Divulgação de informação sobre o governo das sociedades em Portugal: Extensão e determinantes

Tese de Doutoramento em Contabilidade

Contabilidade e relato dos intangíveis: Análise das empresas cotadas na BM&FBOVESPA

O presente trabalho de investigação avalia a situação atual relativa à adoção do disposto na IAS 38 e suas consequências no reconhecimento, mensuração e divulgação obrigatória, e à divulgação voluntária, interna e externa, dos intangíveis nas empresas brasileiras cotadas na BM&FBOVESPA. Adotando a perspectiva positivista e uma abordagem quantitativa, foi utilizado o inquérito por questionário como método de recolha de dados. O questionário foi elaborado de raiz, suportado pelo arcabouço teórico. Os resultados são interpretados à luz dos argumentos da teoria dos stakeholders e da teoria institucional, que revelaram um bom potencial explicativo para o fenômeno em análise. Com a adoção das IAS/IFRS para elaboração dos balanços consolidados de empresas cotadas e não cotadas, o Brasil passa a utilizar a IAS 38, para o registro das operações envolvendo os ativos intangíveis, obrigatoriamente no exercício de 2010. A adoção deste normativo se deu essencialmente por pressões legais. No entanto, as empresas que adotaram a IAS 38 de forma voluntária validaram as razões apresentadas na literatura. Constatou-se que existe concordância quanto à nova forma de contabilização dos intangíveis prevista, sendo o grau de satisfação relativamente ao tratamento contábil dos ativos intangíveis de acordo com o novo modelo contábil adotado no Brasil (IAS 38 e CPC 04) elevado. Como principais dificuldades no reconhecimento contábil dos ativos intangíveis segundo o normativo em vigor, foram confirmados os problemas evidenciados na literatura, tais como incerteza quanto aos benefícios econômicos futuros e falta de medida com confiabilidade suficiente para o registro das transações. As empresas brasileiras acreditam ser importante que haja uma expansão da divulgação sobre intangíveis, no entanto a divulgação interna e externa está ainda em fase embrionária, não sendo uma prática generalizada. Contudo, os objetivos apresentados na literatura para a divulgação interna e externa de informações sobre intangíveis encontram suporte empírico no estudo desenvolvido. No que diz respeito aos stakeholders, conclui-se que as empresas brasileiras têm grande preocupação em atendê-los quando se trata de divulgação voluntária sobre intangíveis, entendendo que todos eles poderão beneficiar com estas informações.

The credit ratings game

The spectacular failure of top-rated structured finance products has broughtrenewed attention to the conflicts of interest of Credit Rating Agencies (CRAs). We modelboth the CRA conflict of understating credit risk to attract more business, and the issuerconflict of purchasing only the most favorable ratings (issuer shopping), and examine theeffectiveness of a number of proposed regulatory solutions of CRAs. We find that CRAs aremore prone to inflate ratings when there is a larger fraction of naive investors in the marketwho take ratings at face value, or when CRA expected reputation costs are lower. To theextent that in booms the fraction of naive investors is higher, and the reputation risk forCRAs of getting caught understating credit risk is lower, our model predicts that CRAs aremore likely to understate credit risk in booms than in recessions. We also show that, due toissuer shopping, competition among CRAs in a duopoly is less efficient (conditional on thesame equilibrium CRA rating policy) than having a monopoly CRA, in terms of both totalex-ante surplus and investor surplus. Allowing tranching decreases total surplus further.We argue that regulatory intervention requiring upfront payments for rating services (beforeCRAs propose a rating to the issuer) combined with mandatory disclosure of any ratingproduced by CRAs can substantially mitigate the con.icts of interest of both CRAs andissuers.

