Resource-monotonicity for house allocation problems

We study a simple model of assigning indivisible objects (e.g., houses, jobs, offices, etc.) to agents. Each agent receives at most one object and monetary compensations are not possible. We completely describe all rules satisfying efficiency and resource-monotonicity. The characterized rules assign the objects in a sequence of steps such that at each step there is either a dictator or two agents "trade" objects from their hierarchically specified "endowments."

Coupling and monotonicity of queueing processes

The main purpose of this work is to give a survey of main monotonicity properties of queueing processes based on the coupling method. The literature on this topic is quite extensive, and we do not consider all aspects of this topic. Our more concrete goal is to select the most interesting basic monotonicity results and give simple and elegant proofs. Also we give a few new (or revised) proofs of a few important monotonicity properties for the queue-size and workload processes both in single-server and multi- server systems. The paper is organized as follows. In Section 1, the basic notions and results on coupling method are given. Section 2 contains known coupling results for renewal processes with focus on construction of synchronized renewal instants for a superposition of independent renewal processes. In Section 3, we present basic monotonicity results for the queue-size and workload processes. We consider both discrete-and continuous-time queueing systems with single and multi servers. Less known results on monotonicity of queueing processes with dependent service times and interarrival times are also presented. Section 4 is devoted to monotonicity of general Jackson-type queueing networks with Markovian routing. This section is based on the notable paper [17]. Finally, Section 5 contains elements of stability analysis of regenerative queues and networks, where coupling and monotonicity results play a crucial role to establish minimal suficient stability conditions. Besides, we present some new monotonicity results for tandem networks.

First price auctions: Monotonicity and uniqueness

I study monotonicity and uniqueness of the equilibrium strategies in a two-person first price auction with affiliated signals. I show thatwhen the game is symmetric there is a unique Nash equilibrium thatsatisfies a regularity condition requiring that the equilibrium strategies be{\sl piecewise monotone}. Moreover, when the signals are discrete-valued, the equilibrium is unique. The central part of the proof consists of showing that at any regular equilibrium the bidders' strategies must be monotone increasing within the support of winning bids. The monotonicity result derived in this paper provides the missing link for the analysis of uniqueness in two-person first price auctions. Importantly, this result extends to asymmetric auctions.

On the (in)compatibility of rationality, monotonicity and consistency for cooperative games

On the domain of cooperative transferable utility games, we investigate if there are single valued solutions that reconcile rationality, consistency and monotonicity (with respect to the worth of the grand coalition) properties. This paper collects some impossibility results on the combination of core selection with either complement or projected consistency, and core selection, max consistency and monotonicity. By contrast, possibility results show up when combining individual rationality, projected consistency and monotonicity.

Resource-Monotonicity for House Allocation Problems

We study a simple model of assigning indivisible objects (e.g., houses, jobs, offices, etc.) to agents. Each agent receives at most one object and monetary compensations are not possible. We completely describe all rules satisfying efficiency and resource-monotonicity. The characterized rules assign the objects in a sequence of steps such that at each step there is either a dictator or two agents who “trade” objects from their hierarchically specified “endowments.”

Monotonicity and asymptotics of zeros of Sobolev type orthogonal polynomials: A general case

Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior (CAPES)

Monotonicity of zeros of Jacobi polynomials

Denote by x(nk)(alpha, beta), k = 1...., n, the zeros of the Jacobi polynornial P-n((alpha,beta)) (x). It is well known that x(nk)(alpha, beta) are increasing functions of beta and decreasing functions of alpha. In this paper we investigate the question of how fast the functions 1 - x(nk)(alpha, beta) decrease as beta increases. We prove that the products t(nk)(alpha, beta) := f(n)(alpha, beta) (1 - x(nk)(alpha, beta), where f(n)(alpha, beta) = 2n(2) + 2n(alpha + beta + 1) + (alpha + 1)(beta + 1) are already increasing functions of beta and that, for any fixed alpha > - 1, f(n)(alpha, beta) is the asymptotically extremal, with respect to n, function of beta that forces the products t(nk)(alpha, beta) to increase. (c) 2007 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

Monotonicity of zeros of Laguerre-Sobolev-type orthogonal polynomials

Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior (CAPES)

Monotonicity of zeros of Laguerre polynomials

Denote by X(nk)(alpha), k = 1, ..., n, the zeros of the Laguerre polynomial L(n)((alpha))(X). We establish monotonicity with respect to the parameter at of certain functions involving X(nk)(alpha). As a consequence we obtain sharp upper bounds for the largest zero of L(n)((alpha))(X). (C) 2009 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

Monotonicity of zeros of Jacobi-Sobolev type orthogonal polynomials

Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior (CAPES)

Monotonicity of the zeros of orthogonal polynomials through related measures

Relation between two sequences of orthogonal polynomials, where the associated measures are related to each other by a first degree polynomial multiplication (or division), is well known. We use this relation to study the monotonicity properties of the zeros of generalized orthogonal polynomials. As examples, the Jacobi, Laguerre and Charlier polynomials are considered. (c) 2005 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.