The moral status of babies

In their controversial paper 'After-birth abortion', Alberto Giubilini and Francesca Minerva argue that there is no rational basis for allowing abortion but prohibiting infanticide ('after-birth abortion'). We ought in all consistency either to allow both or prohibit both. This paper rejects their claim, arguing that much-neglected considerations in philosophical discussions of this issue are capable of explaining why we currently permit abortion in some cases, while prohibiting infanticide.

An Analysis of Capacities, Moral Hierarchies, and the Moral Status of Non-Human Animals in Contemporary Animal Rights Work

The primary objective of this thesis is to demonstrate the pernicious impact that moral hierarchies have on our perception and subsequent treatment of non-human animals. Moral hierarchies in general are characterized by a dynamic in which one group is considered to be fundamentally superior to a lesser group. This thesis focuses specifically on the moral hierarchies that arise when humans are assumed to be superior to non-human animals in virtue of their advanced mental capabilities. The operative hypothesis of this thesis is essentially that moral hierarchies thwart the provision of justice to non-human animals in that they function as a justification for otherwise impermissible actions. When humans are assumed to be fundamentally superior to non-human animals then it becomes morally permissible for humans to kill non-human animals and utilize them as mere instrumentalities. This thesis is driven primarily by an in-depth analysis of the approaches to animal rights that are provided by Peter Singer, Tom Regan, and Gary Francione. Each of these thinkers claim that they overcome anthropocentrism and provide approaches that preclude the establishment of a moral hierarchy. One of the major findings of this thesis, however, is that Singer and Regan offer approaches that remain highly anthropocentric despite the fact that each thinker claims that they have overcome anthropocentrism. The anthropocentrism persists in these respective approaches in that each thinkers gives humans Regan and Singer have different conceptions of the criteria that are required to afford a being moral worth, but they both give preference to beings that have the cognitive ability to form desires regarding the future.. As a result, a moral hierarchy emerges in which humans are regarded to be fundamentally superior. Francione, however, provides an approach that does not foster a moral hierarchy. Francione creates such an approach by applying the principle of equal consideration of interests in a consistent manner. Moreover, Francione argues that mere sentience is both a necessary and sufficient condition for being eligible and subsequently receiving moral consideration. The upshot of this thesis is essentially that the moral treatment of animals is not compatible with the presence of a moral hierarchy. As a result, this thesis demonstrates that future approaches to animal rights must avoid the establishment of moral hierarchies. The research and analysis within this thesis demonstrates that this is not a possibility, however, unless all theories of justice that are to accommodate animals abandon the notion that cognition matters morally.

O status ontológico e moral do embrião humano

A presente dissertação é fruto de uma investigação filosófica, inserida na linha de pesquisa de Ética. Esse trabalho aprofunda uma discussão polêmica no contexto da Bioética, a saber: a manipulação de células embrionárias. Contudo, o autor não envereda seus esforços nas conse-quências éticas advindas das novas tecnologias produzidas pela Engenharia Genética, mas adentra na causa do problema, isto é, pretende antes saber se o embrião humano é ser vivo, ser humano e, principalmente, pessoa. Assim, o autor tem como objetivo principal investigar o status ontológico e moral do embrião humano. Nesse contexto, investiga o conceito de identidade pessoal, examinando-o - brevemente - à luz de duas teorias da Filosofia da Mente: internalista, que defende a construção do eu por bases internas; e a externalista, que advoga a construção do eu por bases externas. Elenca e analisa os atributos essenciais que concebe uma pessoa. Também pesquisa o conceito de dignidade humana e sua vinculação ao conceito de pessoa, tendo como base a filosofia moral de Immanuel Kant, através de sua obra Fundamentação da Metafísica dos Costumes. Além desta e da bibliografia utilizada sobre o tema, a fonte principal dessa discussão é a obra Ética Prática, do filósofo Peter Singer. Vale destacar que existem três posições dominantes dentro dessa temática: a) Teoria Concepcionalista, a qual argumenta que o embrião é pessoa desde a concepção e, por isso, desautoriza qualquer manipulação; b) Teoria Genético-Desenvolvimentista, a qual defende a pessoalidade do embrião a partir de diferentes etapas do seu desenvolvimento biológico e, desse modo, defende as pesquisas biomédicas; c) Teoria da Potencialidade da Pessoa, a qual advoga que o embrião ainda não tem a pessoalidade, no entanto, é um potencial ser humano e pessoa, e, por essa razão, sua integridade deve ser preservada. Ao final, o autor enumera as principais implicações éticas, psicológicas, sociais e jurídicas, uma vez determinados os estatutos ontológico e moral do embrião humano.

