Equilibrium Principle in Colombian Public Contracting

Public contracting in Colombia is conflicting and inefficient. It frequently leads to damage to State property. The Colombian legal system cannot assure efficient and transparent public contracting. The cause is the institutional environment characterized by high transaction costs. Colombian law worsens the process by recognizing the principle of economic equilibrium in public contracts. This principle increasese contract incompleteness and renders impossible the use of economic incentives to control the opportunism of the economic agents. The authors present the hypothesis that the economic equilibrium principle increases the conflictive nature of public contracting. They test the hypothesis empirically. The first section of the paper presents a summary of the literature on transaction costs economics, as well as the legal literature on the historical origin and the content of the economic equilibrium principle. The second section describes the methodology of the empirical study. The third section shows the empirical evidence of the effects that the economic equilibrium principle exerts over the public contracting. The last section presents the conclusions.

Three essays in incomplete contracts

General Introduction These three chapters, while fairly independent from each other, study economic situations in incomplete contract settings. They are the product of both the academic freedom my advisors granted me, and in this sense reflect my personal interests, and of their interested feedback. The content of each chapter can be summarized as follows: Chapter 1: Inefficient durable-goods monopolies In this chapter we study the efficiency of an infinite-horizon durable-goods monopoly model with a fmite number of buyers. We find that, while all pure-strategy Markov Perfect Equilibria (MPE) are efficient, there also exist previously unstudied inefficient MPE where high valuation buyers randomize their purchase decision while trying to benefit from low prices which are offered once a critical mass has purchased. Real time delay, an unusual monopoly distortion, is the result of this attrition behavior. We conclude that neither technological constraints nor concern for reputation are necessary to explain inefficiency in monopolized durable-goods markets. Chapter 2: Downstream mergers and producer's capacity choice: why bake a larger pie when getting a smaller slice? In this chapter we study the effect of downstream horizontal mergers on the upstream producer's capacity choice. Contrary to conventional wisdom, we find anon-monotonic relationship: horizontal mergers induce a higher upstream capacity if the cost of capacity is low, and a lower upstream capacity if this cost is high. We explain this result by decomposing the total effect into two competing effects: a change in hold-up and a change in bargaining erosion. Chapter 3: Contract bargaining with multiple agents In this chapter we study a bargaining game between a principal and N agents when the utility of each agent depends on all agents' trades with the principal. We show, using the Potential, that equilibria payoffs coincide with the Shapley value of the underlying coalitional game with an appropriately defined characteristic function, which under common assumptions coincides with the principal's equilibrium profit in the offer game. Since the problem accounts for differences in information and agents' conjectures, the outcome can be either efficient (e.g. public contracting) or inefficient (e.g. passive beliefs).

El régimen contractual de las empresas sociales del Estado

En nuestro país existen múltiples entidades y materias que no aplican la Ley 80 de 1993. Así, el desarrollo de su actividad contractual escapa al ámbito normativo que establece el Estatuto General de Contratación de la Administración Pública, configurándose de esta manera los denominados regímenes excepcionales. Sin embargo, teniendo en cuenta que son entidades que administran recursos públicos y en virtud del deber de observancia de los principios que orientan la función administrativa establecido por el ordenamiento jurídico, el Derecho Público que pareciere inicialmente no exigible a estos regímenes termina siendo aplicado, llegando a convivir e interactuar entonces con el Derecho Privado preponderantemente aplicable en este tipo de entidades. Dentro de estas, precisamente, se encuentran las denominadas Empresas Sociales del Estado - ESES -, las cuales por disposición expresa del legislador en materia contractual se rigen por el Derecho Privado, pero otorgándoles además la facultad de utilizar las cláusulas exorbitantes previstas en el Estatuto Contractual. Este escenario particularmente confuso, donde impera la incertidumbre sobre el alcance de la aplicación del Derecho Público y/o del Derecho Privado, constituye el problema jurídico que se aborda en el presente trabajo, el cual se desarrolla a partir del estudio del régimen contractual de las ESES, señalando sus rasgos más importantes y brindando una serie de criterios para la determinación de aspectos puntuales como: la aplicación de los principios, el régimen de inhabilidades e incompatibilidades aplicable, la utilización de las cláusulas y potestades exorbitantes, las modalidades de selección del contratista, entre otros.

Mecanismos jurídicos contra la corrupción en la contratación estatal en Colombia. Especial referencia en las acciones constitucionales en la lucha contra la corrupción

En el presente trabajo final, nos dispondremos a presentar un análisis de las distintas herramientas jurídicas en nuestro ordenamiento normativo, que son utilizadas para enfrentar la corrupción administrativa que se presenta en los procesos de contratación estatal en nuestro país.

