Communications amendment-clarifying regulatory authority : report (to accompany S. 1740)

"August 12, 1959."

Chronological Monte Carlo-based assessment of distribution system reliability

Regulatory authorities in many countries, in order to maintain an acceptable balance between appropriate customer service qualities and costs, are introducing a performance-based regulation. These regulations impose penalties, and in some cases rewards, which introduce a component of financial risk to an electric power utility due to the uncertainty associated with preserving a specific level of system reliability. In Brazil, for instance, one of the reliability indices receiving special attention by the utilities is the Maximum Continuous Interruption Duration per customer (MCID). This paper describes a chronological Monte Carlo simulation approach to evaluate probability distributions of reliability indices, including the MCID, and the corresponding penalties. In order to get the desired efficiency, modern computational techniques are used for modeling (UML -Unified Modeling Language) as well as for programming (Object- Oriented Programming). Case studies on a simple distribution network and on real Brazilian distribution systems are presented and discussed. © Copyright KTH 2006.

Propuestas regulatorias para el diseño de un mercado ibérico a plazo eficiente de la energía = Regulatory proposals for the development of an efficient iberian energy forward market

El mercado ibérico de futuros de energía eléctrica gestionado por OMIP (“Operador do Mercado Ibérico de Energia, Pólo Português”, con sede en Lisboa), también conocido como el mercado ibérico de derivados de energía, comenzó a funcionar el 3 de julio de 2006. Se analiza la eficiencia de este mercado organizado, por lo que se estudia la precisión con la que sus precios de futuros predicen el precio de contado. En dicho mercado coexisten dos modos de negociación: el mercado continuo (modo por defecto) y la contratación mediante subasta. En la negociación en continuo, las órdenes anónimas de compra y de venta interactúan de manera inmediata e individual con órdenes contrarias, dando lugar a operaciones con un número indeterminado de precios para cada contrato. En la negociación a través de subasta, un precio único de equilibrio maximiza el volumen negociado, liquidándose todas las operaciones a ese precio. Adicionalmente, los miembros negociadores de OMIP pueden liquidar operaciones “Over-The-Counter” (OTC) a través de la cámara de compensación de OMIP (OMIClear). Las cinco mayores empresas españolas de distribución de energía eléctrica tenían la obligación de comprar electricidad hasta julio de 2009 en subastas en OMIP, para cubrir parte de sus suministros regulados. De igual manera, el suministrador de último recurso portugués mantuvo tal obligación hasta julio de 2010. Los precios de equilibrio de esas subastas no han resultado óptimos a efectos retributivos de tales suministros regulados dado que dichos precios tienden a situarse ligeramente sesgados al alza. La prima de riesgo ex-post, definida como la diferencia entre los precios a plazo y de contado en el periodo de entrega, se emplea para medir su eficiencia de precio. El mercado de contado, gestionado por OMIE (“Operador de Mercado Ibérico de la Energía”, conocido tradicionalmente como “OMEL”), tiene su sede en Madrid. Durante los dos primeros años del mercado de futuros, la prima de riesgo media tiende a resultar positiva, al igual que en otros mercados europeos de energía eléctrica y gas natural. En ese periodo, la prima de riesgo ex-post tiende a ser negativa en los mercados de petróleo y carbón. Los mercados de energía tienden a mostrar niveles limitados de eficiencia de mercado. La eficiencia de precio del mercado de futuros aumenta con el desarrollo de otros mecanismos coexistentes dentro del mercado ibérico de electricidad (conocido como “MIBEL”) –es decir, el mercado dominante OTC, las subastas de centrales virtuales de generación conocidas en España como Emisiones Primarias de Energía, y las subastas para cubrir parte de los suministros de último recurso conocidas en España como subastas CESUR– y con una mayor integración de los mercados regionales europeos de energía eléctrica. Se construye un modelo de regresión para analizar la evolución de los volúmenes negociados en el mercado continuo durante sus cuatro primeros años como una función de doce indicadores potenciales de liquidez. Los únicos indicadores significativos son los volúmenes negociados en las subastas obligatorias gestionadas por OMIP, los volúmenes negociados en el mercado OTC y los volúmenes OTC compensados por OMIClear. El número de creadores de mercado, la incorporación de agentes financieros y compañías de generación pertenecientes a grupos integrados con suministradores de último recurso, y los volúmenes OTC compensados por OMIClear muestran una fuerte correlación con los volúmenes negociados en el mercado continuo. La liquidez de OMIP está aún lejos de los