The credit ratings game

The collapse of so many AAA-rated structured finance products in 2007-2008has brought renewed attention to the causes of ratings failures and the conflicts of interestin the Credit Ratings Industry. We provide a model of competition among Credit RatingsAgencies (CRAs) in which there are three possible sources of conflicts: 1) the CRA conflictof interest of understating credit risk to attract more business; 2) the ability of issuersto purchase only the most favorable ratings; and 3) the trusting nature of some investorclienteles who may take ratings at face value. We show that when combined, these give riseto three fundamental equilibrium distortions. First, competition among CRAs can reducemarket efficiency, as competition facilitates ratings shopping by issuers. Second, CRAs aremore prone to inflate ratings in boom times, when there are more trusting investors, andwhen the risks of failure which could damage CRA reputation are lower. Third, the industrypractice of tranching of structured products distorts market efficiency as its role is to deceivetrusting investors. We argue that regulatory intervention requiring: i) upfront paymentsfor rating services (before CRAs propose a rating to the issuer), ii) mandatory disclosure ofany rating produced by CRAs, and iii) oversight of ratings methodology can substantiallymitigate ratings inflation and promote efficiency.

Ativos intangíveis, valor da firma e estrutura de capital no Brasil

Nos últimos anos, a importância dos ativos intangíveis vem crescendo consideravelmente, em função de ser um dos principais determinantes da vantagem competitiva de uma companhia. A implantação da nova lei contábil no Brasil em 2007, com a obrigatoriedade de divulgação do montante de ativos intangíveis em separado pelas companhias de capital aberto, abriu espaço para a realização de novos estudos acerca desse tema. Esse trabalho analisa o impacto dos ativos intangíveis sobre o valor de mercado e endividamento das companhias listadas na BM&FBovespa. Encontramos evidências de que o nível de ativos intangíveis impacta positivamente o valor de mercado e negativamente o grau de endividamento das companhias de capital aberto no Brasil.

A Regulação pela informação no mercado de valores mobiliários

O mercado de capitais no âmbito do sistema financeiro apresenta-se como um instrumento capaz de definir e aumentar a eficiência da alocação de bens e recursos entre poupadores e investidores em uma sociedade. Não obstante, o mercado é passível de falhas, necessitando, portanto, da intervenção estatal para corrigir eventuais falhas. Dentre as falhas mais comuns apresentadas no mercado de capitais, destaca-se a assimetria de informações, que basicamente consiste na falta de plena informação para todos os agentes participantes do mercado acionário. Neste cenário, o Estado elegeu o regime de divulgação de informações para nortear e fiscalizar o mercado de valores mobiliários, objetivando corrigir as assimetrias de informações decorrentes, sendo o modelo adotado por inúmeros países atualmente. Deste modo é importante compreender os motivos pelos quais levaram o Estado a primeiramente intervir nos mercados por meio da regulação e os motivos pelos quais levaram a adoção do regime de divulgação obrigatória de informações como pedra angular do mercado de valores mobiliários, analisando os aspectos positivos e negativos que justificam tal regime.

A divulgação de provisões e passivos contingentes ambientais pelas empresas do setor de energia elétrica em comparação ao desenvolvimento da normatização da evidenciação contábil

