BDI agents for Real Time Strategy games

While the use of distributed intelligence has been incrementally spreading in the design of a great number of intelligent systems, the field of Artificial Intelligence in Real Time Strategy games has remained mostly a centralized environment. Despite turn-based games have attained AIs of world-class level, the fast paced nature of RTS games has proven to be a significant obstacle to the quality of its AIs. Chapter 1 introduces RTS games describing their characteristics, mechanics and elements. Chapter 2 introduces Multi-Agent Systems and the use of the Beliefs-Desires-Intentions abstraction, analysing the possibilities given by self-computing properties. In Chapter 3 the current state of AI development in RTS games is analyzed highlighting the struggles of the gaming industry to produce valuable. The focus on improving multiplayer experience has impacted gravely on the quality of the AIs thus leaving them with serious flaws that impair their ability to challenge and entertain players. Chapter 4 explores different aspects of AI development for RTS, evaluating the potential strengths and weaknesses of an agent-based approach and analysing which aspects can benefit the most against centralized AIs. Chapter 5 describes a generic agent-based framework for RTS games where every game entity becomes an agent, each of which having its own knowledge and set of goals. Different aspects of the game, like economy, exploration and warfare are also analysed, and some agent-based solutions are outlined. The possible exploitation of self-computing properties to efficiently organize the agents activity is then inspected. Chapter 6 presents the design and implementation of an AI for an existing Open Source game in beta development stage: 0 a.d., an historical RTS game on ancient warfare which features a modern graphical engine and evolved mechanics. The entities in the conceptual framework are implemented in a new agent-based platform seamlessly nested inside the existing game engine, called ABot, widely described in Chapters 7, 8 and 9. Chapter 10 and 11 include the design and realization of a new agent based language useful for defining behavioural modules for the agents in ABot, paving the way for a wider spectrum of contributors. Chapter 12 concludes the work analysing the outcome of tests meant to evaluate strategies, realism and pure performance, finally drawing conclusions and future works in Chapter 13.

Theoretical frameworks for analysing turn-based computer strategy games

This paper argues for a more specific formal methodology for the textual analysis of individual game genres. In doing so, it advances a set of formal analytical tools and a theoretical framework for the analysis of turn-based computer strategy games. The analytical tools extend the useful work of Steven Poole, who suggests a Peircian semiotic approach to the study of games as formal systems. The theoretical framework draws upon postmodern cultural theory to analyse and explain the representation of space and the organisation of knowledge in these games. The methodology and theoretical framework is supported by a textual analysis of Civilization II, a significant and influential turn-based computer strategy game. Finally, this paper suggests possibilities for future extensions of this work.

La stratégie comme processus cognitif dans le jeu vidéo StarCraft

Pour respecter les droits d’auteur, la version électronique de ce mémoire a été dépouillée de ses documents visuels et audio‐visuels. La version intégrale du mémoire a été déposée au Service de la gestion des documents et des archives de l'Université de Montréal.

RFIDice - Augmenting Tabletop Dice with RFID

Augmented dice allow players of tabletop games to have the result of a roll be automatically recorded by a computer, e.g., for supporting strategy games. We have built a set of three augmented-dice-prototypes based on radio frequency identification (RFID) technology, which allows us to build robust, cheap, and small augmented dice. Using a corresponding readout infrastructure and a sample application, we have evaluated our approach and show its advantages over other dice augmentation methods discussed in the literature.

Repenser l’histoire de la jouabilité : l’émergence du jeu de stratégie en temps réel

