Bayesian ratemaking procedure of crop insurance contracts with skewed distribution

Over the years, crop insurance programs became the focus of agricultural policy in the USA, Spain, Mexico, and more recently in Brazil. Given the increasing interest in insurance, accurate calculation of the premium rate is of great importance. We address the crop-yield distribution issue and its implications in pricing an insurance contract considering the dynamic structure of the data and incorporating the spatial correlation in the Hierarchical Bayesian framework. Results show that empirical (insurers) rates are higher in low risk areas and lower in high risk areas. Such methodological improvement is primarily important in situations of limited data.

La Crema: A case study of mutual fire insurance

We analyze a mutual fire insurance mechanism usedin Andorra, which is called La Crema in the locallanguage. This mechanism relies on households'announced property values to determine how much ahousehold is reimbursed in the case of a fire andhow payments are apportioned among other households.The only Pareto eficient allocation reachablethrough the mechanism requires that all householdshonestly report the true value of their property.However, such honest reporting is not an equilibriumexcept in the extreme case where the property valuesare identical for all households. Nevertheless, as the size of the society becomes large, thebenefits from deviating from truthful reportingvanish, and all of the non-degenerate equilibriaof the mechanism are nearly truthful andapproximately Pareto efficient.

The influence of supplementary health insurance on switching behaviour: evidence from Swiss data.

This paper focuses on the switching behaviour of enrolees in the Swiss basic health insurance system. Even though the new Federal Law on Social Health Insurance (LAMal) was implemented in 1996 to promote competition among health insurers in basic insurance, there is limited evidence of premium convergence within cantons. This indicates that competition has not been effective so far, and reveals some inertia among consumers who seem reluctant to switch to less expensive funds. We investigate one possible barrier to switching behaviour, namely the influence of supplementary insurance. We use survey data on health plan choice (a sample of 1943 individuals whose switching behaviours were observed between 1997 and 2000) as well as administrative data relative to all insurance companies that operated in the 26 Swiss cantons between 1996 and 2005. The decision to switch and the decision to subscribe to a supplementary contract are jointly estimated.Our findings show that holding a supplementary insurance contract substantially decreases the propensity to switch. However, there is no negative impact of supplementary insurance on switching when the individual assesses his/her health as 'very good'. Our results give empirical support to one possible mechanism through which supplementary insurance might influence switching decisions: given that subscribing to basic and supplementary contracts with two different insurers may induce some administrative costs for the subscriber, holding supplementary insurance acts as a barrier to switch if customers who consider themselves 'bad risks' also believe that insurers reject applications for supplementary insurance on these grounds. In comparison with previous research, our main contribution is to offer a possible explanation for consumer inertia. Our analysis illustrates how consumer choice for one's basic health plan interacts with the decision to subscribe to supplementary insurance.

Testing for Hidden Information and Action in Automobile Insurance Market

I test the presence of hidden information and action in the automobile insurance market using a data set from several Colombian insurers. To identify the presence of hidden information I find a common knowledge variable providing information on policyholder s risk type which is related to both experienced risk and insurance demand and that was excluded from the pricing mechanism. Such unused variable is the record of policyholder s traffic offenses. I find evidence of adverse selection in six of the nine insurance companies for which the test is performed. From the point of view of hidden action I develop a dynamic model of effort in accident prevention given an insurance contract with bonus experience rating scheme and I show that individual accident probability decreases with previous accidents. This result brings a testable implication for the empirical identification of hidden action and based on that result I estimate an econometric model of the time spans between the purchase of the insurance and the first claim, between the first claim and the second one, and so on. I find strong evidence on the existence of unobserved heterogeneity that deceives the testable implication. Once the unobserved heterogeneity is controlled, I find conclusive statistical grounds supporting the presence of moral hazard in the Colombian insurance market.