O pressuposto desta pesquisa é de que a divulgação de informações ambientais, no âmbito das provisões e passivos contingentes, reagiu aos avanços na normatização contábil. A normatização contábil genérica sobre evidenciação de obrigações incertas era restrita, em meados de 1976, à Lei no 6.404, e assim permaneceu ao longo de pelo menos uma década e meia, quando começou a ser desenvolvida. Ao longo dos anos foram criados padrões obrigatórios de divulgação, com critérios de julgamento mais detalhados para a classificação da obrigação incerta em provável, possível ou remota. Embora ainda apresente algum grau de subjetividade, o desenvolvimento destes critérios pode ter contribuído para a diminuição da assimetria informacional: a empresa passou a contar com um conjunto de orientações mais claras e, portanto, com melhores condições de averiguar e divulgar suas obrigações incertas. Esse avanço contribuiu para que as obrigações ambientais passassem a ter maior exposição, principalmente no âmbito das empresas potencialmente poluidoras, como as do setor de energia elétrica, que utilizam recursos naturais e modificam o meio ambiente. Neste contexto, o objetivo deste estudo foi analisar as evidências de passivo ambiental divulgadas pelas empresas do setor de energia elétrica, de 1997 a 2014. Para tanto, foi desenvolvido um estudo qualitativo, descritivo e longitudinal, por meio da análise de conteúdo de 941 notas explicativas, de uma população de 64 empresas do setor de energia elétrica, de acordo com listagem na BM&FBovespa, em maio de 2015. A amostra foi constituída de 26 empresas, que divulgaram o total de 468 notas explicativas no site da CVM, de 1997 a 2014. Ao longo destes 18 anos, 14 empresas da amostra (53,85%) evidenciaram passivos ambientais ao menos uma vez e 12 instituições (46,15%) não o fizeram e, do total de 468 notas explicativas, 100 (21,37%) evidenciaram passivo ambiental. O número de evidências de passivos ambientais era pequeno em meados de 1997, mas ascendeu, com um aumento mais consistente a partir de 2006, ano que coincide com a aprovação da Norma e Procedimento de Contabilidade 22 - Provisões, Passivos, Contingências Passivas e Contingências Ativas, emitida pelo IBRACON. Adicionalmente, a materialidade quantitativa estava na média de 0,61% para provisões ambientais e 0,89% para os passivos contingentes ambientais, desconsiderando-se os outliers. A dimensão das notas explicativas, em termos de quantidade de palavras, foi crescente e diversificada. Em conclusão, a evidenciação contábil pode, em adição à evidenciação voluntária, ser um meio plausível para a divulgação de questões ambientais e redução da assimetria informacional, principalmente quando a normatização contábil se faz mais clara e detalhada.

Three essays on corporate taxation : financial reporting, value, and firm creation

Doutoramento em Gestão

A divulgação de informação do governo societário e o seu efeito no mercado de capitais. Evidência no PSI20 - Euronext Lisbon

Dissertação de Mestrado, Finanças Empresariais, Faculdade de Economia, Universidade do Algarve, 2016

Mandatory accounting disclosure by small private companies

This article analyzes how mandatory accounting disclosure is grounded on differentrationales for private and public companies. It also explores technological changes, such ascomputerised databases and the Internet, which have recently made disclosure of companyaccounts by small companies potentially less costly and more valuable, thanks to electronicfiling and universal online access to credit information systems. These recent developmentsfavour policies that would expand the scope of mandatory publication for small companies incountries where it is voluntary. They also encourage policies to reduce the costs and enhancethe value of disclosure through administrative reforms of filing, archive and retrieval systems.Survey and registry evidence on how the information in the accounts is valued and used bycompanies is consistent with these claims about the evolution of the tradeoff of costs andbenefits that should guide policy in this area.

Mandatory and voluntary information disclosure and the effects on financial analysts: evidence from China

Purpose – This paper aims to make a comparison, different from existing literature solely focusing on voluntary earnings forecasts and ex post earnings surprise, between the effects of mandatory earnings surprise warnings and voluntary information disclosure issued by management teams on financial analysts in terms of the number of followings and the accuracy of earnings forecasts. Design/methodology/approach – This paper uses panel data analysis with fixed effects on data collected from Chinese public firms between 2006 and 2010. It uses an exogenous regulation enforcement to minimise the endogeneity problem. Findings – This paper finds that financial analysts are less likely to follow firms which mandatorily issue earnings surprise warnings ex ante than those voluntarily issue earnings forecasts. Moreover, ex post, they issue less accurate and more dispersed forecasts on former firms. The results support Brown et al.’s (2009) finding in the USA and suggest that the earnings surprise warnings affect information asymmetries. Practical implications – This paper justifies the mandatory earnings surprise warnings policy issued by Chinese Securities Regulatory Commission in 2006. Originality/value – Mandatory earnings surprise is a unique practical regulation for publicly listed firms in China. This paper, for the first time, provides empirical evaluation on the effectiveness of a mandatory information disclosure policy in China. Consistent with existing literature on information disclosure by public firms in other countries, this paper finds that, in China, voluntary information disclosure captures more private information than mandatory information disclosure on corporate earnings ability.