L’objectif de cette thèse est de réfléchir aux enjeux d’une histoire du jeu de stratégie en temps réel (STR). Il s’agit de mieux comprendre les contextes dans lesquels le genre prend sens pour historiciser son émergence et sa période classique. Cette thèse cherche à documenter, d’une part, la cristallisation du STR en tant qu’objet ayant une forme relativement stable et en tant que corpus précis et identifié et, d’autre part, l’émergence des formes de jouabilité classiques des STR. La première partie est consacrée à décrire l’objet de cette recherche, pour mieux comprendre la complexité du terme « stratégie » et de la catégorisation « jeu de stratégie ». La seconde partie met en place la réflexion épistémologique en montrant comment on peut tenir compte de la jouabilité dans un travail historien. Elle définit le concept de paradigme de jouabilité en tant que formation discursive pour regrouper différents énoncés actionnels en une unité logique qui n’est pas nécessairement l’équivalent du genre. La troisième partie cartographie l’émergence du genre entre les wargames des années 1970 et les jeux en multijoueur de la décennie suivante. Deux paradigmes de jouabilité se distinguent pour former le STR classique : le paradigme de décryptage et le paradigme de prévision. La quatrième partie explique et contextualise le STR classique en montrant qu’il comporte ces deux paradigmes de jouabilité dans deux modes de jeu qui offrent des expériences fondamentalement différentes l’une de l’autre.

Repenser l’histoire de la jouabilité : l’émergence du jeu de stratégie en temps réel

L’objectif de cette thèse est de réfléchir aux enjeux d’une histoire du jeu de stratégie en temps réel (STR). Il s’agit de mieux comprendre les contextes dans lesquels le genre prend sens pour historiciser son émergence et sa période classique. Cette thèse cherche à documenter, d’une part, la cristallisation du STR en tant qu’objet ayant une forme relativement stable et en tant que corpus précis et identifié et, d’autre part, l’émergence des formes de jouabilité classiques des STR. La première partie est consacrée à décrire l’objet de cette recherche, pour mieux comprendre la complexité du terme « stratégie » et de la catégorisation « jeu de stratégie ». La seconde partie met en place la réflexion épistémologique en montrant comment on peut tenir compte de la jouabilité dans un travail historien. Elle définit le concept de paradigme de jouabilité en tant que formation discursive pour regrouper différents énoncés actionnels en une unité logique qui n’est pas nécessairement l’équivalent du genre. La troisième partie cartographie l’émergence du genre entre les wargames des années 1970 et les jeux en multijoueur de la décennie suivante. Deux paradigmes de jouabilité se distinguent pour former le STR classique : le paradigme de décryptage et le paradigme de prévision. La quatrième partie explique et contextualise le STR classique en montrant qu’il comporte ces deux paradigmes de jouabilité dans deux modes de jeu qui offrent des expériences fondamentalement différentes l’une de l’autre.

On the existence of pure-strategy equilibria in large games

Over the years, several formalizations and existence results for games with a continuum of players have been given. These include those of Schmeidler (1973), Rashid (1983), Mas-Colell (1984), Khan and Sun (1999) and Podczeck (2007a). The level of generality of each of these existence results is typically regarded as a criterion to evaluate how appropriate is the corresponding formalization of large games. In contrast, we argue that such evaluation is pointless. In fact, we show that, in a precise sense, all the above existence results are equivalent. Thus, all of them are equally strong and therefore cannot rank the different formalizations of large games.

Power Games in Strategy Formation Processes – A Performative Interpretation

The article approaches an understanding of power within strategy formation processes established by verbal and bodily communication. On this note, we examined concepts of power constituted by hierarchy and developed a conceptual framework for a performative interpretation of power. In line with Austin’s (1962) and Butler’s (1990, 1993, 1997) concept of performativity as well as strategy-as-practice research (Balogun et al., 2007; Jarzabkowski & Spee, 2009) we ask: How is persuasion achieved by strategic actors during strategy formation processes? To explore verbal and bodily communication empirically we developed an experimental setting in a small high-tech company located in Germany in December, 2012. The Results indicate that (1) during critical incidents – when perspectives clash – actors use arguments to gain persuasion. (2) The data illustrates that independently of their hierarchical position within the company, strategic actors show an equal distribution of argumentative techniques.

The compleat strategyst, being a primer on the theory of games of strategy;

Mode of access: Internet.