niveles alcanzados por los mercados europeos más maduros (localizados en los países nórdicos (Nasdaq OMX Commodities) y Alemania (EEX)). El operador de mercado y su cámara de compensación podrían desarrollar acciones eficientes de marketing para atraer nuevos agentes activos en el mercado de contado (p.ej. industrias consumidoras intensivas de energía, suministradores, pequeños productores, compañías energéticas internacionales y empresas de energías renovables) y agentes financieros, captar volúmenes del opaco OTC, y mejorar el funcionamiento de los productos existentes aún no líquidos. Resultaría de gran utilidad para tales acciones un diálogo activo con todos los agentes (participantes en el mercado, operador de mercado de contado, y autoridades supervisoras). Durante sus primeros cinco años y medio, el mercado continuo presenta un crecimento de liquidez estable. Se mide el desempeño de sus funciones de cobertura mediante la ratio de posición neta obtenida al dividir la posición abierta final de un contrato de derivados mensual entre su volumen acumulado en la cámara de compensación. Los futuros carga base muestran la ratio más baja debido a su buena liquidez. Los futuros carga punta muestran una mayor ratio al producirse su menor liquidez a través de contadas subastas fijadas por regulación portuguesa. Las permutas carga base liquidadas en la cámara de compensación ubicada en Madrid –MEFF Power, activa desde el 21 de marzo de 2011– muestran inicialmente valores altos debido a bajos volúmenes registrados, dado que esta cámara se emplea principalmente para vencimientos pequeños (diario y semanal). Dicha ratio puede ser una poderosa herramienta de supervisión para los reguladores energéticos cuando accedan a todas las transacciones de derivados en virtud del Reglamento Europeo sobre Integridad y Transparencia de los Mercados de Energía (“REMIT”), en vigor desde el 28 de diciembre de 2011. La prima de riesgo ex-post tiende a ser positiva en todos los mecanismos (futuros en OMIP, mercado OTC y subastas CESUR) y disminuye debido a la curvas de aprendizaje y al efecto, desde el año 2011, del precio fijo para la retribución de la generación con carbón autóctono. Se realiza una comparativa con los costes a plazo de generación con gas natural (diferencial “clean spark spread”) obtenido como la diferencia entre el precio del futuro eléctrico y el coste a plazo de generación con ciclo combinado internalizando los costes de emisión de CO2. Los futuros eléctricos tienen una elevada correlación con los precios de gas europeos. Los diferenciales de contratos con vencimiento inmediato tienden a ser positivos. Los mayores diferenciales se dan para los contratos mensuales, seguidos de los trimestrales y anuales. Los generadores eléctricos con gas pueden maximizar beneficios con contratos de menor vencimiento. Los informes de monitorización por el operador de mercado que proporcionan transparencia post-operacional, el acceso a datos OTC por el regulador energético, y la valoración del riesgo regulatorio pueden contribuir a ganancias de eficiencia. Estas recomendaciones son también válidas para un potencial mercado ibérico de futuros de gas, una vez que el hub ibérico de gas –actualmente en fase de diseño, con reuniones mensuales de los agentes desde enero de 2013 en el grupo de trabajo liderado por el regulador energético español– esté operativo. El hub ibérico de gas proporcionará transparencia al atraer más agentes y mejorar la competencia, incrementando su eficiencia, dado que en el mercado OTC actual no se revela precio alguno de gas. ABSTRACT The Iberian Power Futures Market, managed by OMIP (“Operador do Mercado Ibérico de Energia, Pólo Português”, located in Lisbon), also known as the Iberian Energy Derivatives Market, started operations on 3 July 2006. The market efficiency, regarding how well the future price predicts the spot price, is analysed for this energy derivatives exchange. There are two trading modes coexisting within OMIP: the continuous market (default mode) and the call auction. In the continuous trading, anonymous buy and sell orders interact immediately and individually with opposite side orders, generating trades with an undetermined number of prices for each contract. In the call auction trading, a single price auction maximizes the traded volume, being all trades settled at the same price (equilibrium price). Additionally, OMIP trading members may settle Over-the-Counter (OTC) trades through OMIP clearing house (OMIClear). The five largest Spanish distribution companies have been obliged to purchase in auctions managed by OMIP until July 2009, in order to partly cover their portfolios of end users’ regulated supplies. Likewise, the Portuguese last resort supplier kept that obligation until July 2010. The auction equilibrium prices are not optimal for remuneration purposes of regulated supplies as such prices seem to be slightly upward biased. The ex-post forward risk premium, defined as the difference between the forward