Teoría de los riesgos previsibles en los contratos estatales de prestación de servicios profesionales

Con la finalidad de mantener la mirada financiera equivalente entre las partes - lo que responde a la relación entre el derecho y la economía- no en vano la Ley 1150 de 2007 contempló dentro de su articulado el restablecimiento del equilibrio económico y financiero del contrato. Por su parte, el Decreto Nacional 0734 del 13 de abril de 2012 –hoy derogado por el Decreto 1510 de 2013- impuso la obligación a las entidades del Estado de incluir los riesgos previsibles en los estudios previos pero sólo aquellos que puedan afectar el equilibrio económico del contrato que pretenda celebrar la Entidad Pública contratante. Aunado a lo anterior, el Decreto Nacional 1510 del 17 de julio de 2013 también contempla la teoría de los riesgos dentro de su articulado. No obstante lo anterior, la normatividad legal pese a su esfuerzo, no puede regular todas las situaciones, prueba de ello, es que para los contratos de prestación de servicios profesionales la disposición legal en lo que respecta a los riesgos previsibles resulta ser innecesaria por la naturaleza misma de éstos y otras razones que se abordo a fondo. Es así como las actuaciones que se desplieguen en la contratación Estatal deben funcionar sobre una lógica económica, por ello, resulta pertinente investigar sobre la eficacia o no de incorporar los riesgos previsibles que puedan afectar el equilibrio económico en los contratos de prestación de servicios profesionales cuando la ejecución de éstos depende exclusivamente del desarrollo intelectual que corre por cuenta del contratista.

O uso do poder de compra do estado como instrumento de política pública: a lei complementar nº 123/2006, sua implementação

This study aims to bring back the debate on the use of the purchasing power of the State as instrument to boost other public policies established by federal entities. Besides putting it in a context of innovation in the public sector, the study of this issue must consider all its variables and questions, whwther of legal, economic, social or political order, starting with the one I consider the most important: the possibility of the State to assert its power of puchasing in order to design and promote markets, searching to achieve other objectives rather than those traditionally accepted. Thus, in the analysis of a direct application of a new practice, this study evaluates the implementation of the Additional Law number 123/06, which gives a differentiating treatment to micro and small enterprises in public contracting. By means of interviews, information was collected with the relevant actors in in this phase. The conclusion was that aspects such as the heterogeneity of the segment of the MPE`s and their low capacity of articulation, along with the endogenous obstacles of the instituion of the bidding, contribute decively to the low stage of the implementation that occurs at this moment.

O regime diferenciado de contratações públicas à luz das Adins 4645 E 4655 – Análise Crítica

O presente trabalho visa discutir as mudanças trazidas na Lei 12.462/11, que institui o Regime Diferenciado de Contratações Públicas, popularmente conhecido como RDC, no cenário das licitações públicas voltadas para infraestrutura da Copa do Mundo e dos Jogos Olímpicos. Apresenta a lei geral de licitações, Lei 8666/93, apontando sua importância, bem como a reação negativa da doutrina a algumas de suas disposições, ao longo de quase 20 anos de vigência. Insere neste contexto a Lei 12.462/11 e seu modo de elaboração. Tendo como pano de fundo as Adins 4645 e 4655 ajuizadas no Supremo Tribunal Federal, esta obra analisa as supostas inconstitucionalidades formais e materiais do RDC, procurando revelar que a Lei 12.462/11 pode ser utilizada pela Administração Pública como importante ferramenta de alcance do melhor interesse público à luz do princípio da eficiência.

Contratações Públicas no Setor de Resíduos Sólidos: Um estudo sobre as formas de contratação, delegação e gestão das atividades econômicas e serviços públicos relacionados ao setor de resíduos sólidos

Existem diversas formas no ordenamento jurídico brasileiro mediante as quais o poder público pode contratar, delegar ou gerir a prestação de serviços que envolvam entes privados. São elas os contratos de mera prestação de serviços regidos pela Lei 8.666/93 ou pela Lei 10.520/02; os convênios; as concessões comuns de serviço público regidas pela Lei nº 8.987/95; as parcerias público-privadas tuteladas pela Lei 11.079/04 e os consórcios públicos regidos pela Lei nº 11.107/05. O presente trabalho visa explorar como as contratações públicas ocorrem no setor de resíduos sólidos. Para isso, em um primeiro momento foi analisada a natureza jurídica dos serviços relacionados ao manejo de resíduos. Em um segundo momento, foi traçado um panorama sobre as modelagens contratuais disponíveis ao poder público para realizar essas contratações, bem como os possíveis problemas levantados pela doutrina no uso desses moldes. Por último, foram analisados casos concretos com o fim de averiguar se os referidos problemas são levados em consideração pelo Administrador Público ao elaborar os editais e contratos para prestação desses serviços pela iniciativa privada.