Accounting for Human Rights Violations Risk: Conflict Minerals Mandatory Disclosures under the Dodd Frank Act

This paper examines the equity market response to firms’ disclosure of human rights violation risk with regard to conflict mineral usage as required by Section 1502 of the Dodd-Frank Act (the Act). This paper assesses the aggregate equity market response to regulatory events leading to the passage of the Act, the equity market reaction to voluntary early disclosures and mandatory disclosures of conflict mineral information in Form SD, as well as the determinants of the equity market response. Using a sample of 4,399 US registrants from January 1, 2008 to September 30, 2014, we document a significant negative stock market reaction to the passage of the Act and to conflict minerals disclosures on Form SD. The equity market reaction is more negative and limited to companies that source their minerals from conflict zones, companies with human rights violations, and companies with ambiguous disclosures. Taken together, the results of this study provide an economic justification for companies with poor conflict minerals practices to improve in order to avoid high costs that will arise if firms are forced to disclose human rights abuses. This paper also provides preliminary evidence that Form SD is successful in reducing the governance gap that exposes investors to unnecessary sanction, litigation and reputation risk from firms’ activities in conflict minerals usage.

Essays on behavioral aspects of the design and disclosure of compensation contracts

This thesis consists of four essays on the design and disclosure of compensation contracts. Essays 1, 2 and 3 focus on behavioral aspects of mandatory compensation disclosure rules and of contract negotiations in agency relationships. The three experimental studies develop psychology- based theory and present results that deviate from standard economic predictions. Furthermore, the results of Essay 1 and 2 also have implications for firms’ discretion in how to communicate their top management’s incentives to the capital market. Essay 4 analyzes the role of fairness perceptions for the evaluation of executive compensation. For this purpose, two surveys targeting representative eligible voters as well as investment professionals were conducted. Essay 1 investigates the role of the detailed ‘Compensation Discussion and Analysis’, which is part of the Security and Exchange Commission’s 2006 regulation, on investors’ evaluations of executive performance. Compensation disclosure complying with this regulation clarifies the relationship between realized reported compensation and the underlying performance measures and their target achievement levels. The experimental findings suggest that the salient presentation of executives’ incentives inherent in the ‘Compensation Discussion and Analysis’ makes investors’ performance evaluations less outcome dependent. Therefore, investors’ judgment and investment decisions might be less affected by noisy environmental factors that drive financial performance. The results also suggest that fairness perceptions of compensation contracts are essential for investors’ performance evaluations in that more transparent disclosure increases the perceived fairness of compensation and the performance evaluation of managers who are not responsible for a bad financial performance. These results have important practical implications as firms might choose to communicate their top management’s incentive compensation more transparently in order to benefit from less volatile expectations about their future performance. Similar to the first experiment, the experiment described in Essay 2 addresses the question of more transparent compensation disclosure. However, other than the first experiment, the second experiment does not analyze the effect of a more salient presentation of contract information but the informational effect of contract information itself. For this purpose, the experiment tests two conditions in which the assessment of the compensation contracts’ incentive compatibility, which determines executive effort, is either possible or not. On the one hand, the results suggest that the quality of investors’ expectations about executive effort is improved, but on the other hand investors might over-adjust their prior expectations about executive effort if being confronted with an unexpected financial performance and under-adjust if the financial performance confirms their prior expectations. Therefore, in the experiment, more transparent compensation disclosure does not lead to more correct overall judgments of executive effort and to even lower processing quality of outcome information. These results add to the literature on disclosure which predominantly advocates more transparency. The findings of the experiment however, identify decreased information processing quality as a relevant disclosure cost category. Firms might therefore carefully evaluate the additional costs and benefits of more transparent compensation disclosure. Together with the results from the experiment in Essay 1, the two experiments on compensation disclosure imply that firms should rather focus on their discretion how to present their compensation disclosure to benefit from investors’ improved fairness perceptions and their spill-over on performance evaluation. Essay 3 studies the behavioral effects of contextual factors in recruitment processes that do not affect the employer’s or the applicant’s bargaining power from a standard economic perspective. In particular, the experiment studies two common characteristics of recruitment processes: Pre-contractual competition among job applicants and job applicants’ non-binding effort announcements as they might be made during job interviews. Despite the standard economic irrelevance of these factors, the experiment develops theory regarding the behavioral effects on employees’ subsequent effort provision and the employers’ contract design choices. The experimental findings largely support the predictions. More specifically, the results suggest that firms can benefit from increased effort and, therefore, may generate higher profits. Further, firms may seize a larger share of the employment relationship’s profit by highlighting the competitive aspects of the recruitment process and by requiring applicants to make announcements about their future effort. Finally, Essay 4 studies the role of fairness perceptions for the public evaluation of executive compensation. Although economic criteria for the design of incentive compensation generally do not make restrictive recommendations with regard to the amount of compensation, fairness perceptions might be relevant from the perspective of firms and standard setters. This is because behavioral theory has identified fairness as an important determinant of individuals’ judgment and decisions. However, although fairness concerns about executive compensation are often stated in the popular media and even in the literature, evidence on the meaning of fairness in the context of executive compensation is scarce and ambiguous. In order to inform practitioners and standard setters whether fairness concerns are exclusive to non-professionals or relevant for investment professionals as well, the two surveys presented in Essay 4 aim to find commonalities in the opinions of representative eligible voters and investments professionals. The results suggest that fairness is an important criterion for both groups. Especially, exposure to risk in the form of the variable compensation share is an important criterion shared by both groups. The higher the assumed variable share, the higher is the compensation amount to be perceived as fair. However, to a large extent, opinions on executive compensation depend on personality characteristics, and to some extent, investment professionals’ perceptions deviate systematically from those of non-professionals. The findings imply that firms might benefit from emphasizing the riskiness of their managers’ variable pay components and, therefore, the findings are also in line with those of Essay 1.

