and circumstances. Rather than curiosities or objects for exoticism, the eighteenth-century depictions of the northern periphery tell about an emerging interest in the most extreme, and often most telling, examples of the workings of the invariable laws of nature. Whereas the idea of accumulating knowledge through cooperation was most manifest in joint astronomical projects, the idea of gathering and comparing data from differing places of observation appears also in other fields, from experimental philosophy to natural studies or medicine. The effects of these developments are studied and explained in connection to the Montesquieuan climate theories and the emerging pre-romantic ideas of man and society.

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The emperor of our fatherland The changing national identity of the elite and the construction of the Finnish fatherland at the beginning of the autonomy This study addresses the question of changing national identity of the elite at the beginning of the autonomy (1808 1814) in Finland. Russia had conquered Finland from Sweden, but Finland was not incorporated into the Russian Empire. Instead, it was governed as separately administered area, and Finland retained its own (laws of the realm of Sweden) laws. The inclusion in the Russian Empire compelled the elite of Finland to deliberate their national identity; they had to determine whether they remained Swedes or became Finns or Russians. The elite chose to become Finns, which may seem obvious from the nowadays perspective, but it cannot be taken for granted that the Swedish speaking and noble elite converted their local Finnish identity into a new national identity. The basis of this study is constructive in a sense that identity is not seen as stable and constant. Theoretical background lies on Stuart Hall s writings on national identity, which offer good practical methods to study national identity. According to Hall identity is based mainly on difference , difference to others . In practice this means how elite began to define themselves in contrast to Swedes and Russians. The Finnish national identity was constructed in contrast to Swedes due to the political reasons. In order to avoid Russians suspicions Finns had to diverge from Sweden. Sweden had also gone trough coup d état, which was disliked by the elite of Finland. However, the attitudes of the elite towards Sweden remained somewhat ambiguous. Even if it was politically and rationally thinking wisest to draw away from Sweden, emotionally it was difficult. Russia, on the other hand, had been for centuries the archenemy of the Finns as well as all the Swedes. The fear of the Russians was mainly imaginary. Russians were seen as cruel barbarians who hated and resented Finns. The Finnish national identity was constructed above all in contrast to the Russians, for the difference to Russia was seen as a precondition for the existence of Finland. Respectively, the new position of Finland also required approaching towards Russia, which was in its nature very pragmatic. The elite contrived to get rid off its prejudice against Russians on intellectual level, but not on emotional level. At the beginning of the autonomy the primary loyalty of the elite was directed into the Finnish fatherland and its habitants. This was a radical ideological change, because traditionally the loyalty of the elite had focused on monarch and monarch s realm. However, the role of Alexander I was crucial. According to the elite the emperor had granted them a new fatherland. The former native country (Finland) was seen as a new fatherland instead of Sweden. The loyalty of the elite to the emperor generated from the reciprocal gratitude; Alexander I had treated their native country so mercifully. The elite felt strong personal responsibility for Finland s existence. The elite believed that the future of Finland rested on their shoulders. Alexander I had given them fatherland, but it was in the hands of the elite to construct the Finnish state and national spirit. The study of the Finnish national identity brings forth also that the national identity was constructed by emphasizing Finns civic rights. The civic rights were essential part of the construction of the Finnish national identity, for the difference between Finns and Russians was based on Finns own laws and privileges, which the emperor of the Russia had ensured.