and spot prices in the delivery period, is used to measure its price efficiency. The spot market, managed by OMIE (Market Operator of the Iberian Energy Market, Spanish Pool, known traditionally as “OMEL”), is located in Madrid. During the first two years of the futures market, the average forward risk premium tends to be positive, as it occurs with other European power and natural gas markets. In that period, the ex-post forward risk premium tends to be negative in oil and coal markets. Energy markets tend to show limited levels of market efficiency. The price efficiency of the Iberian Power Futures Market improves with the market development of all the coexistent forward contracting mechanisms within the Iberian Electricity Market (known as “MIBEL”) – namely, the dominant OTC market, the Virtual Power Plant Auctions known in Spain as Energy Primary Emissions, and the auctions catering for part of the last resort supplies known in Spain as CESUR auctions – and with further integration of European Regional Electricity Markets. A regression model tracking the evolution of the traded volumes in the continuous market during its first four years is built as a function of twelve potential liquidity drivers. The only significant drivers are the traded volumes in OMIP compulsory auctions, the traded volumes in the OTC market, and the OTC cleared volumes by OMIClear. The amount of market makers, the enrolment of financial members and generation companies belonging to the integrated group of last resort suppliers, and the OTC cleared volume by OMIClear show strong correlation with the traded volumes in the continuous market. OMIP liquidity is still far from the levels reached by the most mature European markets (located in the Nordic countries (Nasdaq OMX Commodities) and Germany (EEX)). The market operator and its clearing house could develop efficient marketing actions to attract new entrants active in the spot market (e.g. energy intensive industries, suppliers, small producers, international energy companies and renewable generation companies) and financial agents as well as volumes from the opaque OTC market, and to improve the performance of existing illiquid products. An active dialogue with all the stakeholders (market participants, spot market operator, and supervisory authorities) will help to implement such actions. During its firs five and a half years, the continuous market shows steady liquidity growth. The hedging performance is measured through a net position ratio obtained from the final open interest of a month derivatives contract divided by its accumulated cleared volume. The base load futures in the Iberian energy derivatives exchange show the lowest ratios due to good liquidity. The peak futures show bigger ratios as their reduced liquidity is produced by auctions fixed by Portuguese regulation. The base load swaps settled in the clearing house located in Spain – MEFF Power, operating since 21 March 2011, with a new denomination (BME Clearing) since 9 September 2013 – show initially large values due to low registered volumes, as this clearing house is mainly used for short maturity (daily and weekly swaps). The net position ratio can be a powerful oversight tool for energy regulators when accessing to all the derivatives transactions as envisaged by European regulation on Energy Market Integrity and Transparency (“REMIT”), in force since 28 December 2011. The ex-post forward risk premium tends to be positive in all existing mechanisms (OMIP futures, OTC market and CESUR auctions) and diminishes due to the learning curve and the effect – since year 2011 – of the fixed price retributing the indigenous coal fired generation. Comparison with the forward generation costs from natural gas (“clean spark spread”) – obtained as the difference between the power futures price and the forward generation cost with a gas fired combined cycle plant taking into account the CO2 emission rates – is also performed. The power futures are strongly correlated with European gas prices. The clean spark spreads built with prompt contracts tend to be positive. The biggest clean spark spreads are for the month contract, followed by the quarter contract and then by the year contract. Therefore, gas fired generation companies can maximize profits trading with contracts of shorter maturity. Market monitoring reports by the market operator providing post-trade transparency, OTC data access by the energy regulator, and assessment of the regulatory risk can contribute to efficiency gains. The same recommendations are also valid for a potential Iberian gas futures market, once an Iberian gas hub – currently in a design phase, with monthly meetings amongst the stakeholders in a Working Group led by the Spanish energy regulatory authority since January 2013 – is operating. The Iberian gas hub would bring transparency attracting more shippers and improving competition and thus its efficiency, as no gas price is currently disclosed in the existing OTC market.