Seguro de crédito

Dissertação de Mestrado apresentada ao Instituto de Contabilidade e Administração do Porto para a obtenção do grau de Mestre em Contabilidade e Finanças, sob orientação do Mestre Armindo Licínio da Silva Macedo

A intervenção da seguradora nas acções propostas contra o segurado

The problem to be discussed results from the relationship established between the insurer and insured by the conclusion of an insurance contract, namely an optional liability insurance contract, to cover the risks taken by the insured resulting from the occurrence of a claim, such as those arising from the emergence of the liability and consequent obligation to compensate damages caused to a third party. This thesis concerns thus the debate between those who consider that, in the optional insurance, the third party may require compliance with the provision to both the insured and the insurer (in the case of voluntary joinder, pursuant to Art. 27 CCP, which corresponds Art. 32 of the New Code of Civil Procedure, Law n. 41/2013 of 26 June, which entered into force on 1 September, hereinafter New Code) - insurance contract on behalf of a third party conception - in the same way that the insured defendant can bring the insurer to intervene as co-defendant in the main process, pursuant al. a) of art. 325 of the CCP (corresponding to art. 316 of the New Code - main intervention caused), and those who argue that the insurer may only intervene in the action as an ancillary party, to assist the defendant, lacking interest, therefore, in necessary or volunteer joinder, with the consequence that the insurer cannot be sued as a main party - only ancillary intervention is justifiable (cf. art. 330 CPC, which corresponds to art. 321 of the New Code).

Consequências da mora do segurador e o princípio neminem laedere no âmbito contratual

Relatório de atividade profissional de mestrado em Direito dos Contratos e da Empresa

A celebração do contrato de seguro à distância

Dissertação de mestrado em Direito dos Contratos e da Empresa

Modelling dependence in a ratemaking procedure with multivariate Poisson regression models

When actuaries face with the problem of pricing an insurance contract that contains different types of coverage, such as a motor insurance or homeowner's insurance policy, they usually assume that types of claim are independent. However, this assumption may not be realistic: several studies have shown that there is a positive correlation between types of claim. Here we introduce different regression models in order to relax the independence assumption, including zero-inflated models to account for excess of zeros and overdispersion. These models have been largely ignored to multivariate Poisson date, mainly because of their computational di±culties. Bayesian inference based on MCMC helps to solve this problem (and also lets us derive, for several quantities of interest, posterior summaries to account for uncertainty). Finally, these models are applied to an automobile insurance claims database with three different types of claims. We analyse the consequences for pure and loaded premiums when the independence assumption is relaxed by using different multivariate Poisson regression models and their zero-inflated versions.

La ley aplicable al contrato de seguro internacional

A raíz de la promulgación de la Ley 1328 de 2009 y de la celebración del Tratado de Libre Comercio (TLC) con los Estados Unidos, el sistema normativo colombiano será testigo de un negocio jurídico que, hasta antes de esos eventos, no había visto factible su celebración: el contrato de seguro internacional. Al vernos frente a esta realidad, no queda más remedio que empezar a dar respuesta a las preguntas que surgen con ocasión de que un residente en nuestro país contrate con una compañía de seguros ubicada en el exterior; y, tal vez, la primera de ellas es ¿cuál es la ley aplicable al contrato de seguro internacional? El presente trabajo pretende contribuir a la búsqueda de una respuesta a este cuestionamiento de no poca trascendencia; con el estudio de legislación, doctrina y jurisprudencia extranjeras, junto con el análisis de la particular regulación del contrato de seguro en Colombia, además de consideraciones en torno a la jurisdicción local y foránea, "La ley aplicable al contrato de seguro internacional" se convierte en, si bien una sugerencia de respuesta al ya enunciado interrogante, igualmente en un llamado para que sean las autoridades, Magistrados y expertos en el tema, quienes reparen en ese punto desde este momento y, así, no vernos sorprendidos en 2013, cuando vea la luz el primer contrato de seguro internacional en Colombia.