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The doctoral thesis deals with Finnish and foreign expert s analyses of Finland s military strategic position and defence capability, dating back to the early years of the Cold War. Finland s military high command prepared assessments of the country s strategic position and of the capability of the Defence Forces as grounds for defence planning. Since Finland was located on the Cold War dividing line, the foreign powers were also monitoring the development of Finland s situation. The research carried out had access to the armed forces internal assessments, as well as to analyses prepared by the military intelligence services of Sweden, Britain and the United States. One of the working hypotheses was that after the WWII the ability military leadership to estimate the security political needs of the country and the organisation of its defence was severely weakened so that the dangers of the international development were not perceived and the gradual erosion of defence capability was partly unnoticed. This hypothesis proved to be wrong. Even if the Finnish military intelligence was much weaker than during the war, it was able to provide the military leadership with information of the international military development for the most part. The military leadership was also fully aware of the weakening of the defence capability of the country. They faced the difficult task of making the country s political leadership, i.e. President Paasikivi and the government, also understand the gravity of the situation. Only in the last years of his term in office Paasikivi started to believe the warnings of the military. According to another hypothesis, outside observers considered the Finnish armed forces to primarily act as reinforcements for the Soviet Red Army, and they believed that, in the event of a full-scale war, the Finns would not have been able or even willing to resist a Soviet invasion of Sweden and Norway through Finland. The study confirmed that this was approximately the view the Swedes, the British and the Americans had of the Finnish forces. Western and Swedish intelligence assessments did not show confidence in Finland s defence ability and the country was regarded almost as a Soviet satellite. Finland s strategic position was, however, considered slightly different from that of the Soviet-occupied Eastern European countries. Finland had been forced to become part of the Soviet sphere of interest and security system and this was sealed by the Finno-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance in 1948. Finland had little importance to the military interests of the Western powers. In Sweden s defence planning, however, Finland played a significant role as an alarm bell of a possible Soviet surprise attack, as well as defensive frontline and buffer zone.

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The evacuation of Finnish children to Sweden during WW II has often been called a small migration . Historical research on this subject is scarce, considering the great number of children involved. The present research has applied, apart from the traditional archive research, the framework of history-culture developed by Rüsen in order to have an all-inclusive approach to the impact of this historical event. The framework has three dimensions: political, aesthetic and cognitive. The collective memory of war children has also been discussed. The research looks for political factors involved in the evacuations during the Winter War and the Continuation War and the post-war period. The approach is wider than a purely humanitarian one. Political factors have had an impact in both Finland and Sweden, beginning from the decision-making process and ending with the discussion of the unexpected consequences of the evacuations in the Finnish Parliament in 1950. The Winter War (30.11.1939 13.3.1940) witnessed the first child transports. These were also the model for future decision making. The transports were begun on the initiative of Swedes Maja Sandler, the wife of the resigned minister of foreign affairs Rickard Sandler, and Hanna Rydh-Munck af Rosenschöld , but this activity was soon accepted by the Swedish government because the humanitarian help in the form of child transports lightened the political burden of Prime Minister Hansson, who was not willing to help Finland militarily. It was help that Finland never asked for and it was rejected at the beginning. The negative response of Minister Juho Koivisto was not taken very seriously. The political forces in Finland supporting child transports were stronger than those rejecting them. The major politicians in support belonged to Finland´s Swedish minority. In addition, close to 1 000 Finnish children remained in Sweden after the Winter War. No analysis was made of the reasons why these children did not return home. A committee set up to help Finland and Norway was established in Sweden in 1941. Its chairman was Torsten Nothin, an influential Swedish politician. In December 1941 he appealed to the Swedish government to provide help to Finnish children under the authority of The International Red Cross. This plea had no results. The delivery of great amounts of food to Finland, which was now at war with Great Britain, had automatically caused reactions among the allies against the Swedish imports through Gothenburg. This included the import of oil, which was essential for the Swedish navy and air force. Oil was later used successfully to force a reduction in commerce between Sweden and Finland. The contradiction between Sweden´s essential political interests and humanitarian help was solved in a way that did not harm the country´s vital political interests. Instead of delivering help to Finland, Finnish children were transported to Sweden through the organisations that had already been created. At the beginning of the Continuation