A influência da estrutura e dos processos organizacionais nas contratações públicas

O objetivo desta pesquisa foi conhecer como ocorreram as mudanças no planejamento da contratação em uma organização pública. O estudo de caso concentrou-se no Tribunal de Contas do Distrito Federal-TCDF, um órgão autônomo da Administração Pública direta do Distrito Federal. Os dados da pesquisa foram baseados em documentos e legislações relacionados ao órgão em estudo e em entrevistas com as chefias vinculadas à contratação pública. A análise foi efetuada de forma exploratório-descritiva, com abordagem qualitativa. Os dados coletados trouxeram a caracterização do órgão e apresentaram informações sobre as mudanças de procedimentos internos relacionadas à contratação pública, além dos efeitos dessas mudanças para a organização. O estudo demonstrou o quanto a instituição foi receptiva às mudanças e inovações administrativas. Dentre os fatores que ocasionaram as mudanças, destacam-se a flexibilidade que a organização apresenta em adaptar-se às variações externas impostas pelas legislações e normativas e, sobretudo, a necessidade da mudança. Confirmando o caráter sistêmico das organizações, detecta-se que muitas mudanças ocorridas geraram bons resultados.

São públicas as contratações do estado brasileiro? - uma experiência de contratações públicas junto à comunidade Coqueiral em Aracaju/SE.

State intervention generally demands the purchase or rental of goods and services, and such acquisitions are subject to a number of indispensable legal frameworks. In the Brazilian State, Law 8.666 of 21 June 1993 and further norms regulate the necessity of a formal process, usually licitation. Given the importance of this subject to public and private spheres, one of the prerequisites of these formal contracting rules is the openness of public acts, and society s knowledge and accompaniment. The objective of this study is to investigate society s participation in public contracting, with the aim of debating theories surrounding the state/society relationship proposed by public political thought and authors in relation to legal aspects involving licitations. The principal question of this research is: despite the possibility of society s participation being predicted in the legal frameworks which orientate licitations, why is this social control not carried out? Why does it only occupy a secondary position to both individual and collective agents? In order to test some of this study s hypotheses, field research was carried out in the Coqueiral community in Aracaju, Sergipe, in relation to public acquisitions of goods and services during the period of May to September 2009. Research involved observation visits and guided interviews with the relevant community and public sector representatives. This project s hypotheses were confirmed, as this social control is not apparent, even in areas where popular participation is a strong component in asserting ones local rights, like in the Coqueiral community.

DR-CAFTA: aspectos relevantes seleccionados del Tratado y reformas legales que deben realizar a su entrada en vigor los países de Centroamérica y la República Dominicana

Incluye Bibliografía

Rigidez ou flexibilidade governamental? Discursos anti-corrupção e pró-eficiência sobre contratações com orçamento sigilogo

Dissertação (mestrado)—Universidade de Brasília, Instituto de Ciência Política, Programa de Pós-Graduação em Ciência Política, 2016.

Local Public-Services Provision under Public-Private Partnerships : Contractual Design and Contracting Parties Incentives

When deciding to resort to a PPP contract for the provision of a local public service, local governments have to consider the demand risk allocation between the contracting parties. In this article, I investigate the effects of demand risk allocation on the accountability of procuring authorities regarding consumers changing demand, as well as on the cost-reducing effort incentives of the private public-service provider. I show that contracts in which the private provider bears demand risk motivate more the public authority from responding to customer needs. This is due to the fact that consumers are empowered when the private provider bears demand risk, that is, they have the possibility to oust the private provider in case of non-satisfaction with the service provision, which provides procuring authorities with more credibility in side-trading and then more incentives to be responsive. As a consequence, I show that there is a lower matching with consumers' preferences over time when demand risk is on the public authority rather than on the private provider, and this is corroborated in the light of two famous case studies. However, contracts in which the private provider does not bear demand risk motivate more the private provider from investing in cost-reducing efforts. I highlight then a tradeoff in the allocation of demand risk between productive and allocative efficiency. The striking policy implication of this article for local governments would be that the current trend towards a greater resort to contracts where private providers bear little or no demand risk may not be optimal. Local governments should impose demand risk on private providers within PPP contracts when they expect that consumers' preferences over the service provision will change over time.

Public Governance, Health and Foreign Direct Investment in Sub-Saharan Africa

In this paper we diverge from the existing empirical literature on FDI determinants in two ways. First, we decompose the sources of the foreign direct investment (FDI) gap between Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) and other developing regions. Once market size has been accounted for, we nd that SSA's FDI de cit is mostly explained by insufficient provision of public goods: low human capital accumulation, especially health, in SSA explains 100-140% of the inter-regional FDI gaps. Second, we estimate the indirect effect of infectious diseases on FDI through their direct impact on health. We find that a 1% point rise in HIV prevalence in the adult population is associated with a decrease in net FDI inflows of 3.5%, while a country in which 100% of the population is at risk of contracting deadly malaria receives about 16% less FDI than a similar country located in a malaria-free region.