The late discovery of adoptive and donor insemination offspring status : ethical implications for conceptual understandings of the ‘best interests of the child’ principle

Late discovery is a term used to describe the experience of discovering the truth of one’s genetic origins as an adult. Following discovery, late discoverers face a lack of recognition and acknowledgment of their concerns from family, friends, community and institutions. They experience pain, anger, loss, grief and frustration. This presentation shares the findings of the first qualitative study of both late discovery of adoptive and donor insemination offspring (heterosexual couple use only) experiences. It is also the first study of late discovery experiences undertaken from an ethical perspective. While this study recruited new participants, it also included an ethical re-analysis of existing late discovery accounts across both practices. The findings of this study (a) draws links between past adoption and current donor insemination (heterosexual couple only) practices, (b) reveals that late discoverers are demanding acknowledgment and recognition of the particularity of their experiences, and (c) offers insights into conceptual understandings of the ‘best interests of the child’ principle. These insights derive from the lived experiences of those whose biological and social worlds have been sundered and secrecy and denial of difference used to conceal this. It suggests that acknowledging the equal moral status of the child may be useful in strengthening conceptual understandings of the ‘best interests of the child’ principle. This equal moral status involves ensuring that personal autonomy and the ability to exercise free will is protected; that the integrity of the relationships of trust expected and demanded between parent/s and children is defended and supported; and that equal access to normative socio-cultural practices, that is; non-fictionalised birth certificates and open records, is guaranteed.

The typic in Kant’s critique of practical reason : moral judgment and symbolic representation

Comment pouvons-nous représenter un principe moral universel de manière à le rendre applicable à des cas concrets ? Ce problème revêt une forme aiguë dans la philosophie morale d’Emmanuel Kant (1724-1804), tout particulièrement dans sa théorie du jugement moral, car il soutient que l’on doit appliquer la loi morale « suprasensible » à des actions dans le monde sensible afin de déterminer celles-ci comme moralement bonnes ou mauvaises. Kant aborde ce problème dans un chapitre de la Critique de la raison pratique (1788) intitulé « De la typique de la faculté de juger pratique pure » (KpV 5: 67-71). La première partie de la thèse vise à fournir un commentaire compréhensif et détaillé de ce texte important, mais trop peu étudié. Étant donné que la loi morale, en tant qu’Idée suprasensible de la raison, ne peut pas être appliquée directement à des actions dans l’intuition sensible, Kant a recours à une forme particulière de représentation indirecte et symbolique. Sa solution inédite consiste à fournir la faculté de juger avec un « type [Typus] », ou analogue formel, de la loi morale. Ce type est la loi de la causalité naturelle : en tant que loi, il sert d’étalon formel pour tester l’universalisabilité des maximes ; et, en tant que loi de la nature, il peut aussi s’appliquer à toute action dans l’expérience sensible. Dès lors, le jugement moral s’effectue par le biais d’une expérience de pensée dans laquelle on se demande si l’on peut vouloir que sa maxime devienne une loi universelle d’une nature contrefactuelle dont on ferait soi-même partie. Cette expérience de pensée fonctionne comme une « épreuve [Probe] » de la forme des maximes et, par ce moyen, du statut moral des actions. Kant soutient que tout un chacun, même « l’entendement le plus commun », emploie cette procédure pour l’appréciation morale. De plus, la typique prémunit contre deux menaces à l’éthique rationaliste de Kant, à savoir l’empirisme (c’est-à-dire le conséquentialisme) et le mysticisme. La seconde partie de la thèse se penche sur l’indication de Kant que la typique « ne sert que comme un symbole ». Un bon nombre de commentateurs ont voulu assimiler la typique à la notion d’« hypotypose symbolique » présentée dans le § 59 de la Critique de la faculté de juger (1790). La typique serait un processus de symbolisation esthétique consistant à présenter, de façon indirecte, la représentation abstraite de la loi morale sous la forme d’un symbole concret et intuitif. Dans un premier chapitre, cette interprétation est présentée et soumise à un examen critique qui cherche à montrer qu’elle est erronée et peu judicieuse. Dans le second chapitre, nous poursuivons une voie d’interprétation jusqu’ici ignorée, montrant que la typique a de plus grandes continuités avec la notion d’« anthropomorphisme symbolique », une procédure strictement analogique introduite auparavant dans les Prolégomènes (1783). Nous en concluons, d’une part, que la typique fut un moment décisif dans l’évolution de la théorie kantienne de la représentation symbolique et que, d’autre part, elle marque la réalisation, chez Kant, d’une conception proprement critique de la nature et de la morale comme deux sphères distinctes, dont la médiation s’opère par le biais des concepts de loi et de conformité à la loi (Gesetzmässigkeit). En un mot, la typique s’avère l’instrument par excellence du « rationalisme de la faculté de juger ».