The game to play: expanding the co-opetition proposal through the strategic games matrix

Purpose - Using Brandenburger and Nalebuff`s 1995 co-opetition model as a reference, the purpose of this paper is to seek to develop a tool that, based on the tenets of classical game theory, would enable scholars and managers to identify which games may be played in response to the different conflict of interest situations faced by companies in their business environments. Design/methodology/approach - The literature on game theory and business strategy are reviewed and a conceptual model, the strategic games matrix (SGM), is developed. Two novel games are described and modeled. Findings - The co-opetition model is not sufficient to realistically represent most of the conflict of interest situations faced by companies. It seeks to address this problem through development of the SGM, which expands upon Brandenburger and Nalebuff`s model by providing a broader perspective, through incorporation of an additional dimension (power ratio between players) and three novel, respectively, (rival, individualistic, and associative). Practical implications - This proposed model, based on the concepts of game theory, should be used to train decision- and policy-makers to better understand, interpret and formulate conflict management strategies. Originality/value - A practical and original tool to use game models in conflict of interest situations is generated. Basic classical games, such as Nash, Stackelberg, Pareto, and Minimax, are mapped on the SGM to suggest in which situations they Could be useful. Two innovative games are described to fit four different types of conflict situations that so far have no corresponding game in the literature. A test application of the SGM to a classic Intel Corporation strategic management case, in the complex personal computer industry, shows that the proposed method is able to describe, to interpret, to analyze, and to prescribe optimal competitive and/or cooperative strategies for each conflict of interest situation.

O papel da interactividade na construção da narrativa em role-playing games digitais

Dissertação apresentada à Escola Superior de Comunicação Social como parte dos requisitos para obtenção de grau de mestre em Audiovisual e Multimédia.

An existence result for discontinuous games

We introduce a notion of upper semicontinuity, weak upper semicontinuity, and show that it, together with a weak form of payoff security, is enough to guarantee the existence of Nash equilibria in compact, quasiconcave normal form games. We show that our result generalizes the pure strategy existence theorem of Dasgupta and Maskin (1986) and that it is neither implied nor does it imply the existence theorems of Baye, Tian, and Zhou (1993) and Reny (1999). Furthermore, we show that an equilibrium may fail to exist when, while maintaining weak payoff security, weak upper semicontinuity is weakened to reciprocal upper semicontinuity.

Strategy definition of a new business opportunity in mobile-casual gaming: Partnership between Nmusic and Rovio Entertainment Ltd.

A Work Project, presented as part of the requirements for the Award of a Masters Degree in Management from the NOVA – School of Business and Economics

A class of stochastic games with infinitely many interacting agents related to Glauber dynamics on random graphs

We introduce and study a class of infinite-horizon nonzero-sum non-cooperative stochastic games with infinitely many interacting agents using ideas of statistical mechanics. First we show, in the general case of asymmetric interactions, the existence of a strategy that allows any player to eliminate losses after a finite random time. In the special case of symmetric interactions, we also prove that, as time goes to infinity, the game converges to a Nash equilibrium. Moreover, assuming that all agents adopt the same strategy, using arguments related to those leading to perfect simulation algorithms, spatial mixing and ergodicity are proved. In turn, ergodicity allows us to prove “fixation”, i.e. that players will adopt a constant strategy after a finite time. The resulting dynamics is related to zerotemperature Glauber dynamics on random graphs of possibly infinite volume.

Testing the TASP: An Experimental Investigation of Learning in Games with Unstable Equilibria

We report experiments designed to test between Nash equilibria that are stable and unstable under learning. The “TASP” (Time Average of the Shapley Polygon) gives a precise prediction about what happens when there is divergence from equilibrium under fictitious play like learning processes. We use two 4 x 4 games each with a unique mixed Nash equilibrium; one is stable and one is unstable under learning. Both games are versions of Rock-Paper-Scissors with the addition of a fourth strategy, Dumb. Nash equilibrium places a weight of 1/2 on Dumb in both games, but the TASP places no weight on Dumb when the equilibrium is unstable. We also vary the level of monetary payoffs with higher payoffs predicted to increase instability. We find that the high payoff unstable treatment differs from the others. Frequency of Dumb is lower and play is further from Nash than in the other treatments. That is, we find support for the comparative statics prediction of learning theory, although the frequency of Dumb is substantially greater than zero in the unstable treatments.