War (25.6.1941 27.4.1945) negative opinion regarding child transports re-emerged in Finland. Karl-August Fagerholm implemented the transports in September 1941. In 1942, members of the conservative parties in the Finnish Parliament expressed their fear of losing the children to the Swedes. They suggested that Finland should withdraw from the inter-Nordic agreement, according to which the adoptions were approved by the court of the country where the child resided. This initiative failed. Paavo Virkkunen, an influential member of the conservative party Kokoomus in Finland, favoured the so-called good-father system, where help was delivered to Finland in the form of money and goods. Virkkunen was concerned about the consequences of a long stay in a Swedish family. The risk of losing the children was clear. The extreme conservative party (IKL, the Patriotic Movement of the Finnish People) wanted to alienate Finland from Sweden and bring Finland closer to Germany. Von Blücher, the German ambassador to Finland, had in his report to Berlin, mentioned the political consequences of the child transports. Among other things, they would bring Finland and Sweden closer to each other. He had also paid attention to the Nordic political orientation in Finland. He did not question or criticize the child transports. His main interest was to increase German political influence in Finland, and the Nordic political orientation was an obstacle. Fagerholm was politically ill-favoured by the Germans, because he had a strong Nordic political disposition and had criticised Germany´s activities in Norway. The criticism of child transports was at the same time criticism of Fagerholm. The official censorship organ of the Finnish government (VTL) denied the criticism of child transports in January 1942. The reasons were political. Statements made by members of the Finnish Parliament were also censored, because it was thought that they would offend the Swedes. In addition, the censorship organ used child transports as a means of active propaganda aimed at improving the relations between the two countries. The Finnish Parliament was informed in 1948 that about 15 000 Finnish children still remained in Sweden. These children would stay there permanently. In 1950 the members of the Agrarian Party in Finland stated that Finland should actively strive to get the children back. The party on the left (SKDL, the Democratic Movement of Finnish People) also focused on the unexpected consequences of the child transports. The Social Democrats, and largely Fagerholm, had been the main force in Finland behind the child transports. Members of the SKDL, controlled by Finland´s Communist Party, stated that the war time authorities were responsible for this war loss. Many of the Finnish parents could not get their children back despite repeated requests. The discussion of the problem became political, for example von Born, a member of the Swedish minority party RKP, related this problem to foreign policy by stating that the request to repatriate the Finnish children would have negative political consequences for the relations between Finland and Sweden. He emphasized expressing feelings of gratitude to the Swedes. After the war a new foreign policy was established by Prime Minister (1944 1946) and later President (1946 1956) Juho Kusti Paasikivi. The main cornerstone of this policy was to establish good relations with the Soviet Union. The other, often forgotten, cornerstone was to simultaneously establish good relations with other Nordic countries, especially Sweden, as a counterbalance. The unexpected results of the child evacuation, a Swedish initiative, had violated the good relations with Sweden. The motives of the Democratic Movement of Finnish People were much the same as those of the Patriotic Movement of Finnish People. Only the ideology was different. The Nordic political orientation was an obstacle to both parties. The position of the Democratic Movement of Finnish People was much better than that of the Patriotic Movement of Finnish People, because now one could clearly see the unexpected results, which included human tragedy for the many families who could not be re-united with their children despite their repeated requests. The Swedes questioned the figure given to the Finnish Parliament regarding the number of children permanently remaining in Sweden. This research agrees with the Swedes. In a calculation based on Swedish population registers, the number of these children is about 7 100. The reliability of this figure is increased by the fact that the child allowance programme began in Sweden in 1948. The prerequisite to have this allowance was that the child be in the Swedish population register. It was not necessary for the child to have Swedish nationality. The Finnish Parliament had false information about the number of Finnish children who remained in Sweden in 1942 and in 1950. There was no parliamentary control in Finland regarding child transports, because the decision was made by one cabinet member and speeches by MPs in the Finnish Parliament were censored, like all criticism regarding child transports to Sweden. In Great Britain parliamentary control worked better throughout the whole war, because the speeches regarding evacuation were not censored. At the beginning of the war certain members of the British Labour Party and the Welsh Nationalists were particularly outspoken about the scheme. Fagerholm does not discuss to any great extent the child transports in his memoirs. He does not evaluate the process and results as a whole. This research provides some possibilities for an evaluation of this sort. The Swedish medical reports give a clear picture of the physical condition of the Finnish children when arriving in Sweden. The transports actually revealed how bad the situation of the poorest children was. According to Titmuss, similar observations were made