O estatuto moral dos animais não-humanos em uma perspectiva sistêmica

Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior (CAPES)

The potentiality of the embryo and the somatic cell

Recent arguments on the ethics of stem cell research have taken a novel approach to the question of the moral status of the embryo. One influential argument focuses on a property that the embryo is said to posses—namely, the property of being an entity with a rational nature or, less controversially, an entity that has the potential to acquire a rational nature—and claims that this property is also possessed by a somatic cell. Since nobody seriously thinks that we have a duty to preserve the countless such cells we wash off our body every day in the shower, the argument is intended as a reductio ad absurdum of the claim that the embryo should be afforded the same moral status as a fully developed human being. This article argues that this argument is not successful and that it consequently plays into the hands of those who oppose embryonic stem cell research. It is therefore better to abandon this argument and focus instead on the different argument that potentiality, as such, is not a sufficient ground for the creation of moral obligations towards the embryo.

Green Political Theory

Ecologism or green political theory is the most recent of schools of political thinking. On the one hand, it focuses on issues that are extremely old in politics and philosophical inquiry – such as the relationship between the human and nonhuman worlds, the moral status of animals, what is the ‘good life’, and the ethical and political regulation of technological innovation. Yet on the other, it is also characterised as dealing with some specifically contemporary issues such as the economic and political implications of climate change, peak oil, overconsumption, resource competition and conflicts, and rising levels of global and national inequalities. It is also an extremely broad school of political thought covering a wide variety of concerns, contains a number of distinct sub-schools of green thought (here sharing a similarity with other political ideologies) and combines normative and empirical scientific elements in a unique manner making it distinctive from other political ideologies.

Insults, free speech and offensiveness

This article examines what is wrong with some expressive acts, ‘insults’. Their putative wrongfulness is distinguished from the causing of indirect harms, aggregated harms, contextual harms, and damaging misrepresentations. The article clarifies what insults are, making use of work by Neu and Austin, and argues that their wrongfulness cannot lie in the hurt that is caused to those at whom such acts are directed. Rather it must lie in what they seek to do, namely to denigrate the other. The causing of offence is at most evidence that an insult has been communicated; it is not independent grounds of proscription or constraint. The victim of an insult may know that she has been insulted but not accept or agree with the insult, and thereby submit to the insulter. Hence insults need not, as Waldron argues they do, occasion dignitary harms. They do not of themselves subvert their victims' equal moral status. The claim that hateful speech endorses inequality should not be conflated with a claim that such speech directly subverts equality.

Thus, ‘wounding words’ should not unduly trouble the liberal defender of free speech either on the grounds of preventing offence or on those of avoiding dignitary harms.