Controlo estratégico dos custos das atividades e recursos da Direção Comercial da Eletricidade dos Açores, S.A.

Dissertação de Mestrado, Ciências Económicas e Empresariais, 16 de Janeiro 2014, Universidade dos Açores.

Planning smart cities using wireless low energy monitoring systems

Thesis to obtain the Master Degree in Electronics and Telecommunications Engineering

Estudo sobre Perdas de Água

O presente relatório resulta de um estudo realizado na empresa Águas do Douro e Paiva, S.A. (AdDP), atual Águas do Norte, S.A., sob a forma de estágio curricular, com a duração de seis meses e que teve como tema as perdas de água na rede da empresa. Inicialmente é feito um enquadramento ao tema onde se aborda o setor das águas em Portugal, a importância do mesmo na sociedade Portuguesa e as suas principais características. É apresentada também uma introdução à empresa onde foi realizado o estágio e, posteriormente, são apresentados fundamentos teóricos relativos às perdas de água onde se incluem as diversas fases de abordagem ao problema, métodos de medição dos caudais e técnicas de localização de fugas. De modo a comparar resultados já obtidos pela empresa, foi feito um levantamento de dados anuais e mensais para o cálculo do balanço hídrico e indicadores de desempenho para toda a rede da empresa. A informação obtida foi traduzida sob a forma de gráficos e os resultados foram comparados com os resultados da empresa e com os valores recomendados pela Entidade Reguladora dos Serviços de Águas e Resíduos (ERSAR). Tendo em conta a problemática em estudo, foi desenvolvida uma folha de cálculo de auxílio à gestão que permite obter valores para as perdas de água diárias para os subsistemas de Lever e do Vale do Sousa e onde a informação é apresentada sob a forma de gráficos. Os vários passos necessários ao desenvolvimento da folha de cálculo são descritos no presente relatório e é explicado o funcionamento e distribuição dos diversos componentes da rede.

Desenvolvimento de ferramenta de apoio ao dimensionamento de sistemas de autoconsumo fotovoltaico em ambiente doméstico

Nos últimos anos, tem-se assistido a uma maior preocupação com o meio ambiente, a atual conjuntura mundial está cada vez mais direcionada para a eficiência energética e para a utilização de fontes de energias renováveis. Os principais governos mundiais, incluindo o português, já perceberam a necessidade de enveredar por esse caminho e nesse sentido aplicam medidas que direcionam e consciencializam a população para a eficiência energética e para as energias renováveis. Em Portugal, o setor das energias renováveis assume atualmente uma posição de extrema importância, resultante da expressão que governo português tem vindo a implementar no panorama energético nacional, da qual resulta uma importante contribuição para o desenvolvimento económico, na criação de riqueza e geração de emprego. Neste contexto, e no caso particular da energia fotovoltaica têm sido implementadas medidas que incentivam a aposta nesta tecnologia, prova disso é o Decreto-Lei n.º 153/2014 aprovado em conselho de ministros em Setembro de 2014, que promove essencialmente o autoconsumo. O autoconsumo consiste na utilização de painéis fotovoltaicos para produção de energia elétrica para consumo próprio com ou sem recurso a equipamentos de acumulação. Em termos práticos, este sistema permite que os consumidores produzam a sua própria energia através de uma fonte renovável ao invés de adquirir essa energia na rede elétrica de serviço público. As políticas de incentivo ao autoconsumo proporcionam uma oportunidade para os consumidores interessados em investir na produção da própria energia elétrica, neste sentido e de forma a ajudar no dimensionamento de unidades de produção de autoconsumo foi desenvolvida, no âmbito desta tese, uma ferramenta de apoio ao dimensionamento de sistemas de autoconsumo fotovoltaico sem acumulação em ambiente doméstico, com o objetivo de estimar as necessidades de potência fotovoltaica a instalar em habitações de baixa tensão normal. Na base da construção desta ferramenta estiveram essencialmente os perfis de consumo, aprovados pela Entidade Reguladora dos Serviços Energéticos, de todos os clientes finais que não dispõem de equipamento de medição com registo de consumos e também a estimativa de produção fotovoltaica desenvolvida pelo Centro Comum de Investigação da Comissão Europeia. A aplicação desenvolvida tem como principal funcionalidade proporcionar ao utilizador o dimensionamento de unidades de produção de autoconsumo fotovoltaico, mediante a introdução de alguns dados tais como o distrito, a potência contratada, a tarifa e o consumo energético anual. Esta aplicação apresenta resultados relativos ao dimensionamento do sistema, como é o caso da potência a instalar e da estimativa de produção fotovoltaica anual, e resultados relativos à análise económica do sistema como é o caso do valor atual líquido, da taxa interna de rentabilidade e do payback do investimento.

Evaluation of the welfare impact of regulating mobile termination rates in Portugal

Following the European Commission’s 2009 Recommendation on the Regulatory Treatment of Fixed and Mobile Termination Rates in the EU, the Portuguese regulatory authority (ANACOM) decided to reduce termination prices in mobile networks to their long-run incremental cost (LRIC). Nevertheless, no serious quantitative assessment of the potential effects of this decision was carried out. In this paper, we adapt and calibrate the Harbord and Hoernig (2014) model of the UK mobile telephony market to the Portuguese reality, and simulate the likely impact on consumer surplus, profits and welfare of four different regulatory approaches: pure LRIC, reciprocal termination charges with fixed networks, “bill & keep”, and asymmetric termination rates. Our results show that reducing MTRs does increase social welfare, profits and consumer surplus in the fixed market, but mobile subscribers are seriously harmed by this decision.