Anulabilidad de las Cláusulas Abusivas en el Contrato de Seguro

El trabajo de grado consiste en un análisis de la naturaleza jurídica de las cláusulas abusivas, particularmente en el contrato de seguro, para proponer como consecuencua jurídica adecuada a dicho fenómeno la nulidad relativa de la cláusula abusiva.

Una aproximación teórico-práctica para el costeo de cápitas de paquetes de salud

Metodología para la estimación de cápitas de planes de salud. Se propone un método de cuantificación de insumos a emplear, la estimación de costos indirectos asociados a las intervenciones y un método de anualización para los costos fijos que generalmente trascienden en su vida útil al período de duración de una cápita. Finalmente, a través de un ejercicio práctico de estimación de la cápita del Componente de Salud del Programa Oportunidades de México se ilustra la aplicación del desarrollo metodológico expuesto en la parte inicial.

Insuring cleaner oceans: the economics of oil pollution prevention

The current system of controlling oil spills involves a complex relationship of international, federal and state law, which has not proven to be very effective. The multiple layers of regulation often leave shipowners unsure of the laws facing them. Furthemore, nations have had difficulty enforcing these legal requirements. This thesis deals with the role marine insurance can play within the existing system of legislation to provide a strong preventative influence that is simple and cost-effective to enforce. In principle, insurance has two ways of enforcing higher safety standards and limiting the risk of an accident occurring. The first is through the use of insurance premiums that are based on the level of care taken by the insured. This means that a person engaging in riskier behavior faces a higher insurance premium, because their actions increase the probability of an accident occurring. The second method, available to the insurer, is collectively known as cancellation provisions or underwriting clauses. These are clauses written into an insurance contract that invalidates the agreement when certain conditions are not met by the insured The problem has been that obtaining information about the behavior of an insured party requires monitoring and that incurs a cost to the insurer. The application of these principles proves to be a more complicated matter. The modern marine insurance industry is a complicated system of multiple contracts, through different insurers, that covers the many facets of oil transportation. Their business practices have resulted in policy packages that cross the neat bounds of individual, specific insurance coverage. This paper shows that insurance can improve safety standards in three general areas -crew training, hull and equipment construction and maintenance, and routing schemes and exclusionary zones. With crew, hull and equipment, underwriting clauses can be used to ensure that minimum standards are met by the insured. Premiums can then be structured to reflect the additional care taken by the insured above and beyond these minimum standards. Routing schemes are traffic flow systems applied to congested waterways, such as the entrance to New York harbor. Using natural obstacles or manmade dividers, ships are separated into two lanes of opposing traffic, similar to a road. Exclusionary zones are marine areas designated off limits to tanker traffic either because of a sensitive ecosystem or because local knowledge is required of the region to ensure safe navigation. Underwriting clauses can be used to nullify an insurance contract when a tanker is not in compliance with established exclusionary zones or routing schemes.

Should we be afraid of managed care?: a theoretical assessment

Managed caIe capitation contracts provide monetary incentives for doctoIs to save medical costs while standard health insurance contracts do noto The papeI proposes an alternative model for insurance markets which is used to analyze managed caIe contracts. In our model, households would like to buy insurance for the possible need of a service. The distinctive aspect of our model is that providers of service have privileged information on the most appropriate procedure to be followed. In the managed care application of the model, doctors are the providers of the service and through a diagnosis have better information of the patient's health condition. Equilibrium in our model is always constrained eflicient. A partial capitation contract arises when both the cost and net benefits of treatment are high enough. We show that a capitation contract provides incentives for doctors: i) to care about the likelihood households will obtain the good state of nature (altruistic behamor); and ii) to save medical costs (managed care behamor). Doctors, in this case, choose less medically eflicient treatments as they would choose under a standard health insurance contract. Besides this, household' welfare is increased in comparison to the standard contract. This increased welfare translates into a revealed preference for the capitation contract.