The movement toward patient safety: State action related to reporting and disclosure of healthcare-associated infections

Increasing attention has been given to the problem of medical errors over the past decade. Included within that focused attention has been a strong interest in reducing the occurrence of healthcare-associated infections (HAIs). Acting concurrently with federal initiatives, the majority of U.S. states have statutorily required reporting and public disclosure of HAI data. Although the occurrence of these state statutory enactments and other state initiatives represent a recognition of the strong concern pertaining to HAIs, vast differences in each state’s HAI reporting and public disclosure requirements creates a varied and unequal response to what has become a national problem.^ The purpose of this research was to explore the variations in state HAI legal requirements and other state mandates. State actions, including statutory enactments, regulations, and other initiatives related to state reporting and public disclosure mechanisms were compared, discussed, and analyzed in an effort to illustrate the impact of the lack of uniformity as a public health concern.^ The HAI statutes, administrative requirements, and other mandates of each state and two U.S. territories were reviewed to answer the following seven research questions: How far has the state progressed in its HAI initiative? If the state has a HAI reporting requirement, is it mandatory or voluntary? What healthcare entities are subject to the reporting requirements? What data collection system is utilized? What measures are required to be reported? What is the public disclosure mechanism? How is the underlying reported information protected from public disclosure or other legal release?^ Secondary publicly available data, including state statutes, administrative rules, and other initiatives, were utilized to examine the current HAI-related legislative and administrative activity of the study subjects. The information was reviewed and analyzed to determine variations in HAI reporting and public disclosure laws. Particular attention was given to the seven key research questions.^ The research revealed that considerable progress has been achieved in state HAI initiatives since 2004. Despite this progress, however, when reviewing the state laws and HAI programs comparatively, considerable variations were found to exist with regards to the type of reporting requirements, healthcare facilities subject to the reporting laws, data collection systems utilized, reportable measures, public disclosure requirements, and confidentiality and privilege provisions. The wide variations in state statutes, administrative rules, and other agency directives create a fragmented and inconsistent approach to addressing the nationwide occurrence of HAIs in the U.S. healthcare system. ^