in Great Britain during the British evacuations. The child transports saved the lives of approximately 2 900 children. Most of these children were removed to Sweden to receive treatment for illnesses, but many among the healthy children were undernourished and some suffered from the effects of tuberculosis. The medical inspection in Finland was not thorough. If you compare the figure of 2 900 children saved and returned with the figure of about 7 100 children who remained permanently in Sweden, you may draw the conclusion that Finland as a country failed to benefit from the child transports, and that the whole operation was a political mistake with far-reaching consequenses. The basic goal of the operation was to save lives and have all the children return to Finland after the war. The difficulties with the repatriation of the children were mainly psychological. The level of child psychology in Finland at that time was low. One may question the report by Professor Martti Kaila regarding the adaptation of children to their families back in Finland. Anna Freud´s warnings concerning the difficulties that arise when child evacuees return are also valid in Finland. Freud viewed the emotional life of children in a way different from Kaila: the physical survival of a small child forces her to create strong emotional ties to the person who is looking after her. This, a characteristic of all small children, occurred with the Finnish children too, and it was something the political decision makers in Finland could not see during and after the war. It is a characteristic of all little children. Yet, such experiences were already evident during the Winter War. The best possible solution had been to limit the child transports only to children in need of medical treatment. Children from large and poor families had been helped by organising meals and by buying food from Denmark with Swedish money. Assisting Finland by all possible means should have been the basic goal of Fagerholm in September 1941, when the offer of child transports came from Sweden. Fagerholm felt gratitude towards the Swedes. The risks became clear to him only in 1943. The war children are today a rather scattered and diffuse group of people. Emotionally, part of these children remained in Sweden after the war. There is no clear collective memory, only individual memories; the collective memory of the war children has partly been shaped later through the activities of the war child associations. The main difference between the children evacuated in Finland (for example from Karelia to safer areas with their families) and the war children, who were sent abroad, is that the war children lack a shared story and experience with their families. They were outsiders . The whole matter is sensitive to many of such mothers and discussing the subject has often been avoided in families. The war-time censorship has continued in families through silence and avoidance and Finnish politicians and Finnish families had to face each other on this issue after the war. The lack of all-inclusive historical research has also prevented the formation of a collective awareness among war children returned to Finland or those remaining permanently abroad.. Knowledge of historical facts will help war-children by providing an opportunity to create an all-inclusive approach to the past. Personal experiences should be regarded as part of a large historical entity shadowed by war and where many political factors were at work in both Finland and Sweden. This means strengthening of the cognitive dimension discussed in Rüsen´s all-inclusive historical approach.

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The aim of my thesis, which consists of five original articles and a summarizing chapter, is to study the identity, lifestyle and cultural taste of the Finnish Swedes, i.e. the Swedish-speaking language minority in Finland, from a qualitative point of view. The Finnish Swedes are a somewhat special minority, first of all because of their wide-ranging language rights guaranteed by the constitution, and secondly because of the common image that Finnish Swedes represent a more legitimate or better lifestyle and taste than the Finnish-Speaking Finns. This conception is corroborated by the fact that, in comparison to the language majority, the Swedish-speakers have better health, employment, income and so on according to a number of quantitative studies. My research data is composed of twenty-six focus group interviews conducted among a geographically and socio-economically wide range of Swedish-speaking Finns. Group sizes ranged from 3 to 11 people. In the interviews, culture was approached through a framework of seven topics: music, cinema, television, arts, reading, eating and clothing. In each focus group interview, two subfields of culture were discussed along with a short section about cultural events and participation and definitions on good and bad taste. After discussing culture and taste, there was a final discussion on the Finnish Swede identity. The main theoretical framework of my thesis comes from Pierre Bourdieu (1979) and his followers: I am asking whether the status of being a Swedish-speaker can be used as a means of distinction. The main research questions are the following: (1) How does the Swedish-speaking minority look studied in the light of extensive qualitative data and in a framework of lifestyle and taste? (2) What kind of differences in lifestyle, taste and linguistic identity are there between different Finnish Swedes and how do those connect with socio-economical position, place of residence or age? I also ask how belonging to the language minority might work as a tool for cultural distinction and how different Swedish-speaking groups take use of it. My main research question is (3) whether mother tongue is a remarkable factor of lifestyle or cultural taste in contemporary Finland.