Task Competency in the Rights Analytic: Mental Health and the Justification for Rights and Duties

The paper concerns the moral status of persons for the purposes of rights-holding and duty-bearing. Developing from Gewirth’s argument to the Principle of Generic Consistency (PGC) and Beyleveld et al.’s Principle of Precautionary Reasoning, I argue in favour of a capacity-based assessment of the task competencies required for choice-rights and certain duties (within the Hohfeldian analytic). Unlike other, traditional, theories of rights, I claim that precautionary reasoning as to agentic status holds the base justification for rights-holding. If this is the basis for generic legal rights, then the contingent argument must be used to explain communities of rights. Much in the same way as two ‘normal’ adult agents may not have equal rights to be an aeroplane pilot, not all adults hold the same task competencies in relation to the exercise of the generic rights to freedom derived from the PGC. In this paper, I set out to consider the rights held by children, persons suffering from mental illness and generic ‘full’ agents. In mapping the developing ‘portfolio’ of rights and duties that a person carries during their life we might better understand the legal relations of those who do not ostensibly fulfil the criteria of ‘full’ agent.

Utilitarianism and Buddist ethics: a comparative approach to the ethics of animal research

This thesis explores the comparison utilitarianism and Buddhist ethics as they can be applied to animal research. It begins by examining some of the general discussions surrounding the use of animals in research. The historical views on the moral status of animals, the debate surrounding their use in animals, as well as the current 3R paradigm and its application in Canadian research are explored. The thesis then moves on to expound the moral system of utilitarianism as put forth by Jeremy Bentham and John Stuart Mill, as well as contemporary additions to the system. It also looks at the basics of Buddhist ethics well distinguishing the Mahayana from the Therevada. Three case studies in animal research are used to explore how both systems can be applied to animal research. It then offers a comparison as to how both ethical systems function within the field of animal research and explores the implications in their application on its practice.

La investigación sobre los efectos de las single sex vs. coeducational schools.

Resumen tomado del autor

Consumer Behavior in Moral Markets. On the Relevance of Identity, Justice Beliefs, Social Norms, Status and Trust in Ethical Consumption

This article addresses ethical consumer behavior and uses the purchase of Fair Trade (FT) coffee to gain insights into determinants of ‘moral behavior’ in the marketplace. Our primary concern is to clarify which theoretical concepts and determinants are more useful than others in explaining FT consumption. We compare the explanatory power of consumer budget restrictions, consumer identity, social and personal norms, social status, justice beliefs, and trust. Our second aim is methodological; we contrast data on self-reported consumption of FT coffee with experimental data on hypothetical choices of different coffee products. To gain insights into the robustness of our measurement and findings, we test our propositions using two samples of undergraduate students from Germany and the United States. Our data show that consumer identity and personal norms are the major determinants of FT consumption in both samples, the results from survey-based data and from our experimental data are similar in this regard. Further, we demonstrate that studies based on a limited number of determinants might overestimate effects; the effect of justice beliefs for instance vanishes if other determinants are taken into account.

Um estudo sobre o status moral dos animais desde uma perspectiva deontológica

The main concern of this work is to offer an analysis of the possibility of an ethical approach to the interaction between human beings and animals. As far as possible we seek an approach which rely neither on utilitarian considerations nor on indirect reasons to explain the attribution of dignity or moral rights to animals. We take for granted that some of them (if not all) do possess it. And then we try to show that a deontological ethical theory (one which centers in the human as the agent but is not restricted to humans as the objects of the moral action) can afford us a good theoretical basis for the grounding of the attribution of rights or dignity to animals. Analyzing the main features of Kantian ethics, as well as some of its alternatives, it will be possible to show that an ethical theory which does not presuppose reciprocity nor depends solely upon particular human concerns is not only possible but also reveals itself as the most sensible and adequate to the nature of our values and of the case at hand.

Um estudo sobre o status moral dos animais desde uma perspectiva deontológica

The main concern of this work is to offer an analysis of the possibility of an ethical approach to the interaction between human beings and animals. As far as possible we seek an approach which rely neither on utilitarian considerations nor on indirect reasons to explain the attribution of dignity or moral rights to animals. We take for granted that some of them (if not all) do possess it. And then we try to show that a deontological ethical theory (one which centers in the human as the agent but is not restricted to humans as the objects of the moral action) can afford us a good theoretical basis for the grounding of the attribution of rights or dignity to animals. Analyzing the main features of Kantian ethics, as well as some of its alternatives, it will be possible to show that an ethical theory which does not presuppose reciprocity nor depends solely upon particular human concerns is not only possible but also reveals itself as the most sensible and adequate to the nature of our values and of the case at hand.