The new economy: Essays in network economics and two-sided markets

Following the Introduction, which surveys existing literature on the technology advances and regulation in telecommunications and on two-sided markets, we address specific issues on the industries of the New Economy, featured by the existence of network effects. We seek to explore how each one of these industries work, identify potential market failures and find new solutions at the economic regulation level promoting social welfare. In Chapter 1 we analyze a regulatory issue on access prices and investments in the telecommunications market. The existing literature on access prices and investment has pointed out that networks underinvest under a regime of mandatory access provision with a fixed access price per end-user. We propose a new access pricing rule, the indexation approach, i.e., the access price, per end-user, that network i pays to network j is function of the investment levels set by both networks. We show that the indexation can enhance economic efficiency beyond what is achieved with a fixed access price. In particular, access price indexation can simultaneously induce lower retail prices and higher investment and social welfare as compared to a fixed access pricing or a regulatory holidays regime. Furthermore, we provide sufficient conditions under which the indexation can implement the socially optimal investment or the Ramsey solution, which would be impossible to obtain under fixed access pricing. Our results contradict the notion that investment efficiency must be sacrificed for gains in pricing efficiency. In Chapter 2 we investigate the effect of regulations that limit advertising airtime on advertising quality and on social welfare. We show, first, that advertising time regulation may reduce the average quality of advertising broadcast on TV networks. Second, an advertising cap may reduce media platforms and firms' profits, while the net effect on viewers (subscribers) welfare is ambiguous because the ad quality reduction resulting from a regulatory cap o¤sets the subscribers direct gain from watching fewer ads. We find that if subscribers are sufficiently sensitive to ad quality, i.e., the ad quality reduction outweighs the direct effect of the cap, a cap may reduce social welfare. The welfare results suggest that a regulatory authority that is trying to increase welfare via regulation of the volume of advertising on TV might necessitate to also regulate advertising quality or, if regulating quality proves impractical, take the effect of advertising quality into consideration. 3 In Chapter 3 we investigate the rules that govern Electronic Payment Networks (EPNs). In EPNs the No-Surcharge Rule (NSR) requires that merchants charge at most the same amount for a payment card transaction as for cash. In this chapter, we analyze a three- party model (consumers, merchants, and a proprietary EPN) with endogenous transaction volumes and heterogenous merchants' transactional benefits of accepting cards to assess the welfare impacts of the NSR. We show that, if merchants are local monopolists and the network externalities from merchants to cardholders are sufficiently strong, with the exception of the EPN, all agents will be worse o¤ with the NSR, and therefore the NSR is socially undesirable. The positive role of the NSR in terms of improvement of retail price efficiency for cardholders is also highlighted.

A liberalização do mercado energético e o papel das entidades reguladoras

The liberalisation of the energy market goes back to the 1990s, when it was impelled by the European legislator. Since then, three legislative packages, temporarily successive, were approved. Those packages contained the measures to be implemented in order to deepen the internal energy market. Besides the opening up of several national markets to competition, the European legislator aimed the creation of a real internal energy market within the European Union. The unbundling regime was one of the most important steps with respect to the liberalisation process. The introduction of these rules ensured independence to the various market operators. A real and effective right of choice was granted to the consumers so they may choose their electricity and natural gas supplier. Therefore, the activity of comercialisation is subject to competition. However, some activities of the electricity’s and natural gas’ chain of value, namely the activities of transportation and distribution, were kept under regulation rules. Even though it may seem odd, the assignment of important competences and strong powers to a regulatory authority was essential in order to achieve the liberalisation process’ goals. Electricity and natural gas are essential public goods; therefore the market operators are legally bound to public service obligations, such as the security, the universality and the continuity of the supply. The performance of these obligations may become, in some cases, unprofitable for those operators. For such reason, the protection of the consumers’ rights shall only be properly defended if there is a regulatory authority that monitors the behaviour of the operators and sanctions the failure to comply with the public service obligations. Portugal, as a Member State of the European Union, transposed into the national legal order the European directives concerning the liberalisation process. This transposition has caused radical changes to the electricity and natural gas’ national markets. The Entidade Reguladora dos Serviços Energéticos also suffered various mutations in order to keep up with the regulatory demands regarding the liberalisation process.

Requisitos de gestão e técnicos no Laboratório de Análises das Águas do Porto à luz da norma NP EN ISO-IEC 17025

Dissertação de mestrado em Técnicas de Caracterização e Análise Química